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RUSSIA

FROM THE VARANGIANS TO THE BOLSHEVIKS

BY

RAYMOND BEAZLEY, NEVILL FORBES
AND G. A. BIRKETT
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ERNEST BARKER

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Professor of Modern History in the University of Birmingham

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INTRODUCTION

War is a time of rapid vicissitudes. Among all the vicissitudes in the destinies of nations which this great war has caused or occasioned, none have been more rapid or more striking than those which we have seen in Russia. Failure has alternated with success: one figure after another has appeared, stood for a moment in the ascendant, and then passed away: parties, causes, political creeds have come and gone with an amazing velocity. From our thoughts and pictures of Holy Russia we have been swung to the spectacle of Russia secularized and socialist: we have seen the apparent unity of Russia dissolved, and Poland, Finland, and the Ukraine disengaged from the body of the Russian Empire; and while we recognize the depth and profundity of these changes, we dimly guess that the future may bring us changes still deeper and still more profound. Bewildered by all these revolutions of the wheel, we cannot but ask ourselves how and why they came—whence they sprang, and whither they tend.

If we are to answer such questions, we must turn to the story of Russian history. History cannot solve the riddle of humanity, but it can at any rate record the gradual accumulation of factors which have gone to produce the result by which we are confronted, and by breaking up the problem into its constituent elements and successive stages it may enable the student to find some reason and provide some answer for the whole. The stages of Russian history, as they appear in this volume, are sufficiently various. In the first book Professor Beazley paints the romantic epoch of mediaeval Russia—the epoch of vikings and traders, of Kiev and Nóvgorod: in the second Mr. Forbes

depicts the hard and austere story of the building of the Russian colossus: in the third Mr. Birkett traces the infiltration of Western thought and Western science into the Russian State, and the accumulation, during the nineteenth century, of a mass of social and political problems—problems of serfdom, peasant proprietorship and socialistic doctrine; problems, again, of autocracy and bureaucracy, of nationality and constitutionalism. The one gives an impression as of a gay banquet: the other unfolds a story of perpetual wars and annexations: the third has to tell a tale of railways, education, economics, and agitation—a tale which ends, for the moment, in the crumbling of the colossus and the dissolution of the structure reared by autocracy into the component elements from which it was built.

The original Russia was gay, boisterous, and full of colour, vitality and emotion. It suggests to the imagination the spectacle of the great Russian opera, with all its colour and motion and music. The Tartar Invasion of the thirteenth century clouded much of the gaiety—but not all. It left traces for many centuries—but not, perhaps, as many as the famous dictum ascribed to Napoleon ('scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar') would suggest. More important in its influence on the future history and character of Russia was the rise of the Princes of Moscow, and their steady pursuit of a dour policy of adding acre to acre and principality to principality. It was a policy natural under the geographical conditions amid which it was pursued. Here was a vast plain, with few or no marked boundaries or natural frontiers within which a State might feel itself naturally designed to live. A snowball once set rolling would roll continuously over this area until it was shattered by some shock of events, or dissolved by some sudden heat of action. This absence of natural frontiers has, indeed, been the sad geographical dower of Eastern Europe, and it explains much of

its history—the intermixture and interlacing of its stocks : the dissolution of Poland, unsupported by any frontier buttresses : the increase of Russian territory, unchecked by any resistance of physical barriers. As long as the face of the earth remains the same, this dower will tend to produce its tragedies ; and as one Power has rolled westwards, another may roll eastwards in its turn for its appointed space. But there has been another factor in Russian history which also accounts for Russian expansion—a factor partly dependent upon the last. This is the migratory habit of the Russian stock, moving restlessly towards new land and new settlements—southwards towards the Black Sea and the rich black soil on the way towards it, or eastwards across the Ural Mountains into Siberia. The most striking result of this migratory habit is the Cossacks ; but the migrations of the Russian stock are older than the Cossacks, and its results are written in many other regions of the world than those of the Cossack settlements.

Combine these things—the policy of the Princes of Moscow and their successors, the absence of natural frontiers, and the migratory habit of the Russian people—and the result is that enormous expansion which has carried Russia from Warsaw to Vladivostók, and from the White Sea to Southern Turkestán. This expansion has two sides—one which is national, and another which is governmental, or, according to a prevalent word, 'imperialistic'. The national expansion still lives, and—perhaps above all in Siberia, a solid core of Russian life—it will continue to live. It has created the Russian 'Colonies', which (we hope) may yet find self-government in a Russian Commonwealth. The governmental expansion is different : it has brought into dependence on the Tsars a belt of non-Russian peoples on the west, and another belt of non-Russian peoples on the south. On the west are the Finns, the Baltic peoples between Finland and Poland, and the Poles ; on the south, from

the Crimea to Turkestán, are the Turks.[1] The expansion which has brought the belt of peoples on the west of Russia into dependence on the Tsars is now being undone before our eyes; and as for what may happen on the south of Russia, that is a thing which perhaps no man can tell.

We are beginning to realize that the dissolution of the great State which had been built on the east European plains is less astonishing than its long continuance in the past. Shaped by force to a great extent, it was held and clamped together almost entirely by force. Nothing but the old bureaucracy, with all its engines of police and gendarmerie, could have maintained that artificial structure for so long a period; and even while we condemn its methods, we cannot withhold a meed of admiration from its achievement. But if it was, in its way, an Atlas, it was not a very thoughtful or efficient Atlas, and the world which it sustained on its shoulders was a world possessed by an instinct for dissolution. On a long view, it was perhaps an unwise policy for Russian rulers, if they valued the preservation of the *status quo*, ever to venture on a great European war. War searches the joints and harness of every State that challenges its verdict: it appraises, first by a rude and sudden shock and then by a long, slow, dragging tension (just as we test and appraise the worth of steel), the endurance and the capacity for survival of each political community. More than once, in the last few decades, the test of war has shaken Russia. The Crimean War caused searchings of heart; the Russo-Turkish War of 1878 left an uneasy legacy; the Russo-Japanese War of this century made the whole structure of Russia rock on its foundations. Less than ten years after its conclusion there ensued the great war in which we are still engaged—a war which dwarfs all previous wars to child's play—

[1] See the article in the *Round Table* for December 1917 on 'Russia, Islam, and the Turks'.

and the structure, though it endured the strain for almost three years, cracked and collapsed. A State with communications still thin and scanty, and an organization of her resources still largely imperfect, was plunged into a modern scientific war that demanded perfect communications, along which millions of men could be moved like the shuttle across a loom, and required an intensive organization of resources and productive effort which would have taxed the most highly developed machinery of government. The communications were not there: the organization was not ready. The triumph of Russia over Austria was more amazing than the triumph of Germany over Russia. The triumph of Germany let loose the forces of dissolution, social and national, which were already at work in Russia—*suis et ipsa viribus ruit.*

It was natural, a year ago, as we watched the beginning of the Russian Revolution, that we should think of the French Revolution. We drew hope from the analogy for our ally and for our own cause. We remembered revolutionary France gathering herself together to defend her freedom against Prussia and Austria: we hoped that revolutionary Russia would gird her loins no less successfully against the same foes. Historical parallels are often misleading; and we have found by experience that the parallel which we drew for ourselves was very far from true. The French Revolution was a revolution of a united country—a country united round the common hearth of Paris, in spite of federalist or royalist movements in the south-west and the west, with an intimate and enduring unity. The Russian Revolution was a revolution of a country essentially disunited—a country of many centres, many nationalities, many languages, many creeds. There is also another difference perhaps no less profound. The French Revolution was political rather than social: it sprang more from the *bourgeoisie* than from the proletariate. Not till the days of the Directory did

any movement of a socialistic character appear, and when it appeared it was rapidly stifled. From the beginning of the Russian Revolution the socialistic movement was strong, and during its rapid course it has become progressively stronger. Socialism, all the more advanced in proportion as Russia herself was less advanced in her economic development than other States, had been a force, indeed, for many years before the Russian Revolution had its birth. Social disruption, no less than political, was thus the product of the Revolution of 1917. The French Revolution may have led to the emigration of the *noblesse* of France; but instead of disrupting France, it made her one in many respects in which she had before been divided, and it produced a national and social unity which carried her safely through more than twenty years of war.

In searching for the causes of events, whether they be great or whether they be small, we are naturally prone *chercher l'homme*; and the man who naturally presents himself to our thoughts, when we seek the author of the present state of Russia, is Peter the Great. He first, it may be said, set Russia on the wrong path. Introducing a German system of bureaucracy and pushing towards the Baltic and the Black Sea, he wrested his country from a quiet internal development on the lines of her own Slavonic genius. This may be true; but it is also true that the cause of trouble goes farther back, as it also goes farther forward, than the reign of Peter the Great. It goes back to Ivan III and Basil III and Ivan IV, who also followed the way of annexation and the way of autocracy: it runs forward to Catherine II and her successors, whose thoughts were also thoughts of annexation and autocratic government. It is possible to think of a better, if a harder, way; but it is a way that one can hardly expect 'dynasts' to have seen or, if they saw, adopted. That better way would have been to turn energy inwards to domestic, instead of outwards to foreign

olitics: to shed bureaucracy, and to develop local self-overnment and initiative; to create a free peasantry and a hriving middle class; and to erect, on such a social basis, a ystem of free institutions. No reformer, it is true, even if he e a Tsar, can achieve any real results without the co-operation f a people possessed of enough practical gifts to work new nstitutions and fit themselves to new requirements. Whether he Russian people possesses these practical gifts time alone will how; but the work done by the local zémstvos, both before nd during the war, would seem to suggest that reforming Tsars night have found a basis among their people for their reforms. The difficulty was perhaps less with the people, and less with he Tsars themselves, than with the bureaucracy. Some of the ater Romanoffs have shown a strain of idealism which, under avourable auspices, might have made their names famous in he annals of progress. Alexander I had his phase of liberalism; nd even his Holy Alliance, however Utopian, was in its begin-nings a noble conception. The Tsar liberator, Alexander II, dded to the sum of human freedom by the emancipation of the erfs; and the name of Nicholas II will always be connected with he history of the Hague Conference. But bureaucracy does not love new things, which will disturb its routine and diminish ts power; and Russian bureaucracy was always a tract of sand n which the waters of reform sank and were absorbed without a trace. Nor was the attitude of the Orthodox Church and the Slavophil party very favourable to any change. The Orthodox Church was proud of Russia as she stood, and regarded her as the depositary and treasurer of a unique and immaculate faith, which any approximation to the West would only soil; and the Slavophils tended to think that if Russia was different from the West, that only meant that she was better, and that she must at all costs maintain her superiority pure and intact.

Under conditions such as these the attention of the Russian

government was steadily turned to what seemed the m
attractive field of foreign politics, and the old policy of exp
sion and annexation (one may almost call it agglutinati
continued to be steadily pursued. Here Constantinople offe
itself as a natural goal. It had, indeed, been a goal of Russi
effort far back in the earliest mists of Russian history. A th
sand years ago, and more, Russians—or rather Scandinavi
leaders at the head of Russians—had been pushing southwa
down the Russian rivers to the Black Sea and so to Constan
nople; and to this day, it is said, the cascades of the Dnie
bear Scandinavian names. Luitprand, the 'scandalous chro
cler' of the tenth century, tells of these attacks and of th
collapse before Byzantine organization and Greek fire. Th
were early forays; but from the end of the fifteenth centu
when the Princes of Moscow married into the House of t
Palaeologi, a new and more insistent element of irredentis
was added. The Tsars could now claim to be heirs of t
Roman Caesars, and could oppose themselves to the simil
(but less founded) pretensions of the Turkish Sultans, nc
established in Constantinople as usurping Kaisar-i-Rum. Fro
the time of Catherine II this motive becomes conspicuous; a
it could be pleaded in its defence that the recovery of Co
stantinople would also mean the redemption of the sufferi
kinsfolk of Russia in the Balkan peninsula. Thus Russia entere
into the perennial question of the East, and thus she w
brought into conflict primarily and particularly with Austri
the great Danubian Power—like Russia an agglutination
fragments, like Russia looking outwards instead of inward
and like Russia looking towards Constantinople—but also,
late years, when Germany began to look south-eastward towar
Bagdad, with the military power of Germany. Across the slo
movement of Russia—a movement which, if it was half im
perialistic, was also half idealistic, and directed to noble objec
such as the redemption of the Slavs in south-eastern Europ

nd the recovery for Christendom of Constantinople—there vas suddenly plunged the German *Drang nach Osten*, half nilitarist, half mercantilist, but almost wholly materialist. Challenged to war by Germany, first in 1909, when she was too veak to accept the challenge, and again in 1914, when she could iot but accept it on pain of seeing Serbia ruined and south-astern Europe brought under German control, she accepted he challenge, and was plunged into the great war which has brought her so many vicissitudes in its course, and last of all ias brought her revolution.

The results of the Revolution, as far as Russia is concerned, nd the results for the whole world of what will result in Russia, re things still hidden from us. Some of us dreamed before the var of the possibility of a federal Russia, in which the different nd seemingly incongruous elements of her life would be com-bosed together in unity and harmony. We can only continue o hope, and to pray, that our dream may still come true, and hat all the groups and nationalities of the Russian common-vealth may find a *modus vivendi* (or a *modus convivendi*) in a ederal state. If that should prove impossible, and if Russia hould fall permanently asunder into a number of separate States, there will be a happy hunting-ground in eastern Europe or the ambitions and intrigues of three Powers—Germany in he north-west of Russia, Austria in the Ukraine, and Turkey n the region from the Crimea, through the Caucasus, to Turkestán. Meanwhile, there is, as it were, a vacuum in the vorld, and we wait in suspense to see what will rush into the vacuum. Whatever it be, we in these islands shall be affected by it—as will, too, the peoples of many other countries. The uture of Russia in Asia (to say nothing of Russia in Europe) nust vitally affect the future of our Empire. But there is a still arger question, and a still larger issue, than the future of our Empire; and that is the future peace of all the world. The old Russia did not make for peace. States imperfect within

are a source of menace without; and it is the incompleteness of the organization of their life that has made the States of eastern Europe, and Russia among the rest, military in character and militarist in policy. It is now forty years ago since T. H. Green, writing of the military system of Europe which even then appalled the observer, attributed that system to 'the fact that the organization of State-life, even with those peoples that have been brought under its influence at all, is still so incomplete'. 'Standing armies,' he wrote, 'though existing on a larger scale now than ever before, are not products of the civilization of Europe, but of the predominance over that civilization of the old *δυναστείαι*. The influences which have given rise to and keep up those armies essentially belong to a state of things in which mankind—even European mankind—is not yet thoroughly organized into political life.'[1] If only the vacuum which now exists in Russia can ultimately be filled with the complete and thorough organization of a State-life, based not on a *δυναστεία* but on a true *πολιτεία*, it will mean more than perhaps any other event could mean for the future peace of the world.

But these things are in the future; and the concern of the historians by whom this book is written is with the past. What they have sought to do is to set forth the successive stages of the past, and to explain how each successive stage produced the next. They give us the key to the present: they can give us no key to the future until the future has become the past. History is not prophecy; and if it teaches, what it teaches is not the future. But it is perhaps possible to take some comfort for the future from the history of the past. Russia has gone through trouble before, and she has come out safely on the other side. Some three hundred years ago there was a 'time of troubles', with an aristocracy dominant where the Bolshevik now reigns, and the Poles interfering from outside as the Germans are

[1] *Principles of Political Obligation*, § 173.

ping to-day. She escaped from the 'time of troubles' by a gorous native reaction; and a similar reaction may yet come o-day. We must not expect it too impatiently: the music of istory is not played at a rapid pace. But it may come, none he less, in its own time and at its own season. Russia has shed tely many foreign elements in her body politic—a bureau-racy largely German: annexed and alien peoples of different ocks and with different traditions from her own: a social order hich was incompatible with liberty. It may be that she is eing purified as by fire, and that from the fire, and the beating f the iron on the anvil, a firmly-wrought unity will emerge—peasant democracy, or a federation of peasant democracies, ill holding firmly the old religious faith which has so long been f the essence of Russian life, but adding a new liberty to the ld faith, and a new equality to the old Christian brotherhood f true believers.

At any rate we in England can only wish Russia well, whatever e may suffer to-day from her defection. She has left us: our insfolk who live in Russia are passing through deep waters: ur armies who stand on guard in Flanders and northern France ave a heavier burden thrust upon their shoulders. But if she as left us now, she looked to us, in her struggles for liberty, uring the early years of this century; and the study of our onstitutional history, it is said, has raised among the Liberal hinkers of Russia an enthusiasm which might astonish an nglishman. 'All three Dúmas', wrote Professor Pares some ears ago, 'were remarkably friendly to England, and England upplied the staple of the precedents and parallels for quota-ion.'[1] What was true of the earlier Dúmas and their Liberal nembers is not, it must be admitted, true of the Soviets and the ocialists of whom they are composed. To them England is the ome, not of liberalism, but of capitalism and imperialism—*bourgeois* State, no more able to be the ally of the social

[1] *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. xii, p. 379.

republic of Russia than Germany or Austria. Experience may teach other lessons; and the progressive forces of Russia may yet turn back to us, as builders of an ancient house of freedom which, with all its defects—its rambling wings, its incommodious passages, its many relics of an outgrown past—can still give suggestion and even inspiration to new builders. If ever they turn to us—if ever the statesmen to whose lot it falls to build the new Russia of the future come to us for counsel or comfort—we shall be proud to give freely, and to help, in whatsoever measure we can, the building of a State so organized and so completed that it can be a full fellow member with our own in the comity of the nations that we trust to see established.

Whatsoever comes and goes in the future, there is one lesson that these great happenings in Russia teach us, even more, perhaps, than anything else that has happened in the war. They teach us that we are entering into a new order and upon a new dispensation of the political system of the world. The war has surged over eastern Europe, and lo, the old landmarks are gone. We shall need new maps: we shall see new States: we shall meet new groupings: we shall find a fresh system of politics. Our more stable and older West will change less; but it too will change, and its relations with eastern Europe will change. We stand on the threshold of new hours. From the peaks to which we have climbed we stare at a new ocean, dimly descried, unsailed, uncharted, moved by unknown tides and currents. What fortunes will attend our voyaging—whether we shall have halcyon days, or still be tossed by adverse winds—the voyage alone can prove. What rests upon each people is to trim its ship: what rests upon all peoples is to sail in convoy.

February 24, 1918.

THE PRONUNCIATION OF RUSSIAN AND POLISH NAMES

Russian uses the Cyrillic alphabet, Polish the Latin with additional signs; e table gives first the Cyrillic, second the equivalent in English, and third e Polish letter or letters corresponding.

Russian		Polish
Cyrillic	Transliteration	
а	a (as in *far*)	a
б	b	b
в	v	w
г	g	g
д	d	d
е	e (as in *yet*)	e or ie
ж	zh (= *s* in *pleasure*)	ż or rz
з	z	z
и	i	i
(-ій)	(i)	
к	k	k
л	l	ł = soft l (in *lend*) ł = hard l (second l in *little*, almost like English *w*)
м	m	m
н	n	n
о	o (as in *or*)	o
п	p	p
р	r	r
с	s	s
т	t	t
у	u (as in *rule*)	u or ó
ф	f	f
х	kh	ch (in Scots *loch*)
ц	ts	c (= ts)
ч	ch	cz (in *chin*)
ш	sh	sz (in *shin*)

Russian		Polish
Cyrillic	Transliteration	
щ	shch	szcz
ъ	(hard sign, omitted)	—
ы	y (as in *hymn*)	y (as in *hymn*)
ь	(soft sign, omitted)	(expressed by an accent o a consonant)
ѣ = e	—	—
э	e (as in *end*)	—
ю	yu (as in *yule*)	ju
я	ya (as in *yard*)	ja

In Polish *ć*, *dź*, *ś* and *ź* are softened or palatalized consonants: *ć* soun like *t* in *tune* (Russian: ть), *dź* like *d* in *dune* (Russian: дь); *ś* and *ź* a sounds between *s* and *sz*, and *z* and *ż* respectively; when followed b a vowel the place of these accents is taken by *i*, e.g. *ci-* and *dzi-* = *ć* and *d*

In Russian e is always preceded by a *y*-sound (as in *yet*) when e is initia or is preceded by a vowel or the letters *l* (л), *n* (н), *t* (т), *d* (д), and to a le extent when preceded by other consonants; this 'softening' is represent in Polish by *ie*.

In Russian when e is accented it sometimes acquires the sound of *y* (as in *yonder*), but when preceded by certain consonants, e. g. *ch* (ч), th *y*-sound disappears and then e has the sound of *o*, e. g. Pugachëv, pronoun Pugachóf. This e is represented by the diaeresis: *ë*.

Polish *ł* = Russian л (*l*) before ъ or a 'hard' vowel (*a*, *o*, &c.); Polish *l* = approximately Russian л (*l*) before ь or a 'soft' vowel (*e* or *i*).

In Polish the nasal vowels *ą* and *ę* have the sound of the French syllabl *on*, *om*, and *in*, *im*, respectively.

Polish *j* = English *y*, and Polish *h* = English *h*.

Both in Russian and Polish final voiced consonants become voiceles e. g. final *v* (Polish *w*) is pronounced like *f*.

Accentuation

Russian names, except those most familiar to Englishmen, have be marked with the accent to indicate the stress. In Polish the stress is alwa on the last syllable but one, and has therefore not been marked. Accented (*ó*) in Polish only means that this letter is pronounced like *u* in *rule*.

BOOK I

I

The Old Free Russia

The Foundations

THE history of the Russian people may be considered as eginning about the middle of the ninth century (*c.* 852–62, the *Ancient Chronicle* gives it), when a Scandinavian migration unds a new national centre in the east European plains, along ose east European rivers which traverse the great isthmus etween the Baltic and the Black Sea.

At this time (*c.* 860) the Slavonic race inhabited only a part what is now European Russia. It lay mainly in what we may ll the middle west of the modern country. In the north stopped just short of the Nevá, Petrograd, and the Gulf of nland, nowhere reaching the Baltic. In the east it stretched most, but not quite, to the longitude of Moscow. In the uth it was cut off from the Black Sea by the great plains or airies of the *steppes* (a little earlier some Slav tribes may have uched the Euxine coast for a time, between the mouths of e Danube and Dnieper). To the west the tribes which became e Slavs of Old Russia were perhaps bounded by the upper urse of the Polish Buh (Bug) and by the Carpathians. Beyond e Buh, Slavdom of course continued in the ninth century over e Polish and Wendish plains, rivers, and forests, up to the be, and even beyond, till it met the German stock—but these, e the Slavonic lands of Bohemia, Moravia, Croatia, and the

Balkans, were regions altogether beyond the historic limits of the *Rus*.

Just as the Finnish tribes, who then occupied all the extreme north of Europe, cut off the Russian Slavs from the coast of Esthonia and all the northern Baltic, so Lithuanians and allied races cut them off from the Gulf of Riga and the outer coasts of Courland.

And as all the north, the far north-west and north-east, and much of the middle east, of our Russia-in-Europe were then in the feeble hands of thinly-scattered Finnish tribes, to whom belonged the upper course of the Volga, the sites of Moscow and Petrograd, and most of the Urál range; so the south-east and nearly all the south (up to the southern, or Black Sea, Buh) were held by Turkish tribes, strongly mixed in some cases with Finnish elements. The semi-Judaized Khazars in the Euxine coast-lands, and the Muhammadan Bulgarians of the middle Volga, were the most interesting of these.

Looking at Russia from north to south, in its various zones or belts, it is clear that the famous but almost desert *tundra* of the far north lay entirely outside the interests, and even knowledge, of the eastern Slavs in the ninth century; that the steppes of the extreme south were almost equally beyond their power though by no means so far beyond their ken; and that their settlements were restricted to certain sections of the forest and agricultural zones.

Thus the *Russian land*, at the beginning of the national history, was perhaps slightly smaller than the Scandinavian peninsula.

The Russian Revolution of this year should serve to remind one that Russia was not always an autocratic empire. However false the Napoleonic sneer about scratching a Russian and uncovering a Tartar, the Tartar conquest, the Tartar domination

ıe Tartar legacy, are elements of some importance in the life
Russia. This life-story may well be divided into three parts,
reference to the Tartar age. Russian history is all *Before the*
artars, *Under the Tartars*, or *After the Tartars*. And from the
artar slavery, Great Russia, the only part in question (for the
st, as a result of the Tartar devastation, had fallen under alien
uropean rule), emerges as the principality, the kingdom, the
npire, of the despotic Tsars of Moscow. The Tartar 'Time of
roubles' is the direct and main cause of the modern Russian
ıtocracy.

But the Tartars did not come till the thirteenth century.
was in the half-dozen years from 1237 to 1243 (midway
the reign of Henry III of England, and while Westminster
bbey was in building) that the Mongols and their followers
recked and subjugated the old free Russia.

Now the origins of the Russian people, as a people, and of the
d Russian federation of states, reach back to the middle of the
ınth century, to the early days of King Alfred. For these first
ur centuries the Russian land was certainly not ruled by
espotic monarchs. And to an astonishing degree, democratic
eas, free life, even republican organization, prevailed in this
dest Russia. The formation of the Russian nation begins with
ıe settlement of a body of Scandinavians (traditionally under
ıe leadership of one Rurik [1]), in east Baltic regions, from Old
óvgorod, about a hundred miles south of modern Petrograd,
o to, and even a little east and north-east of, the present
ussian capital (then, of course, a swamp). These Scandina-
ans, in the tradition, mostly come from the region of Upsala
Sweden. Both the name of *Rus* [2] and the fact of a Russian
:ople and Russian States are due to them. With the coming

[1] The Scandinavian *Roerek*, *Hroerekr*, or *Hrurikr*.

[2] See the note on p. 201.

of these 'Varangians' this name of *Rus* (originally a Finnish description of the Swedes as *Rowers*) becomes famous in al the East. As a Hebrew writer of the tenth century puts it :

'The tribes of the North, and among them the people o *Rus*, have placed certain of the Slavs in subjection, and ar dwelling in the midst of them to this day—so intermingled that they[1] have even adopted their language'.[2]

In the oldest Russian record this great event, a Norman conquest in the East, is disguised as the result of a spontaneou invitation to Varangian princes from the scattered and warring tribes of these regions, so incessantly attacked by Viking and other enemies.

'In the year of the world 6360 [A. D. 852] at the accession o the Emperor Michael [III of Constantinople] they began t name the Russian land. . . .

'The Varangians from over sea laid tribute upon the Chuds and the Slavs' (859). . . . 'They drove the Varangian beyond the sea and paid tribute to them no more. And they set themselves to govern themselves, and there was no mor justice among them : families disputed with families, and ther were discords, and they made war between themselves. Then said they, Let us seek for a prince to reign over us and judg us according to right. And they went beyond the sea of th Varangians and went among the *Rus*—for these Varangian called themselves *Rus*—others called themselves *Swedes*, other *Normans*, others *Angles*, others *Goths*. So the Chuds, the Slavs and the others said to the *Rus*, Our land is great and rich, bu there is no order among us ; come then and rule and govern us And three brothers joined together, with their *families*, an brought them to *Rus*. They went first among the Slavs, an built the town of Ládoga, and Rurik the eldest established him self at Ládoga ; the second, Sineus, on the shores of the Bél Ózero [the White Lake] ;[4] the third, Truvor, at Izborsk.

[1] The Varangian conquerors. [2] The Slav.
[3] Finns. [4] Almost due east of Ládoga.

from these Varangians that the men of Nóvgorod are called
us; to-day the men of Nóvgorod belong to the Varangian
ce: they were at first Slavs.'[1]

All three phases—a time of raids and civil war, an invitation
Swedish Vikings by some discontented party (perhaps itself
partly Scandinavian origin), and the entrance, success, and
omination of the foreign conqueror and settler—are probably
presented in the complete history of the facts.

Rurik and his comrades hesitated for a time—we read in one
ggestive version of the record—'scarce electing to go, for
ead of the beast-like manners of the men of Nóvgorod'. Yet
sooner had they settled than they began 'to build them towns
d to wage war everywhere'. Native risings were rigorously
ppressed. The Varangian dominion had only lasted two
ars when the folk of Nóvgorod 'rebelled, saying, We are but
ves, and suffer evil from Rurik and his nobles'. But the revolt
ickly died away with the death of its leader, the punishment
d the exile of his followers.

'At the end of two years', says *Nestor*, 'died Sineus and
s brother Truvor,[2] and Rurik made himself master of all the
untry. He went forward to the Ílmen,[3] fortified a little town
the Vólkhov[4] and called it *Nóvgorod*.[5] He established him-
f there as prince, and divided among his companions the
ıds and the towns, giving to this one Pólotsk, to that one
stóv, to a third Bélo Ózero. And in these towns the Varan-
.ns were only colonists; the first inhabitants of Nóvgorod
re Slavs.'

Chronicle of 'Nestor', A. D. 860.

It is not necessary to labour the point of the legendary element in these liest Russian records. *Sineus* and *Truvor* are the Scandinavian *Signiutr*, *niutr*, or *Sibniuta*, &c., and *Thorvardr* or *Thorvard*.

The lake just above, and to the south of, Nóvgorod.

The river of Nóvgorod, flowing from Lake Ílmen to Lake Lâdoga.

New Town.

Kiev and Constantinople

The Scandinavian conquerors soon pressed south and made themselves overlords of all the eastern Slavs, who then stretched from the Baltic to the middle Dnieper or Dnepr. Here the trading town of Kiev was perhaps already of some importance. This was the southernmost of the east Slav settlements, the final link in the chain of primitive markets which dotted the river route from the Baltic basin to that of the Black Sea—though commencing some way from the shores of the northern sea and ending at a great distance from the waters of the latter, on the northern edge of the steppe or prairie country.

From Kiev an ancient trade, even before Rurik, passed down the Dnieper and over the Euxine, or along its shores, to certain rich sources of supply and profit, the great markets of the Eastern Roman Empire, and above all the Eastern Rome itself. From Kiev a Russian people, once formed, would naturally move towards those markets, and might even aspire to command them.

Within little more than twenty years of the migration of Rurik his successor takes Kiev, and makes it his capital. Even before this, Viking free-lance leaders had been masters of the place; and in 865, over a thousand years ago, while their princes are settling themselves in the north-west, and crushing rebellion in Nóvgorod, these free lances make their first attack —the earliest Russian raid—upon Constantinople, by the sea.

'There were with Rurik', says *Nestor*, 'two men, Askold and Dir,[1] who were not of his race, but were among his nobles. And they left him to go to *Tsargrad*[2] with their *family*. And

[1] *Askold* or *Oskold* is the Scandinavian *Höskuldr* (*Ascald* in some old Irish records); *Dir* the Scandinavian *Dyri*.

[2] The 'City of the Caesars', Constantinople; *grad* is the old Slavonic form of the Russian *gorod*, etymologically the same as our words *garden*

ney crossed the Dnieper, and beyond this river they saw upon hill a fort.' Here was the town of Kiev, which then paid ribute to the Khazars, in which Askold and Dir fixed themelves, to which they 'gathered a great number of Varangians', nd from which they 'marched against the Greeks. . . .'

'It was the fourteenth year of the Emperor Michael [Michael II of Constantinople]. The Emperor had gone against the Agarenes [Saracens]. . . . His enemy [the *Rus*] penetrated into he gulf [the Bosphorus], made a great slaughter of Christians, nd besieged *Tsargrad* with 200 ships.' The Emperor returned, nd with the Patriarch Photius sought the miraculous help of he Mother of Christ. The storm which dispersed and wrecked he fleet of the Russian pagans—'so that but little of it escaped rom disaster'—was naturally ascribed to her by the monastic hronicles of Russians and Byzantines alike.

The Patriarch Photius (so eminent and tragic a figure in the istory of the Eastern Empire, of the Christian Church, and of cholarship; so valuable a witness to early Russia) was not nerely an eyewitness of this raid. He was also its best historian. Like *Nestor*, he records how cunningly the *Rus* crept up to the Bosphorus and the very walls of the city, at the time when the Emperor was absent, with his main fleet and army, in one of his ampaigns against the Saracens. But, unlike *Nestor* and all ther marvel-lovers, he also tells us how the Russian attack was planned after the Empire had broken a trade agreement, and ow it was embittered by an insult offered to Russian merchants. The *Rus*, he adds, who had been hitherto unknown and of no ccount, had now become, after this daring onslaught on the Queen of Cities, 'most renowned and glorious'. These same Rus had also recently conquered the tribes living around their ome, and were become 'boundlessly proud and bold'.

arth, *yard* = an enclosure, cf. German *Zaun* = fence, Dutch *tuin* = garden, nd English *town*.

Photius somewhat prematurely congratulates the Greek Church and himself on the conversion of these fierce and bloody barbarians.

Askold and Dir, according to the *Ancient Chronicle*, were mere Viking adventurers, 'neither princes nor of the family of the prince'. They were soon followed, captured, and executed it is said, by Óleg the successor of Rurik and the guardian of his son Ígor [1] (A.D. 880–1).

When the main Varangian body, under its official chiefs, had mastered Kiev,[2] and made it the head-centre of the new Slav-Scandinavian Russian people, now in formation, this expansive energy showed itself afresh, more fiercely than ever.

Four times in the tenth century (904–7, 935–41, 944, 971) did the Russians, from their Kiev centre and under their Kiev princes, return to the attack on New Rome—before the Russian people at last realized the prophetic description of Photius, and 'acknowledged Christ for their God,' the missionaries of the Church for their teachers, and the Romans for their friends and brethren'.

Kiev stood to Russia in the position of the chief advanced base either for aggression or for defence, and of the chief market for the east Slav trade of this early time. Mainly from Kiev proceeded the impetus of Russian attacks upon the Eastern Empire or upon the Muhammadan world; upon Kiev rested the burden of guarding the *Russian land* from the raids of its enemies of the steppes. Russian trade with Germans, with

[1] *Óleg* is the Scandinavian *Helgi*; *Ígor* the Scandinavian *Ingvarr* or *Ingvar*.

[2] It is a curious point that just at this time a great part of the Hungarian nation passed Kiev on its westward migration to its final home in the Danube valley. The Magyar chronicles speak of an Hungarian victory over Óleg and his *Rus*.

oles, or with Hungarians, as yet, was not ; with the Scandina-
ians it was but a small thing in comparison with the two chief
elds of commerce for this easternmost Europe—the Byzantine
nd the Arabic. The chief starting-point for Russian traders
ring to the markets of the south and east—the chief supporting
ase to travellers crossing the steppes by river or land, to Euxine
r to Caspian—was Kiev.

As soon as an armed power appeared in Kiev, able to do
mething effective for defence of the country and support of
s expansion, there was a widespread submission to it on the
art of tribes, groups, and settlements, hitherto disunited and
ostile, but having the inward bonds of common race, tradition,
anners, morals, religion, and interests. Hitherto, these
mmon elements had been insufficient to form even such a
ose federation as now comes into being under the pressure of
is new external military force. Once revealed as unifier and
rotector of the common interest, the powerful Varangian
hief, who was now master of Kiev and Nóvgorod, becomes a
olitical force. With the justification of the common interest,
powerful plea along the riverine trade-routes from Baltic
Euxine, the *Veliki Knyaz* [Grand Prince] of Kiev subju-
ates, or rather federates under his leadership, the whole of the
ast Slav tribes (beyond the borders of Polish influence)—even
ose least responsive to nationalist appeal.

As the Kiev suzerains extend their dominions, piece by piece,
ey establish in the conquered or federated territories a system
f tribute and taxation which was one of the chief objects of
eir administration. The rulers or princes of these conquered
r federated districts are generally, by the time of the conversion
980–1000), either near relatives or paid retainers of the Grand
rince. Yet they act so independently of Kiev, and maintain
slender a connexion with it, that they are nearly as complete
vereigns as the head of the federation himself, the chief of the

House of Rurik, who stood to them as president, the chief of a military league, rather than as monarch.

Like the early English kings, the Grand Princes of *Rus* made periodic tours of their dominions and dependencies, to be fed and entertained throughout the winter, and to fix and collect their dues and taxes, tribute and tolls. Usually these visitations —solemn progresses with the whole of the princely retinue, who of course shared in the *gifts* or tribute—began in November and ended in April: contributions were paid sometimes in coin, more usually, perhaps, in furs and skins, corn and slaves, honey and wax. When the Prince returned to Kiev with the spring, all had been made ready for the summer trade. Trees had been felled; boats had been built. When June came, a great flotilla of small craft floated, sailed, or rowed down the Dnieper, entered the Black Sea, and so reached the Byzantine ports. By the Sea of Azóv, the Don, and the Volga, the Russian traders could also reach the markets of eastern Islam. The chief actors in this curious commercial movement were the Prince of Kiev and his retinue; the latter formed the Prince's chief instrument of rule, and was also the principal commercial class—thus playing a leading part both in the politics and in the trade of Old *Rus*. With the official convoys, however, went the boats of private merchants, under the protection of the Prince's fighting men. As an early treaty with the Eastern Empire claims, in 941: 'Every year it shall be lawful for the Grand Prince of Rus and his nobles to send to the Greek Tsar as many ships as the Prince may desire, together with his commissioners and his guests.'

Thus every summer the Russian traders came to Constantinople for the season. They had other foreign markets, but Byzantium was the chief. Throughout their stay they were lodged in a particular suburb of the capital [St. Mamas]. Both the Prince's official traders and the private merchants

vere allotted free board and baths by the Imperial Government, vhich, in 971,[1] bound itself to 'receive as allies, and as hath lways been the custom', the *Rus* folk visiting Constantinople or trade. On this principle they were free from tolls, and on eparture received a present from the Imperial Government of rovisions for the journey home, and of all such shipping-tackle s required to be made good.

The official traders from *Rus* received a Byzantine allowance n accordance with their rank, while private merchants received sum, paid monthly, varying according to the status of their ome towns—Kiev, of course, holding the first place.

Trade was chiefly by barter: Byzantine silks, stuffs, gold, vine, and fruit were exchanged for Russian furs, honey, wax, orn, and slaves. Only a few Byzantine coins seem to have ound their way to Russia.

The tribute collected by the Prince as Ruling-President ormed a large part—perhaps the mass—of his commercial naterial as Trading-President. His character as the chief varrior-merchant of the people over which he presided was ssentially Varangian:—how different in most respects from he autocracy of Moscow and St. Petersburg.

The Russian intercourse with the Empire was especially important as the basis of the conversion of *Rus* to Eastern Christianity, nd the origin of the working of Roman legal conceptions in Russia. Among these conceptions that of the absolute power f the head of the State was the most fruitful—for good and ill; einforced by the results of the Tartar conquest, its effect was t last quite revolutionary.

It was Óleg and Ígor, Rurik's first successors, who fixed the Varangian-Russian capital at Kiev, about 880. From this centre he new Russia was organized, and the native tribes of the middle

[1] As in the treaty between John Tzimiskes and Svyatoslav: *see* p. 17.

Dnieper were conquered, in the last years of the ninth century. And from Kiev (we have seen) proceeded all the tenth-century attacks upon *Tsargrad*. So goes the witness of the *Fundamental Chronicle* of 'Nestor':

'And Óleg established himself as Prince of Kiev, and said, This shall be the Mother of Russian towns. . . . He had around him Slavs, Varangians, and other peoples, and they called themselves Rus. Then Óleg began to build fortified towns, and he laid tribute upon the Slavs. . . . And he ordained that Nóvgorod should pay to the Varangians a yearly tribute, and they paid this till the death of Yaroslav.'

Flushed, perhaps, with their rapid and easy conquests among the native tribes of the Dnieper, largely at the expense of the declining Khazar Empire, the Russians, in 904–7, made a fresh descent upon Byzantium with an armada of 2,000 boats, and perhaps 80,000 men. They ravaged the country near the imperial city with the ferocity which earned them the most dreaded name among all the barbarian enemies of the Eastern Rome in this age. For not merely did they kill many a Greek, pillage many a palace, and burn many a church: they butchered and tortured their prisoners with a ruthlessness uncommon even for the tenth century.[1] Terrified by the Russian successes, the Russian cruelties, and the danger of the imperial city, the *Christian* Government (as the documents express it) concluded an agreement in 907, and a fuller treaty in 912. Nestor professes to give the text of both, and their bearing on commerce is evident throughout. No less evident is the Scandinavian nationality of the Russian leaders of this time.

'When the merchants come they shall receive bread and wine, fish and fruit, and baths shall be provided them for six months.

[1] Some they beheaded, some they drowned, some they cut in pieces, some they made targets for arrows; they broke the limbs of others, or drove iron nails into their heads. *Nestor*, A. D. 904–7; 935–41.

. . If a Russian come without merchandise, he shall receive no
ionthly subsidy.

' The Russians who shall come shall enter the city by one only
ate without arms, by fifty at a time, and shall transact their
ommerce as they please, without paying dues. . . .

' If a tempest throws a Greek vessel on a foreign shore near
ie Greek land, and some of our Russians find it there, our
eople shall come to the aid of the ship and its cargo . . . and
iall bring it with its cargo unbroken. . . .'

If such an accident happened to a vessel near the Russian land,
ie cargo was to be sold, as far as possible, and ' when we go
ito Greece, to trade or negotiate, we shall honourably hand
ver the price of the cargo '.

Murder, theft, and other crimes committed by Greeks against
ussians, or by Russians against Greeks, were to be expiated on
regular system according to the terms of this treaty. Pro-
sion is made for the ransom of Russian slaves sold into Greece,
Greek slaves sold into Russia. The eternal friendship of
ie two nations is asserted with special emphasis : even some-
iing of a military alliance is projected.

' If the Emperor goes to war, and the Russians wish to
onour your Emperor by putting themselves at his service, all
iose who wish to go with him and remain there can do so freely.'

This treaty, concluded in the second week of September in the
ear of the world 6420 [A. D. 912], is subscribed by ' us of the
ussian nation ' Karl, Ingeld, Vermud, Ruald, Karn, Ruar,
idul, Fost, Stemid,[1] and others, whose racial origin, from
ross the Baltic, is hardly open to question.

' Greeks ' and Russians declared their agreement to be *un-
akable*. Yet, after a generation this eternal peace is violently
oken by a fresh Russian offensive [from 935]. Igor, the son of

[1] *Ingeld*, *Vermud*, *Ruald*, *Karn* are the Scandinavian *Ingjaldr*, *Vermundr*, *Roaldr* or *Hrualtr*, *Karni*. And so with the other names here quoted (e. g. *Idul* is *Leidulfr* or *Litulf*).

Rurik, the third of the Rurikide Grand Princes of *Rus*, leads a new fleet of a thousand war boats against the Empire. Descending the Dnieper, and crossing the Black Sea, in the regular manner, he ravages the coasts of Bithynia almost to the mouth of the Bosphorus with the customary atrocities. But his troops while on land in north-western Asia Minor are caught by an imperial force returning from the East; they are defeated on shore, and driven to their boats; finally, they are pursued and decimated by Byzantine vessels armed with 'a fire like that of heaven', the *liquid, unquenchable*, or *Greek fire* of the Middle Ages. '. . . A terrible prodigy. The *Rus*, seeing the flame, threw themselves into the sea, and those who survived thus returned to their country.'

Ígor, 'longing to avenge himself', collects a new army, even 'sending to the Varangians beyond the sea to excite them against the Greeks', and in 944 he marches to the Danube.[1] After their last experience the Russians no longer venture all so readily on the hazard of the sea-route. But at the great river, the northern boundary of hostile Bulgaria, the invaders listen to the 'Greek' offers of the ancient peace, the ancient treaties, the ancient subsidies (judiciously increased); reflect upon the question, Who has the sea for his ally; and recollect, That death menaces all.

A new edition of Óleg's agreement is witnessed by Ivor, Buiefast, Kanimar, Shikhbern, Prastien, Libi, Grim, Kary, Egri, Shibrid, Kol, Steggi, Sfirka, Alvad, Frudi, and other ambassadors and merchants of Scandinavian name,[2] with whom appear an equal number of Slavonic personages, or at least of Slavonic name-forms. Ígor's infant son Svyatosláv, for whom

[1] In this same year the Russians are reported by Arab historians as fighting at Berdaa, beyond the Caucasus.

[2] Thus *Ivor* is the Scandinavian *Ivarr*, *Buiefast* is *Bofastr* or *Vefastr*, *Shikhbern* is *Sigbjörn* or *Sikbiarn*, &c.

this treaty Buiefast is sponsor, represents in his own name, erson, and reign, somewhat in the manner of Henry III of ngland, the change from foreign to native, from Varangian to lav, from the first to the second chapter of Russian history.

Special provision is made in the charter of 944 for the safety the Graeco-Roman colonies in the Crimea—'Kherson and s towns', 'the Khersonese' of the North.[1] The Russians are o leave this land in peace; they are even requested to prevent ne Black Bulgarians of the Volga from raiding there. Russians, oth merchants and others, coming to *Tsargrad*, are not to pass ne winter there—they are not to make a permanent residence ven at the Dnieper estuary. 'When the autumn shall come, ney shall be bound to return to their home in *Rus*.' The ussians are to send soldiers, on appeal to the Grand Prince, to einforce the armies of the 'Greek' Emperor. 'Greeks' are to o, on the occasion of a similar appeal, to help the Russian rince. 'Thus other lands shall learn what friendship there is etween Greeks and Russians.'

Once more, and for the last time before the conversion of the *us*, the friendship between these formidable pagans and the *hristians* is broken by Ígor's son Svyatosláv. The revival of ne Eastern Rome, which made it again so formidable a power om the early days of our King Eadgar to the Norman Conquest England, gave to its diplomacy as well as to its arms a fresh aring. Into the timid policy of Byzantine tradition, into the recepts of the *Administration of the Empire*, Nikephoros Phokas reathes a new spirit. 'Aux grands maux les grands remèdes.' o meet the Bulgarian danger he invokes the Russian peril. vyatosláv responds to the appeal, accepts the imperial subsidy,

[1] Part of the modern Sevastópol stands on the site of Old Kherson. The ter's history begins in the days of early Greek colonization: it ends in the ne of Lithuanian conquest in the fourteenth century.

falls upon the Bulgars, and heavily defeats them. A great part of Bulgaria is occupied by the Russians (although the treaty of alliance forbade their permanent retention of the country), and their Grand Prince declares his purpose of moving his capital from Kiev on the Dnieper to Pereyaslavets on the Danube, newly won from the shattered Bulgar State. 'I do not like Kiev,' *Nestor* makes him say to his mother Olga and the Boyárs. 'I will live at Pereyaslavets . . . there is the centre of my dominions, and there all rich products come—money and stuffs, fruit and wine, from Greece; money and horses from Bohemia and Hungary; skins, wax, honey, and slaves from Russia.' The Empire was faced with a more pressing danger than had threatened her since the great Arab siege of 717—a Slav-Scandinavian foe, ruling from Philippopolis almost to the Baltic, with its capital upon the Lower Danube; allied by race with Danes, Swedes, and Northmen on one side, with the Slav colonists of the Balkans and of Greece upon the other, practically certain of military and social help from both these quarters, and commanding the resources of a *Rus* now fairly united for purposes of plunder, conquest, or trade-expansion.

Nikephoros had been murdered, and succeeded, by John Tzimiskes (A. D. 969), but the new emperor-regent was no less capable of dealing with the crisis. The Russians, who had just stormed Philippopolis and massacred its people with their usual freedom, received the imperial summons of evacuation with contempt. They would soon be at *Tsargrad* instead (971).

Tzimiskes opens the campaign in March 972. He sends the Greek fleet to the mouth of the Danube: advancing with his army from Adrianople, he outflanks the Russian main force, seizes the passes of the Balkans, arrives by forced marches at Pereyaslavets, and storms the place after desperate resistance. Eight thousand Russians defend the palace of the Prince to the last extremity, refuse all quarter, and perish in the flames

vatosláv, obliged to fall back, contrives to reach the Danube
d encounters the *Romans* at Dorystolon or Silistria, so long
e key-fortress, in later time, of north-eastern Bulgaria and the
bruja. A Borodinó of the tenth century closes with the
reat of the Russian masses into Silistria, with all the honours
war. A siege follows, equally remarkable for the ability and
adiness of the blockade, for the heroism, the cruelty, and the
lliancy of the defence. The struggle is set off by Homeric
els of champions. Russian women, amazons of the Varan-
n camp, join in the combats. The heavy Byzantine cavalry,
rse and man alike shod in iron, proves a match even for Russian
antry. Among the latter are many who prefer suicide to
render. By the light of the moon the *Romans* watch their
:my burning their dead : with horror they see them slaughter
ir prisoners upon these funeral pyres, and fling into the
nube chickens, and children, to appease their gods.

'amine forces the Russians to a final effort, and after the
:ndid failure of this outbreak, peace is concluded. The
pire, with apparent generosity, grants a free departure and
:newal of the treaties :

I, Svyatosláv, Russian Prince, wish to have peace and
ling friendship with all the great Greek emperors inspired
God, and with all your people ; and so do all the *Rus*
ject to me. . . . Never will I attack your land, or gather an
y, or guide a foreign people against those subject to the
ek Government, nor against the Khersonese [Crimea], nor
nst the land of the Bulgars. And if any other attack your
, I will march against him and fight with him. . . . If we do
observe this . . . may we be accursed by the god in whom we
eve, by Perún, and Vólos the god of flocks : may we become
ow as gold, and perish by our own weapons.'

treaty was sealed by a personal interview of the two leaders
1 the bank of the Danube. Tzimiskes, who ' in his diminu-
body concealed the spirit of a hero ', on horseback and in

full armour awaited Svyatosláv. The Russian Prince came
the meeting-place by boat, rowing with his attendants. He w
of moderate height, but most robust: big in the chest, thick
the neck, with blue eyes, thick eyebrows, flat nose, long mou
tache, a slight beard, and shaven head, with a single tuft of ha
left to mark his rank. In one of his ears was a gold ring set wi
a ruby and two pearls. *Svyatosláv* is a good Slavonic name, b
Leo the Deacon is here describing [1] the true Varangian chie
who would march 'like a panther' at the head of his army, wh
would use no carriage nor cooking-pot on his marches, for who
meals a little horse-flesh would suffice, and who would sleep
no tent, but on a garment spread upon the ground, with
saddle for his pillow.[2]

The peace of 971—so soon followed by the conversion of th
Rus—is practically final between Constantinople and the Kie
princes; the magnanimity of the victorious Empire appea
impressive; yet it seems probable that under cover of all th
friendliness, spoken, written, and acted, Byzantine diplomac
with characteristic cunning, repaid the Russians in their ow
coin. The Pechenég [3] attack at the cataracts of the Dniepe
which cost Svyatosláv his life and 'gave his skull for a drinkin
cup' to the Nomade chiefs, shattering the remnants of th
Russian army in almost the last stage of its homeward journe
was surely concerted with Tzimiskes.

The Conversion

The conversion of the Russian people, which Photius haile
as an accomplished fact in the days of our King Alfred, was on
seriously begun in the time of Eadgar, a century later. On

[1] 'Remarquons ce portrait; il nous faudra aller loin dans les annales de
Russie pour en retrouver un autre.' Rambaud, *Russie* (1893), p. 55.

[2] *Nestor*, A. D. 965.

[3] This Turkish race was now replacing the Khazars in the mastery of t
steppes south of Kiev.

the end of the tenth century did the Prince of Kiev, his urt, retinue, and council, receive baptism. They received it om the Eastern Church and Empire, from Constantinople; ey rejected the claims of Rome, as they rejected the claims of am and of Judaism; by this they cut themselves off from the ief civilization of the Western, and even of the Christian, world in particular they severed themselves from their brother- ivs of the Polish stock, with momentous consequences.

Russia was the chief convert of Greek Christianity; the ussian Emperor was long the supreme earthly protector d champion of the Eastern Church; and the Church of ussia has shown itself in history, not only the largest in extent, t certainly the freest, most courageous, patriotic, spiritual, d active of all branches of the Orthodox communion. The luence of its own type of religion upon the Russian people has en almost incalculable in the past.

Holy Russia has been no empty phrase. Constantly one finds e religious element surprising one afresh by the depth, the iquity, and the subtlety of its action in Russian history. nstantly one has to recognize its power of accomplishing what :hing else can do. To take only one instance: it is the greatest ıll factors in the creation of the autocratic empire of Moscow, the absorption of all the lesser Russian princedoms and cities, the deliverance of the country from the yoke of the mis- ieving Musulman and the heretic Pole.

The first *Rus* attack on *Tsargrad*, and the first failure, pro- :ed, it is said, the first converts. Askold himself (in a more n doubtful tradition) was won to the faith of the Greek urch. It is far more certain that about this very time the t Christian bishop was sent by the Emperor Basil I from ıstantinople, and settled in, or at least visited, Kiev. This ıopric of *Rus* continues to appear in the list of Byzantine sees.

in the next generation, under Óleg and Leo VI.[1] The treaty of 944 discloses the existence of a numerous body of Russian converts, who swear, separately, their acceptance of this *confirmation of charters*—'for many Varangians were Christians by this time.

The reign of Ígor's widow and practical successor, the regent Olga,[2] shows us another step on the road to the conversion of Russia. In 955 this 'wisest of women', who by most cunning treachery and ruthlessness had avenged her lord's murder upon the tribe of the Drevlyans, comes on a state visit to Constantinople. She is received by the *Porphyrogennetos* Constantine VII, who holds so honourable a place among the royal authors of the world.

'And he, seeing that she was perfectly beautiful and very wise, said, admiring her intelligence, Thou art worthy to reign with us. And she said, I am heathen. If thou wilt, baptize me thyself. Otherwise I will not be baptized. And the Emperor with the Patriarch baptized her. And they gave her the name of Helena, from the mother of Constantine the Great.'

With her usual cunning (the *Ancient Chronicle* exultingly relates) she cheats the emperor out of his hopes of marriage with his proselyte—for she had now become his godchild, and was within the prohibited degrees—just as she cheats him out of his expectation of costly presents from *Rus* in return for all he had showered upon her in *Tsargrad*. 'When thou hast come and stayed in Kiev as long as I stayed in thy city, I will give thee those presents.'

Yet St. Olga fails to win either her son or the bulk of her nation to Christianity. Her example and her influence probably increase conversion, but the mass of the nobles and warriors despise the new faith. 'My retinue would laugh at me,' pleads Svyatosláv. His mother's final argument, 'If thou

[1] Leo 'the Wise', Emperor of Constantinople.

[2] The Scandinavian *Helga*.

once baptized, all of them will do the same', was worthy the 'wise woman', and it proved sound enough under ıdímir in the next generation. As yet it was perhaps pre-ture and dangerous. In any case, Svyatosláv rejects it, and es and dies a typical heathen Varangian.

Only with his son Vladímir (who, like so many other princes Varangian *Rus*, had found a refuge oversea in the Varangian meland in time of trouble) does Christianity master the ssian people.

St. Vladímir's career is a good instance of historic irony. The ovis of Russia is at first noteworthy for his love of war, of athenism, and of sensuality: in *Nestor* he is 'another Solomon'. sides two wives and three mistresses of some standing, he keeps ht hundred concubines in three great harems.

At the same time he reconquers from the Poles the Red ssia of East Galicia, wins Peremyshl[1] ('still subject to Russia day,' adds *Nestor*[2]), and makes extensive conquests in the n-Russian lands of the east Baltic shore, in Livonia and thuania. He opens a window for Russia upon the seas of south by conquering Tmutorokán at the entrance of the of Azóv.[3] Finally, he attacks the Graeco-Roman settlements the Crimea and takes Kherson.

But with all this he feels the stirrings of the religious move-nts agitating his people. At first it makes him a zealous torer of the old heathendom. He sets up a new wooden ıge of Perún, 'with a head of silver and a beard of gold', on of the heights overlooking the Dnieper. By its side were ıges of other gods. Both Kiev and Nóvgorod offered sacrifice

[1] The Przemyśl of the Poles and of the present Austrian official use.

[2] This was probably written about A. D. 1120.

[3] A. D. 988. Here a Russian principality survived for about a century: we of it still in 1078 in *Nestor*, chap. 70.

to Perún—' their sons and daughters as victims to the demons . . . and the Russian land was defiled with blood '. Nestor records how a Christian Varangian of Kiev, 'come from Greece', was summoned to give his son for sacrifice, and died in his defence, defying the mob, and scorning their deities—the wooden carvings of men's hands. ' I will not give my son to demons.

It was, perhaps, through his wars with the *Black Bulgaria* on the Volga (the modern Kazan region) that Vladímir came to examine the theory and practice of Islam as a religion for his people. From this the Russian Prince and his Council (in the record of the *Ancient Chronicle*) went on to the examination and comparison of all the great faiths of the European World, and to the adoption of Eastern, Greek, or *Orthodox* Christianity. The successes of Vladímir in the Crimea definitely brought about the last and decisive stage of this religious settlement.

Less than a century before (about A. D. 900) Muhammadanism had won its most northerly success with the conversion of Bolgar, the great market town of the Middle Volga basin, whose commerce and influence are so remarkable in the tenth century. These hyperborean Bulgarians in their turn became a focus of proselytism, and *Rus* a special field for their missionary zeal and hope.

Islam might have seemed to offer certain attractions very winningly to such a devoted warrior and polygamist as Vladímir, but according to *Nestor* its prohibition of pork and wine was fatal. ' We Russians cannot live without drinking.' Deeper causes were perhaps at work. Vladímir was possibly already in reaction from the bloody and sensual heathendom of his earlier life. In such a mood, he would be repelled where the stranger might have expected the reverse. The *Ancient Chronicle* pictures him as disgusted by the darker vices of some Bulgarian Musulmans. ' When he heard that, he spat upon the ground and said, " It is abomination ".'

The appeal of the Roman Church was quite unattractive ('our forefathers would never have allowed that'), whether from the failure of the Russian envoys to appreciate its services ('we saw nothing beautiful therein'), or from other and weightier causes, more probable, though not expressed in *Nestor*.

The Jewish faith was put aside as that of men hated and rejected of God and dispersed abroad ('Do you wish that this evil should befall us too?').

Full satisfaction was only given by Eastern Christianity, the creed and the services of the Orthodox Church. In the Patriarchal Church of Hagia Sophia, in the imperial city, the Russian visitors no longer knew whether they were in heaven or on earth. 'For there is no such spectacle upon the earth, nor one of such beauty. We cannot describe it: we only know that there God dwells in the midst of men.' And to this another argument was added: 'If the Greek Faith were evil, Olga thy grandmother, the wisest of human beings, would never have received it.'

Such was the position, according to *Nestor*, at the end of 987; next year befell Vladímir's successful siege of Kherson; and the fall of this cherished *Roman* colony was followed by the conqueror's marriage and conversion treaty with the East Roman Empire. The Emperor Basil II was carrying on the triumphs of the Byzantine revival, and the military strength of the Byzantine State was nearing its zenith. But the final conquest of the Bulgaria of the Balkans called for all the energies of the *Kaisar*, and the Russian alliance was to be welcomed, at the easy price of an imperial marriage and with the enormous premium of a Russian conversion.

Vladímir, therefore, married the sister of the *Boulgaroktonos*;[1] before the ceremony he himself received baptism at Kherson.

[1] 'Slayer of the Bulgars' is a favourite and well-earned title of Basil II, one of the greatest of Byzantine generals and not the least cruel.

As a wedding present for his princess he gave the town back to the 'Greeks', and returning to Kiev, a true Russian Clovis, began to adore what he had burned, to burn what he had adored: The new Perún he had set up over the Dnieper was thrown down, beaten with clubs, dragged at a horse's tail, and thrown into the stream: the other gods were tossed into the fire. 'Whoever he be,' the Prince proclaimed, 'who will not come to the river to-morrow to be baptized, be he rich or poor, will fall into disgrace with me.' *A new people*, as he said, was added to Christendom that day. What was done at Kiev was soon accepted, and imitated, throughout *the Russian land*.

Zenith and Decline of Kiev

Under St. Vladímir, Russia's Constantine, the *Isapostolos*,[1] early Russia attained its highest power, greatest extension, least defective organization—though always stopping far short of a thoroughly unified State. But, as in the early Frankish kingdom, the death of the supreme chief is marked by the partition of his dominions among his sons. The sovereignty is put into commission. Under Yaroslav the Law-giver, the ablest of Vladímir's children (1016–54), the Russian federation again assumes, for a time, something of the appearance of a great political entity under a single government, that of the Grand Princedom of Kiev. Most of the Red Russia of Galicia was again recovered from Poland. Russian colonization was extended in the east Baltic coast-regions and among the Finns of the north. Yúrev and Yaroslávl are settlements of this time and of this Prince.[2] A fresh disastrous war with the Eastern

[1] This title, specially applied to Constantine the Great, was also given by the grateful Church to the Russian who 'brought so great a people to Christ', and so deserved to 'rank with the Apostles'.

[2] Yaroslávl 'belonging to or founded by Yaroslav'; Yúrev 'belonging to or founded by George' (Yúri), which was Yaroslav's 'monastic' name.

Empire over trading privileges made an unhappy but momentary breach in the friendship and alliance of 'Greek' teacher and Russian proselyte. But the age of Yaroslav, on the whole, was marked by the deepening and strengthening of all the ties, religious, commercial, and cultural, which bound the *Rus* to Constantinople. The Pechenégs of the steppes were decisively repulsed, and with the aid of other Turkish hordes pressing towards the West, their power was broken, only to be replaced by a fresh danger in the same region. The Nomade *Kumans* are the curse of Kiev in the later eleventh century and in the twelfth, just as the Pechenégs had been in the tenth and throughout the life of Vladímir. And from these same steppes, in the thirteenth century, came the final overmastering blow—the invasion of the Tartars, who beat down Kuman and Russian alike.

To Yaroslav was long ascribed the complete authorship of, or at least the responsibility for, the *Rúskaya Právda*, the *Russian Law* or *Right*. This earliest Russian legal code itself claims to be 'the judgement' or 'ordinance' of Yaroslav: in the articles of the code it is repeatedly stated that Yaroslav 'did thus judge' or 'thus ordain'. To a large extent this is no doubt true. But the *Právda* is not the work of Yaroslav alone; it contains decrees of Vladímir Monomákh, and other successors of Yaroslav, reaching into the twelfth century. Again, 'it does not always present us with the original or exact text of a given law, but, in place of this, with a mere explanation or paraphrase of that law'. As one instance of its incompleteness, 'it ignores the legal duel, or trial by battle, which undoubtedly was practised in *Rus* throughout the eleventh and twelfth centuries, despite the ban of the Church'. Some have gone so far as to maintain that the *Právda* is not an independent code', but a supplement to a code of Canon or Church Law; that its composition was deeply influenced by the ecclesiastical legislation of the Eastern

Empire ; and that its primary inspiration is not to be found in the courts of princes but in those of bishops.

In any case, this primitive *Russian Right* is curiously, but naturally, parallel to the early law and custom of the Scandinavian and Germanic peoples. It sanctions private vengeance ; it fixes the tariff for the various crimes known to the law—both what is due to the injured individuals, and what must be paid to the treasury of the sovereign. From other sources we know that this early Russia recognized, quite in the manner of Roman Christendom, not only the trial by battle, but the ordeal in certain forms, the system of *compurgators*, the trial by a jury assistant to a representative of the Prince. Like the West, again, Russia did not yet acknowledge either capital punishment, or the legal use of torture, or the penalty of judicial flogging, or a regular prison system.

With Yaroslávthe House of Rurik won a full recognition from the rest of Christendom, and made a brilliant entry into the Christian family. The Grand Prince married his sister to Casimir, King of Poland ; one daughter, Elizabeth, to Harald Hardrada of Norway ; another, Anne, to Henry I of France ; a third to Andrew I of Hungary. Exiled princes from Sweden, Norway, and England, took refuge at his court. St. Olaf and Harald Hardrada, especially, owed much to him in their time of trouble. One can say of the Russia of Yaroslávwhat one can no longer say of the Russia of the fourteenth, or even of the early fifteenth, century, that it was a true European State.[1]

The time from the death of Yaroslávto the fall of Kiev, and still more from the fall of Kiev to the coming of the Tartars,[2] is, on the whole, a time of disorder, civil strife, and disintegra-

[1] Cf. Rambaud, *Russie* (1893), p. 63.

[2] Roughly, from the eve of the Norman Conquest of England to the morrow of the Great Charter, 1054–1169 ; 1169–1220.

tion. It is therefore, in its essential historic meaning, parallel to the period which precedes it in English history, the later Anglo-Saxon time. It is in complete contrast with the contemporary English time—the reconstructive and consolidative age of the Normans, of Henry II, and of the Great Charter.

The princely anarchy of this Eastern Europe almost matches the earlier feudal anarchy of the West. Thus sixty-four principalities of considerable importance and duration (not to count more transient examples), two hundred and ninety-three sovereign princes, eighty-three civil wars, are reckoned by a Russian historian for this period of one hundred and sixty-six years. To these may be added a trifle of forty-six invasions by the Turkish Kumans of the steppes. Some appearance of effective Kievian primacy, ensuring some strength and order to the nation as a whole, is maintained as late as Vladímir Monomákh (1113–1125), who won notable successes against the Nomade foes of Russia to south and south-east; who extended Russian colonization among the Finns of the north-eastern forests; who was able to punish and even dethrone refractory and troublesome princes of junior position (as at Minsk, at Nóvgorod, at Vladímir Volýnsk); who gave a refuge to the relics of one of the most interesting of the lesser peoples of history (the Khazars); and who left in his *Instruction* to his sons, his *Letter* to his cousin Óleg, and his *Prayer*, a bequest of wisdom, kindliness, and human nature worthy of an unspoilt and heroic age.

Thus under certain Kiev princes of outstanding ability and influence—Óleg, Svyatosláv, St. Vladímir, Yarosláv the Law-giver—we seem to see a possibility of the welding together of all Russian lands, principalities, and settlements, in a single organized and centralized State. But, as in Anglo-Saxon England, the old weakness and disunion obstinately reappear. National elements have been prepared from which the Russian

nation is at last to be formed. But the Russian nation, in the full political sense, is not evolved in the times of the Old Free Russia.

At the height of its power Kiev becomes the centre of a great federation and a great trade, the home of a powerful and wealthy chief and court, a city of widespread extent and widespread fame. Foreign rumour credits it with hundreds of churches.[1] To Adam of Bremen it is the would-be rival of the Eastern Rome—proud ambitious *Chive*, emulous of the sceptre of Constantinople, that brightest glory of Greece. But it just fails to become, like Moscow, a true national capital.

From Ládoga in the north to the steppes of the Dnieper in the south, from the Klyázma in the north-east to the Carpathians in the south-west, the Grand Prince of Kiev is overlord, at the time of his highest power. But he just fails to become a true monarch or national head.

The *druzhína* or retinue of the Prince was alone enough to prevent an autocracy in this early Russia. And besides the Prince's personal following—his greater and lesser nobility of service, the former mainly Varangian—the military officers of the towns, the elected City Wardens, commanding the local forces, had at least the right to form part of the *Dúma* or State Council of the sovereign, and to be consulted therein. St. Vladímir himself, the most powerful of all the Kiev princes, 'delighted to consult with his *druzhína* concerning the administration of the land, and concerning the army, and concerning the statutes'. The momentous question of the conversion is debated by Vladímir with his *Dúma*.

And if there had been no other barrier to an autocracy, the fierce free spirit of the towns—the great trading communities—would have been enough. Thus Old Nóvgorod, with Kiev the

[1] Thus Thietmar of Merseburg gives it 400 churches, and eight markets.

most populous city of early Russia, and the chief centre of trade —after the decline of Kiev, without a rival among the Russian city-states of the Middle Ages—though in name a principality, is, in fact, something of a democratic republic.

From the earliest times Nóvgorod is famous for its free spirit. When, in 972, the Prince of Kiev proposes to govern Nóvgorod by ordinary officials, disregarding the custom which already entitled it to the eldest son, or nearest relative, of the *Veliki Knyaz*, the city insists on its rights. 'We know how to find another prince.' The menace is heeded.

Again, when in 1102 Kiev wishes to conform to this rule and displace the reigning Prince of Nóvgorod, who was now an example of the citizens' own choice of a permanent head of their own, it is met with defiance and threats. 'Nóvgorod hath sent us to say this unto thee, We desire neither thee nor thy son. Send thy son unto us only if he have two heads. Already have we Mstisláv . . . reared by us to rule Nóvgorod.'

As the Old Russian federation falls to pieces, and Kiev declines, republican spirit develops in Nóvgorod. The sovereignty is treated as purely elective, and election is often followed by deposition. A prince installed one year may be 'shown out' the next.

Thus, after the time of Henry I of England all hope of a centralized Russian State, an effective Russian monarchy, fades away. The real leadership of the Grand Prince of Kiev disappears. Even the nominal leadership seems to cease to be entred in the hands of one prince (especially after 1169). From he fall of Kiev till the creation of the Moscovite Empire no ingle prince makes any serious pretension to the presidency of he Russian States as a whole: no single prince is in any sense ord of *the Russian land*.

The various princes do not even remain permanent irremovable rulers of their allotted provinces, but, as changes occur n the great family of Rurik, junior members of that stock are

promoted to provinces of superior rank. And these transferable rulers move from one principality to another, according to a definite rotation.

Soon after the middle of the twelfth century, a few months before Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered in his cathedral at Canterbury, Kiev, which had so long beaten back the foreign foe of the steppes, falls a victim to a rebellion of its own Russians. The Mother of Russian Cities, taken in 1169 by Andréy Bogolyúbski and his confederates, never recovers its position. The Grand Princedom, the vague Russian suzerainty so shadowy since Monomákh, now forsakes Kiev for ever. Seventy years later ambitious *Chive* is stormed and sacked by the Tartars (1240), and for a time lies desolate. Little more than ruins told of trade or town, when the first of the great friar travellers in the Mongol Age [1] passes through south Russia to the head-quarters of the Tartars in Central Asia (1245). And when the Mongol hold relaxes in the next century (1300–1400), Kiev and all its neighbourhood, the *Rus par excellence* of earlier days, only passes under another foreign and heathen rule, that of Lithuania. The union of Lithuania and Poland (1386), and the conversion of the former to Roman Christianity in the days of our Richard II, a year or two after the death of Wycliffe, incorporates Kiev for centuries in the Great Poland of the House of 'Jagellon',[2] and in Roman Catholic Christendom. Not till 1669, in the hey-day of Louis XIV or Charles II, is the old Russian metropolis restored to an independent *Rus*—now the Empire of Moscow.

The blow of 1169 was so fatal because it was both a result and a cause of a certain malignant process. It was largely a result

[1] John de Plano Carpini.

[2] See pp. 62 and 87. Jagiello is the Polish, and Iagáilo the Lithuanian, form of James.

f the migration movements which had already begun to drain way the life of Kiev to new lands in the north-east. And its uccess added such volume and speed to this movement as to nake the complete decay of the old capital and the collapse of he old Kiev régime unavoidable.

Up to this time—the middle of the twelfth century, the early ays of Henry II, or of Frederick Barbarossa—a high level of naterial prosperity, active citizenship, and general culture, had een maintained by the men of Kiev. Trade, especially foreign rade, the ruling factor in the industry of the people, had served oth to preserve the life of the community from isolation and tagnation, and to bring wealth into the country. Money circu- ated in abundance. The splendid materials and artistic taste f such shrines as the cathedrals of the Holy Wisdom, in both Kiev and Nóvgorod, show what resources in money, labour, nd skill were at the command of the princes and the chief owns, even at the era of the Norman Conquest of England. A little later than this, one of the lesser princes is recorded as eceiving in yearly tribute from his province (the province of molénsk) sums equal to fully 150,000 rubles to-day. Rich resents from one prince to another are frequently on record. There is abundant evidence, too, of remarkable wealth among obles, officials, and private persons. Magnificent offerings are nade to the churches. Heavy fines are expected from those ersons of the upper classes who had broken the law of the State r of the Church. Many documents, such as inventories, attest he size and magnificence of the princely households. Not nerely the Grand Prince himself, but the provincial sovereigns nd governors keep wine-puncheons by the dozen, slaves and orn-stacks by the hundred, horses by the thousand, honey by he ten thousand pounds.

Naturally enough, this constant flow of native and foreign ealth to Kiev, and the other leading towns, enables the ruling

class to live sumptuously, to dress well, to build itself lordly habitations. For centuries the memory of the festivals of the *Rus* princes (and especially the Easter feasts) lingers among the people, and echoes of it are still to be heard in the folk-songs of the north, and especially in Olónets and Archangel.

All this material prosperity found expression also in art and literature. To this day the mounds and hoards of Old Southern or Little Russia yield gold and silver, and other articles of beautiful workmanship, while the buildings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with their frescoes and mosaics, mainly inspired from Byzantine sources, produce an extraordinary impression of delight and surprise.

The annals of this time bear emphatic testimony to the learning of the Russian princes of the great Kievian time, and to their zeal for culture—their knowledge of other tongues ('a thing foreigners admire in us,' says Vladímir Monomákh), their wide reading, their book collections, their foundation of schools, their encouragement of Greek and Latin study, their reception of foreign scholars. Before the era of our Norman Conquest something of a Russian Literature had been founded, and there are Russian manuscripts of the twelfth century which can almost be compared with really fine examples from the West.

There is a darker side to the picture. And here we find the chief causes of those movements of migration which sapped the strength of Kiev and founded Moscow, which completely shifted the Russian centre of gravity, and which gave so much of western Russia for a prey to Lithuanians and to Poles.

The economic prosperity of the old Kievian *Rus* largely depended on slavery. And the slave-system of Russia became steadily more important down to the Tartar Conquest. For three centuries and more, slaves were a principal article of export to the Byzantine and Muhammadan markets, and even,

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THE
RUSSIAN LANDS
TO 1250
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300
NOVGOROD SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
NOVGOROD COLONY OF VYATKA
NOVGOROD (OLD or GREAT)
NOVGOROD HOME-LANDS
PRINCY OF KOSTROMA
PRINCY OF VLADIMIR-SUZDAL
PRINCY OF SMOLENSK
PRINCY OF POLOTSK
PRINCY OF RYAZAN
PRINCY OF CHERNIGOV
PRINCY OF NOVGOROD SEVERSK
PRINCIPALITY OF KIEV
PRINCY OF VOLYNSK (VOLYNIA)
PRINCY OF GALICH (GALICIA)
PRIPET MARSHES
KUMANS or POLOVTSY
(till Tartar Conquest)
MONGOL-TARTAR EMPIRE
(from 1237 etc)
(Sub-Khanate or Viceroyalty of KIPCHAK
or of the GOLDEN HORDE)
OLD PRUSSIANS
(TEUTONIC ORDER)
from 1226, etc
LITVA
(LITHUANIA)
BALTIC SEA
GULF OF FINLAND
GULF OF RIGA
POLAND
HUNGARY
BULGARIA
OLD or BLACK BULGARIA
Lake Ladoga
Ladoga
Lake Onega
Belo Ozero
(White Lake)
Kolyvan
Lake Chud
Lake of Pskov
Lake Peipus
Pskov
Riga
(SWORD-BRETHREN)
from 1200 etc
Valdai Highlands
Volga R.
Yug R.
Vyatka
Vyatka R.
Kostroma
Yaroslavl
Rostov
Tver
Pereyaslavl
Suzdal
Nizhni Novgorod
Kazane
Kama R.
Bolgar
Volga R.
Oka R.
R. Klyazma
Vladimir
Moskva R.
Moscow
Murom
Volok Lamsk
Velikie Luki
W. Dvina R.
Niemen R.
Kovno
Vilna
Grodno
Smolensk
Dnieper R.
Desna R.
Sozh R.
Ryazan
Tsna R.
Elets
Vistula R.
Narew R.
Bug R.
W. Bug R.
Brest Litovsk
Berezina R.
Pripet R.
Vladimir (Volynski)
Chernigov
Novgorod Seversk
Kiev
Desna
Donets
Don
Perevaslavl
Cracow
Carpathian Mts.
Lvov
Galich
Dniester (Nestr)
Prut R.
Danube R.
S. Bug R.
Dnieper (Dnepr) R.
Black Sea
Crimea
Sea of Azov
Tana
(Azov)
R. Don
Donets R.
Manych Depression
Sarai
Volga R.

erhaps, to the Scandinavian. The Russian merchant came to e known above all as a slave-dealer.

Arab writers of the tenth century, such as Ibn Fozlan,[1] aphically sketch the Russian trader plying his slave-commerce the Volga ports. Much later than this, when a man wanted slave in Constantinople, his best plan was usually 'to go to e merchants who came from *Rus* to barter with the slaves'. o declares Nicolas the Magician, about 1090, at the beginning the Crusading Age.)

To slavery the early Russian legislation devoted its most ose and detailed attention. From slave-owning Russian vnership of land derived its special character, its legal theory origin. In other words, the original title to the soil appears rmally based upon the settlement and exploitation of the nd by slaves. 'This land is mine, because the slave-labour at works it is mine.'

To the end of the tenth century the Russian ruling class is rgely urban. The simple fact sounds paradoxical indeed; ch is the effect of later history in destroying the very capacity understand the earlier. Slave-raids and wars of all kinds led the houses of the rich and powerful with serfs though eat part of the captives were sent abroad to foreign markets. ne chief articles of early Russian export trade were slaves d furs.

Gradually, however, from the opening of the eleventh cen-y, the upper class begins to settle its serf-dependents more d more widely upon the land. Thus the privileged soldier d merchant slave-dealer of the tenth century (the character-c figure of the Old Nobility) is by the end of the twelfth

[1] Ibn Fudhlan ('Fozlan'), sent in A. D. 921 on a mission from the Baghdad ph to the Black Bulgarians of the Volga, who had lately embraced Islam, left us a famous picture of the blue-eyed and fair-haired *Rus*, 'tall as n-trees', their weapons, funerals, human sacrifices, and other traits.

converted into the landowner and slave-owner of the New Nobility. And along with this process goes a constant widening of the slave-class, both from without and from within. The social system of Kievian Russia is maintained only at the cost of the enslavement of the lowest class, and the debasement of the simple freeman towards poverty and slavery. Hence there is an ever-widening separation between the upper and lower orders—not only between the wealthy and their slaves, but between the wealthy and the poor of the free community.

To these causes of decay and of migration we must add the feuds of the princes and the increasing ménace from the Nomade tribes of the steppes.

The princes were only kept from raiding one another by a strong suzerain at Kiev. After Vladímir Monomákh there were no more Grand Princes who counted for much in the Mother of Russian Cities. And the rotation of princely rule helped the development of princely anarchy.

Degenerating into a series of savage and greedy reprisals, in which the chief objects were vengeance in destruction and enrichment through plunder, these struggles, which converted Russian freemen wholesale into slave-captives, completed the misery of the lower and lower-middle classes.

Here, then, in the divorce of classes, the growth of slavery, and the degradation of the poorer freemen, are the chief causes of the ruin of the Social Order of early Russia. For this Social Order appeared more and more to the common people as merely oppressive and hateful.

Lastly, we often forget that, in examining early Russian history, 'we are observing a drama which has for its scene the very edge of the world of Christian culture—the edge beyond which stretched the boundless sea of the steppes', of the heathen and nomadic world of Asia and the Arctic lands, of

he vast countries of Tartars, Turks, and Finns. The Nomades of the steppes, we have seen, were the chief historic courge of early Russia, a Russia which was finally destroyed by he greatest of nomadic empires, in the thirteenth century. Already in the twelfth century (as if in anticipation of the next ge) the attacks of the Kumans so increased in number and iolence that the border region south and south-east of Kiev ecame almost a complete waste. 'Thus men began to ask hemselves whether life was possible under such conditions,' nd two streams of migration set in: one westward, into Galicia nd other Red Russian and White Russian lands (which, in the ext age, passed under Poland and Lithuania); the other, orthward and north-eastward, into the regions of the Upper Volga basin, and beyond, into the lands of Nóvgorod. The ormer was lost to Russia, politically, for ages (not till the eventeenth century is its recovery even begun). The latter reated a new Russia in the northern forests, from which, fter much tribulation, Moscow and the Empire of Moscow, the Empire of the Tsars, arose.

The Republic of Nóvgorod

'Lord Nóvgorod the Great,' *Gospodín Veliki Nóvgorod*, as once called itself, is the starting-point of Russian history. It also the best example of the Russian city-state of the Middle ges. Kiev and Moscow, in their separate times of supremacy, re greater in political importance—the one before 1169 (or at ast before 1125 [1]), the other after about 1380—but no Russian own of any age has the same republican individuality, self-fficiency, activity, and success.

'Who can stand against God and the Great Nóvgorod?' *Któ prótiv Bóga i Velíkago Nóvgoroda?*) was the famous pro-erbial expression of this self-sufficiency and success.

[1] The death-year of Vladímir Monomákh.

Nóvgorod, we have seen, is the first centre of a Russian nation, the first capital—the 'New Town'—of Russia, in the ninth century. With the decline of Kiev in the twelfth, Nóvgorod again becomes the chief centre of Russian city-life, as it had been at the dawn of Russian history. Out of the universal ruin of the Tartar Conquest it alone survives, tributary but almost uninjured, the one important relic of the Old Free Russia. In size and wealth and democratic energy it seems to grow throughout the Tartar age, at least till Moscow, under Dmítri of the Don, takes command of a new *Rus* (about 1380). Even in the early fifteenth century Nóvgorod is probably by far the largest and wealthiest of East Slav settlements.

From the age of the Norman Conquest of England to the fall of the Eastern Empire (*c.* 1070–1450) Nóvgorod is unique among Russian cities as controlling a colonial empire, or sphere of influence, of vast extent. This was mainly in the Far North, extending from Lapland to the Uráls, and perhaps at certain periods to the Siberian Ob. The modern provinces of Olónets and Archangel, with parts of Vólogda, Perm, and Tobólsk, represent this colonial domain—the present *Government* of Nóvgorod standing for the old homeland of the Republic. Both the homeland and the colonial dominion were traditionally divided into five parts (the celebrated *Pyátini* or *Fifths*). In the colonial division were reckoned all the lands beyond Bélo Ózero, including the northern Dviná country, Russian Lapland, the region of Lake Onéga and the White Sea coastlands, the Perm country or the upper Káma basin, the Pechorá basin, and (at the zenith of Nóvgorodian power) the land on both sides of the Northern Uráls.

The Great Nóvgorod of the Middle Ages, the quiet decayed cathedral town of to-day, lies on both sides of the deep and

road Vólkhov, at the beginning of its course from Lake Ilmen
o Lake Ládoga. Here we are about one hundred miles south-
outh-east of Petrograd. Before the Moscovite Conquest of
471 Nóvgorod may be considered as a mediaeval Petersburg—
he great Russian outpost on the Baltic side of *Rus*, the chief
nk, especially in race and trade, with the Western world and
he Western seas. It is the foundation of St. Petersburg that
eals a final blow at the ruined republic, still capable (up to
703) of playing an important provincial and commercial part
n the life of Russia.

As in the Middle Ages, the *Side* or *Quarter of 'St. Sophia'*
till lies on the left or west bank of the Vólkhov, the *Commercial*
ide on the right. The eleventh-century cathedral of the Holy
Visdom is still one of the oldest and most precious historic
monuments of Russia; the walls of the Nóvgorod Kremlin
till show how slender was the old Russian skill in fortification.

But the mighty turbulent republic is no more. The modern
own, of some 26,000 people, has little more than a tenth,
erhaps, of its old numbers, when to Ghillibert de Lannoy,
oming from the Low Countries in 1413, it appeared of such
prodigious size'. The Hanseatic Market is a memory. The
ncient earthen ramparts are in ruins, and of their stone towers
nly one, *The White*, still stands, on the south of the city.
uite as ruinous is the *Tower of Yaroslav* within the town, over-
oking that *Court of Yaroslav*, which was once the favourite
eeting-place of the popular assemblies. The great bell which
mmoned the citizens to these assemblies, or to riot, hangs
ere no longer. More than from Florence or from Ghent has
e old life departed, which made Nóvgorod a Slavonic counter-
rt of the city-states of Italy or of Flanders.

As already suggested, the government and social system of
ovgórod, especially after the death of Vladímir Monomákh

and the beginnings of Kievian decline, is essentially democrat
Nominally, it is an elective principality, and in the han
of a strong character the headship of the State is not witho
its influence. The full course of the democratic current is al
modified by the influence of the Church and the influence
the foreign traders. Yet in the last resort, when inspired
definite purpose and not too much divided by faction, t
Véche[1] or General Assembly of the Citizens is supreme a
irresistible.

The power of the elected princes (especially after 112
rests mainly on their own personality, on the sympathy of t
Church and the leading merchants, and on the capacity of t
individual *knyaz* for maintaining popularity and organizi
definite support. In modern language, Nóvgorod is large
governed by the party system. While the prince can comma
a majority, or at least avoid open defeat in the *Véche*, he
fairly secure; as soon as his party is unpopular, the result
inevitable; in the old Russian phrase, they 'show him t
way out'.

We have seen how independent was the tone of Nóvgor
throughout the time of Kievian power, and how its sem
sovereign position in eastern Europe, and its democratic spi
at home, were alike strengthened by Kievian decline. T
princedom becomes more dependent on popular will. Thu
to take examples only from the middle of the twelfth centur
in 1136 the men of Nóvgorod seize their *knyaz* and impris
him in the archbishop's palace 'with his wife and children a
his mother-in-law', and finally expel him. The next prin
reigns less than a year; his successor is driven out after 'twent
one months'. In 1141 the city 'sat without a prince' for ni
months, and the man next chosen is put in the care of t

[1] Two syllables, *vé-ché*, the emphasis on the first, which is pronounc
like *Vi*enna.

rchbishop and 'let go' after a few weeks. Again, in 1154, Nóvgorod expels its prince and fetches in another who soon oes to reign at Kiev, leaving his son in his place. The son is nown the road before the close of this year. In 1157 his succes- r, despite the support of the *Commercial Side*, has to fly under over of night. The prince next appointed (in 1158) is shown he way out to Ládoga, in 1160—only to be restored after a year, less a week', when his rival and supplanter is 'fetched way'. And in this way examples might be tenfold multiplied. There is another side to the picture. In the changeful line f Nóvgorod princes, we meet at times with men who rule. aroslav the law-giver, in the eleventh century, is such a overeign; Alexander Névski, in the thirteenth, is another. rom 1240, when he gains his surname by his Nevá victory over he Swedes, down to his death in 1263, Alexander dominates Nóvgorod. He even makes the Republic diplomatic. After ich triumphs as his over Swedes and Teutonic Knights,[1] it was ard to submit to the Mongol tax-gatherer, 'taking tribute for he accursed' (1259). But Alexander realizes that to defy the artars is to complete the desolation of a Russia where only Nóvgorod had survived. The hero of the city at last per- ades her of the humiliating truth. He rides out with the Iongol emissaries, whom he had guarded day and night from e fury of the mob, and under his protection 'the accursed go rough the streets, writing down the houses of the *Christians*'. o save the Russian remnant, Alexander journeys repeatedly the head-quarters of the Western Tartar army, or *Golden orde*, upon the Volga—once at least to the Grand Khan in ongolia. Death overtakes him on his way home from a final sit to the Horde. The news reaches Nóvgorod as the Eucha-

[1] The battle of Lake Chudskoe (Peipus)—fought on the ice—on April 5, 42, 'lest they should boast, saying "We will humble the Slovan race under for is not Pskov taken, and are not its chiefs in prison?"'

rist is finishing; turning to the people, Archbishop Cyril tel
the disaster—'The sun of the Russian land has set, my children
'Grant, merciful Lord,' exclaims the chronicler, 'that he ma
see thy face in the age to come, for he has laboured for Nóvgorod
and for the whole Russian land.'

Yet even this hero of the North, fresh from the victory of th
Nevá, has for a time to leave Nóvgorod, 'having quarrelle
with the citizens'. Better thoughts come with reflection
within a year Alexander is recalled.

As time goes on, and both Eastern and Western Christendon
witness the growth of more powerful and centralized monarchies
the Nóvgorod princedom still further declines; by the end o
the fourteenth century, the Grand Prince of Moscow begins t
press hard upon the Republic; and at last, in the later fifteenth
we find the citizens, unable to stand longer alone, doubting onl
whether to become frankly Moscovite or disloyally Polish.

The crisis of 1471, ended by the victory of Moscow, bring
into special prominence the second person in the tempora
polity of Nóvgorod. At this time we hear nothing of a prince
but much of the *posádnik*, governor, or burgomaster Isaac (o
Simon) Borétski, and of the *posádnitsa* Marfa, his 'accursed
widow. This remarkable woman, a Russian parallel to Elizabet
of England, Catherine de' Medici, and the rest of the female off
spring of the Classical Renaissance, plays a vital part in th
intrigues which almost succeed in detaching Nóvgorod fro
Rus and the Eastern Church. She is therefore not highl
flattered by the Moscovite annalists from whom come most o
our records of the fall of the Republic. The hatred of he
opponents [1] shows the influence which one *posádnik* at least wa

[1] 'That tempter, the Devil, entered into the wily Marfa Isakova Boré
skaya, and that accursed woman entangled herself in words of guile with th
Lithuanian *knyaz* . . . she beguiled the people, diverting them from th
right way to Latinism, for the dark deceits of Latinism blinded the eyes o
her soul through the wiles of the cunning Devil.'

ıble to exercise. And even in more normal periods strong ınd popular *governors* sometimes appear, and play a leading ɔart in home and foreign politics. At times[1] the Nóvgorod lemocracy keeps a *posádnik* in office, in defiance of the ɔrince. 'He is without blame . . . therefore we bow down to hee, but this is our *posádnik*, and we will not give in to this.' Yet next year the fickle monster may displace its favourite, only to restore him the following winter. But usually these burgomasters, like the princes, are creatures of the popular will. They ire set up and cast down almost as frequently, and their fate is harder. Deposed princes are shown the road, but deposed *posádniks* are often killed.

The riots of 1209 give a vivid picture of the city in uproar over an unpopular burgomaster:

'The men of Nóvgorod held a *Véche* over *posádnik* Dmítri nd his brethren, because they had ordered the levying of silver n the people of Nóvgorod, for collecting money throughout he district, [and] fines from the merchants, for enforcing the ollection of taxes at fixed times, and everything bad. And they vent to plunder their *courts*,[2] and set fire to . . . Dmítri's, seizing heir effects; they sold all their villages and servants, they sought ut their treasures, and took of them without number, and the est they divided, so that each got some. . . . God alone knows ow much any took secretly. And many grew rich from this. . . . The same year they brought Dmítri dead . . . and buried him. . . . The people of Nóvgorod wanted to throw him from the ridge, but the archbishop . . . forbade. . . . And the men of Nóvgorod kissed the honourable cross, That we will not keep Dmítri's children by us. . . .'

As everywhere in Old Russia, the Church in Nóvgorod is of he first importance. From some points of view the Republic

[1] As in 1218.

[2] *Dvory*, houses, especially the houses of the great, with their enclosures, ıtbuildings, &c.

has been well described as semi-theocratic. Its prelates share power with princes and burgomasters. Religious feelings, religious scruples, are the most efficient checks on the activity of the popular assembly. As early as 1034 *Nestor* mentions a bishop of the city,[1] and in 1045 the historic cathedral of the Holy Wisdom is built by Yaroslav the Law-giver and his son Vladimir. 'St. Sophia' becomes the symbol of the prosperity, freedom, and power of the city. 'Where St. Sophia is, there is Nóvgorod,' exclaims one of the princes, in 1215. 'Come to your patrimony, to St. Sophia,' the citizens beseech another, in the same year. 'With the aid of St. Sophia' Nóvgorod conquers in battle. Sooner than submit to the Mongol census of 1259, the people resolve to die honourably for St. Sophia. 'I bow down to St. Sophia, and to the men of Nóvgorod;' . . . 'I make my greeting to St. Sophia and to you: God grant that I may lie by my father in St. Sophia,' are typical expressions of princely courtesy to the city. An accused archbishop who has been exiled rights himself 'through God and St. Sophia'. 'The Devil crushed by God and St. Sophia,' is the exclamation of the chronicler, at the end of a riot, when 'brethren come together . . . and kiss the Cross'.

The *Nóvgorod Chronicle*, the official annals of the city, a work of ecclesiastics, abounds in reference to Church matters. Almost every other year we read of the consecration or adornment of a church or monastery, 'a refuge for Christians, a joy to angels, and ruin to the Devil'. Often it is St. Sophia itself, Nóvgorod's Westminster, which is repaired or beautified, or which becomes the burial-place of another prince.

The *Vladýkas* or Bishops, usually chosen by the Prince and citizens, but needing confirmation by the *Metropolitan of All Rus* at Kiev, Vladimir, or Moscow, somewhat depend on popular favour for their election, and largely depend on the same for

[1] One Tidyata.

ontinuance in office. Thus, in 1211, the archbishop of the ay, one Mitrofan, is exiled, 'bearing this gladly, like John Chrysostom', and after eight years is recalled by the same General Assembly and Church of the Citizens.

Monasticism, which began in the Eastern Church, and has lways played so prominent a part in Russia, is of course power- ul in the great Russian trading town. From its ranks, here s elsewhere in the Orthodox Communion, the higher clergy re mostly drawn. Foundations of monasteries—'refuges for nchorites, delights to the faithful, terrors to devils.'—are ommon events indeed in the annals of Nóvgorod: they are andmarks in the architectural and artistic and social life of the Republic.

As in the West, so in the East. The greatest soldiers and tatesmen often take refuge in the cloister. Alexander Névski imself, when he feels his mortal illness upon him, is 'shorn' as monk.[1]

'Mediaeval society', many still believe, 'included only oldiers, churchmen, and peasants.' The Old Free Russia, and specially Nóvgorod, gives as much help against this superstition s any Western land. The burgess, the responsible citizen, who ossesses a stake in the country, and who deliberates, votes, and ghts for its freedom and well-being, is constantly in evidence n the history of the North Russian Republic.

But beyond the ordinary life of the average prosperous medi- eval town the merchant and his trade hold an exceptional rank n Nóvgorod. For this was the chief commercial centre of the astern Slavs, at least from the middle of the twelfth century— was certainly little less than this in earlier time, from the oundation of Russia—and here, in the later Middle Ages, was

[1] November 14, 1263.

one of the four leading factories of the Hanseatic League i non-German lands.

Both before and during the reign of Frederick Barbarossa (the exact contemporary of our Henry II) 'foreign', apparentl German, traders are noticed at Nóvgorod; Bremen merchan appear in the neighbouring lands of Livonia; and direct com merce between Cologne and Russia is recorded.[2] The agree ment concluded in 1269—in the first years of the North Germa *Hansa*, the last years of Henry III of England—betwee Nóvgorod, Lübeck, and Gothland, shows that the *Némtsy* had long possessed a regular commercial status on the Vólkho And the famous *Skra* or Code of the German factory here go back to the early thirteenth century, a generation before th permanent organization of the Hanseatic League.

Half Nóvgorod is known, we have seen, as the *Commerci Side*. Here the foreign traders had their quarters—the guildhall, their church of St. Peter, their shops, stores, an dwelling-houses. This *Court of the Némtsy*,[4] *Court of the Ge mans*, or *Court of St. Peter*, was built for defence as well as fo trade—like the Hansa settlements in Bergen and London and was closed and guarded at night. At its head was a Counc of Aldermen, with a President, the chief Alderman of St. Peter Court. *Common Rooms* were maintained for all the Hanseatic 'summer and winter travellers' alike, the privileged seafare and the landsmen whose easier life was rewarded with few privileges. The junior clerks and apprentices had plenty freedom in the 'children's room'.

[1] 1152–90. 'Foreign' traders of Scandinavian origin, besides t original Swedish *Rus*, of course abound in Nóvgorod from the age of Ruri

[2] 1142, 1157, 1165.

[3] The 'dumb' or 'incomprehensible' folk, the old Russian term mo in use for Germanic foreigners (sometimes including Scandinavians).

[4] See the note on p. 191.

The *Némtsy* of St. Peter's Court had their own brewery, es, and forests. Their organization was largely governed by e sound principles of keeping their good things to themselves d guarding against fraud by their customers. Above all, they bade the intrusion of non-Hanseatics into the Russian trade. In the early days of this factory, the annual profits were ored at St. Mary's Church in Visby—another indication of othland influence. The original authors of the *Skra* were obably Gothland merchants, and the Nóvgorod Court of the *émtsy* is perhaps, at first, a dependency of Visby. But in the rteenth century the Gothland domination is first rivalled, en replaced, by that of Lübeck. Thus from 1346 the Han- tic President in Nóvgorod is chosen, by representatives of e Hanse towns, from among Lübeck and Visby merchants.

The growth of German, and especially of Hanseatic, trade in óvgorod and other parts of western Russia during the Mongol e (1220–1460) is not only due to the business ability of the rman merchants. It is aided by the disasters, and consequent pendence, of so much of the Russian people at this time—by rtar, Lithuanian, and even Teutonic conquest.

Except in Flanders, no field of non-German trade gives so le a Hanseatic picture, shows so many Hanseatic centres gaged in the local commerce. Merchants of Brunswick, rtmund, Duisburg, Magdeburg, and many other Teutonic vns appear in Nóvgorod, in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and centh centuries, often travelling by the dangerous overland tes. And even mediaeval Russians sometimes venture far rland, in search of customers.

The Annals of Nóvgorod abound in notices of trade, especially n early in the twelfth century. We have seen an instance 1209) of the whole city in uproar over extortions practised n merchants. We read again, not once or twice, of com- cial interests causing foreign war and civil strife. Trade

is the life of the Republic: if other Russians could not 'liv without drinking', Nóvgorod could hardly exist witho commerce.

Every rank, power, and interest in Nóvgorod rests upon th Sovereign People. As no dynasty can establish itself perma nently, still less any aristocracy of Western type, the Republ preserves with peculiar purity the ancient democratic ideas an institutions. From the death of Vladímir Monomákh down the Moscovite conquest, the city is more powerful than any its lords, officials, or classes. As we have seen, the great popul assembly, comparable to the *ecclesia* of Athens in power, supremely characteristic of Nóvgorod. Once the city-sta has fully developed (before the middle of the twelfth centur the *Véche*—which is both a citizen republic and a Christia community—supervises all government. It invites a new princ and arraigns, imprisons, or expels him when it pleases. It elec and deposes burgomasters and the lesser officers of state. Wi due respect to the sacred lot, and to Orthodox feeling, it elec the bishops: in other words, it designates the favoured fe from whom a new *Vladýka* might be chosen. It is free, extreme cases, to depose an unpopular prelate.

It decides peace and war, banns black magic and pagan supe stitions, punishes crime. A bad character, or unpopular pe sonage, may be hurled from the Great Bridge—or otherwi disposed of—at the conclusion of a *Véche*.

Like the Polish Diets, the Nóvgorod *Véches* nominal respect the primitive Slav principle of *necessary unanimity*. B there is no real *liberum veto* on the Vólkhov. Minorities Nóvgorod are bludgeoned, ducked, drowned, put to the swor or expelled. Prince or *posádnik*, or any respectable par among the citizens, can legally or practically summon th *Véche*. Sometimes rival personages, or rival parties, call riv

éches, and the meetings end with desperate fighting, a nference, or the mediation of the archbishop.

On any general view of European history, there are few inci- nts more suggestive than the colonial expansion of Russia— e eastern vanguard of Western civilization.

However we may criticize the Russian people, it is certainly e pioneer and representative of Christendom in the north- st of Europe and in North Asia. And nowhere in the Old orld has the dominion of the higher races been so much dened as in the lands from the Black Sea to the White, and om the Baltic to the Sea of Japan, which have been gradually nquered or colonized by the *Rus*.

As we have seen, the primitive Russian homeland did not clude more than a portion of the present Russia-in-Europe. icial movements of remarkable depth and tenacity, continued er several centuries, have gradually given so noteworthy an tension to the Russian name.

The first discovery of those two Siberias—European and iatic—which lay to the north of the primitive *Rus*, as far as e Polar Ocean and the Ob river, was the work of Nóvgorod.

Probably about the time of the First Crusade (1096), and rtainly before the Second (1147), the Republic had already me into touch with that corner of Asia, between the Uráls d the Ob estuary, which was known to the Russians of that e as *Yúgra*.

Long before this, perhaps as early as the time of Cnut the reat, the Nóvgorod pioneers had penetrated to Lapland, to e White Sea, and even to the Uráls. One of the north Urál sses probably corresponds to those *Iron Gates* where the men Nóvgorod suffered disaster in 1032—'few returned, but ıny perished there'.

The time of Henry I of England shows Nóvgorod communi-

cating with the Asiatic lands beyond the dividing range. Speaking of a year which apparently answers to A. D. 1112, the *Ancient Chronicle* tells how a Nóvgorod personage [1] sent his servant to the Pechorá, how the Pechorá folk then paid tribute to *Novgrad*,[2] and how from the Pechorá the messenger went on to *Yúgra*. We may doubt the *Yúgrian* report of a mysterious people enclosed in lofty mountains by the sea, vainly struggling to break out, and accessible only by a minute opening through which they screeched their unknown lingo, thrust out an iron finger, and bartered furs for iron. But we need not doubt that 'Nestor' in this entry refers to the real fact of Nóvgorodian intercourse with the north-west corner of Asiatic Siberia early in the twelfth century.

And this Siberian intercourse is not a passing incident like the early Russian dominion on the Azóv or in the Crimea, or the early Russian raids towards and beyond the Caucasus. It is indeed so far persistent [3] throughout the central and later Middle Ages that when Nóvgorod is displaced by Moscow, the Moscovite power is able to continue and develop the Russian overlordship in *Yúgra*. What Nóvgorod had asserted (with uncertain success, it is true) down to 1445, Moscow takes up with more vigorous hand, greater resources, and more definite result, from 1465.

In 1471 Moscow crushes Nóvgorod and enters upon its whole inheritance. But at least six years before this the founder of the Moscow Tsardom, Ivan the Great, had begun the conquest of the Asiatic Siberia with which Nóvgorod had dealt so long.

The less remote colonial provinces or spheres of the Republic were probably acquired, in part at least, before the way was

[1] Guryata Rogovishch by name. [2] See p. 6, note 2.

[3] Thus in 1187 there is a great native rising, both east and west of Urál against Nóvgorod; in 1193–4 a disastrous punitive expedition; in 1323, 1329, &c., notices of Nóvgorod citizens travelling to *Yúgra*.

pened to *Yúgra*; but our records are here scanty in the extreme. n later times, the twelfth and following centuries, we have fuller eferences to Novgorod influence, trade, and military action ere; and fullest of all is our knowledge (though fragmentary nd badly-lighted even in this) of the intrusion of Moscow into ese regions at the expense of the older Russian colonists. The undation of Vyátka in 1174; the tribute-gathering expedition 1169 in the northern Dviná basin; the hold of the Republic on the Kóla region of Lapland in the thirteenth century; ne native risings against Nóvgorod domination;—are broken ghts of evidence for a fascinating chapter of colonial history. rom the time when Iván Kalitá, the first founder of Moscovite ower, demands *tribute in silver* for the lands beyond the Káma robably with special reference to the mines which Nóvgorod id long exploited in the Northern Uráls), the pressure of loscow continues and increases, till all the people of Yúgra and e Pechorá, of the Dviná and of Kóla, had 'kissed the cross' fealty to the new Head of *Rus*.

This early Russian expansion, it may be remembered, is led t by an absolute monarch and his soldiers, but by a fickle mocracy, whose chief activity is commerce, and to whom the ht of insurrection is sacred. One may also notice that the e life of Old Nóvgorod has left widely-scattered traces in orth Russia. Thus the colony planted in the well-stocked d beautiful woodland of far-away Vyátka in 1174—though no ger governed by elected civil magistrates, sharing power, in vgorod fashion, with Church dignitaries—yet still keeps ch of the manners and customs, the domestic architecture, dialect, and even the head-dress, of the mother city.

On the other hand, when autocratic Moscow displaces its rty-loving rival, popular government has clearly been found ting in Russia. If Nóvgorod had not fallen before Moscow,

she would have fallen away to Poland. Ivan the Great conquer her, in the name of Russia and Orthodoxy, to save her from treachery and *Latinism*. And Moscow certainly substitutes a clearer political reality, and a higher national unity, for the ill-ordered diversity of the turbulent city-states which she absorbed in northern *Rus*—Nóvgorod, Pskov, Vyátka, and the rest.

To understand the Russian expansion in which Nóvgorod took so great a share, we must not overlook the influence of rivers. The territorial growth of Russia, like that of French America, is largely a river-history—a progress from end to end of a river-basin, a passing from one river-system to another. The slight elevation of the northern plains aids the inland navigator from Baltic to Urál.

And again, if the Urál were not, in so much of its course despite length and breadth, a very moderate obstacle—in height as in scenery, something of a Russian *Schwarzwald*—the early Nóvgorod connexion with *Yúgra* might be quoted as another disproof of the fallacy that mountain chains form an absolute barrier between states and races.

Lastly, the Empire of Nóvgorod, like the home-life of the Republic, is largely commercial: her discoveries and conquests are perhaps normally the results of trade expansion. The mercantile side of history has often been treated with contempt. But what form of man's energy has done more to bring about the discovery of the earth, to 'clear the mind of cant', to break down the obstacles of ignorance, fear and prejudice which once hemmed in mankind, and separated lands and races?

Russia under the Tartars

The Tartar Conquest

Old Nóvgorod is the only Russian state, or city, of impor-
ance which escapes full subjugation by the Mongols of the
hirteenth century. And even Nóvgorod, saved from siege and
ck behind her marshes, in a summer of providential wetness,
ecomes the vassal of the Tartars. The Asiatic irruption, which
ters the whole course of Russian history, and so sharply divides
e life and polity of the Old Free *Rus* from the life of Russia in
cceeding times, breaks upon all eastern Europe with the force
sudden terror. 'For our sins came unknown tribes. No one
nows exactly who they are, nor whence they came out, nor
hat their language is, nor of what race they are, nor what their
ith is, but they call them *Tatáry*. . . . God alone knows who
ey are, and whence they come out. Very wise men know
em exactly, who understand books, but we do not. . . .'[1]

It was in 1224 that the *Ta-ta* armies, which in this first
arter of the thirteenth century had already formed out of the
in of the older Orient the largest Asiatic empire in history,
st came in conflict with the *Rus*. Under the chief of a petty
ongol tribe, a great military genius, who had gradually
ought under his leadership all the eastern and most of the
stern Turks, a new empire of Huns, a new confederation of
iatic Nomades, had been formed. And this chieftain, the
st terrible of land-wasters, best known by his title of Chingiz
'Jenghiz' Khan, had now conquered all of modern Mongolia,
ch of Manchuria, a great part of northern China, with Peking
lf, and most of what is now Chinese and Russian Turkestan.

[1] *Chronicle of Nóvgorod*, A. D. 1224.

Finally, he had proclaimed for himself and his race a universal lordship—one sun in Heaven and one lord on Earth.

From the conquest of Bukhára, a part of the Mongol host led by the strategist Subudai, the most brilliant of the lieutenants of Chingiz, fought its way round the southern shore of the Caspian Sea, broke into Georgia, forced the passes of the Caucasus, and overran the steppe-lands of the Kumans, nearest neighbours of the *Rus* to south and east.

'These cursed *Pólovtsy*, godless sons of Ishmael, had indeed wrought evil to the Russian land, and they died by the wrath of God and his immaculate mother, to atone for the blood of Christians upon them.' So wrote the annalist of Nóvgorod a little later, but at the moment the Russian rulers felt the force of the Kuman appeal: 'They have taken our country to-day to-morrow they will take yours.'

Nearly all the princes of *Rus*, from Nóvgorod and Smolénsk to Kiev and Galicia, made common cause with the 'Pólovets people': the Khan of 'these accursed' proclaimed his conversion to Orthodox Christianity.

After a series of successes against outposts, and after the thoughtless and criminal massacre of the Tartar envoys, the Russians met their new enemy, the most sinister in all their history, just beyond the little river Kálka, close to the north shore of the Azov Sea (May 31, 1224). 'But the Pólovets men ran away back, having accomplished nothing, and in their flight they trampled the camp of the Rus princes, and they were all thrown into confusion, and there was a terrible and savage slaughter.' The Tartars pursued the Russians to the Dnieper several of the vanquished princes were taken and suffocated—'put under boards', while the Tartar chiefs themselves 'took seat upon them to have dinner'. One of the leading fugitives who reached the Dnieper, 'cut loose the boats from the bank . . and himself barely escaped. And of the rest of the people, every

nth man returned to his home. . . . But the Tartars turned ack at the Dnieper, and we know not whence they came, nor here they hid themselves again. God knows whence he tched them against us, for our sins.'

So the annalist of Nóvgorod wrote in 1224; in little more an a decade, some nine years after the death of their Attila,[1] ne godless Tartars returned. Their first attack, a reconnaisnce in force, had been by the south; their next onslaught—ne of conquest—was by the north-east, through the *Black ulgaria* of the Volga, our Kazán. 'The year of the world 6744 . D. 1236) . . . This year the Tartars seized all the Bolgar land, nd took their great city, and slew all, even wives and children.'[2] hus perished the chief market of the Volga, one of the central oints of interest in the Oriental life of the Middle Ages, the anstor of the Fair of Nízhni[3] Nóvgorod, and the most northerly lony of Islam. Yet neither the trade nor the faith of Old ulgaria was permanently extinguished. Both reappear in the azán of later time; the former lives also in the Great Fair ittle higher up the Volga. And even the Bulgar race, although tradition, in this northern branch of the stock, is fatally scured from this time, perhaps survives in some measure in e obstinately Muhammadan people of Kazán.

The collapse of the Volga Bulgarians, and of the Kumans of e steppes, opened Russia to attack along the whole of the east d south-east, and the worst fears of patriots were realized. e 'Tartar foreigners' poured west like locusts. The town d principality of Ryazán, to the south-east of Moscow, was first important bulwark of *Rus* itself, on the side of Old lgaria; it did not stand long.

Chingiz, who by about 1206 had formed his Turco-Tartar Empire in its Mongolian form, died in 1227.

Chronicle of Nóvgorod, A. D. 1236.

Cf. note on p. 114.

'The year of the world 6746 (A. D. 1238). . . . The Tartar
sent envoys to the princes of Ryazán, a sorceress and two men
demanding a tenth of everything, of men and princes and horses
And the princes said, When none of us remain, all will be your
And they sent to George of Vladímir asking for help. . . . But
George listened not to the request, but wished to make war
separately. But it was too late to oppose the wrath of God, as
was said to Joshua the son of Nun, *I will send upon them before*
you perplexity, and thunder, and fear, and trembling. . . . And
the foreign pagans encompassed Ryazán, and fenced it in with
a stockade.'

An attempt at relief was made from Kolómna, George of
Vladímir helping, but it ended in disaster, 'and many fell
here, and the men of *Moscow* ran away, having seen nothing.'[1]
The Tartars had 'advanced against Ryazán' on the 16th of
December, and on Mid-winter Day, the 21st, the town fell
with terrible butchery. 'They killed the prince and his wife
men, women, and children, monks, and nuns, and priests.'

Next came the turn of Vladímir, claimant of the *Grand*
Princedom since the decline of Kiev, but almost useless as
leader of *Rus*. Hither from Ryazán came

'the pagan and godless Tartars, a host of shedders of
Christian blood. . . . And the whole of the province shut
themselves up in Vladímir. And the lawless Ishmaelites
surrounded the town and fenced it round. And it was in
the morning that the Prince Vsévolod and the Bishop
Mitrofán saw that the town must be taken, and they entered
the Church of the Mother of God, and were all shorn into
the schema[2] by the bishop—prince and princess, daughter
and daughter-in-law, good men and women. And the lawless
ones set up battering rams, and took the town, and fired it
on the Friday before Sexagesima.'

Prince and princess and bishop had taken refuge in the

[1] One of the earliest notices of Moscow in history.

[2] I. e. admitted to the strictest form of monastic life.

Church of the Virgin Mother, but the pagans, breaking in he doors and piling up burning wood around, slew all. Thus they perished, giving up their souls to God.'

After the town, its sovereign. The feckless George, titular ead of the Russian people, had fled: he was soon overtaken. While he fancied himself to be sending out scouting parties he vas himself entrapped. The scouts 'came running, "They ave surrounded us already". And behold the Tartars came up uddenly, and the prince fled, without having done anything. And when he reached the river Sit[1] they overtook him, and here he ended his life.'

Thus 'the accursed' work their will on the fragments of disnited and defeated Russia. Moscow, and Pereyaslávl, and Tver, nd many another town greater than the Moscow of those days, ney take, quickly and easily—'Rostóv and Súzdal going each its wn way'—only at Nóvgorod is the flood arrested. Advancing orth-west, the foe master Torzhók[2] with another indiscrimiate massacre. 'They slew all, from the male sex even to the male, all the priests and the monks, and all, stripped and reviled, ave up their souls to the Lord in a bitter and a wretched death.' he road to the Baltic was now open, and the 'accursed lawless nes' pushed on, cutting down every one like grass—but before ie heaven-protected birthplace of the *Rus* the Mongols paused. od, and the sacred apostolic cathedral of the Holy Wisdom, and e prayers of the bishop, of the faithful princes, of the monks, arded the Republic.[3] At the *Cross of Ignáti*, 70 miles away, the vader turned aside, weary and disgusted with the thick woodnds, vast morasses, and incessant rains, which confronted and peded him. For all this summer it 'stood with' wet.

[1] Almost at the frontier of the Nóvgorod territories.

[2] Torzhók is the diminutive of, and an alternative name for, the town Nóvi Torg (= New Market), south of Nóvgorod.

[3] So the *Nóvgorod Chronicle*, 1238.

Yet Nóvgorod, though saved for the moment, would soon have shared the fate of the rest of Russia, if she had not placated the danger by prompt, unvarying submission. Her princes and officials now obey the Tartar *Tsar* in all things, visiting the *Horde* when summoned,[1] doing homage, punctually paying tribute, admitting Mongol assessors and tax-gatherers,[2] showing every mark of respectful vassalage. The orders of the Khan brook no evasion or delay, and the hero Alexander Névski, statesman no less than soldier, is especially active in propitiation.

Thus, in 1259, when 'the accursed raw-eating Tartars came taking tribute for the accursed', the Republic, we have seen, though bursting with defiance, yields to the judgement of its leader. Nóvgorod rages and trembles; the greater men 'bid the lesser be counted for tribute'; the citizens gather in force—they will 'lay their heads by St. Sophia'; but the city pays at last, without a blow.

Nóvgorod escapes destruction; but her great rival, already so heavily buffeted by fortune, receives the full fury of the Tartar storm (1240). From the low east shore of the Dnieper, the Mongols, it is said, gazed with astonishment and delight on the white walls and coloured roofs, the church domes and towers, of the still splendid town on the heights of the western bank. Under the leadership of Baty, their supreme commander in the west, a grand-nephew of Chingiz, the Nomade hosts stormed the old Russian capital. 'It was hardly possible within the city' declares the chronicler, 'to hear oneself speak—such was the din of the assault, the groaning of the wooden chariots, the lowing of the buffaloes, the grunting of the camels, the neighing of the horses, the shrieks of the warriors.' By the *Polish Gate* the enemy forced his entrance, and the sack which followed was decisive for Old Kiev. When Carpini, five years later, passed

[1] As in 1247. [2] As in 1257, 1259.

rough the *Mother of Russian Cities*, there were but a few uses standing, and a few survivors sheltering. Not till the eteenth century does *Chive* revive as a large and prosperous y, and then only as capital of a *Little Russia*.

With Kiev fall the south and south-west of *Rus*: the ncipalities of Volýnia and Galicia are quickly overrun, and e Tartar hordes pass on to the attack of the lands of Central rope. Hungary is overwhelmed and devastated, almost from d to end. Poland suffers only less severely. Even the borders the Holy Empire, of the German nation—Silesia, Moravia— threatened and insulted.

But now the death of the Grand Khan Okkodai, second mperor and Moderator of all the Tartars', the son and first suc- sor of Chingiz, who ended his short and terrible reign in China, ped to recall the Mongol flood from Europe. The immense ent of the Tartar advance into the west, the almost infinite gthening of the lines of communication, the increased vigour l obstinacy of the resistance offered on the borders of the rmanic world—at Olmütz or at Liegnitz—the satiety uch a marvellous and interminable series of victories and ches, also contributed to the ebb of the Nomade tide. it was the conquest of Persia and of China, occupying all the rgies of the Tartars for so many years (till about 1280), which lly saved non-Russian Europe from another attack.

radually the Mongol hold over western *Rus* relaxes; ngol garrisons withdraw; the Lithuanian armies are able to at the Tartar forces in the Dnieper basin; only the east and h-east of our Russia-in-Europe—the Middle and Lower ga, the Don and Donéts (= Little Don), the Crimea, the pes between Don and Dnieper—are retained in immediate ession by the *Golden Horde* in the fourteenth century and

the early fifteenth. But all the Russian land not overru by western enemies remains, as we have seen, under th Mongol obedience.

Within the desolated and broken fragments of tributar Russia her Tartar masters introduce little direct politic change. To each principality they leave its constitution, i laws, and (usually) its dynasty.[1] The position of Russia und the Mongols may be compared with that of Moldavia and Wall chia under the Ottoman Turks. Like the Rumanians, th Russians remain in possession of their lands. They are n fully annexed to the Mongol dominions, nor directly subjecte to *Tartarization*; but they are under a definite and ofte grinding overlordship. At all times of importance, the Ru sian princes are compelled to visit the *Horde*—the court ar camp of the Khan of the *Golden Horde* upon the Lower Volg himself a viceroy, for many years, of the supreme Mongo Tartar Emperor, or Grand Khan, in Mongolia or in Chin For authorization to rule, for investiture in their principalitie for justification against any grave charge,[2] for the solution such disputes as were then so frequent between prince claimants, rivals, and enemies—on all such occasions the Russia vassals appear before their suzerain. At times these pilgrimag have to be extended to the court of the Grand Khan in Asia.

The Russian people, even in Nóvgorod, are obliged to pa heavy poll taxes, whose severity repeatedly provokes rebellio and disorders.[3] By farming these taxes in the fourteen century—until strong enough to lead the patriot cause—th princes of Moscow laid at least one foundation-stone of the wealth and power.

[1] Where the princely line survived.

[2] With which the Tartar overlordship could be in any way connected.

[3] As in 1262 at Súzdal, in 1284 at Kursk, in 1318 at Kolomna, in 13 at Tver.

Again, every Russian principality is bound to furnish the ongol armies with a contingent of troops, on demand. ssians are thus frequently brought against Russians, and the t faint stirrings of national revival are crushed with the help the oppressed themselves. Sometimes Russian troops are ployed, like slaves of an Assyrian monarch, at the other end the Empire and of Asia, at the utmost possible distance from me. A 'faithful Russian regiment' camped near Peking is quently noticed in the Mongol-Chinese records.

Once more, no Russian ruler, state, or town, is allowed to ry on hostilities with another without the Khan's permission. d, generally, in social life, in finance, in war, and in the theory l practice of government, the Tartar influence is deep and g-continued. The Russian princely and aristocratic families sometimes forced, bribed, or attracted into matrimonial ances with the Tartars. In all but physical origin, the early ars of Moscow, it has well been said, are far more descendants l imitators of the Tartar Khans than of the Old Russian nces. The Moscovite autocracy is largely built on Mongol ndations, and largely after Mongol pattern. The partial aration of Russia from the rest of Christendom, and especially m central and western Europe, is, above all, due to the Tartar quest and domination—the *Tatárshchina*. The half-Oriental usion of Russian women, which lasts, in a measure, till the orms of Peter the Great, is probably, to a large extent, of tar origin—though Byzantine contributory influence must be forgotten, here as elsewhere. And the same may haps be said of the tortures, mutilations, and floggings, the ant and painful banishments and forced labour, of the later sian laws; of much of the military equipment and civil dress Russians till the age of Peter; of the prostrations and other ilities both of the court and of the Church.[1]

[1] Due allowance being made for Byzantine influence as well.

But the Tartar influences also produce, at least indirectly, surprising increase in the comparative power and resources that Church. In the national disasters religion is often the chi remaining comfort. Among the national humiliations, after th first storm of the conquest, the Asiatic overlords make a parti exception of things and persons ecclesiastical. The Tartars the later thirteenth century show, in various quarters—Persia Russian, Chinese and other—a decided leaning towards Christ anity : high hopes of their conversion are entertained, both Rome and elsewhere, till the age of Timur (1370–1405).[1] Th princes of Moscow lean on the Church as their surest suppor the Khans of the *Golden Horde*, even after their definite pr fession of Islam, seem hardly less anxious to win the friendsh and alliance of the clergy.

The Lithuanians and Russia

The *godless Litvá* of Russian annals, the last importa heathen race of Europe, had little concern with *Rus* before th Mongol conquest. As early as 1183 we hear of the men Pskov, the *younger sister* of Old Nóvgorod in the extreme nort west, fighting with the Lithuanians : in 1258 the Tartars ' to all Litvá land and killed the people '—it reads like the end of a possible danger from this quarter—but we know what the large phrases mean to chroniclers (as to journalists) of ma countries. And here it is more than usually misleading.

For at this very time (1240–63) the *Litvá* were first becomi a serious political power under their Prince Mindovg, the capt of Grodno. And a few years later, the next of the great Lithu nian military leaders or *dukes*, Gedimin the Conqueror, tea away most of the west and south-west of Russia, with Ki

[1] The life of Timur sees the complete defection of all the western Tu and Tartars to Muhammadanism.

lf (1315–40). The great fortress of *Brest Litóvsk*,[1] *Brest of the vá*, on the Polish Buh, the easternmost of the *Polish Quadri-ral*, still preserves the memory of these Lithuanian conquests. beyond Brest, Gedimin masters Pinsk and Pólotsk, Vladímir ýnsk, with the whole of the Volynian principality, Chernígov, n Kiev itself, with most of what we know as *Little Russia*. th admirable policy he courts the favour both of the Ortho- and of the Roman Church, both of the cities and of the ntry-folk. Large sections of western *Rus* 'welcome this master who freed them at once from the crushing yoke of Mongols and from their own eternal civil strife'. On one , he endeavours to legitimatize his conquests in Russian eyes contracting alliances with the House of St. Vladímir, by per-ting his son to embrace the Orthodox faith, by authorizing construction of Orthodox churches.[2] On the other hand, welcomes Franciscan and Dominican missionaries, negotiates n the Papacy, offers to recognize its spiritual supremacy at price of its friendly influence in holding back or diverting Teutonic Knights. From Germany he draws artists, artisans, merchants to his new capital at Vilna.[3]

lgerd, son and successor of Gedimin, brings Lithuanian er nearly to its zenith (1345–77). He defeats Nóvgorod,[4] es Pskov to obedience, conquers Podolia and almost the le basin of the Dnieper, expels the Tartars from the ian south-west, overruns the Crimea, and ruins that ancient rson which had outlived the barbarian attacks of two

ee the note on p. 207.

g. at Vilna and Novogoródek.

Here, on the Vilya, Gedimin fixed the permanent centre of Lithuanian es and nationality.

lgerd's attack in 1346 follows upon some plain language from Nóv-. 'Your *posádnik*', declares the duke, 'has barked at me: he called hound.' The abusive *posádnik* is executed by his fellow citizens, in aginian wise, 'for it is owing to you that our lands have been seized'.

thousand years. Thus he extends the *Litvá* empire from t
Baltic to the Black Sea. In 1370 he penetrates almost
Moscow. But for Poland and the Teutonic Order, Olgerd, li
(and unlike) Vitovt in the next century, might have subdu
all the fragments of the Russian race.

The next era, the age of the 'Jagellons' (1377–1434), witness
the chief events of Lithuanian history. Under Duke Iagáil
this great heathen race accepts Roman Christianity, as the pri
of the crown of Poland, and gains its decisive victory over t
German knights. The Litvá prince becomes the Polish kin
the Litvá people are baptized; Tannenberg is won. Despi
all difficulties Personal-Union gradually hardens, as in the Briti
Isles, into National-Union. The work of 1386 is completed
1569. No prominent European people has shown less politic
insight than the Poles, in recent centuries—but the marriag
treaty of Queen Hedwig with 'Jagiellon', completed in t
desperate hope of ending an everlasting Polish-Litvá warfa
at all costs,[2] is a master-stroke. It creates the mighty Poli
state of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the seventeen
century. It holds back the Moscovite till Peter the Great.
forms a powerful and fairly effective barrier against Turki
advance beyond Hungary, Transylvania, and the Euxine stepp
It arrests and rolls back the German crusading and colon
expansion, the *Drang nach Osten* in Baltic lands. It shatt
the Teutonic Order, wins Courland and Old Prussia from t
German knights and settlers, commences a momentous Slavo
revival, a notable Germanic depression. Not till the rise
Brandenburg-Prussia under the Great Elector,[3] and the rec

[1] Of which name *Jagellon*, the ordinary term, is a Germanization.
p. 87 and p. 30, n. 2.

[2] These including the sacrifice of every personal feeling of Queen Hedw
who loathed her barbarian bridegroom.

[3] The contemporary of our Charles II, 1640–88.

y of Moscovite Russia under the Románovs, do its effects in to weaken. In the time of Charles I of England, as in that Richard II and Henry IV, Poland-Lithuania is mistress of all tern *Rus*.

With Duke Vitovt, the partner and ally of the Polish king, o governs Lithuania from 1392 to 1430, partly as co-reign, partly as chief vassal, of 'Jagellon',[1] ends the last hope t Lithuanian conversion, despite the Roman allegiance of the gellons', might ultimately profit the Eastern Church. 'For nce Vitovt (the Nóvgorod annalist bemoans in 1399) 'had viously been a *Christian*; but he renounced the Orthodox th and adopted the Polish, and perverted the holy churches ervice hateful to God.' Yet in the great Duchy of Lithuania, n the time of its formation by Gedimin, a majority of istians has perhaps always belonged to the Russian race and h. The official documents of the Litvá dukes long con-ed to be written in White Russian. The savage struggles hese dukes and their people against the German Order im-ed a specially bitter anti-Roman colour to Lithuanian iotism, for a time. Cruel were the trials of some of the Latin missionaries.

inally, with the death of Vitovt,[2] the last great Litvá con-or, whose triumph at Tannenberg (1410) balances his at by Timur near Poltáva (1399), the separate politics of uania really come to their end. Even in his latter years a non diet of Polish and Litvá representatives is arranged for election of Polish kings or Lithuanian dukes, and for all ers of outstanding importance affecting kingdom or duchy. his disappearance from the scene, Lithuania is soon again

[1] his was a concession to Litvá conservatism, alarmed at the rapid es (kingship of their dukes, conversion of the people, removal of the l to Cracow).

[2] hose intrigues to make his dukedom a sovereign royalty fail in 1429–30.

joined in complete personal union with Poland, and after 15 this union is permanent. In the fifteenth century only Mosc vite conquest[1] prevents the absorption of Nóvgorod and Pskov in other words, the gain of all north-western *Rus*—by Polan Lithuania, already mistress of the middle west and south-w of Russia.

The Germans and Russia

Occasional and highly interesting Russian relations with t Germans are recorded from the beginnings of the Russi nation, but it is only in the twelfth century that these begin be generally important. And as yet they are in trade and religi rather than in politics or war. German merchants undoubted appear in Nóvgorod long before the organization of the Hanse tic League in the thirteenth century, but their influence perhaps not very marked before that event (*c.* A. D. 1250–6 German traders and German missionaries on the coast of t Gulf of Riga are soon followed by German crusaders, who fou Riga in 1200, and plant there the head-quarters of a new Germ Order—the famous *Brotherhood of the Sword-Brethren*, *Sword-Bearers*, also called the *Brotherhood of the Soldiers Christ*. But these are events which for some time exclusive concern the non-Russian peoples of the Baltic coasts—Lithu nian and Finnish.

There is no clear reference in the annals of Nóvgorod to t Teutons of the Continent, as opposed to the Scandinavia before the time of the Third Crusade (1188). We are now to of *Némtsy* plundering the Nóvgorodians. But a little lat soon after the days of Magna Carta, the same records notice h *Némtsy* from beyond sea succour the city with corn and flo after a terrible famine, when already near its end (1231). A in 1237 the union of the Sword-Bearers with the Teuto

[1] 1471-8, &c.

rder of Old Prussia is perhaps recorded as a piece of good ews : ' The Némtsy came in strength from beyond sea to iga, and all united there ; and the men of Pskov sent aid, and ey went against the godless Litvá, and for our sins they were efeated by the godless pagans.'

Yet soon the *Némtsy* appear among the most dreaded enemies Russia. In 1242 Alexander Névski fights his good fight with the erman Order on the ice of Lake Chúdskoe ' by the Raven's ck ' ; when the *Némtsy* drove themselves like a wedge through e army of Nóvgorod, and God helped Prince Alexander.

Much lost ground is thus recovered (including Pskov, just nquered by the Teuton knights), and the Russian remnant of e north-west is saved from German dominion, in politics if t in trade. But it is a deliverance which has to be worked out ce and again in the next two centuries. Thus, in 1268, after agreement with the bishops and godly nobles of the German rder—wherein these godly men, in the Russian view, planned ly deceit—the men of Nóvgorod fight a desperate drawn ttle near the Kegola river, with iron troops of *Némtsy*, like orest to look at, ' for the whole land of the Némtsy had come gether '.

Almost every decade of later Nóvgorod history gives us some tice of conflict, negotiation, or trade with the *Némtsy*, inly represented by the Teutonic Order and the Hanseatic ague. But although lands and towns near or even within e limits of the Russian race fell under German rule through- t this period (1270–1410), during a great part of it, or at long ervals ; and although the whole Baltic coast, from Danzig to e entrance of the Gulf of Finland, is at one time held by e Order and the League, yet the German danger only touches e fringe of north-western *Rus*. Nóvgorod itself is never even ieged by the Teutonic Knights, though her trade passes in eat measure under Hansa control.

And from the German fear mediaeval Russia is finally de livered by the union of Poland and Lithuania, and by th victory of the new Slav power over the Order. The Nóvgoro Annals, which so constantly neglect decisive events of neigh bouring history, do not forget that battle of Tannenberg o Grünwald, which marks the ebbing of the tide of Germa eastward advance—so active since the twelfth century, firs apparent in the tenth.

'The year of the world 6918 (A. D. 1410). . . . This yea on July 15th, King Iagailo son of Olgerd and the Grand Princ Vitovt fought with the Prussian Némtsy, in their country o Prussia . . . and killed the Meister [1] and the Morshold [2] and th Kuntury,[3] and defeated the whole army of the Némtsy, an took the towns of the Némtsy.'

The Rise of Moscow

Later generations of Russians were accustomed to ask them selves in amazement how Moscow ever contrived to rise so fa and so far. As a seventeenth-century tale begins, 'What ma ever divined that Moscow would become a kingdom? Wha man ever guessed that Moscow would be accounted an empire Once by the Moskvá there stood only the goodly hamlets of noble.'

It is as the establishment of one of the lesser Russian princ that Moscow first appears about 1147, midway in the anarchy Stephen's reign in England.

George Dolgorúki, Prince of Rostóv, invites a friend an neighbour to visit him at his country seat on the present hill the Kremlin. Here he gave him a mighty dinner, and nin years later, in 1156, he 'laid the town of Moskvá', probabl

[1] The Grand Master of the Teutonic Order. [2] The Marshal.
[3] The Commanders.

nning an enclosure of wooden walls round his villa, his estate, d the dependent settlement which had grown up there.

Not long before, all the Kremlin had been pine-woods, and e little Church of the *Saviour in the Wood*, the oldest building Moscow, in the courtyard of the great palace of Nicholas I, ll preserves the memory of this time.

The rise of Moscow may be traced partly to its geographical sition, partly to movements of colonization, but mainly to the rsonal qualities, the policy, the good fortune, of its princes. is the policy of the ruler which gives him the practical direc- n, the temporal headship, the enthusiastic support, of the ıssian Church. It is by home and foreign policy that he comes leader of a new Russia.

The geographical position of the *White Stone City* offered tain advantages. It was placed conveniently near the courses the Volga and the Oká,[1] and it communicated with both by vigable tributaries. It lay at the intersection of three impor- ıt land-tracks (one cannot call them roads), of which one ınected the city with Kiev, and another with Nóvgorod. It , roughly, equidistant between the northern and southern remities of the Russian world, though on its eastern fringe. particular, the river Moskvá had special commercial impor- ce, as a most convenient and direct waterway connecting Middle and Upper Oká and the Upper Volga.[2] The Moskvá med a chord between the two ends of this *Mesopotamia* of ıtral Russia, whose settlements, trade, and wealth were at t mainly along the courses of the enclosing rivers.

The importance of this Moskvá waterway, and its *portage* to Volga, is well borne out by the history of the valuable and

[1] The Oká, joining the Volga at Nízhni Nóvgorod, in volume and impor- e is almost equal to the main stream.

[2] I.e. the basins of both rivers above Nízhni Nóvgorod.

fiercely disputed Nóvgorod colony at Vólok-Lámsk, commandi
this very portage, and serving as the central Nóvgorod trad
station towards the Oká and the rest of these southern tran
Volga regions.

The colonizing movement, which had called Moscow in
being in the early days of Kievian decay, from various caus
set with peculiar strength into the Moscow region, both befo
and after the Tartar conquest (1237–43). The process
colonization caused the emigrant Russian population to becom
chiefly massed in the region between the Oká and the Upp
Volga, beyond which—to north and north-east, east and soutl
east, beyond the Nízhni Nóvgorod of the future—farth
advance was very difficult. There were other centres of migr
tion, such as Vyátka or Ustyúg[1] in the far north, but this Ok
Volga *Mesopotamia* was certainly the chief; and in the ver
middle of it stood Moscow. In other words, it stood in th
middle of what came to be known as the *Great Russian* stock
the colonizing, eastward-moving part of the Russian race, whic
had long been escaping from Kiev and the rest of the ruined an
enslaved south.

Moscow's inner position in this colonized region, far awa
from the troubles of the south, yet not absolutely expose
(from the time of Iván Kalitá) to the frontier dangers an
assaults of the East, was a sensible assistance to the town's earl
growth. 'Blows from without might fall upon neighbourin
places'—Ryazán, Rostóv, Yaroslávl, Smolénsk—but the
seldom reached as far as Moscow. Thanks to this, Mosco
became a refuge for the surrounding Russian population, whic
everywhere was suffering from alien pressure.[2]

For a century and a quarter, between 1238 and 1368
between the first Tartar onslaught (when the men of Mosco

[1] Ust-yug = the (town at the) mouth of the river Yug.

[2] See Klyuchévski, *History of Russia* (Eng. trans.), i. 277–8.

a away, or when the Mongol *Ishmaelites* took the city) and the t Lithuanian attack—Moscow was one of the few places in ssia which suffered little at enemy hands. The Tartar sack 1293 is almost the only instance we have of such suffering. is comparative immunity not only drew on settlers from the est, in pursuance of the long-established colonizing movement the *Rus*,[1] but drew back settlers from farther East, where tlements were more dangerously exposed.

As the point where popular movements of colonization north-twards intersected popular movements of commerce south-stwards, and south-eastwards, Moscow conferred perceptible nomic advantages upon its ruler. A large population racted to his principality meant a large number of taxpayers, ile the commercial movement on the Moskvá meant the nulation of popular industry in his dominions, and a good ome from transit dues.

But the main source of Moscovite greatness, after all, lay in character and policy of its princes. Without the personal iation Moscow would have remained a *bourgade*. Geography itself should have made Nízhni Nóvgorod, at the Oká-Volga ction, an imperial position, the head of the new Russia in the ddle east.

Beginning with Ivan I, Iván Kalitá, John the Purser (A. D. 8–41), the descendants of Alexander Névski who reigned at scow created what no favourable circumstances of geo-phy or of history would have accomplished by themselves—foundation of a new Russia.

Western Europeans are not well acquainted with these men—ore Ivan the Terrible, the contemporary and correspondent, brother and good friend, of Elizabeth of England. Yet are worth attention. They were not all of shining moral

[1] Which ultimately brings the Russian to the Pacific.

virtue. Several of them were conspicuously wanting in darin
even perhaps in courage. From the standpoint of rival princ
and towns, they were unblushing robbers. They first rose
calculated and unbounded subservience to the foreign tyran
The Russian patriot of the fourteenth century, seeing only t
present, might have counted Ivan the Purser, or Simeon t
Proud, the worst of traitors.

But they were statesmen, they were financiers, they were fa
seeing helpers of their country. In almost everything they we
men of cool head—almost everywhere they shunned the fals
hood of the extreme; the weakest of them kept at least
a silver mediocrity. They were, in private, usually models
temperance and precision—even the fashionable tendency
get drunk after dinner was honoured by them, as Hamlet wou
have had it, rather in the breach than in the observance. 'Th
loved not treason or sedition, and punished the guilty; th
drank, but not unto drunkenness; they loved not war, b
always held their army in readiness.' They showed an u
swerving continuity of policy—external and internal. In t
latter they were remarkable for their freedom from dissensio
their family harmony. As their wills constantly exhort the
descendants—they lived 'at one'. And they were the keene
and closest of treasurers and economists. It is not witho
reason that the first founder of Moscovite greatness is known
history as *Kalitá*, the *Purser*. When dictating their bequests,
preparation for a last account, how attentive were these men
every item of their property. They forgot neither their citi
nor their broad lands, neither their treasure-chests, their floc
and herds, their golden girdles, nor their fur coats. Everythi
was recorded in its place by these testators. To preserve the
inheritance, and add to it—that seemed to be always in the
thoughts.

But Kalitá and his successors were more than economis

rincely stewards, enterprising merchants, successful men of usiness—just as they showed themselves in time to be more ıan pliant servants of the foreign tyrant.

If the *Purser* consolidated his power by eager unscrupulous ıbservience to the Tartars, and by the most rigid and petty ttention to finance, he prepared the way for his successors to ecome leaders of a revived Russia—and within fifty years of his eath this result was reached. Having won the willing consent f the *Golden Horde* to his revival of the Grand Princedom at Ioscow, to his removal of the chief bishopric of the Russian hurch to the same place, and to his financial supervision (for ıe purposes of tribute) of all the subject Russian principalities, Kalitá really created a new national centre for the Russian eople,[1] and before half a century even the Mongols of the *Iorde* had to recognize this fact.

In 1380 Kalitá's third successor, the hero-warrior Dmítri ' of ıe Don ', led the whole of eastern *Rus* against the Tartars. Jnder the Moscovite standard the eastern Slavs, on the ' clean eld ' of Kúlikovo[2] beyond the Don, gained their first victory gainst the invincible Asiatic conqueror, the unendurable shmaelite oppressor.

The incessant Tartar raiding, which Kalitá had stopped by iplomacy (so that ' thenceforth there was quietness forty years, nd the ravaging of the Russian land did cease '), was now hallenged by the sword. The financial union of east Russian rinces, which Kalitá had accomplished as chief tax-gatherer or the *Horde*, was now becoming a political union of the ele- ıents of a reviving nationality. And the spiritual leadership 'hich Kalitá had given to Moscow was now beginning to bear 'uit.

The transference of the old ecclesiastical primacy of Kiev

[1] Roughly the time of Crécy (1346). Kalitá died in 1341.

[2] Kúlikovo Póle, *the field of woodcocks* (kúlik).

(like the political presidency) from Vladímir [1] to Moscow migh have seemed a mere incident, a result of convenience, perhap a temporary arrangement, in Kalitá's own time. Did it matte so very much that the Metropolitan Peter should stay so ofte with his friend the Prince of Moscow, should finally fix his sea in his friend's city, should join with him in founding the Uspén ski [2] Cathedral in the Kremlin? What had Vladímir gained fro its possession of the chief metropolitan see, or indeed of th Grand Princedom itself? Gradually the full value of the con nexion of the religious primacy (as of the princely headship with a vigorous and growing political power, and with a city o such vitality and possibility as Moscow, became apparent.

The threads of Church life which spread over the Russia land from the metropolitan seat helped to draw the variou parts of the country, especially of eastern Russia, toward Moscow. And the material wealth in the hands of the Churc now also tended to gravitate towards the city, and contribute to its enrichment. Even more important was the moral im pression. As the permanent connexion of the metropolitan se with Moscow was proved by events, all Orthodox Russian began to treat the Prince of Moscow with a semi-religiou reverence. They began to see in him the eldest son of th Church, the friend and protector of the supreme Russia hierarch. They began to see in *Mother Moscow* a sacred city Thus political resistance to the new power in eastern an northern Russia was everywhere undermined. And along wit the extension of Moscovite power and influence goes the per sonal advancement of the Prince, who finally tends to claim th supreme lordship of all Russian land, the absolute monarch

[1] On the Klyazma (roughly half-way between Moscow and Nízhni Nóv gorod), whither the title of Grand Prince had been, partially, transferre after the fall of Kiev.

[2] Uspénski, *of the Assumption* (uspénie, lit. falling asleep).

autocracy of all the Russias—*Great*, *Little*, *White*, *Red*, or ıer.

At about the same time, therefore,[1] Russians began to look on the Moscovite ruler as a model administrator, the true litical head, and the spiritual protector of the subjected and ɔken Russian people. They saw in him, even under Kalitá, e source of new territorial, judicial, and financial relations, ıich had at last won a measure of peace and security for the ·tured country.

And with Dmítri Donskói Russians were able to recognize the Moscovite Prince their chief hope of liberty, their leader victory and national restoration.

Although Iván Kalitá makes Moscow the real head of the ıtes of *Rus* vassal to the Tartar, Vladímir remains, for nearly century after his death,[2] the coronation-city of the Grand ınce, the Rheims of *Moscovy*. Simeon the Proud, Ivan the ɔod, Dmítri of the Don, Vasíli I, are all crowned here. But ·ore Dmítri's death in 1389, still more under his successor síli, Vladímir increasingly becomes the mere possession and ɔendency, *the patrimony*, as it is called, of the sovereign of : Moskvá. Towards a similar dependence, a similar inclusion their *patrimony*, the Moscow rulers, from Kalitá to Dmítri, m Dmítri to Ivan the Great, steadily endeavour to force the public of Nóvgorod, and it is in the course of a constant ıggle to shake off this grip and save their ancient liberties t the citizens of the great trading town lean upon Lithuania. ɔn in the time of Kalitá they install a son of Gedimin as their ıce; in the age of Ivan the Great the decisive struggle h Moscow is provoked by the same policy—of aggression . resistance—on both sides.

Kalitá's Church policy, which does so much for Moscow, is

[1] In the course, and even before the middle, of the fourteenth century.
[2] Till 1431.

studiously continued by his successors. If John the Founder the *Purser*, builds the first great churches of the Kremlin, and brings the *Metropolitan of All Rus* to settle there, his next successors help St. Serge to found the monastery of the Trinity (the famous *Tróitsa*)[1] in the forests near the Moskvá. Here and in the capital are formed effective substitutes for the convent of Kiev: the new *Mother Moscow* becomes as holy as the older *Mother of the Cities of Rus*.

The aid of the Church is invaluable to the new power at every crisis. When the fatal gentleness of Ivan the Good threatens to bring about a transference of the Grand Princedom from Moscow once more, it is St. Alexis the metropolitan who puts up Ivan's little son Dmítri, to struggle for the post of the Khan's chief vassal: by appeal to the *Horde*, Moscow's position is maintained. The same spiritual power which enables Dmítri to mount his war-horse, in all the dignity of his twelve years, and to march with his army to be crowned at Vladímir (1363) supports him as a man in his defiance of the Tartars (1378–80, &c.). Before Kúlikovo the hero of the Don visits the *Tróitsa*, and is solemnly blessed by St. Serge, who predicts victory at a heavy price, and sends two of his monks (one of whom had been a noble and a soldier of renown) with the army of Moscow.

Under the same Dmítri Donskói and his successors, the Russian Church shows no little activity in missions. About 1376 the monk Stephen, afterwards canonized as the apostle of Perm (Stephen Pérmski), founds a Christian outpost on the Upper Káma. It was a venture of some risk, for an earlier missionary in this region had been flayed by the natives, 'while they were yet but infants in the faith'. Yet, before his death in

[1] One of the chief holy places of the Russian Church to the present day, a head-centre of the national resistance to the Poles and to anarchy in the *Time of Troubles* (1612–13).

96, Stephen had overthrown the local idolatry of the *Golden ld Woman*, stopped the sacrifice of reindeer, secured the iumph of Orthodoxy, and founded Moscovite influence in the gion from which, two centuries later, Moscow overruns the berian khanate. Under Stephen's successors, and under ovgorodian and Moscovite protection, the Russian Church kes root in the Pechorá country and among the Lapps [1]—as it es also in the White Sea, during the early fifteenth century, rough the foundation of the chief monastery of the Far North, Solovétski Island.[2]

[1] 1397–1445.

[2] 1429. On this magnificent foundation, still perhaps the most notable ilding in Russia north of Petrograd, see Engelhardt, *A Russian Province the North*.

3

The Founding of the Russian Empire

Ivan the Great and the Moscovite Empire

Under Ivan III, *Iván Veliki*, John the Great,[1] Moscow gathers into its orbit every part of the Russian stock, every region of Russian land, that had not been absorbed by the Christian, Catholic, West. Ivan is the first true founder of the Russian Empire, as we know it.

If Peter, the son of Alexis, gave Russia a new capital, a new aspect, new claims and ideals, a window on the West, outlets on the seas, a fresh European position and consciousness, an awakened discipleship in the school of modern Western progress, Ivan, the son of Vasíli, first gave to the Russian people the unity and power and consciousness of an imperial state, the policy and claims of a great European power.

The *Reuniter of Russian Land* inherited the humiliation—expiring, indeed, but not yet dead—of Tartar overlordship. His dominion, far smaller than Poland (and how much more barbaric), nowhere reached the sea. Before his death he had raised the Moscow principality to be a sovereign international realm, nearly trebled its extent, brought into it all Russians (outside the defined territories of Western Powers), made it the sole representative in politics of the Russian race and name. He had arrested the advance of Poland-Lithuania, won from it some regions of White Russia, saved Novgorod for *Rus* and the Eastern Church, won a sea-board on the Arctic, a window on the Baltic. He had begun the destruction of the Tartar

[1] 1462–1505.

anates to the east with the overthrow of Kazán, and had rried the arms and authority of Moscow beyond the Uráls, us beginning the Moscovite conquest of North Asia, *Asiatic beria*. And he had united his family, race, and country, with e claims of the dethroned Caesars of the Eastern Rome, by his arriage with Sophia Palaiologos. In the very spirit of Peter e Great, he had developed intercourse with the West, and deavoured to utilize Western talent in the service of Russia, peace and war, in architecture and art, as in artillery and rtification.

It is, above all, as *Reuniter* of the Fatherland that Ivan ves his mark upon his country. In 1463 Yaroslávl was absorbed the Prince of Moscow ; and in the next few years large tracts the colonial domain of Nóvgorod fell into his hands.[1] In 71 Old Nóvgorod itself, with all its remaining possessions, was nquered ; and in the next decade its incorporation in *Moscovy* is made more complete. In 1472 Perm made final submission extensive regions of the Perm principality had already been quired. In 1474 the northern Rostóv [2] sold its remaining lands Moscow, and its princes became Moscovite *boyárs*. In 1480 e Tartar overlordship came to an end : no part of *Rus*, hence-rth, beyond the limits of Lithuania-Poland, acknowledged a reign master ; nearly the whole of this independent Russia, *eat Rus*, was now formed into a Moscovite Empire. In 1485 er, the chief remaining exception, almost the only Great ssian town or principality of any note which Ivan could not claim as his,[3] was taken without resistance. And in 1489

[1] Portions of this had been acquired by Moscow before his day, as by n Kalitá, and by Dmítri of the Don.

[2] Not, of course, Rostóv-on-the-Don, founded in the eighteenth century, the ancient (ninth-century) Rostóv near the Upper Volga, between cow and Yaroslávl.

[3] Ryazán was not fully reunited till 1517.

little Vyátka, in its far north-eastern forests, already for som time practically won, made final and formal submission to th new *Tsar of Rus*. In the subsequent nineties were recovere from *Litvá* both Vyázma and most of the lands of Chernígov Thus the western Moscow frontier was brought close up t Smolénsk. Pskov, although not formally annexed, becam practically Moscovite with the fall of Nóvgorod. Its reunio was complete by 1510.

Beyond the borders of the Russian race, to east and south, i Siberia, on the Middle Volga, and in the steppe-lands of the Don Ivan carried forward the rule of Moscow; he is the first tru Russian conqueror of *Yúgra*, the first Orthodox lord of Kazán The extent of *Moscovy* was nearly trebled in the forty years o his reign. By the absorption of Nóvgorod she gained a larg sea-board on the Arctic and a small outlet on the Baltic.[1]

But it was not only in extent and local value of acquisitio that the importance of this *Reunion* lies. Still more valuabl was the creation of a new national feeling. Russia is born agai in *Moscovy*. And the new birth is not the reappearance of th old 'complex and languid' federation, so rarely federated i any true sense, but the advent of a new monarchy, a highl centralized autocratic state, resembling the East Roman Em pire under such a ruler as Basil II. A general feeling wa now created in the Russian race that a mighty and age-lon work was in progress which bore a profound relation to tha race.[2] Thus when one of the last petty obstacles to Moscovit supremacy had been removed by the arrest and imprisonmen of the Prince of Nóvgorod-Séversk, a monk is said to hav appeared in the Moscow streets, carrying a broom. 'Th

[1] I. e. on the Gulf of Finland, a tiny and precarious opening, disputed b the Swedes, who soon closed it again to Russia.

[2] So Klyuchévski.

pire is not yet wholly cleansed. It is time to sweep hence last of the dust.'

y the close of Ivan's life the *Great Russian* stock (includ- all the elements of the eastward colonial movement we e noticed) was now combined under one political head and ected by one political organization. The principality of scow had become a Great Russian nation, the Prince of scow a Great Russian sovereign, independent of all foreign ver—a *Gosudár* or *Tsar*.[1]

When, in 1486, the Hapsburg Frederick III, as Holy Roman peror, offers Ivan the royal title, a fitting reply is made. e have been sovereigns of our land from our earliest fore- hers, and held of God, even as they. . . . May we never need be commissioned to this sovereignty.'

Before Ivan *Veliki*, the Moscow rulers had not developed ernal or foreign relations beyond their own immediate circle, other princes of *Rus*, and the national oppressor and over- l, who could not be avoided, the Tartar Khan, the *Golden de*. But now Moscow begins to deal with many of the states Christendom and Islam—with Poland-Lithuania, Sweden, Teutonic Knights, and Germany, and even with Italy, the kish Empire, and Persia. The *ritter* Poppel discovers covy for the Teutonic world; the *White Stone City* receives embassy from Vienna; Ambrogio Contarini the Venetian s the country and the capital, and describes the court, the earance, the speech, of 'Duke Zuanne'.

[1] This term ('Tsesar' in *Nestor*), the Russian form of 'Caesar', had usually applied hitherto, in contemporary Russian history, either to the eror at Constantinople, whose imperial city was the *Tsargrad*, or to the ar Khan as overlord. David and Solomon, and the Kings of Judah and l, were *tsars* in the Slavonic scriptures; any absolutely independent rch had some claim to this title; but it was of course specially the gative of the Caesars of Old and New Rome, and their successor, the Head of the *Orthodox* World at Moscow.

With this extension of the political outlook there goes
natural change in Moscovite ideas, and to a great extent
change in the ideas of all Russians. The theory of a nation
state, the sense of need for political unity on a national bas
is developed in and from Moscow, in proportion as Great Russ
becomes united as a sovereign state.[1]

From the Tartar conquest to the revolt of Dmítri Donskó
the struggles of Moscow had been entirely part of the mutu
feuds of the Russian vassals of the *Horde*. Since Kúlikovo the
struggles tend to become, with Ivan the Great they ar
struggles of a Great Russian nation—the only independe
Russia in the world—with other nations.

By the end of the fifteenth century the idea of *Mother Mosc*
is widely spread in all branches of the Russian stock, and dom
nant among Great Russians—the conception of Moscow as
heaven-protected citadel, to watch over the interests, and gua
against the dangers, of the Russian land and race.

'Thus external policy inspires political theory.' And th
theory in turn leaves its mark upon the political and social co
sciousness of the Head of the State. With the whole of *Gre*
Rus under his sway, and an obligation of national leadersh
laid upon him, the *Tsar of All Russia* begins from 1480, mo
definitely from 1494, to demand that every part of Russi
territory and settlement, however much separated by foreig
conquest, should ultimately recognize his supremacy, and th
realize the complete union of the race.

Ivan does not merely imply this by general titles, howev
aggressive. He makes his claim in full diplomatic manne
Thus in 1493, when Lithuania, through the ambassador
Hungary (and of the Pope), complains that Moscow had robb
Lithuania of *her possessions*, the *Gosudár* disputes the who
position :

[1] Cf. Klyuchévski.

Wherefore do they call them *their possessions*? Are they not
ns and provinces which Rus princes have brought to our
ice? . . . Surely the Pope knows that the princes Vladislav
Alexander are heritors of Poland and Lithuania from their
iers only, whereas we are heritors of the Russian land from
beginning.'

he same language recurs in 1503 on the conclusion of peace
ween Moscovy and Lithuania-Poland. King Alexander, on
alf of the latter, reproaches Ivan with unjust seizure of land;
desires nothing but his *ótchina*, he declares. 'And do I not
desire mine own *ótchina*,' replied the *tsar*, 'even the Rus
still held by Lithuania, in which lie Kiev and Smolénsk,
other towns of ours?'

Until he has regained his *ótchina*, 'that is, all the Rus land
belonging to Lithuania', Ivan protests to his ally, the Khan
Krym,[1] there can be no permanent peace, only a truce 'for
gathering of fresh strength and the drawing of fresh breath'.

Nor did the claims of Moscow stop here. Her Grand Prince
aspired to be more than *Gosudár Vseyá Rusi*, *Sovereign of*
Russia. That was his racial ambition. But on a wider field
he demanded to be recognized as the true successor of the
Roman Emperors, the heir of the Caesars of Constantinople,
head of *Orthodox* Christendom.

van's second marriage (in 1472) with Sophia Palaiologos, an
naned niece of the last Byzantine *tsar*, was an expression
his claim. The rights of the only true imperial House
e now to be transferred to the one great political power of
Greek Church, of *Orthodoxy*. By throwing off the Tartar
rainty, and thus becoming an 'international sovereign',
vas able to make his claim complete to the headship of the

[1] Whose khanate included both our Crimea and an extensive steppe-
n on the mainland to the north.

Orthodox World. That world now contained no one co
parable to himself.

Moscovite state documents now begin to take on a rich
and more ceremonious diction, and to elaborate a terminolo
hitherto unknown. The Byzantine marriage is one expressi
of this imperial ambition. The assumption of the terms
Tsar and *Gosudár*, the translation for Russian use of the Byza
tine term of *Autocrat*,[1] and the adoption of the Byzantine cr
of the double-headed eagle, are other indications of the sam

Lastly, Ivan's imperial claims over *Orthodoxy*, like his ro
claims over all Russian lands, are passionately supported
many of his people, most of all perhaps by the churchmen.
monk of Pskov, a few years after the death of the *Reunit*
expresses his rapture at what (he thinks) has come to pass—
that the states of Christendom are now centred in the one gr
Orthodox sovereign, and that his city of Moscow has beco
the *Tsargrad*, the third and final Rome.[2]

[1] Αὐτοκράτωρ is rendered by *Samodérzhets*. Sigismund von Herberst
Imperial Ambassador at Moscow from the Vienna Court in the days
Ivan's successor (1517–26), gives Europe the first good foreign account
the new Moscovite Russia, and witnesses to the realization of the autocr
idea. The Tsar was more absolute over his subjects than any other sovere
in the world. Moscow said, *The will of the Tsar is the will of God, and of*
will of God is the Tsar the fulfiller. The ordinary man of Moscow said, *I k*
not. Only God and the Tsar know.

[2] Here, as elsewhere, V. O. Klyuchévski, *History of Russia*, is of spe
value.

BOOK II

I

The Consummation of Great Russia

Basil III (1505–33)

The State of Russia in 1505

Vasíli (or Basil) III, the son and successor of Ivan III, found nself, on his accession, face to face with a situation of great l ever-growing complexity. The family estate of the Grand kes of Moscow, thanks to their aptitude in adding to their perty, had grown into a political state which comprised entire Great Russian people. It was largely because neither er nor people would realize this fact and adapt themselves the altered relations in which, as a result of it, they came to nd to one another, that the calamities which overtook Russia he sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were brought about. tead of introducing the principles of political economy or king even an attempt at establishing any definite form of ernment, *tsars* Ivan III (1462–1505), Basil III (1505– , and Ivan IV (1533–84) continued to rule their people and er the affairs of their country strictly according to the prin- es of household economy and estate management which ir ancestors had consistently applied with such eminent cess.

efore we deal with this question, we must first of all con- r the Great Russian people itself. The bright figures of the s and their courtiers are apt, in the eyes of the foreign spec- r, to obliterate this dumb and grey background—this mass of

people of such amazing strength and persistency, which, af
all, formed the substance of the Russian state and the not ve
stable foundations upon which the power of Moscovy rested

One of the most noticeable characteristics of the Russi
people is their migratory tendency; another is their apprec
tion of the transience of all matter. These two characterist
help to explain many of the perplexing phenomena of Russi
history, and both of them are, no doubt, partly due to the ge
graphical and climatic conditions in which the Russian peo
have always lived. Dwelling from time immemorial in the mi
of a virtually boundless plain which is intersected throughout
length and breadth by magnificent rivers, flowing in all dire
tions and offering a cheap, easy, safe, and pleasant means of getti
about, the Russians were perpetually urged by nature to migra
whenever the soil was unable to give them as much as they ask
of it, or they were unwilling to give their ruler as much as
asked of them. Often enough the pressure of external a
hostile forces, or the worry of internal and civil strife, impell
them to seek fresh homes, to trek like the Boers, 'to scatte
(*razbrestís' rózno*), as the Russian idiom is, and there were neith
mountain barriers nor ocean perils to daunt them. Towards t
end of the eighteenth century we see Stephen Mikháilovi
Aksákov, head of an ancient and noble line, obeying this secul
instinct, abandoning his ancestral estate in the government
Simbírsk on this side of the Volga, the enforced co-ownersh
of which with many importunate and litigious relati
had become irksome to him, and trekking with his family a
his serfs, his furniture and his cattle, hundreds of miles to t
remote province of Ufá, almost under the shadow of the U
mountains.

On a larger scale, and for very different and more vital reaso
the Russian people had begun to migrate, at first almost i
perceptibly, but nevertheless steadily, and in ever-increasi

ıbers, from the eleventh century onwards, from their homes
he country round Kiev, the middle reaches of the Dnieper
its tributaries. This region had been rendered increasingly
ɔmfortable by the endless civil wars on the part of the in-
ıerable princes for the possession of Kiev, the sentimental
ning for which was their undoing; by the ceaseless raids
depredations on the part of nomadic Tartar tribes which
ɔt in successive waves across the steppes of southern Russia;
by the constantly deteriorating economic condition of the
ɔle as the result of these two causes. While one part of the
ulation moved westwards towards Poland, the main stream
ıigration flowed from the basin of the Dnieper over into that
he Volga. The territory most intensively colonized was a
t of roughly oval shape with very irregular sides contained
veen the upper Volga and its great southern tributary the
, which both flow from west to east and join together at
ıni Nóvgorod. This territory, famous in Russian history
he nucleus of the nascent state, is known as the Land-
veen-the-rivers,[1] that is, between the Volga and the Oká.
vas the kernel of Great Russia.

he term Great Russian which came to be applied to those
ıians who migrated north-eastwards into the basin of the
ga and the Oká, and thence spread ever farther north and
from the basin of the Dnieper, presupposes the existence
nationality and country of Little Russia. This latter term
ffect makes its appearance in documents of the fourteenth
ury. This division of the Russian race, and the origin of the
rence between Great and Little Russians, are easily explained.
ıs already been said that in the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
:s, when the Tartar invasions, recurring with ever-increasing
ıency, combined with other causes to make life in Kiev
the surrounding country intolerable, part of the population

[1] *Mezhdu-réchie* (cf. Mesopotamia): see p. 67.

moved westwards towards Poland and the Carpathians, while t
bulk migrated north-eastwards. From the middle of the fifteen
century onwards the people who had migrated westwards beg
to return to Kiev and the region of the Dnieper, to lands whi
had been lying fallow and virtually deserted for two hundr
years. The causes that contributed to this reaction were t
gradual weakening of the Tartar horde in the fifteenth centu
rendering the Dnieper region again habitable, and the ra
development of serfdom in Poland in the same century. It
these Russians, returning to their original homes in sout
western Russia, after 200 years, who went to form the Lit
Russian people. Probably, as the result of their long absen
in Galicia and Poland, they there incorporated Polish elemen
and absorbed Tartar elements on their return to the basin of t
Dnieper, where, doubtless, some had been left after the ebbi
of the Tartar tide. Similarly, the Great Russians in the ba
of the Volga and the Oká inevitably assimilated Finnish elemen
because that country, at that time, was purely Finnish.
fact, neither the Great Russians nor the Little Russians rep
sented the pure and original Russian stock.

Thus the first cause of the differentiation between t
Russians of the north-east and those of the south-west, betwe
Great Russians and Little Russians, was geographical. Wh
once the migration from the basin of the Dnieper began,
process of differentiation was bound to set in. The grea
rigours of the climate and the greater hardships of existen
in the north-east very soon affected the colonists in the Vol
region. The altered manners of the princes who ruled o
them typify this change in the national character. Instead
the chivalrous, sentimental, debonair, reckless, thriftless, a
riotous princes of south-western Russia, we have the matter-
fact, careful, calculating, persistent, and abstemious rulers
Vladímir, developing into the gloomy, forbidding, materialis

crupulous, and spider-like Grand Dukes of Moscow, builders
vast fortunes, prototypes of the modern *real-politiker*.
The second cause of the differentiation between these two
ves of the Russian people was political. The vicissitudes of
tune experienced by the people of south-western Russia were
tined to accentuate the process of differentiation. Through-
the whole of the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, and six-
nth centuries they were under foreign political domination,
: Lithuanian, then Polish. The Lithuanian principality,
ore it became entangled in the toils of Polish statecraft, en-
ed a boisterous and expansive if somewhat ephemeral career
he cost of its eastern neighbour, Russia, while the latter was
occupied in trying to find shelter from the Tartar storm.
e energetic Lithuanians, last of the European peoples to be
verted to Christianity (1386), emerging from their ancestral
s around Vilna and Kovno,[1] began in the thirteenth century
extend their sway south-eastward. Under Olgerd, in the
rteenth century, they conquered the whole of the basin of
Dnieper except Smolénsk, territory which constituted the
sia of the early Kiev days, and even claimed control of the
pes north of the Black Sea between the rivers Dnieper and
ester. In 1386, as the result of a successful diplomatic and
archic intrigue, Lithuania and Poland were mechanically
ed by the marriage of their rulers Iagáilo (or *Jagiello* =
es) and Jadwiga respectively, but nevertheless throughout
fifteenth century Lithuania remained a semi-independent
e, often indeed with a national prince at its head. Under
ovt (1392–1430) it acquired Smolénsk, thus completing the
quest of the basin of the Dnieper, and overflowed eastwards
that of the Oká, counting the towns of Orël[2] and Mtsensk
ain its boundaries. Thus the whole of *old* Russia, except the
-republics of Nóvgorod and Pskov, was by the middle of

[1] Cf. pp. 60–4. [2] Pronounced *Aryól*.

the fifteenth century brought under *non*-Russian politi
influence.

A factor which militated against this racial differentiati
was that of the common religion, which constituted a power
tie between the two halves of the people. The Lithuani
administration did not interfere with the Orthodox religion of
Russian subjects. Little Russia, indeed, and the country to t
north of it, lying between the rivers Prípet and western Dvi
which came to be known as White Russia[1] (*Ruś Biała* in Polis
exercised in their turn a considerable influence on the state
Lithuania, under whose political sway they came. The great
part of the territorially vast principality of Lithuania was pur
Russian in nationality, and the White Russian dialect became
official language. Until the union of Lithuania and Poland in 13
Russian influence—not the political influence of Moscow, but t
racial influence of the Russians of the whole Dnieper basin—w
predominant in Lithuania. From 1386 onwards this influen
began to give way before that of Poland. After this date t
laws, the administration, and the society of Lithuania gradua
became assimilated to those of Poland. The nobility of Lithu
nia, which included a very large number of Russian famili
acquired immense political power, and secured immunity fr
taxation and absolute control of the peasants, who became se
on the vast estates of these rural magnates. In the fifteen
century great efforts were made by the Poles to propagate th
religion as well as their legal, political, and social institutio
in Lithuania and western and south-western Russia. Indee
from 1413 to 1447 conversion to Roman Catholicism conferr
important political advantages. In the second half of t
fifteenth century, in the reign of Casimir IV, the religio

[1] The country between the Prípet and the Niemen, west of the Berézi
was also differentiated under the name of Black Russia (*Ruś Czarna*
Polish).

paganda was carried on with so much vigour that it aroused antagonism of many of the chief Russian Orthodox families Lithuania. The result was that several of them, whose itories were adjacent to that of the Grand Dukes of Moscow, ned their thoughts and directed their steps eastwards; and n III, always ready to make hay while the sun shone, was sed to accept their allegiance and to become suzerain of r lands.

The reign of Basil III (1505–33), along with that of his er Ivan III, may justly be called the golden age of the ocracy in Russia. Not that at later periods of Russian ory individual rulers did not wield just as great power as , and even greater, in proportion to the growth in size and er of the Russian Empire. But at no other time did the ocracy command the whole-hearted approval and confidence serve the best interests of all classes of the community, archy, nobility, merchants, and proletariat alike, as it did ing this period. Its achievements, its conduct, and its s were applauded by the whole people. It met their most ent needs. It is indeed mainly for this reason that the ocracy came into existence; and it was owing to the port of the whole Great Russian people that the Grand kes of Moscow [1] became the autocrats of all Russia.

ven after their colonization of the country between the Volga the Oká had been accomplished, the Russians found that had not yet got over all their troubles. The Tartars still hed them, subjecting them to methodical taxation instead

Grand Duke is the usual English equivalent for *Veliki Knyaz*, the title e by the rulers of Moscow till they adopted that of *Tsar* (cf. p. 79, n. 1), h is a corruption of *Caesar*, and latterly also borne by all male members e imperial family except the emperor. The word *Knyaz* is of Germanic n, and is of the same derivation as our word *King*; as the highest title e Russian aristocracy it is habitually translated *Prince*.

of erratic depredation. Their own princes they had always wi
them, and these multiplied and fought amongst themselves wi
all their pristine vigour. The result was that the people beg
to look for some centre round which they could cluster, and th
found that Moscow answered their requirements. The polic
and even the character, of the Grand Dukes of Moscow happen
to coincide with the aspirations of the people, distracted as th
were by the discords of their princes within and the pressure
the Tartars without. It was not so much the personal qualiti
of the Grand Dukes of Moscow that inspired confidence,
their solid achievements. The success of their policy was pate
and impressive. Neither heroic nor saintly, they were at t
same time neither vicious nor stupid. They were eminent
practical, careful, and dogged, and in contrast to their conter
poraries and fellow princes in other parts of Russia, they had
just sense of proportion, they realized what was possible ar
what was not, and, above all, they had a keen eye to the ma
chance. In 1300 they were the poorest and the most despis
princes in Russia, with barely 500 square miles of territory ;
1462 they were the richest and incomparably the most powerfu
with 15,000 square miles. They owed much to accident. Th
geographical position of Moscow, almost the hydrographic cent
of Russia, was of inestimable advantage to them, and in pa
ticular the source of great economic strength, which did n
escape the notice of the grand dukes. Again, from 132
onwards, Moscow became the residence of the Metropolita
of all Russia, a fact which imparted immense prestige to i
rulers. On the other hand, they owed much also to their ow
brains. Their policy of temporizing with and humouring the
Tartar suzerains and paying them regular tribute gained th
country comparative peace, which much redounded to the
credit. Their policy of snapping up odd pieces of territo
belonging to their relations and their rivals by fair means or fo

the doubly satisfactory result of reducing the number of ring princes, and of increasing their own revenue.[1]

All these factors contributed to the growth of a feeling of miration for Moscow, and its rulers, who inspired a sense of urity and solidity in the people, actually attracted large nbers of them to their capital and rallied still greater numbers their cause. Moscow became the symbol of strength and ty. Not only did *boyárs* flock thither from other districts of ssia, forsaking their local princelings for service with the and Dukes of Moscow, and thus forcing the princelings to ow in their footsteps, cap in hand, but noble families mi- ted from other countries, notably from Lithuania and from rtary, and settled down in Moscow. The grand dukes, their people with them, began to be filled with the sciousness of success. They had faced and solved the two blems by which they had so long been vexed. They had ome a united nation under one ruler, and they had survived Tartar domination.

This latter process is euphemistically termed the casting-off the Tartar yoke; what really happened was that the yoke rely, very gradually and very prosaically, lapsed. Neverthe- , it must not be forgotten that for 250 years the Russian ple, the youngest in the European family, acted as a shield breakwater for the rest of Europe against the Tartar in- ons. Of course this rôle was not optional, and, as a Russian torian [2] has remarked, the successful performance of rear- rd service seldom evokes gratitude, but at the same time, for the same reason, it is unfair to reproach the Russians h being 250 years behind the rest of Europe.

[1] Cf. pp. 69 sqq.

[2] Klyuchévski, vol. ii, p. 508.

The Conquests of Basil III

The statement that the realm of Ivan III included the whc of the Great Russian people requires some small reservation. was his son and successor Basil III (Vasíli Ivánovich) who w destined to be, in the words of the Russian chronicle, the la of the gatherers of the Russian land. Russia already, in 15c stretched from the White Sea in the north to the river Sei (which falls into the Désna, a tributary of the Dnieper) in t south, from the Urál mountains in the east to the shores of t Gulf of Finland and the river Sozh (another tributary of t Dnieper) in the west, and controlled the course of the Volga far as Vasilsúrsk,[1] midway between Nízhni Nóvgorod and Kazá But there were still a few cities and districts, ancient ar integral members of the Great Russian community, which their effective independence impaired the complete unity the nation at which the ruler of Moscow aimed. These we the city-republic of Pskov in the north-west, 'younger brothe of Nóvgorod; the ancient city of Smolénsk on the Dniepe which had been appropriated by Lithuania at the beginning the fifteenth century; Ryazán on the Oká, south-east of Mosco always a turbulent and unsubmissive member of the Russi family; and Chernígov and Nóvgorod-Séversk on the Désna the south-west.

Pskov was a replica of Nóvgorod, of which, indeed, it was early colony. Like some portraits, it was more attractive th its original. This miniature republic reproduced all the bett features of its prototype. Controlling a very much small extent of territory, the merchant-nobles never amassed su huge fortunes as did those of Nóvgorod. There was less cor mercial exploitation and speculation, a more even distributi

[1] Cf. p. 114.

wealth, and consequently greater social harmony. At the
e time, situated much farther west than Nóvgorod, on the
reme western border of the Russian land, Pskov was always
mminent danger of attack from foreign enemies and acted
he outpost and sentinel, not only of Nóvgorod, but of the
ole of Russia against the enemies in the west, the Livonian
ler of religious knights (the German soldier-politicians dis-
ed as missionaries, who planted themselves on the western
ná in 1187, and throughout the two succeeding centuries
l all the lands between the Gulf of Finland and the Niemen),
against Lithuania and Poland in the fifteenth century.

As a result of this the people of Pskov could not afford
ndulge in the civil war which was such a popular form of
ime in Nóvgorod. Pskov was free and contented, so it
ld not be redeemed ; it was loyal and useful to Russia, so
eed not have been crushed. But its continued independent
tence was an offence in the eyes of Moscow, and so it had
e gathered in. In 1510 Basil III fell upon his prey, carried
the great bell of the city council, symbol of independence,
the 300 foremost families to Moscow, amidst the lamenta-
s of the inhabitants, and replaced them with his own officials
colonists, distributing their lands amongst his nobles.

n 1517 a similar fate overtook Ryazán. This district was still
erned by its own prince. He attempted to assert his inde-
dence but was imprisoned, and on his escape to Lithuania his
ıcipality was annexed to Moscow.

n 1523 the towns and districts of Chernígov and Nóvgorod-
ersk were also finally incorporated within the territory of
scow.

molénsk was only acquired after more arduous efforts. This
ient Russian city, which was to change hands many times
ore it became definitively united to Russia, was at this moment
he possession of Lithuania. But Sigismund I of Poland had

united Lithuania and Poland[1] under his single sceptre as fro
1501, so that war with Lithuania meant war with Polan
Basil III, supported by the whole people, had no hesitation
continuing the policy of aggression in the west for the reclam
tion of Russian lands, which his father had successfully initiate
One war terminated in 1509 without any result. Another beg
in 1514, when the Russians, provided with formidable artille
attacked Smolénsk and took it. The capture of this ci
evoked much enthusiasm throughout Russia. The same ye
however, the great prince-landlord of Little Russia, Consta
tine Ostrózhski, Orthodox yet loyal to his suzerain the King
Poland, inflicted a severe defeat on the Russians at Órsha,
the Dnieper below Smolénsk. But Smolénsk he failed to r
take. The war dragged on until 1522, when negotiations we
opened. In 1526 peace was concluded, and Smolénsk remain
in Russian hands. Thus ended the first bout between Rus
and Poland.

The Tsar and the Boyárs

The reign of Basil III (1505–33) is apt to appear somewh
tame and colourless between the long and eventful reign of
father Ivan III (1462–1505) and the still longer and mo
eventful reign of his son Ivan IV (1533–84). But beneath
impassive aspect a great deal was going on. Basil III reaped t
benefit of his father's strong will and iron rule. His power w
even more absolute than his father's, and it cannot be said th
he abused it. Such small incidents as the crushing of Pskov we
merely exceptions that proved the rule. They were part o
fixed policy and would have happened in any case. By sweepi
away the last of the apanaged princes he had finally and abs
lutely united Russia under Moscow. That was also in t

[1] Poland and Lithuania were united by Jagiello in 1386, but after
reign Lithuania had (intermittently) princes of its own till 1501.

ly tradition. Again, the brothers and other relatives of l III were less troublesome than his father's had been re him. Each of the Grand Dukes of Moscow defined in will the territory and income which he left to each of his , and one of the means adopted by them in order to ngthen the position of their successor on the grand-ducal ne was for each in turn, in each succeeding generation, to ace the apanages of the other sons and to increase that tted to his appointed successor. While in the early days of scow each son had been left a large slice of territory and are in the remunerative city of Moscow itself, Basil III eeded his father with an infinitely greater property than is brothers combined, and possessed the whole of the city Moscow. In addition, his father, besides leaving him ample erial means for asserting his authority, had invested him n certain judicial and political rights, such as the sole right oining money, innovations which still further increased his er. Basil III's reign was thus the continuation and the plement of his father's, as was remarked by Herberstein, Emperor's envoy who visited Moscow and its ruler in 1526, published a most valuable account of his experiences and ressions, in which he states that the power wielded by Basil over his subjects exceeded that of any other monarch in the d. In character also Basil resembled his father; he was lly ambitious and pertinacious; he was still more suspicious, rved, and secretive; but he practised cruelty less extensively. was not for nothing that his mother was the sister of the Greek emperor. It was not only heraldic paraphernalia she had brought with her from Constantinople. Ivan III, gh he always insisted on having his own way, at any rate rved the old custom of consulting the Council of the *rs*, the *boyárskaya dúma*, which was a legislative and ad- strative body, and the supreme court of appeal, consisting

of all the chief nobles, dignitaries, heads of departments, a officials. It resembled a house of lords and a permanent cabi rolled into one. The sovereign often presided at its meetin which, as a rule, took place daily, but his presence was necessary for the taking of a decision or the passing of a l Basil III introduced the practice of ruling and taking decisi without consulting the *boyárs*, preferring an intimate and sn circle of advisers whom he gathered round him in his o apartments. This innovation caused much offence, and *boyárs* were probably justified in discerning in it the fruit occult Byzantine influence. Ivan III encouraged discussi and liked to be answered back and to hear the opinion of *boyárs* for what it was worth; Basil III, even when he n any one outside his inner cabinet, would not tolerate any vo except his own. In short, the *tsar* was discontented with *boyárs* and the *boyárs* were discontented with the *tsar*, thou the decencies were so strictly observed in Moscow that on surface everything seemed smooth.

This discontent was, not many years later, to burst forth i a conflagration which destroyed the *boyárs* as a class, involv the end of the dynasty, and almost ruined the whole fab which the Grand Dukes of Moscow had, for three hund years, been building with ant-like patience and indust Meanwhile, it merely smouldered. The real reason for it in the accumulation of contradictions and misunderstandi on which the system of government was built up, which vitia the relations between the two ruling forces, the *tsar* and *boyárs*. Both parties were conscious of, and took pride in, fact that they were at the head, no longer of a small princ apanage surrounded by other small princely apanages, but a great nation with considerable population, territory, a resources; but neither party realized the fact that the access of wealth and power brings increased responsibility.

e *tsar* continued to look on the whole of Russia as his nal estate, with which he was entitled to do what he liked. *oyárs* continued to look on themselves as voluntary assistants e *tsar*, not as his subjects. As the various apanages had abolished and absorbed by Moscow, so the princes who uled them and all their *boyárs* flocked to Moscow, took up residence there and entered the *tsar's* service. But they nued to look on themselves as free agents, able to stipulate terms of service, and resented the fact that the *tsar* did not with them. In the old days the *boyárs* had been able to se the prince under whom they would serve, and the princes choose their servants. Now there was only one prince to , and only one source from which favours in the shape of nerative posts and landed estates were dispensed. It was stion of Moscow or nothing. There were only two alterna—service under the *tsar* at Moscow, or flight abroad. The was a difficult and dangerous undertaking. It was almost ssible to avoid detection or capture, and this meant im-ishment, torture, and life-long imprisonment or exile. In yes of the *tsar* this was almost the greatest offence that a could commit.

ced in this way at cross-purposes, neither side would openly e its aims, its wishes, or its ambitions. The situation had in a haphazard way, and it was allowed to complicate itself olicy of drift. Neither *tsar* nor *boyárs* made any attempt fine their own or each other's positions, or to state what power and their functions actually were.

e direction in which trouble most often and most clearly ested itself was on the question of the succession to the e. There was no law of succession. Looking on the whole ry as his personal estate, the *tsar* naturally considered lf entitled to dispose of it as he chose, though the custom een for the eldest son to succeed to Moscow and the

Grand Duchy, and to be given increasing superiority
his younger brothers. Basil III was the son of Ivan
second wife. Ivan had intended that his eldest son by
first wife should succeed him, and then changed his mind,
sumably owing to the influence of his second wife. His el
son predeceased him, but he, in his turn, had a son who
right of primogeniture would have succeeded his grandfat
This alteration of the succession, although Ivan III was
fectly entitled to make it, had always rankled in the minds of
boyárs. It was not that they had any liberal leanings or hank
after anything like a constitution. They were indeed ul
conservative, and merely wished to enforce their ancient r
of influencing, not the method of government, but the ch
of a governor. But they mistook the accidental cause of
trouble for its origin. Its origin lay in the fundamental
tradiction from which the government of Moscow and
Russia suffered, which they could not see, and in the alt
relations between themselves and their sovereign, which
would not regulate. The accidental cause was the introduc
of foreign influence into the court life of Moscow, which
observed and resented.

In the good old days the relations between the *boyárs*
their master had been free and easy. Even Ivan III was
and outspoken in a bear-like sort of way. His son cultiv
aloofness and inaccessibility; the virus of Byzantinism
taken deep hold. Instead of facing the facts of the situation
defining by law his own power and that of the *boyárs*, the
tried to solve the difficulty by shutting himself up and surrou
ing the throne with a nimbus.

In defence of this policy, which combined the ineptitud
the ostrich with the efficacy of the hedgehog, it must be
mitted that the *boyárs* scarcely offered promising material f
which to select collaborators. The co-operation which

ed was so limited and passive, that it resembled obstruction. r only wish was to conserve their privileges. With this ct they had evolved an exceedingly elaborate code which, adamantine rules, regulated the quality and the quantity e service which they consented to render the State. This was called *méstnichestvo* (from *mésto*, 'place'). Its govern- dea was a distorted and exaggerated valuation of what was dered family honour. It was a sort of trade union founded enealogical principles. The rules, stated briefly, were that *yár* could accept any post (civil, military, judicial, or diplo- c) if it was lower in rank than that which any member of his ly, alive or dead, had already held, and, further, no *boyár* l accept any position in which he found himself subordinate other *boyár*, to whose family his own family had never been rdinate before. If he infringed either of these rules, he down the collective wrath of his family on his head, and will of the family was stronger than the will of the *tsar*. The could not force a *boyár* to do what the *boyár* considered gatory service. But provided these rules were observed the did not mind what service he performed.

can be imagined that such a system scarcely promoted ency. It involved interminable disputes, law-suits, and s in the filling of all the government posts, and ended by g them merely with those whose relations had filled equiva- posts before. The field where the effects of this incredible antastic code were most injuriously felt was that of military ations. The prospects of an army in which no officer would under any other officer unless any or all of their ancestors, ving together, had previously occupied exactly similar posi- , were naturally gloomy. Besides, as an inevitable corol- each family was perpetually trying to advance its fortunes, meant trying to break the rules of the trade union to its advantage. At the same time the effect of such a system

on a ruler who considered himself an absolute autocrat, and was unable to appoint those whom he judged best fitted carry out his intentions, was exceedingly exasperating.

The phenomenon was one of the unfortunate results of concentration of popular forces in Moscow. The *boyárs* class were of very mixed origin. There was, first, the untit nobility of Moscow itself (*boyár* was a designation, not a tit families who had been settled in Moscow, and served grand dukes before and during the unification of Russia them ; next, there were the apanaged princes, who came settled in Moscow as they lost their apanages (to the Gr Duke of Moscow) or became impoverished, and also their titled nobility, who either preceded, accompanied, or follo them (this class by mere force of numbers naturally s swamped the first) ; lastly, there were titled and untit foreign families, mostly of west Russian ('Lithuanian') or Ta origin, who were attracted to Moscow by the prospects successful career which it offered. *Méstnichestvo* was a re of this flood of noble fortune-seekers and of the desire of e family to establish the superiority of its origin over, and impr the chances of its success at the expense of, all the others. passive assistance which they offered the *tsar* in the adminis tion of his country and the conduct of his wars soon develo into a chronic obstruction. It brought about, eventually, undoing of their own class. Meanwhile, it forced the *tsa* look elsewhere for workers and helpers. The people from wh he began to choose these were of humble origin—sons of pri clerks in the government offices, and others. These gradually began to form the nucleus of a new class of St servants, who were rewarded, not according to their birth, according to their work, and owed everything to the Whereas the *boyárs*, having patrimonies (*vótchiny*) of their o were, at any rate in theory, economically independent, the

of officials were granted estates (*poméstiya*) by the *tsar* in rn for services rendered and on condition of future ser- ; and though these, in course of time, also became freehold es, they owed their origin to the favour of the *tsar* and their ers were not the heirs of troublesome traditions of inde- lence.

is first wife, to whom he had been married twenty-three s, having borne him no children, Basil III induced the ropolitan of Moscow to allow him to divorce her, though uncanonical behaviour aroused great opposition in the ter ecclesiastical circles. As his second wife, Basil married n Glínskaya, daughter of a Little Russian ('Lithuanian') nate, of Tartar antecedents, who had settled in Moscow. had two sons, of whom the elder, Ivan, was born in 1530. III died in 1533 at the age of 55, having reigned 28 years ; Ivan ruled in his place.

2

Expansion Eastwards

Ivan IV (1533–84)

HE long reign of Ivan IV, called 'the Terrible' (1533–84), one of the most eventful, and in its consequences one of the important, in the history of Russia. Its general effect was utely calamitous, and this effect was felt long after the n of the monster who caused it.

ter the death of Basil III an inevitable reaction took place. ow had been ruled by a firm hand for seventy years. Two rats of strong mind and determined character in succession ept the *boyárs* in order, and had, moreover, seriously begun dermine their position as a class. On the premature death

of their sovereign, leaving behind him an infant successor a
three, the *boyárs* entered on halcyon days, which, at the lov
estimate, might reasonably be expected to last fourteen year
in effect they did. Their position resembled that of a commu
of mice after the passing of two generations of exception
formidable cats.

For the first five years (1533–8), it is true, the *tsar's* widow
her uncle Michael Glínski kept the power in their own ha
and under the rule of these intelligent foreigners Russia p
pered. But Helen died suddenly and mysteriously, and f
1538 till 1547 the *boyárs* had the time of their lives. One mi
have expected, in view of the disapproval of the method
government of the two previous *tsars* which they had intern
tently and obscurely, though unmistakably, expressed, that t
would have been ready with some alternative plan, or, at
rate, would have impatiently and eagerly set to work to elabo
one as soon as they were free to do so. Far from it. Their c
idea of government was to snatch the supreme power from
another, and while each held it, to abuse it to the grea
possible advantage of himself and his family, and the grea
possible detriment of the hostile families of his class. The
bitterest rivals were the families of the Shúiskis, descendant
Rurik, and of the Bélskis, descendants of the Lithuanian pri
Gedimin. Of these the latter were the less selfish and vin
tive. Delation, imprisonment, exile, and torture were ev
day occurrences. Such practices were, of course, universa
those days, and were just as normal in Russia as in other countr
and probably no worse at this period than previously.
whereas in the days of the two last *tsars* they were the acc
paniment of order and strong government, now they ser
no end except family spite and personal greed, and indica
nothing but anarchy.

It is intelligible that such a state of things hardly offer

tious setting for the nursery of Ivan IV. Congenitally what abnormal, Ivan experienced in his childhood treat- which was bound fatally to influence the development of haracter. He was exceptionally impressionable and nervous his earliest years, and he and his brother, left orphans in eighth and sixth years, grew up in an atmosphere which r these circumstances was absolutely ruinous. Stinted in and clothing, except when he had to be present at the tion of a foreign ambassador, bullied and terrified, cted and insulted, he saw the *boyárs* fighting amongst selves, slighting his father's memory, and plundering his erty. In the person of Ivan IV the *boyárs*, to satisfy their e, scratched a Russian and in very fact discovered a Tartar, was a plague to them and to his whole people for the rest of tural life.

re all children who are left entirely to their own devices, was precocious, and the feeling of neglect and isolation ı was habitual to him made him secretive and suspicious. ıd by nature a quick mind. It never occurred to any of his ons or spiritual advisers that it would be a good thing to it. He was never educated, but he steeped himself in the and the Fathers of the Church, and learnt long extracts them by heart, which he was fond of quoting in and out of ı. He was all his life the victim of his emotions, which he ever taught and never learnt to control. Everything he as the result of impulse. Since the emotion which, more any other, dominated the whole of his life was fear, or terror, his impulses were almost always those of a man s defending himself from attack, and since the attacks ed against him were conjured up by his own imagination, ɔprisals which he exacted for them were in reality the sion of blind tyranny and senseless cruelty. He was con- l with the conviction that he had been appointed from

on high to rule over his country, and also that his *boyárs* other officials, whom he always termed his 'slaves', were petually aiming at wresting his power from him. In short was the victim of a fixed idea which the bitter experience his childhood had engendered in him. He was firmly persua that he was misunderstood, that nobody loved him or ap ciated his good intentions, and that everybody was against h He was not mad, but he was exaggeratedly self-centred mentally and morally unbalanced. Such people on the bor line—victims of emotion and passion, and of limited reason intelligence—are difficult enough to deal with in ordinary but when they are placed on a throne with unlimited power means to satisfy their impulses they become absolutely possible. But it must be admitted that Ivan IV had be moments, fits of docility, accommodation, even of enterp and public spirit, which, while he was still comparatively you alternated with his moods of passion, and sometimes lasted l enough to facilitate the carrying out of really important w At his worst moments he was neurotic and cruel, bigoted hypocritical; at his best he was an energetic and even lightened ruler.

In 1547, at the age of seventeen, in the midst of an unbri and lurid adolescence, he astonished the Metropolitan of Mos by seriously announcing his intention of being crowned, beg ning to govern by himself, and getting married. His coronat is not unimportant, because of the fact that he was the Russian sovereign to have himself crowned '*tsar*'. This t the Slavonic version of the word Caesar (*tsar* is contracted f the Old Slavonic *tsesar*), was used by the father and grandfat of Ivan IV occasionally in diplomatic documents and on co but only, as it were, casually and tentatively. In the old d the only sovereigns to whom Russians had applied the t which signified to them absolute independence but did

note any particular form of government, were the Byzantine erors and the Tartar khans, to whom they had owed spiri- and temporal allegiance respectively. Most commonly the rs of Russia styled themselves either Grand Dukes (*veliki zz*) of Moscow, or *Gosudár vseyá Rusí*, which can be approxi- ely rendered by 'Sovereign of All Russia'. Occasionally, they used the designation—afterwards adopted perma- tly—of *samodérzhets* (or autocrat), the Slavonic rendering he Byzantine *αὐτοκράτωρ*. But though his immediate pre- essors had dallied with these titles, Ivan IV, obsessed as he with the idea of his divine mission and his own dignity, was first to assume them publicly and officially, and to claim the t to be recognized as autocrat, and not merely to act as one. he family of his wife, chosen at the parade of eligible young es which was customary on these occasions, is of some impor- e, in view of the consequences which attended his marriage. was Anastasia, daughter of Román Yúrevich (= son of i or George) Zákharin-Kóshkin, member of an ancient ily of Lithuanian origin long settled in Moscow, and founder ne family which came to be known in Russian history as the nánovs.

is new responsibilities did not at first produce much change van's behaviour, which may be termed wild. His maternal tions, the Glínskis, wielded most of the power and made nselves very unpopular in Moscow by their behaviour. ut this time a series of exceptionally destructive conflagra- s broke out in the capital; thousands of lives were lost and es burned, the *tsar's* palace amongst them; and the *tsar* ly escaped with his life. The people accused the Glínskis aving caused the fires by their practices in the black art. this, it is said, made a great impression on Ivan. He was g in a village outside Moscow, and here he was visited by iest of his own private chapel, named Silvester. This man

urged on him the view that these disasters were an expressior the divine anger at his misdeeds and frivolity, and admonish him to repent and to turn over a new leaf. The fact is, at a rate, undoubted that at this time Ivan did turn over a new le He threw all his energy into the task, and showed as great anxiety to administer his country as he had hitherto shown amuse himself. He put himself entirely into the hands Silvester, and appointed an extremely intelligent young man humble origin, named Adáshev, at the head of a new departm (*prikáz*) which was to receive popular petitions to the soverei

One of the first results of this new era of concord and c scientious government was the summoning of the first Gene Assembly (*zémski sobór* = 'land assembly') in 1550. T principal object with which this was summoned was to ca out the reform of local government; at the same time a n codification of laws was undertaken, the last having been ma in 1497. Local government was still carried on as it had been the days when the country was split up into apanages. It w in the hands of the ruling class, whose double duty it was bo to provide the sovereign with military forces to defend (or extend) his country in time of war, a personal service perform by them in lieu of the payment of taxes, and also to adminis his country in time of peace. The emoluments of their offi guaranteed their military efficiency; these, however, were n paid them by the State, but levied by them directly from t land which they administered. This administration, as w natural in such remote days, was merely disciplinary and pu tive, not preventive or in any way philanthropic, and the pa ments consisted mostly of various fees and penalties, origina paid in kind and later commuted. This system of decentrali tion led to many abuses and disputes, and also caused delay a time of mobilization owing to the vast extent of country o which the officials were spread. These posts were, appropriat

igh, known as 'feedings' (*kormléniya*), as those who held
n literally battened on the mass of the people—the peasants
tilled the soil.

s the result of laws passed at this general assembly, these
s were gradually abolished, the inhabitants of the country
icts and towns were made responsible for the punishment
riminals and collection of fees payable directly to the State
sury, and certain criminal cases were to be tried in future
Ioscow instead of locally. Thus greater centralization was
bined with an increase in the liabilities and responsibilities
ne peasants. Two objects were gained at one stroke: the
ces of large income were more effectively controlled, and
military forces were more effectively concentrated. This
very necessary in view of the fact that the needs of the State
out of all proportion to the productivity of the people.

he assembly of 1550, like others summoned during the
ury, was not representative in the sense that it consisted of
ities elected by the people to express their views; it was
posed of certain representatives of the people whom the
chose to consult and to make responsible for innovations in
inistration. It included the *boyárskaya dúma*, the heads of
prikázy (the equivalent of ministries and government depart-
ts composing the executive), the heads of the Church and
arious institutions such as trade-guilds, mostly drawn from
metropolis—all of them appointed to take part in the
nbly, but not elected.

he following year, 1551, witnessed the convocation of a
ncil, the object of which was the reform of the Church and
cially the limitation of the acquisition of landed property,
ne detriment of the State, by the monasteries—institutions
members of which, having renounced the world in order to
for its sins, had become the largest and wealthiest land-
ers in the country. It was not till considerably later that

laws were ultimately passed which restricted the practice testators bequeathing their estates to the Church, especially the monasteries, in payment for prayers to ensure their salvat after death. This practice became so prevalent, and the lar held by monasteries on condition of offering prayers for t dead assumed such dimensions, that the State was hard put it to find enough land to grant, with peasants to work it, order to maintain the efficiency of the living.

The Foreign Policy of Ivan IV

Ivan IV, not content with initiating reforms in the inter administration of the country, undertook at this time an ent prising foreign policy, the successes of which laid some of t foundations of the Russian Empire as we have known it. A matter of fact, Russia was almost always at war. The histo of Moscow is illustrative of the truth that a healthy organi cannot remain stationary. It must expand and develop. T internal development of Russia was very slow. Cut off fr material contact with Europe by her inveterate enemies, t Swedes, Germans, and Poles, who knew well enough how da gerous to themselves a well-equipped Russia would be, depriv of mental and spiritual intercourse with the West by her devoti to the Orthodox Church, which inspired fanatical hatred anything coming from the lands of heresy, there was nothing restrict her expansion, which, owing to the tireless energy of h people and the peculiarities of her geographical situati literally knew no bounds.

But after the subjugation of all the small Russian principaliti the unification of the Russian people, and the consummation Great Russia, Moscow found itself confronted with oth problems. These were the establishment of commercial cont with Western Europe, the reclaiming ('redemption') of ancie Russian lands still under non-Russian rule, the security of

h-eastern frontier, and the acquisition of more land for estic purposes such as the raising of revenue and endowment officials and soldiers, or professional governing classes, with es. It may be said that the accomplishment of the first two cts necessitated the preliminary achievement of the last two. first two objects were not accomplished in the sixteenth, yet in the seventeenth, century. The first involved access he Baltic ; and the Swedes, the Germans of Livonia and other Baltic provinces, and the Poles, had no intention of ving such a blow to be struck at their power. The second ied the union of Lithuania with Russia ; but Lithuania one half of Poland, and Poland was, at the height of its ngth, far too vigorous to allow itself to be dismembered. solution of the third problem implied that of the fourth : as eastwards that the line of least resistance lay, and in the that two of Russia's most vital needs could be simultane- y and most easily satisfied. It was to secure the south- rn frontiers of Russia, and to acquire more land to meet the immediate necessities, that Ivan and his able councillors set themselves.

seems at first sight curious that a State already owning such territory should need more, but the nature of the territory t not be forgotten. The soil of Moscow was very different that of Kiev—a fact well appreciated by the Polish nates who were pegging out for themselves vast estates in le Russia. The soil of the whole of Great Russia between Volga and the Oká was comparatively poor. It consisted ly of forest-land, and, especially under the agricultural litions of those days, could not support a large population, therefore could not produce a large revenue. Industries not exist, and timber was not such a marketable asset in e days as it is now. It is true that Russia owned already ne land between the Volga and the White Sea, between the


THE
EXTERNAL GR
OF
MUSCOV
1500 - 180
English Miles
0 100 200 300
SWEDEN
FINLAND
Archangel
R. N. Dvina
L. Onega
Stockholm
Nystadt
Ladoga
Stolbovo
Belo Ozero
White Lake
Dogo
ESTHONIA
INGRIA
Narva
Oselia
Gerdau
Dorpat
Pskov
Novgorod
Vyatka
COLONY OF THE STROGANOVS
Perm
LIVONIA
Ruga
GREAT RUSSIA
Uglich
Yaroslavl
Kostroma
R. Volga
R. Kama
Mitau
LITHUANIA
Minsk
Polotsk
Deulino
Tushino
Alexandrov
Nizhni Novgorod
TRIBES
Kazan
Danzig
PRUSSIA
Konigsberg
R. Dwina
Smolensk
Moscow
Vyazma
Andrusovo
Mogilev
Warsaw
R. Vistula
Grodno
Brest
Pripet
Chernigov
Bryansk
Ryazan
FINNISH
COSSACKS OF THE YAIK
Cracow
POLAND
POLESIE
Novgorod Seversk
Baturin
Voronezh
R. Volga
R. Yaik or Ural
VOLYNIA
Kiev
Lemberg
Khotin
LITTLE RUSSIA (UKRAINA)
COSSACKS OF THE DNIEPER
Poltava
R. Don
COSSACKS OF THE DON
KIRGIZ T
Yassy
Pruth
Dniester
Orgeev
Ghekakov
Porogi (Cataracts)
TARTARS
Fokshany
Galats
NOGAI
Astraldan
KALMUK
Rumnik
Bucarest
Ismail
AZOV TARTARS
Kilia
CRIMEA
R. Kuban
OTTOMAN
Rushchuk
Turtukai
Shumla
Shabardi
CIRCASSIA
KABARDA
Tcrek
EMPIRE
GEORGIA

Russia about 1500
Acquisitions by end of XVI^th Cent.
Territory lost by 1620
Acquisitions of Alexis
" " Peter the Great
" " Anne
" " Elizabeth
" " Catherine II

Uráls and Finland, but the conditions there were, economical even more unfavourable. What was not forest, in the region no of the Volga, was neither arable nor habitable. The peasants this time enjoyed, it is true, a certain prosperity: they had s fairly unrestricted usufruct of the countless rivers and of t abundant wild honey in the forests; the fur-trade was alw profitable; and live stock was cheap and plentiful. Neverthel it was more grain-bearing land which was the prime necessity the State, and this was to be found, not in the north, but in t rich black-earth country south of the Oká, while in order win this country the south-eastern frontier had to be secure

It has been said that at this period Russia was almost co stantly at war. It must not be forgotten that in those da Moscow was, except to the north and north-east, surround by enemies. In the north-west were the Swedes, in the Bal provinces the German Order of Knights, in the west Polan and everywhere else the Tartars. In the period between 14 and 1595 Russia waged ten wars with her western neighbo on the north-western front, which altogether lasted over fi years. But during the same period on the south-eastern fro war was literally perennial: it died down every autumn a sprang up every spring. The Tartar domination, as exercis formally over Russia, came to an end with the fifteenth centu but the Tartar peoples continued to harass the Russians f many years to come; in fact, it was not until the eighteen century that the last remnants of Tartar political power we suppressed. When the Golden Horde,[1] as such, ceased to exi its offspring took its place. This comprised the two khanates Kazán and Astrakhan, which occupied the middle and the low reaches of the Volga, and the khanate of the Crimea, which join to that of Astrakhan on the east, and covered virtually the wh of southern Russia as far west as the Dnieper. All three stat

[1] *Orda* = camp.

solidly and fanatically Muhammadan, and thus in close
tual communion with the ruling powers in the Ottoman
ire, at this period at the very zenith of its strength. The
ea became, in fact, a sort of dependency of the Sultan.
was also the Tartar power which caused most material harm
oscow. Every year bands of marauders on horseback would
north, skilfully making their way along the watershed
een the basins of the rivers Dnieper and Don. Having
ed within the borders of territory settled and inhabited by
ans, which at this time did not extend far south of the line
e river Oká, the Tartars would spread out fanwise amongst
easants labouring on the land, and then, enclosing them
were in a vast net, they would kidnap all the able-bodied
ood-looking of both sexes, drag them off to the Crimea, and
hem as slaves. The Crimea was in those days one of the
ipal slave-markets of the Muhammadan world, and in this
ens of thousands of valuable lives were lost to Russia every

Such experiences as these explain the growth of the
r antagonism which long existed between the Russian and
Ottoman Empires.

ese incessant raids necessitated the organization of serious
ce. A regular system of frontier police grew up, for which
bers were recruited every spring in Moscow. The men were
buted along a line of forts, connected with each other by
ades of felled trees in forest-areas and earthworks in the
country. At the beginning of the sixteenth century this
llowed the course of the river Oká, from Nízhni Nóvgorod
vards to Túla and Kózelsk, a line not far to the south of
began the southern steppe, or open treeless country. This
er police was very effective in counteracting the raids. It
notice to the larger bodies of troops posted behind whenever
pproach of the raiders was apprehended, and in this way,
by year, the amount of occupied and cultivated country

was gradually extended southwards, though the lot of the peo
who settled there was not without excitement or peril.

But the Tartars of Kazán on the Volga were more accessi
and vulnerable than those of the Crimea, who were protec
by hundreds of miles of steppe and the easily defensible isthm
of Perekóp[1] at the end. Russians had for years past b
gradually feeling their way down the Volga, the upper reache
which had been in their possession for centuries. Kazán was
important commercial, as well as a political, centre. It had b
the scene of a great annual commercial fair. Basil III had aim
a blow at Kazán by establishing a rival fair at Makárev, bel
Nízhni Nóvgorod,[2] a fair afterwards transferred to the lat
town, where it became world-famous. He had also found
an outpost-town, called after him Vasilsúrsk, at the point h
way between Nízhni and Kazán, where the river Surá falls i
the Volga.

In 1552 Ivan IV, in the hey-day of his good temper and go
fortune, undertook the expedition against Kazán, which
a formidable stronghold. After an arduous siege of seve
months, the city fell, and the whole of its territory passed i
Russian possession. Much of this, on both sides of the riv
belonged to tribes of Finnish origin, the Mordvá, Cheren
Chuvásh, Votyák, and the Bashkírs; and it was some ye
before all these were successfully reduced, and all their la
became the property of those classes in Russia who so mu
needed it—the soldiers and the clergy. But the capture
Kazán was not only of material advantage. It was a great p
sonal triumph for Ivan, and a great moral triumph for the wh
of Russia. It has been called the Russian *Las Navas de Tol*
and it was indeed the first step in the progress of the Orthod
Cross against the Crescent. The sequel to the conquest

[1] Means literally *Cross-ditch*, i. e. the earth-work across the isthmus

[2] 'Lower Newtown', so called to distinguish it from old Nóvgorod.

n was that of Astrakhan, which was effected with much less ulty in 1556. The lands on either side of the lowest es of the Volga are arid, but Astrakhan is an economic e of great importance. The whole course of the Volga nenceforward in Russian lands; trade with Persia and the was thereby facilitated; and, incidentally, a regular supply viare was assured. The foundation-stones of Russia's great ern Empire had been laid.

ie eastern flank having thus been satisfactorily cleared, attention could be devoted to thwarting the destructive ds of the Crimean Tartars. These robbers, whose com- ty subsisted almost entirely on the profits of the slave- , did as much damage to Lithuania and Poland as they did Ioscow. If Russia and Poland had once put their heads her they could have swept the Tartars into the Black instantly, but of course this was the one thing they could bring themselves to do. But with the aid of frontier police the Russians gradually pushed back the ars and brought under cultivation the fertile zone of black , which begins south of the Oká and extends right across ia in a strip nearly two hundred miles broad. This land apportioned amongst the upper class which provided the ssional army. It was given them as a reward for their ce and also as a means of providing them with the income ssary to maintain their service efficiently. There remained question of labour. This was drawn from the populous cts north of the Oká, from which such a flood of emigrants ut for the new fertile lands that the government, fearing pletion of the country round Moscow, began to restrict ight to migrate. Only younger members of families were ed to go. These naturally arrived in their new homes out means of starting work, and were compelled to borrow the landowners. Such debts are never easy to pay back,

and, while serfdom did not at this time formally exist in Russia this was one of the ways in which the peasant gradually became fastened to the land on which he worked; he could not buy back his freedom, and thus he became a slave. Like a wasp that indulges in jam, his wings were caught.

During the reign of Ivan IV a second line of forts and earthworks was constructed, farther south than the first; this second line started at Alatýr on the river Surá in the east and went westwards to Novosíl and Orël, southwards to Nóvgorod-Séversk, and thence again south-eastwards to Putívl.

At the end of the sixteenth century a third line took its place; this was really a triple line of fortified towns, namely Eléts and Lívny, Voronezh and Kursk, and, far to the south, Valúiki and Bélgorod. In the course of a century the line had shifted from the Oká to half-way down the courses of the rivers Donéts and Don, which flow into the Sea of Azóv.

It was in the formation and in the functioning of this frontier-police that the Cossacks came first into prominence. The word Cossack (in Russian *kozák* or *kazák*) is of Tartar origin, and it was first applied to men of no fixed abode or occupation who hired themselves out as day-labourers. The scene of the frontier warfare against the Tartars was country, some of which had been lying waste for centuries, and more of which had never been exploited at all. It abounded in all manner of game, and the rivers teemed with fish. The Tartars, in the interludes between slave-driving, spent their time in the capture of animals. The Russians similarly, when not killing the Tartars, went hunting. This sort of life attracted all those elements in Russia who either did not possess a home or did not want one. Such men hired their services to the local tradesmen as fishers and hunters, and to the local authorities as frontier police, and they probably acquired the name of Cossack from the Tartars who were engaged in similar occupations. The earliest Cossacks

were those of Ryazán, who are mentioned in 1444, and the first line of frontier forts was where they first developed. As the Tartars receded southwards, the Cossacks pushed forwards, and many of them began themselves to form permanent settlements in the open steppe which they had helped to reclaim. In course of time they grew into a large community, a sort of semi-independent military republic with its own laws and organization, and came to be known as the Cossacks of the Don, the river along which their settlements chiefly lay. From here, again, the more restless spirits migrated eastwards to the banks of the Volga, where they deteriorated into mere brigands who preyed on the rich traffic of that mighty river. Ivan IV sent a punitive expedition against them, and they then dispersed, many going still farther east and settling on the river Urál, then called the Yaík, others going south towards the Caucasus, to the banks of the rivers Kubán and Térek. The Cossacks of the Dnieper, who in the seventeenth century played such an important part in Russian history, arose in the same way, and somewhat later than those on the Don.

In general, the Cossacks, who became an extremely important element in Russian society, may be described as follows. They were originally hunters and adventurers who preferred the risks and profits of a roving life to the security and the liability to taxation of a sedentary life. People used to go and join the Cossacks in Russia (as they used to emigrate from England) when the conventions of society became irksome to them or the conditions of life intolerable. From the nature of the country where they plied their trade and the prevailing political conditions the Cossacks developed into a force of permanent irregular soldiery, which afterwards grew into military communities with territory and laws of their own. The Church had no authority over them, and that of the central Government of Moscow was, for long, of the most shadowy description. Ethnologically, the

Cossacks were extremely mixed. The preponderating element was doubtless Russian, but many Tartars came over from the enemy's camp and made common cause with them, just as, in the days of the Tartar domination, numerous Tartar families had settled in Moscow; and their wives were as often as not of Tartar origin. It was natural that such communities should show but scant respect for persons or traditions. They did not mind where or at whose expense they made a living, and on several occasions took as much out of the Russians as they had ever done out of the Tartars. The *tsar* and his Government found that they formed a useful hedge against their hereditary nomadic enemies, but they also found that a hedge has thorns on both sides. In later years their liberties were drastically clipped, and Russian authority was definitely and firmly enforced upon them. At the present time they still form separate communities, enjoying certain privileges, such as partial exemption from taxation, in return for life-long liability to military service. In the eyes of Russian society they have always had a somewhat heroic colouring. But admiration for them is tempered with fear, as their exploits—at times in opposition to, at others in support of the central authority—have usually been performed at a heavy cost to the proletariate.

Meanwhile events of importance had been happening elsewhere. In 1553 occurred a portent of the coming storm. Ivan IV fell seriously ill, and, death appearing imminent, he required the *boyárs* to swear allegiance to his son, whom he wished to succeed him. Most of the *boyárs*, and with them Silvester and Adáshev, hesitated; many refused; all of them were bitterly hostile to Ivan's maternal relatives, the Glínskis, and to his wife's family, the Románovs, who, if his infant son were to succeed him, would inevitably secure all authority. Besides this, the ostensible and the equally cogent reason for their unwillingness was the fact that they regarded as Ivan's

rightful successor not his son, but his cousin, who, being senior, had in their view prior claims. As it happened Ivan recovered, but the simmering disloyalty and the latent intentions of his confidential 'ministers' and of the *boyárs* which had been revealed to him rankled, and conscious of the fate which would befall his wife and family in the event of his death, he never forgave them.

The success of his arms on the Volga, meanwhile, encouraged Ivan to try his fortune on the north-western front. The fact that Russia was cut off from the Baltic by the Swedes, the Germans, and the Poles, was the motive for this policy, and it proved also the cause of Ivan's failure. Ivan understood clearly the material necessity for Russia to obtain access to the coast, but he did not realize that the resources which enabled him to vanquish the Tartars were unequal to the task of overcoming his enemies in the west, who were thoroughly well equipped. His advisers were in favour of first attacking the Crimean Tartars, and thus making a clean sweep of the hereditary foes on that side, but Ivan was determined to have his own way, and this divergence of policy led to further recrimination. The pretext for beginning the war against Livonia, or rather the German Order of Knights who ruled that country, was the fact that some years previously, well aware that uninterrupted intercourse with western Europe would strengthen Russia's material resources and make her a more dangerous neighbour, they had established a blockade and would not allow engineers and artisans, who had been summoned by Ivan from Saxony, to proceed to Moscow. The war began in 1558, when the Russians invaded Esthonia and Livonia, and captured a number of places, including Nárva and Dórpat (in Russian called *Yúrev*, or 'George's (town)', because it had been founded by Yaroslávl, whose monastic name was George, early in the eleventh century). Kettler, the grand master of the Livonian Order, took alarm and

sought the help of Sigismund II Augustus, King of Poland, who concluded an alliance with him. Russia was thus again at war with Poland, with a long frontier to defend, and this war lasted with intermissions for twenty-five years. If Ivan and his counsellors had been at one it might have continued as well as it began, but unfortunately they were at loggerheads, and their continual discord prepared the way for catastrophe abroad and at home. Domestic differences and divergence of policy eventually brought about a rupture between Ivan and his advisers. Silvester and Adáshev, whom he had himself spoilt by an excess of confidence, were dismissed; the first joined a monastery, the second the army in Livonia. But these two were the ringleaders of the large mass of the *boyárs'* party, who were bitterly hostile to the family of Ivan's wife; they had, moreover, gathered virtually the whole of the executive in their hands, and filled the administration with their partisans. Their dismissal foreshadowed a complete break in the order of government.

The same year, 1560, two further disasters occurred; another great fire broke out in Moscow, and Ivan's wife Anastasia, to whom he was passionately attached, suddenly died. Both events still further exasperated the *tsar*, and the latter he attributed directly to the worry of the personal feuds which were always raging behind the scenes in the palace; indeed, he asserted that she had been poisoned. But even yet the bursting of the storm was delayed. The war in the West was still the chief preoccupation, and the Russian arms gained further successes. The Baltic provinces were in liquidation. Kettler, the master of the Livonian Order, unable to carry on the war, ceded Livonia to Poland, and himself retained only Courland with the title of hereditary duke. Poland, possessed of Livonia, threw more energy into the campaign. Sweden obtained a footing in Esthonia, and the large island of Oesel was bought by Denmark.

In 1563 Ivan was present at the capture by his army of the ancient Russian city of Pólotsk on the western Dviná, which, since 1300, had been in the possession of Lithuania. But the strain of keeping the *boyárs* in hand, and of keeping the Poles at bay, was too great, and in 1564 the crash came.

The Revolution of 1564 *and the New Régime*

The general causes of the break have been described. They were, roughly, the claim of the *tsar* to absolute power over Russia and all that it contained, which he, true to his traditions and to his instinct, looked upon as his private property; the claim of the *boyárs* to a large share in the government of the country and the direction of policy; and the fact that both claims were justified by the absence of laws defining the powers of the rival parties. While the *boyárs* were, strictly speaking, more conservative than the *tsar*, both were the unconscious victims of the fatal policy of drift—the hesitation to define the position clearly. On the other hand, the particular reasons for the break at this juncture have never been thoroughly elucidated, though events which certainly contributed to it were the question of the succession, raised in 1553, and divergence of views on foreign policy.

What actually led to the crisis was the flight and desertion of Prince Kúrbski in 1564. This man, a member of one of the oldest Russian families, was one of Ivan's best generals. He had been a member of the *boyárskaya dúma* and one of Ivan's counsellors in what are known as his 'good years', and he had distinguished himself in the campaign against Kazán. He may be described as an enlightened and intelligent conservative, with a *penchant* for Western civilization; he was relatively well educated, and his patriotism was tempered by a sense of his country's deficiencies. He was in command in Livonia, where

after many successes he lost a battle. Fearing the *tsar's* anger he deserted to the King of Poland, abandoning his wife and child in Dórpat. The fact of the matter was that he could not endure Ivan or Moscow any longer. He was only one of many. Flight abroad, on the part of his subjects, was the one thing Ivan dreaded most, and he used to exact financial guarantees from them against this contingency. Kúrbski's defection is especially important because it resulted in an extraordinary exchange of polemics between him and Ivan, one of the most curious of political correspondences and one of the chief sources for the history of Ivan's reign. The correspondence lasted with long intervals from 1564 to 1579. Kúrbski opened it, and wrote in all four letters to Ivan's two, crowning his work with a short history of the 'Grand Duke of Moscow'. Both sides were so exasperated that neither seriously attempted to argue or succeeded in proving anything. They were just like two hysterical women screaming their convictions at each other, and Ivan certainly screamed the louder. 'I didn't—yes, you did; I shall—no, you shan't' is the general tenor. Kúrbski asserts that Ivan ruled perfectly as long as he listened to the advice of his counsellors. His political programme goes no farther than existing political institutions—the *boyárskaya dúma*, which had always existed, and which he considers a panacea for all ills, and the *zémski sobór*, which was a new creation in 1550. Ivan, in his immense and chaotic rigmarole (his first letter occupies 62 quarto pages, while the whole correspondence only contains 100), asserts that the *boyárs* have unjustly tried to wrest the power from him, and that he has the absolute right to do what he chooses with his 'slaves'. Neither side could see beyond its own grievance; neither had any remedy to suggest. The only touch of novelty was introduced by Ivan in the reiteration of his claim to despotic power by divine right and by inheritance; this he was the first ruler publicly and definitely to proclaim,

but in doing so he was begging the question and falsifying history. The main value of the correspondence is its indication of the profound contradiction and of the mutual misunderstandings which prevented Ivan and his government from fulfilling their real duties, which were to defend the country from its enemies abroad and to enforce at any rate law and order at home. Both Ivan and Kúrbski foresaw disaster; Ivan prophesied the doom of the *boyárs*, Kúrbski that of the dynasty.

Ivan was not long in fulfilling his own words. Kúrbski had assumed the beneficent omniscience of the *boyárskaya dúma*; but, as a matter of fact, the *boyárs* as a class had never been conspicuous for their enlightenment or their spirit of self-sacrifice. Even when capable men of more humble origin, such as Silvester and Adáshev, came accidentally to the top, their impulse of public spirit soon exhausted itself, and simony and corruption supervened. Ivan, for his part, assumed the beneficent omnipotence of the autocracy, and at least his contention was supported by the facts of experience. He compared the reigns of his father and grandfather with the rule of the *boyárs* during his own childhood. But both Ivan and Kúrbski chose unfortunate methods of enforcing their arguments. Both of them reverted to type—evading instead of confronting their problems. Kúrbski turned traitor and ran away, claiming the right for all his colleagues to do likewise unmolested. Ivan proceeded to declare civil war on his own subjects.

This he initiated by the unusual step of suddenly leaving Moscow, late in the year 1564, with his family, his followers, and all his household belongings and valuables, and settling down in the village of Alexándrov, about 70 miles to the north. Like Kúrbski, he migrated. From here he sent forth two decrees, one to the hierarchy and nobility, which included the whole administration and the army, another to the merchants and people of Moscow. In the first he accused the *boyárs* of ruining

the land, of robbing both *tsar* and people, the priests of conniving at this, and the army of failing to defend the country; he put his ban on them all collectively, and said he would have nothing more to do with them, and would go and live somewhere else. In the second he announced that he had no quarrel with the good citizens of Moscow. In short, it was an experimental abdication to test the extent of his power. At the stage of political and intellectual development which the people of Moscow had then reached it worked admirably. They were filled with alarm and terror at the departure of the *tsar*—an unheard of and portentous act—and promptly sent deputations, headed by priests and *boyárs*, to beseech him to return. This he did in February 1565. He was now able to make his own terms. These reduced themselves to the simple and drastic plan of cutting Russia in two. He chose out a number of towns and districts, scattered over various parts of Russia, which should serve for the maintenance of himself, his family, and his bodyguard. This latter was chosen from amongst the military class (the nobility), and numbered a thousand. This separate estate (which amounted to nearly half the country) and *personnel* he termed *oprichnina*—*oprich* means 'apart, separate'—and the *oprichniki*, the desperadoes and cut-throats who formed the guard, were nicknamed by the people *kroméshniki*, the approximate equivalent of 'outsiders'. The rest of the country, and of course the whole onus of its defence and government, he left to the *boyárskaya dúma* and the *prikázy* (ministries), which were termed *zémshchina*, approximately 'commonwealth' or 'dominion', from *zemlyá*, 'land'. The supreme control over decisions of state, nevertheless, he reserved to himself. He also stipulated for the unquestioned right of punishing any *boyárs* or others who were guilty or suspect of disloyalty. He abandoned the palace in the *Kremlin*, and built himself and his satellites a whole new quarter in Moscow, summarily evicting the actual

tenants; but he did not live much in the capital, preferring to direct his reign of terror from the forests of Alexándrov, which village he made his residence. Here he led the life of a lunatic, and forced his two sons, Ivan and Theodore, to do the same. The mornings were spent in bell-ringing and prostration, during dinner he read aloud the lives of the saints, in the afternoon he watched his victims being tortured, and in the evening he listened to soothsayers or got drunk. Everybody whom he suspected he had murdered, tortured, or imprisoned; these included his cousin and all his family, and many of the *boyárs* and their families. The Metropolitan of Moscow was outraged, imprisoned, and finally put to death for remonstrating with him. Not content with this, Ivan toured his unfortunate country, dealing death and destruction wherever he went. He literally devastated the prosperous city of Nóvgorod, and decimated its inhabitants, because it had dared to oppose his grandfather, and had rendered itself suspect of treachery. Finally, his suspicions fell on his own followers, and some of the chief *oprichniki* were executed. He made the people of Russia realize what it meant to invite a sovereign to come and rule upon his own terms. He did infinitely more material and moral harm to his country and to his subjects in twenty years than the Tartars had done in two hundred, and the irony of it was, that he completely failed in his object. Instead of systematically undermining the position of the *boyárs*, who, as a class, undoubtedly were a far greater hindrance than they were a help to good government, or patiently forming another class of officials to take their place, Ivan merely struck at individuals amongst them whom he suspected or disliked. He tried indeed to replace them by his *oprichnina*, but a regiment of blackguards hastily got together does not form a good executive. It was reserved for a greater character than Ivan's to supplant the *boyárs* and to replace the criterion of birth by a standard of efficiency.

Another aspect of Ivan's singular procedure was more personal. It illustrated the persistence of the type of the selfish landlord. Unable to cope with the management of the whole of his estate, he left the responsibility for that of half of it to others, reserving to himself absolute power over his own half, and the right to control decisions which affected the whole. Moreover, he was possessed with the idea that all the *boyárs* were plotting against him. Undoubtedly they were too much for him; they got on his nerves, and he wanted to get away from them; and he devised his scheme as a sort of refuge from the cares of state—a return to a relatively simple life. He even appointed a mock *tsar*, in the person of a converted Tartar prince, to rule in Moscow, and himself addressed petitions to him and assumed a lower title. In fact, he made a rudimentary attempt at getting rid of all the responsibilities while retaining all the advantages of his position. But he led a double life, and, not wishing the realities of the situation to be grasped abroad, used to return to Moscow to receive foreign diplomatic missions (as yet there were no resident ambassadors in Moscow) with full state ceremonial, as if the current of life in Russia was normal. A curious light on his character is afforded by the fact that he kept a careful record of all his victims, and this he used to send to various monasteries in order that prayers might be offered for their souls. It contained over 4,000 names, and of these only a small number were actual *boyárs*—the large majority being their relations or underlings, while many victims from other classes were also included.

The Later Years of Ivan IV

During all this time of horror the people murmured, but patiently endured. The hold of the dynasty on them was very great. They knew that the only alternative to the tyranny of the monarch was that of the oligarchy, and their memory was

good enough to tell them that the former was preferable for them. While the Russian people, for no fault of its own, was suffering these internal torments, it was naturally handicapped in its resistance to its numerous external enemies, whose pressure was scarcely ever relaxed. In 1566 a short truce supervened in the war between Russia and Poland, during which Ivan convoked the general assembly (*zémski sobór*) for the second time, especially to determine whether the war should be continued or given up; the former alternative was chosen, the conditions of the King of Poland being considered unacceptable. But Russia was not in a position to wage a successful war, and, added to all the other troubles, two more enemies—the Swedes in the north, and the Crimean Tartars in the south—began now to attack her. Ivan tried to make an alliance with the Danes on the island of Oesel, but this came to nothing. The Tartars, supported by the Turks, were anxious to recover the lost khanates on the Volga. In 1569 they laid siege to Astrakhan, but ignominiously failed to take it. In 1571 they marched on Moscow with a large army; they soon crossed the Oká and appeared beneath the walls of the capital, which they burnt entirely except the *Kremlin*, retiring with a large number of captives. The next year they returned, intending to go against Kazán, but this time they were met and routed by the Russians.

During this period Poland was approaching the zenith of its fortunes. In 1569 took place the famous congress of Lublin. In view of the growing aggressiveness of the Russians which had manifested itself throughout this century, the Poles were prompted to consolidate their loosely-united kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. At this congress the bonds between them were drawn tighter, and certain changes, destined to be momentous, were made in their status. It was decided that the king should be henceforth elected by the nobles; and a territorial rearrangement also took place, by which Lithuania absorbed

the newly acquired coast-province of Livonia, and Poland took over the southern part of Lithuania—Kiev, Podolia, and Volýnia. From the economic point of view this was a good bargain for the Poles, as it placed the rich lands of Little Russia and the lower course of the Dnieper under the direct control of Warsaw; but it was bound to complicate the issues between Moscow and Warsaw, as it put a large number of Orthodox Russians under immediate Polish rule, and thus extended the range of conflict. The change in the status of the King of Poland indicated that the power of the Polish land-magnates was increasing at the expense of that of their sovereign, while in Russia simultaneously the reverse process was taking place. In Russia, indeed, the nobles for many years made frequent and desperate attempts to curb the autocracy, but ended in accommodating themselves to it, thus securing themselves a longer lease of pleasure.

In 1572 occurred the death of King Sigismund II Augustus of Poland, and the line of Jagiello (cf. p. 87) became extinct. In 1573 Henry of Valois, Duke of Anjou, was elected to the throne, but he could not stand the life and fled to France the next year.

The year 1575 witnessed the election of Stephen Batory, *vóivoda* (= 'duke') of Transylvania, who was destined to be a thorn in the side of Russia. He was energetic and ambitious, and had good artillery and many well-trained German and Hungarian mercenaries at his disposal. He set himself the task of recapturing all that the Russians had wrested from Poland, and he was as good as his word. In 1579 he retook Pólotsk (cf. p. 121), and after other successes he laid siege to Pskov (1581). At the same time the Swedes invaded Carelia and Esthonia, north and south of the Gulf of Finland respectively, took Keksholm[1] on Lake Ládoga, and all the Russian towns on the

[1] = 'Two Hills'.

outh of the Gulf of Finland established by Ivan III. But 'skov, ably defended by Ivan Shúiski, was too much for Batory, nd proved the furthest limit of his success. Ivan IV im-lored the mediation of Pope Gregory XIII. His legate, ntonius Possevinus, who has left a remarkable account of Ivan, ucceeded in bringing about a truce. Peace was made in 1582, ut it deprived Ivan of Pólotsk and all his other earlier conquests, ecured to the Swedes and the Poles all that they had taken from im, and marked with failure his attempt to reach the shores of he Baltic.

But already, at this time, Russia was so vast and the energy of er people so boundless that, while these disasters were going on n what may be termed the home country, more fruitful and ot less important events were taking place in districts which, o the Russians, were the equivalent of our colonies. In 1553 ommunication was first opened between England and Russia y means of the White Sea, as the Germans, Swedes, and Poles etween them definitely closed the Baltic to Russian com-nerce with western Europe; in that year the English navigator, Chancellor, after losing two ships which accompanied him, anded at the mouth of the northern Dviná and bore a letter to van from Edward VI. At this spot, near the monastery of t. Nicholas, the English established a 'factory', which later eveloped into Archangel. From this time onwards English, 'rench, and Dutch vessels frequented the northern coasts of Russia and carried on a considerable exchange of goods. Later van entered into direct relations with Elizabeth, seeking, in eturn for commercial concessions, a matrimonial and political lliance, and an eventual right of asylum; but in all these matters he queen confined herself to amiabilities.

A still more notable development and one of purely Russian nterprise was the great movement of expansion and coloniza-ion eastwards which commenced after the conquest of Kazán

and Astrakhan. In 1558 Ivan gave a large grant of land to the Stróganovs, a family as enterprising as it was humble in origin, on the banks of the river Káma, which rises in the Urál Mountains and joins the Volga not far below Kazán. Here these energetic colonists, surrounded by wild and uncivilized Finnish tribes, founded a great commercial settlement with Russian emigrants, which, beginning with agriculture and salt-production, went on to exploit the vast mineral wealth of that region, and soon overflowed into Asia. But when the Stróganovs made their way across the Uráls they came into conflict with more bellicose Tartar tribes who took up arms in defence of their homes. It was at this point that their venture developed into a sort of East India Company and conquest of Peru and Mexico combined. They enlisted a small number of irregular troops from among the Cossacks of the Don and the Volga (cf. pp. 116–18), promising them the *tsar's* forgiveness if they would divert their energies from the robbery of the natives of their own to that of the natives of another country. This force, numbering in all under a thousand, equipped with fire-arms—which were a novelty to their adversaries—under the leadership of the *hetman* Ermák virtually conquered Siberia. Ermák had little difficulty in disposing of the disorganized Tartar forces which opposed him, and in 1582 possessed himself of their 'capital' Sibír, situated on the river Irtýsh. These successful exploits somewhat made up for the failure in the west, and gained their reward. Ivan received a deputation of the Cossack-conquistadors who brought him trophies, forgave them their past misdeeds, took them into his service at a good rate of pay, and dispatched his own officials to organize the newly acquired territories.

Ivan IV aged prematurely and rapidly. In view of his experiences, of his character, and of his mode of life, this fact is not surprising. He always put an excessive amount of zeal,

olence, and passion into any action in public or private life hich he undertook, and the results he achieved were in an in-rse ratio to the amount of energy he expended. His character id psychology have already been indicated. As he grew older s passions grew stronger and his temper more violent. He was unted by the fear—largely imaginary and much exaggerated -that everybody was plotting against him, and he realized that ie *boyárs* as a class were impossible to govern with, or rather iat it was impossible to reconcile their oligarchical and his own onarchical pretensions. But he had neither sufficient brains or sufficient patience to evolve any good alternative form of overnment, nor sufficient discernment to choose good counsel-rs; perhaps there were none, but the result was that he bandoned himself to his fears and his passions, and his reign came one of terror and himself a typically irrational despot.

is often said that, owing to the Tartar domination, Russia is vo hundred years behind the times, but some of Russia's rulers, / no means solely or even mainly its monarchs, are just as much blame as the Tartars for retarding the people's material and oral progress, and in this respect Ivan IV can least of all be quitted. It is difficult to believe that any people could suffer ie terrible ordeals which Russia has suffered, and still exist; it the Russian people had been going through a hard school om the very beginning of its history—it early developed ienomenal powers of endurance and persistence, and qualities elasticity and diffusion which have enabled it to withstand ie ravages of climate, crown, and crosier. Russia has been ealt hard blows by her friends and by her enemies, but her iperficies is considerable, and distribution lessens the violence shock and the pressure of weight.

Ivan IV not only did his best to ruin and exhaust his country hile he was alive, but directly—though, it must be admitted, ot deliberately—prepared a period of still greater turmoil and

misery for it after his death, and himself immediately and permanently modified the whole course of its history. He was guilty of the manslaughter of his eldest son and heir, and thereby ultimately destroyed his own dynasty. It is impossible to imagine a case where such a comparatively trivial incident led to such momentous results. The event occurred in 1582, two years before Ivan's own death. By his first wife Anastasia Románovna, Ivan had had two sons—the elder called Ivan, and the younger Theodore—who were, at this time, between 20 and 30 years of age. The elder son was married, and his wife was expecting a child. One day the *tsar* entered a room where they were, and, offended by what he considered the too scanty costume of his daughter-in-law, hit her, whereupon her husband came forward in her defence. Ivan habitually carried an iron staff, the heavy weight and sharp point of which were painfully familiar to his courtiers and attendants. Incensed at his son's interference, Ivan struck him on the head with it, and naturally killed him. He sacrificed his dynasty to his temper. His younger son, Theodore, was feeble in mind and body, and Ivan foresaw that at his death, and by his own doing, his country would pass into the hands of those he most hated, namely, the *boyárs*—a contingency which he had spent his whole life in trying to avert. After the death of his first wife in 1560 Ivan had several others ; the seventh, Maria Nagáya, bore him a son in 1583, called Demetrius (*Dimítri*), but Ivan himself died the following year, and his infant son was destined only to complicate the issues in which Russia was soon to become involved.

3

The End of the Dynasty and the Time of Troubles (1584–1613)

Tsar Theodore I (1584–98); *Regency of Boris Godunóv*

Ivan IV had made a will in 1572 in which, true to his ancestral traditions, and in the absence of any law of succession (cf. p. 97), he had nominated his elder son, Ivan, as his heir and successor. This will was nullified by the tragedy of 1582, and no other had been made to take its place. Therefore, the general assembly (*zémski sobór*) was summoned in 1584, for the third time (cf. pp. 106, 127), especially in order to confirm the legitimate succession of Theodore to the throne. The foremost people, it is said, came from all the towns of Russia and prayed the *tsarévich* (tsar's son) to become *tsar*. The Englishman Horsey, who was at that time in Moscow in the capacity of unofficial consul, considered it a sort of parliament composed of the upper hierarchy and nobility.

Theodore accordingly ascended the throne, and his infant half-brother, Demetrius, was with his mother and all her relatives removed to the small town of Úglich, on the Volga, to the north of Moscow, which, with the small surrounding district, had been designated as his apanage, and was shortly to acquire tragic fame.

Theodore was the absolute antithesis of all his predecessors. The Russian historian, Klyuchévski, has pointed out the extraordinary irony of fate which placed this sovereign—the last of his line—on the throne of Moscow. The most striking characteristic of the whole dynasty founded by Ivan Kalitá (cf. p. 69) was their acute matter-of-factness and common sense, their appreciation of the value and power of money, and

their ability to turn to their own good account all the conditions and surroundings in which they found themselves placed; through the successive efforts of generations they had built up a huge material fortune and secured immense political power. The last member of their dynasty was a man who cared absolutely nothing for the things of this world, whose chief preoccupation was the ringing of church bells and the observance of church ritual. The general impression which this *tsar* made on his contemporaries, notably on foreign envoys, who saw him and have left accounts of their impressions, was that he was half-witted. This is possibly true, but it must be remembered that he lost his mother at the age of four, in 1560, and spent his childhood and youth in the midst of the orgies which Ivan and his *oprichnina* carried on at Alexándrov. It is possible that he cultivated a habit of silliness in order to be left in peace and not be drawn into the dangerous tangle of palace and political intrigue, and that this habit became permanent.[1] What is undoubted is that he took no interest whatever in affairs of state or in any problems which concerned the material welfare of himself or of anybody else. It is also a fact that he was undersized, dropsical, and rickety—defects easily accounted for by his upbringing.

In these circumstances it was natural that the supreme power should pass to the hands of others. The sordid struggle between the rival families began all over again. The head of the family of the Bélskis, who was suspected of conspiring to place the infant Demetrius on the throne, was exiled to Nízhni when Demetrius and his mother were sent to Úglich. Amongst the remaining families the most notable were the Mstislávskis, of Lithuanian origin; the Shúiskis, descendants of Rurik—amongst whom Ivan Shúiski, hero of the defence of Pskov, had a large following amongst the townsfolk of Moscow, and had the

[1] This is the suggestion of Klyuchévski.

Metropolitan Dionysius on his side; the Románovs (cf. p. 105), headed by Nikíta Románovich,[1] who was Theodore's maternal uncle; and the Godunóvs. The last were a family of Tartar origin, who had settled in Moscow during the reign of Iván Kalitá. The head of the family was named Borís, and his sister, Irene, was the wife of Theodore and had great influence over him. Borís himself had married a sister of Malyúta Skurátov, one of Ivan IV's chief *oprichniki*, and, without becoming an *oprichnik* himself, had been in Ivan IV's good graces for some years.

At first Nikíta Románovich directed affairs, but he was very old, and shortly afterwards became paralytic and then died. During his illness Borís Godunóv, who was clever, ambitious, and unscrupulous, was already gradually gathering the power into his own hands. Borís was not long in getting rid of his rivals, whom he suspected, quite possibly with good reason, of plotting against his life. Mstislávski, Shúiski, and Dionysius, with all their partisans, were, one after the other, relegated to distant towns and monasteries where they were unobtrusively exterminated. Dionysius was replaced by Job, Archbishop of Rostóv, an ally of Borís; the necessary amount of executions and imprisonments of suspected opponents took place in Moscow, and from 1587 onwards Borís had no rivals.

Fortune, indeed, seemed to favour him. In 1586 Russia's most formidable foreign enemy, the redoubtable Stephen Batory, King of Poland, died, and the danger of further aggression against Russia on the part of that country was temporarily removed. Applications for this vacant and uncomfortable

[1] This family, originally called Kobýlin-Kóshkin, came to be known as Zákharin, i. e. children of one Zákhar (= Zachary) Kóshkin, or Zákharin Kóshkin. Román Yúrevich (= son of Yúri or George) was the father of Anastasia Románovna (= daughter of Román), wife of Ivan IV; Nikita was her brother, and his descendants came to be known as the Románovs.

throne again began to be received. In 1572 Ivan IV had been a candidate, and now Borís Godunóv, who was virtually regent, put forward Theodore's name, but misplaced economy ruined his chances of success with the electors. The other candidates were Sigismund Wasa[1] of Sweden and Rudolf of Austria, and the former was eventually elected. On the death of John III of Sweden in 1592 the two great Powers of Sweden and Poland were, for a brief period, joined together in unnatural union, and Russia's two greatest enemies joined hands—a sufficiently threatening contingency. But the Swedes would have none of Sigismund; he was an alumnus of the Jesuits, and these were already casting envious eyes across the Baltic. His uncle, the Protestant Charles Wasa, the father of Gustavus Adolphus, was first appointed regent, and eventually made king by the Swedes under the title of Charles IX. The momentary union dreaded by Russia thus ended in rupture, and this led to a fratricidal war which lasted for sixty years, and much weakened both countries.

But Borís Godunóv did not avail himself of these circumstances, as he well might have done, to effect the recovery of Livonia and Esthonia. Himself no warrior, he mistrusted his generals and contented himself with a passive foreign policy, merely recovering a few of the towns on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, between the rivers Nárova and Nevá, which the Swedes had taken from Ivan IV. Borís was more interested in the internal progress of Russia, and the much-needed peace which the country enjoyed during the reign of Theodore went some way towards repairing the damage caused by his father's activity.

Whether Borís, in the earlier years of his regency, foresaw the extinction of the reigning dynasty is uncertain. It was not impossible that Theodore and Borís's sister, Irene, would yet be

[1] Son of John III, who had married Catherine, sister of Sigismund II of Poland, and been converted by her to Roman Catholicism.

blessed with offspring, and the infant Demetrius was still alive. Nevertheless, he took every possible precaution to secure friends and supporters, not amongst his own class, but amongst the clergy, the small landowners, who provided the bulk of the fighting forces, the middle classes and the peasantry. He secured the loyalty of the Church by a bold and clever stroke. At this period the head of the Church in Russia was the Metropolitan of Moscow, whose colleague, the Metropolitan of Kiev, was the head of the Orthodox community in the kingdom of Poland. In 1589 the Patriarch of Constantinople, Jeremy, was in Moscow raising funds to help the oppressed Christian subjects of the Sultan. Borís Godunóv, while generously responding to his appeal, induced him to consecrate the Metropolitan of Moscow, a nominee of his own, as Patriarch, though poor Jeremy would have liked to occupy the post himself, and simultaneously it was enacted that thereafter the Russian hierarchy should be considered competent to institute their own Patriarch. In this way Borís Godunóv enhanced his own prestige as well as that of the Church in Russia, and Moscow now definitely eclipsed Kiev in the spiritual, as it had previously in the political, sphere, becoming the head of the whole Russian Orthodox community. At the same time four Russian archbishops were raised to the rank of metropolitan, while six bishoprics became archbishoprics.

Borís Godunóv was sincerely interested in the material welfare of the people as well as in that of himself and his family. He was a great colonizer, and one of his hobbies was the foundation of new and the restoration of ruined townships; amongst the former were Archangel (cf. p. 129) on the north coast, Sarátov and Tsarítsyn on the Lower Volga, Yaítsk (later known as Urálsk) on the river Urál (then called the Yaík), and Tobólsk and Tomsk in Siberia; amongst the latter Kursk and Vorónezh in the southern steppe country.

Himself an illiterate, he appreciated the value of education

and wished to found a number of schools with foreign teachers, but the project was quashed by clerical opposition. He protected foreign merchants and favoured the introduction of foreign customs and inventions. He was an ardent philanthropist, in the sense that he dispensed largesse on a prodigal scale to the poor, was always the first to help in case of any public disaster, and habitually declared himself ready to share his last mite with any who should need it. This he could of course well do, because in his capacity of dictator he amassed an enormous fortune; nevertheless, it was a novel rôle for the ruler of Russia, as he already virtually was, to play. There is no reason to suppose that Borís Godunóv did not genuinely desire the advancement and welfare of his country, but at the same time there is no doubt that he was inordinately ambitious. He was intelligent and prudent, but only up to a certain point. He was absolutely unscrupulous and very determined, and he laid deep schemes which took long to mature. The people of Moscow were vaguely conscious of this, and their suspicions were further aroused by the methods which Borís used to achieve his ends. He developed on a large scale a system of espionage and delation, and the agents of his secret police were usually the domestic servants of those whom he disliked and distrusted. This aroused great resentment and, added to the fact that he allowed himself to be influenced by necromancers, rapidly discounted the effects of his beneficence. He was one of those unfortunate people who are always blamed for every misfortune and are never credited with any success. His indubitably good intentions in the way of reform made him all the more suspect with the ignorant people of Moscow, who perceived a baneful design in all he did or attempted, to such a degree that in later times he has, quite without justification, been made the scapegoat for the general introduction of serfdom.

At this period the peasants, the large mass of tillers of the soil,

not to be confused with the much smaller body of household servants of the *boyárs* and others, who from the earliest times had been in the position of slaves, were still, theoretically, free. They were subject to taxation and not to military service, and were still in possession of the technical right to change their place of residence, or, rather, the scene of their labour. But in practice they had already largely forfeited this right, inasmuch as it could only be legally exercised by those who were economically independent. The peasants, though there were many intermediate varieties, were roughly divided into two categories, those who were on lands owned by the Crown or the State, and those who worked on private properties—the vast estates of the monasteries and of the hierarchy, the dwindling patrimonies of the ancient landed families, and the fiefs, which developed into hereditary estates, of the newly-constituted class of military and official land-holders. Those who were on the Crown lands had long since been subject to taxation under a system of corporate and collective guarantees which made it extremely difficult for any member of the community to move from the spot. The majority of those on private estates had, in course of time, become economically dependent on the persons on whose land they worked. Those who were not under any financial obligation and fulfilled all the requisite conditions, such as the giving of adequate notice, and that of moving only during the specified autumnal period between the gathering of one harvest and the sowing of the next, were still at perfect liberty to move. These conditions, however, so rarely existed that, for the most part, the only possibility for peasants who desired a change of surroundings was removal by force, that is to say, against the wishes of their employer. This was commonly effected in one of two ways, by flight or by agreement with another landlord. This last method merely meant a change of employer, not a change of condition, and usually implied an

increase of indebtedness and therefore a change for the worse. Owing to the increased emigration which took place to the newly-acquired territories in the second half of the sixteenth century, the central provinces around Moscow became largely denuded. The younger members of families, who were not taxable, especially migrated in large numbers, leaving the heads of households unable to cope with the work. Much of the land became neglected and reverted to forest. The land went down and labour went up in value. As a result of this the richer landlords, including the monasteries, made great efforts to attract labour to their estates from those of the small landowners. This they did by going round in the autumn and offering subsidies and abatements wholesale, not hesitating, when occasion arose, to intoxicate and abduct. This naturally provoked violent reprisals from the other side, and the autumn season of moving became notorious for scenes of appalling disorder and gross ill-usage. A few years later these abuses were met by legislation, when it was enacted that only small landholders might take over labour from equally small landholders, monasteries and large estates being forbidden to attract labour from small estates. Such a measure was necessary in order to enable the class of small landowners, from whom the army was drawn and who derived their income entirely from their land, to maintain themselves in a state of efficiency, but it of course involved, in its turn, a further restriction of the peasants' right of movement. The most popular expedient to which discontented peasants had recourse was flight, and it was this expression of their sentiments which caused the greatest embarrassment both to the owners of estates and to the government. Flight was of course illegal, as it implied the repudiation of all liability, but it was the peasants' only method of redress, as effective as it was popular, if by no means always successful. Legislation had already been directed against this procedure,

nd landlords, if they duly announced the flight and sent in a laim, could legally enforce the return of the peasants when ound. There was such an accumulation of pending claims, and uch delay in their settlement, that in 1597 (i. e. during the egency of Borís Godunóv) a decree (*ukáz*) was passed limiting he period for the retrospective validity of claims to five years. That is to say, the peasants who had fled before 1592 could not e reclaimed unless their employers had sent in a claim before September 1, then New Year's Day, in 1597. But this was only measure *ad hoc*; it only applied to the year 1597, and introduced no change into the law. Nevertheless, on the strength of his decree the unfortunate Borís Godunóv has been branded s the man who definitely enslaved the peasants. The facts of the matter are, that, owing to the general economic conditions of labour, the peasants were long before the end of the ixteenth century attached to the land on which they worked; heir right of movement had not been abolished, but had lapsed; nd restrictive legislation was aimed not at that right but at ases of the infringement of that right which were disadvantageous both to the government and to the landowners. The ctual legal conversion of the theoretically free peasants into erfs or slaves, the absolute and hereditary chattels of the landowners, who could be put to any use, for instance as dowries—a development which had such calamitous effects on Russian ociety—was not formally accomplished till the second quarter of the seventeenth century.[1]

But contemporary opinion was concerned with everything ather than with the welfare of the peasants on whose labour he welfare of Russia still almost entirely depended, and was especially interested in events of a more concrete and individual haracter. In these the last years of the sixteenth and the first of the seventeenth century in Russia abounded. The psycho-

[1] See Klyuchévski, lecture xxxvii.

logical atmosphere which Borís Godunóv as regent created in Moscow has been described. By the spirit of reform and altruism which animated his intentions and his actions he evoked admiration, but at the same time, as so often happens, he inspired distrust and even dislike. Himself responsible for many good deeds, he was made responsible for all the dark events which occurred during his period of rule. He was probably guilty of as many political crimes as were most of his colleagues in contemporary Europe, but unfortunately for him he was not protected by dynastic prestige or heavenly grace. One of the tragic events which took place during his regency was destined to have results personally disastrous to himself and politically disastrous to Russia. This was the supposed death, in 1591, of the *tsarévich* Demetrius, the son of Ivan IV, which was the immediate cause, though not the ultimate reason, of the period of anarchy and revolution known as the Time of Troubles (*smútnoe vrémya*), which lasted from 1598 to 1613, and would have ended, but for the heroism of the middle and lower classes, in the total disruption of Russia.

It will be recalled that soon after the accession of Theodore (in 1584) the *tsarévich* Demetrius, then two years of age, was removed to his apanage of Úglich together with his mother and all her relations. Shortly afterwards Borís Godunóv appointed from among his satellites a sort of supervisory commission which he dispatched to Úglich to reside there. It was the general opinion that only Demetrius promised a prolongation of the dynasty, because it was thought improbable that Theodore would become a father. In May 1591 a brawl occurred at Úglich in which the *tsarévich* Demetrius, it was reported, accidentally lost his life. What actually happened, and who was really to blame, has not been and probably never will be discovered. The popular belief at the time was to the effect that the members of Borís Godunóv's commission one day fell upon

he defenceless boy and murdered him. The sexton happened o be in the belfry, whence he witnessed the murder and imme- iately rang the alarm. Thereupon the boy's relatives and ttendants rushed to avenge him, and were aided by the towns- olk, who rose unanimously in their defence. A general scrimmage nsued, in which many of Godunóv's partisans, including his hief commissioner, were killed.

Whatever the exact nature and sequence of these events, as oon as the news reached Moscow a commission of inquiry was ppointed, under the presidency of Prince Vasíli Ivánovich húiski, who, though married to the sister of Borís Godunóv's ife, was a secret enemy and rival of the regent. This commis- ion went about its work in an egregiously unjudicial manner, nd only succeeded, perhaps not unintentionally, in rendering nore obscure an affair which was already highly mysterious. In ts summing up it declared that Demetrius, who was notori- usly subject to epileptic fits, had been playing with a knife on vhich he fell, inflicting on himself a fatal wound, and the ownsfolk of Úglich, for having unjustifiably attacked and done o death the commissioners, were subjected to wholesale torture, nutilation, and banishment. Even the bell which sounded the ocsin was deported to Siberia. After the commission had in his sense concluded its labours the Patriarch Job made a solemn nd official pronouncement to the effect that Demetrius met is death by the divine will. With that the incident was super- cially and temporarily closed. Another and very different heory [1] of the dark business has been put forward, namely that Demetrius really did hurt himself by accident, but not fatally; is mother rushed out and began to belabour the governor vhose negligence was responsible for the accident; whereupon ther people, including Borís Godunóv's agents, came on the

[1] This theory is clearly expounded by M. Waliszewski in his book *La Crise évolutionnaire*.

scene and added their voices and their muscles to the fray, which ended in a general *mêlée* and many deaths. Meanwhile the injured Demetrius was quietly removed. His relatives, well aware of the danger which to the common knowledge constantly threatened him, took the opportunity to abduct him from Úglich, in order that he might mature in secret and in peace. Some even believed that the whole thing was organized beforehand with this object, and that Borís Godunóv's agents murdered the wrong boy. That a boy lost his life that day is certain, because one was buried, and, moreover, extremely hurriedly. Not one of the members of the commission of inquiry ever even saw the body, or so much as interrogated the mother. The body was not exhumed until fifteen years later, and it has never been proved that it was the body of Demetrius. The theory that it was an accident, but not fatal, of course exculpates Borís Godunóv, and explains the severe measures of reprisal taken by him against the Nagói family,[1] who were all imprisoned or banished, and against the townsfolk of Úglich for their needless slaughter of his agents. But at the time it was generally supposed that Demetrius did lose his life in May 1591, and this is still the most commonly accepted and the official theory; in any case, to immediate intents and purposes, he had ceased to exist. The people of Moscow imputed guilt directly to Borís Godunóv, and accused him of causing an outbreak of fire in the capital and an invasion of the Crimean Tartars in order to deflect attention from his misdeed. If the theory that Demetrius was murdered on that occasion—which has never been proved—be true, then the probability is that Borís Godunóv had nothing directly to do with the matter, but that it was carried out independently by his partisans, who knew that it was a consummation he desired and one which would further his and therefore also their own ends. In any case, the mystery

[1] I.e. the relatives of Demetrius' mother: cf. pp. 132, 133.

which the whole episode was shrouded made it all the more kely to redound to the misfortune of those who contrived it nd were involved in it.

The following year a daughter was born to Theodore and rene, but she lived only a brief space, and her demise was aturally attributed to her uncle. In 1598 the *tsar* Theodore ied, and the dynasty became extinct. More important than nat, a peaceful and prosperous reign came to an end, and the Time of Troubles began. The immediate consequences of the vent were that the widowed Irene withdrew to a convent near Moscow, the Patriarch Job summoned a general assembly (the ourth *zémski sobór*) to appoint a new sovereign, and Borís Godunóv was elected *tsar*. But it implied and involved a great eal more than this. In ordinary times and places the end of dynasty may be regrettable; in Moscow, in the sixteenth entury, it was an overwhelming calamity, an elemental atastrophe. Looked on for generations as the absolute and ersonal property of their master, and taught to look on themelves as such, the people were literally like sheep at large without a shepherd, and there were plenty of wolves about. What nmediately impressed the popular imagination was the mysteriously tragic way in which the ruling family flickered out. This gave rise to a phenomenon which was new to Russia, a alady which, in other countries, is epidemic, but in Russia emained endemic for two hundred years, that of the recurrent ppearance of pretenders to the throne. As the historian lyuchévski points out (lecture xli), from 1600 till 1800 scarcely reign passed without the advent of a pretender, and so deepooted did the habit of discovering pretenders become that when real *tsar* like Peter the Great—real in character as well as in ame, and of unimpeachable authenticity—appeared, he was onverted by the popular imagination into a pretender.

The Time of Troubles (1598–1613)

Before relating the confusing and exciting events which filled the Time of Troubles (1598–1613), it is necessary to state briefly the reasons which led to it and enabled it to continue for so long and to assume such calamitous proportions.

The immediate cause was the extinction of the dynasty, and the fact that a new one had to be found—a new *tsar* elected. Owing to the political immaturity of the people it did not easily accommodate itself to the novel idea of an elective *tsar*; hence its dislike of the *tsars* who were elected, and its welcome to any pretender with even the most shadowy claim to genealogical continuity. At the same time the *boyárs* quite realized that it was within the power of any one of them to become *tsar* and to found a new dynasty—a prospect sufficiently tempting to them to inspire the most desperate strife and intrigue. The other and deeper cause was the general condition of the Russian people at this time, which was highly unsatisfactory. It was the vague and half-conscious but profound feeling, not merely of discontent, but of injury and resentment, permeating all classes, that converted what should have been no more than a transitory crisis, lasting until a suitable dynasty was found, into a veritable revolution which dragged on for fifteen years. In a word, the whole people was overburdened with duties and totally bereft of rights. Everybody's obligations, except the *tsar's*, but nobody's privileges—not even the *tsar's*—were defined. Of course the ruling class, the *boyárs*, the officials, the landowners who provided the armed forces of the country, and the hierarchy, had fewer burdens and more power than the lower classes, but even they were well aware from personal experience that their property and their position were not safe from the attacks of the Crown. No one had any guarantees of any sort. The sovereign claimed absolute power—a claim

hich was historically unjustifiable and was never formally
nceded. The late *tsar*, Ivan IV, had for twenty-four years
560–84) grossly abused this power, ruining the country in
der to allay his mad suspicions. He had ended by instilling
to the whole people dread of the throne. They had borne the
on rule of Ivan III and Basil III with equanimity, and even with
atitude, in view of the dangers which threatened Russia with
sruption from within and from without; but even the Russian
eople resented oppression which was arbitrary, unreasonable,
eaningless, and totally negative in result. The welcome relief
id calm of Theodore's reign (1584–98) was unable to destroy
ie deep and painful impression which Ivan IV had made.
oris Godunóv as *tsar* (1598–1605) only maintained himself
ith the aid of a secret police force and by the application of
bitrary methods as ruthless as those of Ivan IV. In Boris
odunóv's case these were more justified by facts than in that
Ivan IV, but Boris had not the quasi-prescriptive right to
rrorism possessed by Ivan in virtue of his imperial descent
id family prestige. What was pardonable in the lineal descen-
int of the men who had consolidated Russia and the conqueror
Kazán and Astrakhan was not so in a *tsar* who had been elected.
ebellion against a *tsar* of the old dynasty at that time and in
ose surroundings was unthinkable. But when the dynasty
ith its halo came to an end a general social upheaval took place,
hich, like an illness, was all the more virulent because it had
een so long repressed.

Beginning with the quest for a new dynasty, the Time of
roubles developed into a social and political revolution em-
racing all classes in turn. The most notable feature of the
hole movement was that each class came out, one after the
her, to improve its material fortunes at the expense of the
ass 'above'.[1] It began by the attempt of the *boyárs*, taught

[1] See Klyuchévski, lecture xliii.

by bitter experience, to limit the power of the new sovereign, whoever he should be, and to extend their own. It was continued by the efforts of the greater military caste and the lesser nobility of the capital to limit the political power, the oligarchy, of the *boyárs*, and then by those of the lesser military caste and the petty nobility of the provinces to secure a decisive voice in the government of the country. It was completed by a general repudiation of their obligations by the mass of tax-paying, non-serving people, who, as it were, declared a general strike in the name of anarchy.

Tsar Borís Godunóv (1598–1604)

The tangled skein of events which filled the Time of Troubles was briefly as follows. Borís Godunóv was elected *tsar* by the *zémski sobór* in 1598 on the death of Theodore, but there is ample evidence that his election was neither honest nor spontaneous. It was engineered by his creature, the Patriarch Job, and by the secret police. Emissaries were dispatched all over the country, whose duty it was to inspire the people to demand the accession of Borís. The people of Moscow were impelled to go in a mass to the convent of the widowed *tsarítsa*, Borís's sister Irene, and piteously to implore her to persuade her reluctant brother to ascend the throne. Borís's reluctance was sufficiently disingenuous, though not entirely so. The *boyárs* were not unwilling to elect him, but they knew what was at stake in the foundation of a new dynasty, and were anxious to obtain guarantees and to limit the power of the sovereign. Borís also, if only partially, appreciated the importance of the moment, and was unwilling to make any concessions. Both sides maintained silence, and the whole episode was vitiated by this refusal of either Borís or the *boyárs* to avow their real aspirations. Finally, Borís won the day and, after twice refusing the honour in order to make the demand more insistent, was elected un-

nditionally. This was his cardinal error. If he had not mmitted it he might have founded a lasting dynasty, and the volution would have been averted. Unfortunately, he lacked litical insight. Instead of admitting that he had no right to e throne, and submitting to the terms of the *boyárs* in return r his election, he invented death-bed injunctions of Theodore, d even of Ivan IV, to take over their task, and foolishly in-ted on perpetuating their claim to look on Russia as the per-nal property of the sovereign. He sacrificed his career to his nity, while eventually the *boyárs* had their way all the same, ly at the cost to the country of inestimable and unnecessary sses.

As *tsar*, Borís was less fortunate than he had been as regent. e soon became aware of his extreme unpopularity with the ling class of Moscow, who, disappointed in their hopes, began lently to work against him. To counter them Borís developed s secret police system. Servants were encouraged to give formation against their masters, and many *boyárs* were im-risoned, tortured, or banished, as in the days of Ivan IV, and eir dependants, thrown out of employment, carried discon-nt and disaffection everywhere. But Borís had more cause for arm than Ivan IV. From 1600 onwards rumours began to read that Demetrius, the rightful heir to the throne, was alive, nd that the child who had been buried at Úglich in 1591 had een a substitute. From this moment Borís knew that his osition was seriously threatened, and his blows fell heavier and ster. He aimed with especial animosity at the family of the ománovs, the relations of the late *tsar* Theodore's mother Nikíta Románovich or Románov was Theodore's maternal ncle), and therefore the most dangerous opponents of the lations of the late *tsar's* wife, the chief of whom was Borís. ikíta Románov had left five sons, all of whom, with their milies, were now exiled to remote parts of the country. The

eldest, Theodore, who was the ablest and the most dangerous, and his wife, were both forcibly 'shorn into a monastic order'; one of the least unpleasant forms of political disgrace, and were dispatched, under their names of Philaret and Martha, to distant cloisters. Their infant son, Michael, was banished to Bélo-ózero (= 'White Lake'), the site of a famous monastery 150 miles to the north of Moscow. He and his father were the only two of this family who survived the storm. But the reports about Demetrius merely gained in credence in proportion as Borís grew more suspicious and tyrannical. Moreover, his reign was unlucky. Even the elements were against him. There was a total failure of the harvest for three years in succession (1601–3), bringing famine and disease in its train, and in the eyes of the people, steeped in ignorance and superstition, this was the finger of God pointing at their temporal sovereign. During the last years of the preceding century the *boyárs*, and especially those in the Godunóv circle, had had a particularly severe bout of acquisitiveness, which took the form of vying with each other and with all the smaller landowners in attracting labour by fair or foul means on to their lands and attempting to fasten it there by contract. During these years of dearth, consequently, they found themselves with more labour than they could keep, and the unfortunate peasants who had just been torn from their old homes were forthwith turned adrift wholesale from their new ones and went to swell the rising numbers of malcontents.

Pseudo-Demetrius I

To crown all, in 1604 it was declared that Demetrius had crossed the Polish frontier and was advancing into Russia amidst the blessings and acclamations of the populace. He had sent his emissaries ahead to explain who he was, and he soon had an immense following. Anybody who had a grievance flocked

) his banner, especially the peasants and the Cossacks. Borís enounced him and the Patriarch Job fulminated against him a vain. He overcame the only resistance that was offered, nat of Basmánov in Nóvgorod-Séversk, and marched upon Moscow. At this point Borís fell ill from the strain, and suddenly ied one day after dinner. His son, a promising and handsome outh of sixteen, was proclaimed *tsar* as Theodore II, but his cause as lost. The whole people, with Basmánov and the army, had lready gone over to the pretender, who inundated Moscow ith manifestoes. His authenticity was in the popular mind confirmed by the fact that after a *tête à tête* interview with him his ypothetical mother, the widowed *tsaritsa* Maria (cf. p. 132), eclared herself convinced that he was her son. Finally, asíli Shúiski (cf. p. 143) was called upon to make a suitable eclaration, which he did publicly, to the effect that the son of van IV had not lost his life in 1591. Thereupon the people cclaimed '*tsar* Dimítri Ivánovich', invaded the 'palace' in he *Kremlin*, seized and imprisoned the whole family of Godunóvs, putting the most important of them to death, and ent a declaration of loyal submission to Demetrius, at the head f which stood the name of the Patriarch Job. Ten days later Demetrius triumphantly entered Moscow, but Job and all the artisans of Borís were promptly disgraced and removed.

Who 'Demetrius' was is not known, though the man was already amiliar to Moscow. He first came to the capital shortly before he death of Theodore, and was known as Yúri (= George) Otréev, son of a petty landowner in the country north of Moscow. n Moscow he was a domestic in the households of the Románovs and of others. Then he became a monk, taking the name f Gregory (Grigóri, *Grishka* for short), and for his literary nd clerical qualifications was made a clerk to the Patriarch Job. He became outspoken in this capacity, and is alleged one day to ave said that he would be *tsar* in Moscow. For this he escaped

imprisonment only by flight to Lithuania, which he was somewhat mysteriously enabled to effect. It was at this moment that the wrath of Borís was vented on the Románovs. In Poland the young man entered the service of Prince Wiśniowiecki. This was in 1603, and he was then 20. To his patron he is supposed to have declared his identity. By him he was brought into touch with Polish society, especially with one Mniszek, *wojewoda*[1] (= 'palatine') of Sandomierz, who had a beautiful daughter, Maryna, who captivated the young pretender. Further, he was introduced to high Catholic circles, whose interests he promised to advance in Russia, and finally to King Sigismund III, who, however, only committed himself to qualified support. Such is the theory officially and most generally held in Russia. Foreign historians have been more inclined to accept the view that he was at least a natural son of Ivan IV, or else some foreign prince of high degree. Nothing has been proved, not even that the young pretender who entered Russia from Poland in 1605 was the same person as the clerk who fled into Poland from Russia in 1603, though the probability is that he was.

Whatever the facts, his identity is of little importance in comparison with his personality. In appearance he was distinctly unprepossessing, and anything but regal. He was, however, gifted with exceptional intelligence. He was enlightened, generous, brave, energetic, frank, well educated, eloquent, and versatile. He appeared convinced of his own authenticity, and treated all those who came in contact with him with a candour and trust sufficiently reckless to be convincing. While his predecessors had gone on the principle of punishing the innocent as well as the guilty, he went on that of rewarding the guilty as well as the innocent. At one moment the notorious family of the Shúiskis began to spread report

[1] Literally = army-leader, i. e. the equivalent of Duke or Herzog.

iat Demetrius was a pretender. He promptly summoned the eneral assembly, which this time achieved a genuinely repre-ntative character, and handed over the whole matter to them decide. They condemned the Shúiskis to death, but Demé-ius commuted the sentence to exile, and eventually brought ick the culprits and restored to them all their former honours id possessions. In the domain of actual government Deme-ius manifested extreme energy. He attended every day the *oyárskaya dúma*, where he found himself faced with the task the political education of the *boyárs*. This he undertook as ctfully as possible. At the same time he made it clear to them iat he was not going to be a tool in their hands. Both in xternal and internal politics he began to develop ambitious and ell-laid plans of his own. He carried through a new law which med at preserving the nominal independence of the peasants a taxpaying class by forbidding them to become serfs, i. e. on-taxpaying, a means of getting rid of their liabilities equally etrimental to themselves and to the State which had been xpressly permitted by a law of 1550 and was much employed the hungry years 1601–3. In foreign policy he began to repare an all-European league to combat Muhammadanism nder the aegis of Russia. As regards the social life of the country, e turned it inside out till the poor unsophisticated Moscovites, hose menfolk led a patriarchally primitive life while the women-olk lived in semi-oriental seclusion, did not know whether they ere standing on their heads or their heels. It was ostensibly is many innovations, his complete disregard of local prejudices, is unconcealed predilection for foreign ways and people, and nally his marriage with the Polish Maryna and the subsequent nflux of Polish place-seekers, but all the time really, and more nan anything else, it was his political self-will which turned ne scales of noble and ecclesiastical opinion against him. With ne mass of the people both in the capital and in the provinces,

in spite of his unconventionality, he maintained his great an well-deserved popularity till the last; he was considered sportsman. But a sportsman was not what the *boyárs* ha bargained for. Already, in the early part of 1606, the Russia envoy who went to Cracow to announce the formal accession o Demetrius quietly hinted to the Polish chancellor that th ruler the Poles had sent the *boyárs* was not at all the sort of ma they wanted; they had no peace from him and would be read to exchange him for Ladislas, the son of King Sigismund. It i the fashion among Russian historians to accuse the Poles o having foisted the 'false' Demetrius on Russia. As a matter o fact he was in all probability concocted in Moscow itself, an most likely among the Románovs and their partisans. A Klyuchévski says, he was baked in a Polish oven, but he wa leavened in Moscow. Once he had served his purpose of sup planting Borís Godunóv, and since, moreover, he turned ou not to be malleable, the *boyárs* began to think it was time tha he was supplanted.

Tsar Vasíli Shúiski (1606–10)

At the head of the conspiracy was Prince Vasíli Ivánovic Shúiski, who admitted that he had only acknowledged Deme trius in order to get rid of Borís. In May 1606 he headed revolt with the cry that the Polish nobles were plotting agains the life of Demetrius. Thereupon the people furiously attacke the courtiers, while Shúiski and his band of followers made shor work of the unfortunate Demetrius. Before anybody had tim to look round, Vasíli Shúiski had been elected *tsar*, not by th general assembly, but by the small party of *boyárs* and othe in Moscow who had worked for him all along. He was fifty-fou years of age, a lineal descendant of Rurik, insignificant in appear ance, and in character ambitious, miserly, crafty, and narrow minded. As a ruler he was as unsuccessful as he was unpopula

His accession was, nevertheless, an important event. Owing is election, as he did, to the support of his fellow *boyárs*, e was not a free agent and could not maintain the position f absolute despot, consecrated by divine grace. He had to ccept terms. These amounted to a considerable curtailment f the most valued, and to the *boyárs* the most dangerous, prero- atives of the sovereign. He renounced the right of arbitrary unishment without proof of guilt or trial, the right of con- scation of the property of the family and relatives of those con- icted, and the right of secret trial with torture merely on the trength of information. He took the oath publicly not to ronounce sentence of death or to take important decisions ithout consulting the *boyárs*, or to disgrace any of the *boyárs* ithout just cause. In short, he became a limited ruler, at any ate in theory, and the personal security of the *boyárs* was assured. Nevertheless, nobody was enthusiastic about him. This was specially the case in the provinces, where Demetrius was sin- erely regretted and Moscow came to be looked on as a factory f lies and deceptions. Confidence was not encouraged by the act that at this point Demetrius' hypothetical mother, the idowed *tsarítsa* Maria, declared herself convinced that he ad not been her son, while *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski had the boy who as buried in 1591 canonized as St. Demetrius by the Patriarch Hermogen, and his holy remains transferred to Moscow. The nevitable result was a fresh resurrection of Demetrius, which uly took place very shortly after *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski's accession.

The years from 1606 to 1613 were a period of complete chaos nd anarchy in Russia. Claimants and counter-claimants, efections of provinces, risings of Cossacks and invasions of oreigners, followed one another with bewildering rapidity. The xtent to which this chronic disorder weakened Russia is shown y the increasing interest, leading to open interference, taken n her internal affairs by foreign countries, notably Sweden and

Poland. Revolts against the authority of *tsar* Vasíli Shúisk began immediately after his accession in 1606, being especiall frequent amongst the Cossacks of the Don and in the souther provinces generally. It was from this time onwards that th lesser nobility of Moscow broke away from the greater; the were followed by the petty nobility of the provinces and finall by the mass of the people, who seized this longed-for opportunit of attacking the wealthy landowners. Thus, what began b being political rivalry in the capital ended in a social revolutio throughout the country and the armed intervention of foreig Powers. For the first two years of Vasíli Shúiski's reign dis affection smouldered in the provinces, but in 1608 it broke ou openly and threatened the capital. A plausible pretender ha been secured. For the rest, his identity was absolutely vague but that did not matter, as he was now merely a symbol. H is known as Pseudo-Demetrius II. He gathered all the dis contented and also the disorderly elements under his banner He was supported by strong Polish forces, and by the Cossack of the Don under their *hetman* Zarútski. He actually establishe an armed encampment under the *tsar's* very nose, in the villag of Túshino, ten miles from Moscow, where he and his follower led a riotous and predatory life. In return for a considerabl sum Maryna's father persuaded her to recognize Demetrius II who was a mere ruffian, as her husband, and she joined him a Túshino, and in due course bore him a son. Many towns an districts all over Russia went over to his side, though the excesse of his myrmidons were not long in causing a reaction agains him, and especially against his lawless Cossacks, in the more sobe sections of the people. His success, however, was such tha Vasíli Shúiski in alarm invoked the aid of the Swedes, who, i return for certain concessions, agreed to help him.

But the appearance of the Swedes on the scene was imme diately and inevitably followed by that of the Poles. Kin

igismund III of Poland was determined not to let his uncle, ing Charles IX of Sweden, steal a march on him. So he rned his arms against Moscow, and in the autumn of 1609 id seige to Smolénsk, a fate which always befell that un- rtunate city, half-way house between Moscow and Warsaw, any war between Poland and Russia. This step on the art of the King of Poland, his covert protector, took the heart ut of Demetrius II, who fled incontinently to Kalúga. The sser nobles of Moscow, who were amongst his camp-followers Túshino, found themselves in mid-air. So they repaired Smolénsk, headed by one M. G. Saltykóv, to try and make rms with King Sigismund, or rather with his son Ladislas, hom they now nominated as *tsar*.

In February 1610 these adventurers, who usurped the func- on of plenipotentiaries speaking for the whole of Russia, made agreement with King Sigismund setting forth the conditions which they were willing to place his son Ladislas on the rone of Moscow. It has become famous in Russian history; r it was nothing less than a draft constitution with complete ndamental laws, defining the rights of the sovereign and of e subject, and the powers of the *boyárskaya dúma* and of the *émski sobór*. In spirit it was essentially conservative, but it cluded some innovations which, for the good people of Moscow, ere sufficiently startling, such as the principles that service to the tate should be rewarded by elevation in rank, and that subjects the *tsar*, though not, *bien entendu*, the peasants, should be free go abroad without risking confiscation of their property. ven religious toleration was indicated; and it was laid down at the *tsar* must not enact any important measure, such as e introduction of fresh taxation, without consulting the *yárskaya dúma*, and that no man should be condemned ithout trial.

Meanwhile, the Swedes under de la Gardie, having joined

forces with the Russians under Prince Michael Skópin-Shúiski the talented and high-minded nephew of Vasíli Shúiski, were clearing northern Russia of disaffected elements, and in March 1610 triumphantly entered Moscow, for a moment restoring the *tsar's* drooping fortunes. Skópin-Shúiski, who was only twenty-four, became the idol of the hour, and was openly nominated for the throne. Unfortunately, he came to a sudden and mysterious end, probably poisoned by his jealous relatives. At the same time Sigismund's general, *hetman* Żółkiéwski,[1] defeated the *tsar's* army. Thereupon, in July 1610 *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski was forcibly deposed by one Z. Lyapunóv, much against his own will and against that of the uppermost *boyárs* and of the hierarchy. Z. Lyapunóv and his brother, P. Lyapunóv, were petty provincial nobles, natives of Ryazán. They played a leading part in all the revolutionary movements from 1605 onwards, being always the first to advocate the cause of each new claimant, with the exception of those put forward by the *boyárs* of Moscow. They maintained the reputation of the men of their native district—semi-nomads of the steppe country and semi-Cossacks—for headstrong and turbulent courage. But the great *boyárs* of Moscow were now thoroughly alarmed at the popular character which the revolution was assuming, and hastened to acknowledge Ladislas. Moreover, Pseudo-Demetrius II was again approaching Moscow, counting on the support of the populace; and the *boyárs*, rather than accept him, turned to Ladislas.

The Polish Supremacy (1610–12)

After the deposition of Vasíli Shúiski the *boyárskaya dúma* assumed complete responsibility, and, at any rate in the capital, enforced its authority. Żółkiewski was invited to occupy Moscow with his army and to accept the oath of allegiance to

[1] Pronounced *Zhuukyéski*.

ıdislas (August 1610). The oath was taken on the basis of the reement of February 1610, but the Moscow *boyárs* managed tone down the features most objectionable to themselves; .e stipulation entitling obscure subjects of the *tsar* to attain :vated rank was replaced by one preventing foreigners in the *ır's* service from being honoured at the expense of natives, d the permission to travel abroad was abolished, as being ıught with menace to the safety of the realm. Żółkiewski and s army of occupation won golden opinions in Moscow by their emplary behaviour, but the fact that the capital was in the ›ssession of the Poles and that the *boyárs* were hand-in-glove .th a Catholic king aroused misgiving throughout the country. ;ter accepting the oath of allegiance to Ladislas, Żółkiewski spatched an embassy to King Sigismund at Smolénsk with e request that Ladislas should become a member of the Ortho- ›x Church. This opened the religious question. The embassy cluded Philaret, Bishop of Rostóv (ex-Theodore Románov), d Prince V. V. Golítsyn, who had himself been a candidate r the throne. Shortly afterwards Żółkiewski himself left for nolénsk, taking with him the ex-*tsar* Vasíli Shúiski as hostage, .d leaving Moscow under the command of the Polish noble ąsiewski.[1] But King Sigismund now showed his hand. He fused to allow his son to join the Orthodox Church, and oreover declared that he himself would be *tsar*. He packed f Philaret and Golítsyn as prisoners to Poland, captured and stroyed Smolénsk, and triumphantly returned to Warsaw th Vasíli Shúiski in his train. At Warsaw Vasíli Shúiski soon terwards died; and meanwhile in Moscow the *boyárskaya ma* recognized Sigismund as *tsar*, and the *boyárs* sought and cepted favours at his hands as their sovereign.

[1] Pronounced *Gonsbéski*.

The National Rising under Minin and Pozhárski (1611–13

At the end of 1610 Demetrius II was assassinated, and th issues immediately became simplified in the sense that a Russia outside Moscow began to rally against the Poles and th pro-Polish party who controlled the city. Towns and village which had each been acting independently began to communi cate and to concert measures with one another. But by thi time the whole country was so torn asunder and demoralize that it was no easy matter effectively to reunite the warrin social elements which composed it. The Polish garrison, too had such a firm hold of Moscow that it was not to be ejected fo the wishing. However, in the early part of 1611 a force of abou 100,000 men, known as the 'first national levy' (*opolchénie*) was collected and made its way to Moscow, led by P. Lyapunóv representing the petty provincial nobility, and including a larg force of Cossacks under Prince Trubetskói and *hetman* Zarútski in whose arms Maryna and her infant son now sought shelter The people of Moscow rose in sympathy with the new move ment, but the well-armed and alert Poles fell on them, and afte massacring many of them and burning a large part of the city shut themselves up in the *Kremlin* and in the fortified quarter adjacent to it (March 1611). Here they were besieged by th national levy, the three leaders of which formed a provisiona government. But dissensions, fomented by the Poles, soo broke out between Lyapunóv, by far the most able of the three and the two others, and developed into a quarrel between th purely Russian and the mixed Cossack elements. In the upsho Lyapunóv was killed and the levy broke up.

The year 1611 marked the *nadir* of Russia's fortunes. Th Poles were in possession of Moscow and Smolénsk, the Swed occupied Nóvgorod, the treasury was empty, and the fields we waste. Final disruption seemed imminent and inevitable. Th

rebodings of the people as to the probable result of the ex-
nction of the dynasty seemed about to be justified.

But from the end of 1611 the instinct of national self-preserva-
on began to assert itself. The people scattered throughout
ıe vast land began to realize the danger which threatened them
ıd the necessity for united action. In the national movement
r the re-establishment of law and order and for the restora-
on of Russia to the Russians which now began, the Orthodox
hurch played a great and noble part. Both priests and people
alized that their religion was menaced by foreign domination,
d the Church rose to the occasion. The ecclesiastical centre
nence flowed the current that galvanized the people to politi-
l and military action was the monastery of the Trinity of
. Sergius, the largest, wealthiest, and most famous of all
ıssian monasteries, founded in the forests 40 miles north of
oscow by the hermit Saint Sergius, about the year 1340. The
onastery had already successfully withstood a siege of sixteen
onths by the Polish forces under Lisóvski and Sapieha, followers
Pseudo-Demetrius II. It was strongly fortified, and was a
rt of general base of supply of arms, money, and food for the
ıole people. At this time it was under the rule of the archi-
ındrite, Dionysius, who, after the Poles in Moscow had im-
isoned and done to death the Patriarch Hermogen, became
e leader of the Russian Church. He was ably assisted by the
rsar Abraham Palítsyn, who has left a remarkable history of
e period. Between them they sent forth a number of horta-
:y missives in all directions, urging the people to make common
ıse against the foreign usurpers and promising them their
lp. In the town of Nízhni Nóvgorod on the Volga (cf. p. 114)
ese appeals met with a notably warm response. The towns-
k mustered under the leadership of their mayor (*stárosta*), the
tcher Cosmo Mínin, and were joined by large numbers of the
tty nobility and professional military class of the surrounding

country, many of whom had in the course of the revolution lo
all their property. These were led by Prince D. M. Pozhársk
Mínin was really at the head of the movement, and his was th
supreme authority. Equipment was provided by abundan
voluntary subscriptions which flowed in from all sides, an
further, a levy was ordered by Mínin consisting of one-fifth of a
personal property. This force is known as the second nation
levy.

At length, in the spring of 1612, it started on its way, but i
journey proved long and slow. It moved first to Yaroslávl
where it halted and deliberated. During this time the Pol
were still besieged in the *Kremlin* by the Cossacks und
Trubetskói, who had organized a replica of Túshino.[1] At th
monastery of the Trinity of St. Sergius it was learnt that
strong Polish force under Chodkiewicz was approaching Mosco
from the west, in order to relieve the garrison and reassert th
authority of King Sigismund. Palítsyn sent urgent messag
to Mínin and Pozhárski not to delay their advent, and at la
went himself to Yaroslávl to impress them with the necessity
anticipating Chodkiewicz. Eventually, the national levy d
get to Moscow in time, but when they found the Cossacks the
they refused to act with them. To the gentry and townsfo
the Cossacks were even more distasteful than the Poles. B
the fact was, that without the Cossacks nothing could be don
In this wonderful combination of national forces the Churc
supplied the spiritual impulse, the *bourgeoisie* the materi
resources, but the irregular soldiery the military initiative an
capacity. The nobility, the great *boyárs*, the great official an
military caste, whose duty and profession it was to govern an
defend the country, were nowhere in the picture. Russia w
saved by the Church, the people, and the Cossacks. Palítsy
with genius born of despair, succeeded in reconciling the t

[1] Cf. *supra*, p. 156.

val camps. Mínin, with the help of the Cossacks, defeated hodkiewicz and forced him to retire. In October 1612 the ossacks stormed the fortified part of the city of Moscow adjant to the *Kremlin* known as *Kitái-gorod*,[1] and the national levy id siege to the *Kremlin* itself, the Polish garrison of which, duced to starvation, eventually capitulated.

When they had expelled the Poles and recovered their pital the Russians were in the same position as they had been teen years previously. That is to say, they were confronted th the task of electing a new *tsar* and establishing a new nasty. But there was this difference, that after fifteen years civil war they were no longer the same people. Their eyes d been opened, their minds were enlarged, their political ucation had begun. For generations taught and accustomed believe that the dynasty and the government were a permancy and themselves no more than its adjuncts, they now ilized that the exact opposite was, in fact, the case. The days ien the people accepted the caprices of the dynasty as part of e divine ordinance were gone, never to return. It is true that s political self-consciousness was at this time, and subsequently remained for more than two centuries, embryonic. Its nifestations were only spasmodic, having the character for e most part of violent and ill-conceived outbreaks. But the d of discontent was sown and was never eradicated. On the ier hand, the crisis through which the Russian people had sed had been excessively severe. Dissolution had been rted, but the illness was so acute that complete prostration ervened, and the strength of the patient was only very wly built up again. Meanwhile, the class which had lost least the whole affair—the *boyárs*, the officials, and the greater downers—was the largest and most immediate beneficiary.

[1] The origin of this word is obscure, but it has not, as is often supposed, thing to do with China (*Kitái*).

From Moscow summonses were issued to all parts of Russia i
the names of Prince Pozhárski, representing the national levy
and of Prince Trubetskói, representing the Cossacks, for th
convocation of a general assembly to elect a *tsar*. This *zémsk*
sobór was by far the largest and most genuinely representativ
which had ever assembled, containing, as it did, delegates fro
all classes of the population, including townsfolk and villager
It met in Moscow at the beginning of 1613. Faced with th
question whether to elect a *tsar* of foreign or of native origin
decided with one accord on the latter alternative; but with tha
unanimity ceased. There were many candidates, and there wa
much canvassing. The revolution had produced men of sterlin
worth, but none of more than mediocre intelligence, and n
popular heroes; or rather, none such had survived. Two o
the most notable personalities, Prince V. V. Golítsyn an
Philaret, were in Polish captivity. Eventually and gradually th
choice settled on Michael, the sixteen-year-old son of Philare
His name was put forward both by the Cossacks and by the provin
cial nobility, and the concurrence of these two otherwise hostil
factions settled the question.

The Románovs (cf. p. 155) were a family of Lithuanian origin
established in Moscow since the reign of Iván Kalitá (1328–41)
They were the only untitled family of *boyárs*, that is, of th
original Moscow nobility, to maintain themselves in the firs
ranks of the *boyárstvo* amid the numerous provincial title
families who flocked to Moscow in the reign of Ivan III
They were, moreover, the only family which, in the eyes of th
people, maintained a decent reputation during the reign o
Ivan IV and in subsequent years. Their persecution by Bor
Godunóv had turned them into martyrs. During the Time o
Troubles they had acted astutely, if somewhat equivocally
They retained the good opinion of the people of Moscow, by
at the same time they cultivated friendly relations with th

etenders, and acquired popularity among the Cossacks. Pseudo-emetrius I had appointed Philaret Bishop of Rostóv, while eudo-Demetrius II had actually made him Patriarch in position to Vasíli Shúiski's Patriarch Hermogen. The boy ichael Románov himself was not remarkable for virtue, vice, intellect, nor was he robust in health, and perhaps for these ry reasons he inspired confidence in the *boyárs* no less than in e people. His tender age alone was sufficient to disarm sus-cion. But beyond all this he had one supreme qualification ich especially in the popular mind ensured his success. He s the first cousin once removed of the late *tsar* Theodore I, ose mother Anastasia had been the sister of Nikíta Románov, andfather of Michael. That alone was enough. The craving genealogical continuity was satisfied. At the end of Feb-ary 1613 Michael was vociferously and unanimously elected *r*.

4

he New Dynasty and the New Times (1613–72)

The Reign of Michael (1613–45)

Internal Affairs

THE election of the new dynasty, after fifteen exhausting ars had been spent, and many failures and misfortunes perienced, in the search for a satisfactory sovereign, may be garded as a great achievement, and it proved the opening of new era in Russian history. The 'Time of Troubles' (*smúta smútnoye vremya*), a euphemism for what was really a virulent m of revolution, was, with its tale of fifteen tumultuous and amitous years, a great crisis which drove a wedge between e epoch and another. It was like a long and trying illness, th its temporary recoveries and relapses; but the convales-

cence, of which the definitive selection of a new dynasty wa merely the preliminary step, was much longer and more tryin still. The contrast between Russia before and Russia after th revolution, between Russia of the sixteenth and Russia of th seventeenth century, is very striking, as much as that betwee Russia of the seventeenth and Russia of the eighteenth century Russia in the seventeenth century was very different in almos every respect from Russia in the sixteenth, and on the whole i may be said that it was a far less happy and attractive country Old Russia and the old order of things may, in a sense, be said t have passed, together with the old dynasty. Notably the goo points of the old régime, a certain free and easy looseness in th structure of society, the freedom of labour (at any rate i theory), and a general atmosphere of contentment and relativ prosperity of all classes, came to a definite end. The defects o the good old times, on the other hand, survived and became in tensified. These were especially the rapacity and the ignoranc of the governing social class, the disinclination or the inabilit of that class to initiate any serious reform or even any con structive policy, particularly in the economic and educationa spheres, and, on the part of the whole people, the largely self imposed distrust of, and isolation from, other European peoples

Throughout the sixteenth century Russia had, except a regards territorial expansion, been virtually stationary, so muc so that it may be called an age of consolidation which came t resemble stagnation. Even during its second half, the madnes of Ivan IV, though undoubtedly it prepared the way for th revolution, at the time merely embittered certain sections o society and crippled the foreign policy of Moscow withou disturbing the massive complacency of the nation.

The revolution proved a very rude and shocking awakening and nothing after it was the same as it had been before. It wa in the first place, a period of disillusionment, and its effect o

e character of the Russian people was profound. For long customed to consider itself and the land it inhabited as the cidental attributes and chattels of an autocratic dynasty, ovidentially ordained and permanently established, it dis- vered, when the dynasty perished, that exactly the opposite s the case: the land and the people kept their position, d found themselves, almost as it were unconsciously, electing onarchs and attempting to limit their power.[1] And it stood reason that the dynasty which, after several unsuccessful orts, was eventually established, was shorn of much of its mour by being elected. In the second place, the revolution s a period of disintegration and of economic ruin. The ntiers of the realm no longer expanded but began to shrink. edish and Polish armies and bands of Cossack marauders nœuvred all over the country. During all those years the lds remained untilled, the harvests unsown and unreaped. The pulation was dispersed, and the forest began to reclaim its t ground; and as a result the public revenue lapsed. The stincts of the people had been right in so far as, during this riod of social and political chaos, Russia very nearly went the y of the old dynasty. The definite re-establishment of e monarchy was an undisguised blessing, though it was ught at what turned out to be a ruinous price.

In contrast with the sixteenth, the seventeenth century was period pre-eminently of internal ferment and development, ile the process of territorial expansion was only tentatively sumed from 1667 onwards. The seventeenth century in ssia was an age of change, of reaction, of reform, of dis- ntent, and of schism. The changes most in evidence were ose of an outward and material character. The governing ss eagerly introduced measures of reaction and repression in der to cope with its own people, and, much against its will,

[1] This is based on Klyuchévski.

was compelled to introduce measures of reform in order to cop with its economic troubles and with its foreign enemies. Th people became impoverished, and for the first time rebelliou Finally, all these troubles in the spiritual sphere resulted i the first schism suffered by the Church in Russia, which ha hitherto been proud above all of its unanimity.

Still greater than the difference between the Russia of th new era and that of the old was the difference between Russi and the rest of Europe in the sixteenth and in the seventeent centuries. In this respect it is no exaggeration to say tha the fifteen years' revolution put Russia back 150 years. In th sixteenth century Russia was far more on a level with the res of Europe, both morally and materially, than in the seventeenth It is true, of course, that in any case geographical remotene isolated Russia from central and western Europe, and that th isolation was accentuated, first by the 250 years of Tarta dominion, and then by the Turkish conquest of Constantinopl and of the Balkan peninsula; for Constantinople in many way had been to Russia what Rome had been to the rest of Europe But the revolution, and still more its various political and econo mic consequences, was even more to blame for widening th gulf which by the laws of nature and by the evolution of religio already separated Russia from Europe. At the very tim when the rest of Europe was developing at a phenomenal rat when the discovery of new worlds, the invention of new indus tries, and the reformation of religion were rapidly amplifyin European civilization, the political growth and economi development of Russia were suddenly and completely arreste Russia stood still while Europe went forward, with the resul that when peace returned and normal intercourse with Europ was resumed, the leeway to be made good was greater tha before, and Russia's position, especially in the material sens was far more difficult than ever.

At the same time material backwardness was aggravated by ıental narrowness. This was the great national moral defect f mediaeval Russia. Cut off from the rest of Europe spiritually ; well as geographically, convinced of her religious infallibility ıd complete moral and material self-sufficiency, violently ɛnophobe, looking upon Rome as a heretic, upon Constanti-ople as a degenerate in bondage to the Muhammadans, upon Ioscow as the only repository of truth, and upon Russian)rthodoxy as the only road to salvation, Russia remained un-ivified by the Renaissance and undisturbed by the Reformation -abysmally superstitious and voluntarily ignorant.

The revolution, which had so many disastrous and negative ɛsults, had at least the positive and not unfruitful effect of ırowing a strong light on the internal state of Russia and f opening the eyes of the Russian people to the conditions nder which they lived. Hence the main characteristic of the ɛventeenth century in Russian history, apart from all those lready mentioned, though they were all more or less tinged by , was the spirit of cleavage, while the spirit of the preceding entury had been that of unanimity. From the beginning of ıe seventeenth century in Russia society was divided, almost nperceptibly and very unevenly at first, but ever more notice-bly, into two sections. Of these, one recognized that things ould not continue on the old lines if Russia was to develop nd was to maintain, let alone improve, her position in the comity f nations ; that, in a word, reform both material and spiritual ras urgently necessary, and that the means to this end could nly be supplied by the countries of central and western Europe. The other held that reform, or rather change, was both un-ecessary and injurious, and that salvation could only be found y preserving the old tradition intact and unaltered. These urrents of opinion were the forerunners of the famous parties f the Westerners and the Slavophils which rent each other in

the first half of the nineteenth century. Seventeenth-century Russia tried to solve this problem by a compromise, in that it tried to emulate the physical aptitudes of a Swedish artilleryman while preserving the mental attitude of a Byzantine monk. Hardly a promising combination.

The immediate results of the revolution were that the Crown suffered a great loss of power, that Russia was sensibly diminished in territory, in strength, and in prestige, that the land was impoverished and the people half-ruined and exasperated. The class which had suffered least in the upheaval, the great landowners, both temporal and spiritual, eventually profited most from it, though it made sensible gaps in the ranks of the aristocracy; and many of the old families, titled and untitled, went under in the storm, never to reappear, their places being taken by families of new names and reputations.

The Crown was the first, after a short eclipse, to recover its pristine splendour. It took the dynasty only one generation to live down the fact of its having been elected. The State took a considerable time to regain its balance and its international position, and to pick up the threads of its foreign policy. The people went under for 250 years. After its bitter experiences at the hands of Ivan IV, and of the shrewish sovereigns it had elected out of its midst, the *boyár* class adopted as its motto 'Never again'. To ensure its fulfilment two things were necessary: they had to secure their political position by limiting the power of the *tsar*, and to improve their financial position by curtailing the freedom of labour. Circumstances facilitated the achievement of both objects.

At the time of his election in 1613 Michael Románov was only sixteen. Moreover, he was far from strong in health, while his mind was remarkable neither for depth nor for vigour—a combination of defects which hampered him till the last. His father, the Metropolitan of Rostóv (Philaret), had been a

isoner in Poland since 1610 (cf. p. 159), and did not return to oscow until 1618, so that at the moment of his election and r the next five years the boy was alone, and the *boyárs* had a od opportunity to put some of their ideas into practice, and ade the most of it.

At the beginning of the new reign both *boyárs* and people ere in an exceptionally strong position with regard to the own. The new dynasty owed to them its existence, and it had pay the price; the fiction that Moscow and Russia were the *ır's* personal property had, at least temporarily, to be waived. ne election of the new sovereign was sufficiently remarkable this respect, that the popular assembly (*zémski sobór*) of 1613 is far larger and more genuinely representative of the whole ople than any held heretofore, and also, for that matter, than y held afterwards. But it was still more so by reason of certain scure events connected with it which have never been com- etely elucidated. It is virtually certain that in return for his ection the *boyárs* extracted from Michael, or from his family, pulations amounting to a limitation of the monarch's pre- gatives and an extension of the *boyárs'* privileges in the shape a guarantee of their personal immunity. Though no actual arter has ever been proved to have existed, the belief at the ne was very general, and is warranted by the behaviour of e *boyárs* during this reign, if by nothing else.[1]

At the same time, Michael was the first ruler officially to style mself 'autocrat' (the Russian equivalent, *samodérzhets*, being literal translation of the Byzantine αὐτοκράτωρ), possibly by a aceful concession on the part of the *boyárs*. Again, his posi- on in relation to the people was also equivocal, for, though ected by them, the cause of his election was largely the fact at he was the first cousin once removed of *tsar* Theodore I, d was popularly considered the legitimate heir to the throne.

[1] This is based on Klyuchévski.

With all this his status as sovereign remained as anomalous as had been that of his predecessors. It was completely nebulous and undefined. There was still no law of succession, and the oath of allegiance only extended to Michael and to his children. The position became fantastic when, on the return of his father from his Polish captivity in 1618, the latter, a strong and determined man, who was already Patriarch, was further created co-*tsar*, on the plea that the father could not be less than the son. The two actually 'shared the autocracy' until the death of Philaret in 1633, this period of Russian history being known as the 'dyarchy' (*dvoevlástie*).

Parliamentary Institutions

While the *boyárs* thus secured their persons and their position, the representatives of the people found themselves in the surprising position of being considered indispensable to the government of the country. The reign of Michael witnessed the efflorescence, premature for the rest and transitory, of parliamentary government in Russia. The reasons for this phenomenon are not far to seek. During its first years the position of the new dynasty was precarious. Moreover, as a result of the revolution, the whole country was in a state of chaos and ruin; the whole machinery of the administration, central and local, was utterly disorganized. Above all, there was no money in the treasury. Order had to be re-established, the organs of government had to be set up afresh, taxes had to be devised and collected—a task far more difficult, because the whole population had been dislocated, and momentous questions of foreign policy constantly required attention and decision. In a word, everything had to be re-created and re-constructed. This was a thorny and responsible task which neither the *tsar* nor the *boyárskaya dúma* (the legislature) was willing even to face, far less to attempt to solve, unaided. Hence

e services of the popular assembly (*zémski sobór*) were called
, and this body accordingly throve. For the first two years
the new reign it virtually became the government, replacing
rather absorbing both the legislature (the *boyárskaya dúma*)
d the executive (the *prikázy* = the ministries or chancelleries),
d performing their functions. During the remainder of
ichael's reign, which lasted until 1645, the representatives of
e people met no fewer than ten times and took an active part
legislation, being often consulted on matters such as the
nctioning of new imposts and the deciding of questions of peace
war. Thus parliament seemed to promise well to become an
tablished institution. As a matter of fact, it did not do so;
.d the history of the Russian national assembly in the seven-
enth century is that of its gradual but persistent decline.
ke a blossom out of season, it withered before it had fully
ened.

The reasons for this are obvious. The *zémski sobór* existed
ily in so far as the *tsar* and the *boyárskaya dúma* needed its
elp for the shouldering of responsibility. In proportion as the
nasty waxed more secure and the exchequer less empty, the
nportance of the assembly dwindled. It had no solid founda-
on, and it failed to appreciate the potentiality of the weapon
financial control. The initiative in its convocation and the
ecision as to what it was required to do when once it had been
nvoked lay, not with itself, but with the *tsar* or with the
preme council of the Russian Church (*osvyashchénny sobór*).
is true that in its constitution it differed considerably from
s fellow of the previous century. Then its members had con-
sted entirely of officials, central and local, and of their nominees.
ow, while it still included in itself the whole *boyárskaya dúma*
nd *osvyashchénny sobór* and representatives of the chancelleries
'yáki, lit. 'clerks', who were also members of the *boyárskaya*
úma), the popular part of it was really elective and represented

the merchants of Moscow and of other centres, and the country people. But unless it was actually asked by the *tsar* to initiate legislation its functions were merely consultative and advisory. The constitutional assembly of 1610, which met to select the new dynasty, had been of course unique. Otherwise, the history of the assembly is illustrated by an enumeration of its meetings. During the reign of Michael's successor, Alexis (1645–76), it met five times, as opposed to ten during the preceding thirty years, and these five were all during the period 1645–53. Subsequently it only met twice in 1682, and once—for the last time—in 1698.

In the course of this period the assembly itself gradually became less representative of the people. It was sometimes summoned on the spur of the moment, giving no time to the members who were scattered over the immense expanse of the country to gather, and on these occasions it consisted merely of those members who at the time happened to be in the capital, these naturally always including the *boyárskaya dúma* and the permanent high officials. Finally, it came to resemble a random gathering from the streets of Moscow, as it were the chorus in an opera whose sole duty was to shout monosyllabic assent. Thereafter legislation became reduced in form to the piecemeal presentation of petitions by isolated classes of the community, which were naturally easier to deal with. In time the formula 'in answer to the petition (*chelobítie*, lit. = 'forehead-beating') of the people' became the accepted preamble to any new law which the *tsar* or the *boyárskaya dúma* chose to impose.

Thus one of the principal reasons for the lapse of the national assembly was the fact that, once having accomplished the purpose for which it was summoned, the assembly ceased to be necessary to the governing class. Another reason was that in the given conditions no other result was to be expected. The

olitical consciousness of the people was so undeveloped and the eneral obscurity so profound that the need of a regular assembly, ermanently established and properly defined and secured, was ot acutely felt. No serious or concerted effort was made by ie people to keep the thing alive, none was really even possible, id therefore it died a natural and easy death. But there were her positive causes which also contributed to this result. One as the change in the whole system of administration. In the xteenth century the tendency had been to decentralize ithority and develop local government on an elective basis, hich in its turn formed a groundwork for the election of presentatives to the national assembly; in the seventeenth ntury the tendency was to centralize authority and concenate it in the hands of single individuals appointed by the rown. Another was the entirely fresh constitution of society hich appeared at this time, the result of the new policy of itting up the whole population into rigid classes with fixed and ipassable barriers between them. This arrangement was new Russia, and was the basis on which society in the new gime was reconstructed. Its ultimate expression was the rmal and general introduction of serfdom. With the disanchisement and enslavement of the responsible 'free' rural opulation the national assembly was, to a great extent, eprived of its popular elective basis.

Growth of Serfdom

One of the features of Russian society in the sixteenth ntury was its looseness of structure and the relative freedom labour. These characteristics, combined with the great tent of territory covered by the State and the sparseness of e population by which that territory was covered, produced state of things very disadvantageous to the central authority, pecially from the fiscal point of view. The greatest drawback

in this connexion was the regular evasion of their financi obligations to the State by large numbers of people. Tax were paid to the State by the townsfolk and by those peasan (agricultural labourers and village folk) who were still techn cally free. The monasteries excepted, the land-holding cla (the nobility, great and small) paid its duty to the State in th shape of military service, in return for which it was allowed t own the land, the land itself providing it with the means becoming an efficient fighting force. The immediate depen dants of this class—servants of the house and of the State—wer not free and were liable neither to taxation nor to conscriptio In the absence of laws to the contrary, it was a great temptatio to penurious members of the serving class, younger members petty land-holding families, and also to needy townsfolk an peasants, to escape their onerous obligations by a voluntar renunciation of their liberties and by enrolling themselv as dependants (*zakládchiki*, lit. 'pledgers') of some larg landowner or land-owning corporation, such as a monaster This process differed from serfdom in that the agreement wa entirely voluntary and could be terminated at will, while at th same time it absolved the person who made it from all h obligations to the State. This practice was very injurious t the prosperity alike of the State, the towns, and the fre peasants, while it poured money into the pockets of the land owners, who exploited labour which was not liable to taxatio

Legislation was first directed to the preservation for th State of the military land-holding class. A law of 1642 forbad members of this class to renounce their liberties and the obligations. As a result of this, the various grades of nobility an gentry (*boyárstvo* and *dvoryánstvo*) became assimilated into on vast class of 'serving people' (*sluzhílye lyúdi*). Next the towns folk were taken in hand, and after much delay a law was passe in 1658 absolutely prohibiting removal from one town to anothe

ıe settling in the towns of non-taxpaying peasants for purposes
f trade, and the settling in the country of townsmen as non-
xpaying peasants. In 1649 a law was passed that all those
easants who had renounced their freedom and their obligation
o pay taxes (*zakládchiki*) must be reinstated in their former
osition as taxpayers, or at any rate as liable to taxation either
irectly or through their employers. The necessity for this
as realized in 1619, but the monasteries and the landowners
uccessfully battled against the passing of the measure for
hirty years. Thus trade became the exclusive right of the
ownsfolk and the payment of duties their class obligation, just
the ownership of land was the right and State service the
ass obligation of the nobility and gentry, great and small.
hus these two classes became fixed in their spheres for the
enefit of the State as they had never been before. There
emained the peasants. The problem of their status had in
fect been in process of solution for some time past. The
easants were a bone of contention between the central autho-
ty, especially the treasury, and the large landowners. A
iangular contest was engaged between the Crown, labour,
ıd capital, in which capital won, labour went under, and the
rown, while sacrificing its principles, managed to secure its
terests. Such was the setting in which the drama of the
eneralization, formularization, and legalization of serfdom in
ussia was played; a drama which vitiated the whole of
ussian life for 250 years, undermined the moral strength of
ıe Russian people, and left indelible traces on the national
ıaracter.

Domestic and estate slavery (*kholópstvo*) had existed as an
stitution from the earliest times, but at the beginning of the
venteenth century the mass of agricultural labour, the peasants
restyáne), was still technically free (cf. p. 139), though owing
various causes most of them were already in a state of total

or partial dependence economically on the great landlords. T
date at which this dependence became complete and legaliz
slavery, a gradual process, may be said to have been the seco
and third decades of the seventeenth century. One of t
factors which hastened the change proceeded directly from t
revolution. During those years the whole country populati
had been scattered. This was partly the result of the reacti
after the reigns of Theodore and Boris. The central author
weak, the *boyárs* indulged in an orgy of enslaving free labo
by foul means, whereupon, during the three years of fami
which heralded the revolution (1601–4), they found themsel
in possession of more mouths than they could feed and w
forced to liberate their serfs, often incurring severe loss
personal property in the process. It was also the result
the general chaos of those years, when all who found th
obligations irksome took the opportunity to disown them a
decamped. One of the first duties of the new régime w
therefore to make a census and inventory of the living resour
of the State in order to fix the responsibility for the taxes and
secure their payment. It had to re-establish the village co
munities, bring back the fugitives, and restore to their freedo
and to their obligations to the State those peasants who h
renounced them.

This work was first undertaken in 1619, but it made ve
slow progress, and all the results in manuscript were destroy
by a great conflagration which visited Moscow in 1626.
was begun afresh in the next year, and finished in 1628. T
general principle which guided the censors was 'Stay wh
you are'. Where the peasants were found, there they w
inscribed and there they had to remain. Complication w
introduced by the fact that, wherever they were, the peasa
already were almost all economically dependent on the lan
lords, with whom they had made contracts (*krépost*, lit.

curity'), which gave the landlord the right to their labour, not yet to their bodies. These contracts took a number of rms, according to the various conditions which attached to em. The formulae contained in them, however, gradually anged till they came unmistakably to imply that the peasant, r economic reasons, had forfeited his right of changing his nployer, and that first of all he himself, and then his family and s descendants, had become the chattels of the landlord. Thus e peasant was pinned down to one place by the government nsus, bound over to a master by his own contract and his onomic dependence, and finally crushed by the quantum of rced labour which the landlord chose to demand from him in turn for the use of a portion of his land. Thus both the vernment and the landlords *cherchaient l'homme*. The latter nted his labour, the former his money. During the reign of ichael the *boyárs* were in such a strong position that they ried the day. This fact was expressed in the ultimate out-me of the whole process, which was that peasants, after they d lost the last vestiges of their independence and become rged with the serfs, became the absolute and hereditary operty of their landlords, but, in return for this, the land-ds were made collectively responsible for the collection of e taxes which the peasants as tillers of the soil owed the State. us was legalized the baneful state of serfdom known in Russia he 'law' or 'right of security' (*krepostnóe právo*), that is, con-l over the destinies of an object, the object in this case being body of another man and those of his wife and children, and ntually all his belongings. Thereby also the aim of the vernment to demarcate society into as few, as large, and as lterable compartments as possible was promoted: the ious kinds of labourers, domestic serfs, peasants, voluntary es (*zakládchiki*), and others were all rolled into one huge egory.

Although all these important and eventually disastrous d
velopments were given their legal and political form only at th
late date (during the years 1620–50), the effect was merely
legalize a state of things which was already informally exis
ing and prevalent. For long the landlords had used the
serfs (*kholópy*) to plough their land, while the 'fre
peasants (*krestyáne*) under contract often performed housekho
duties; each class did the work of the other, and both serv
the same master, with the result that their status becam
identical. It is true that even after this date there we
certain technical differences which preserved the personali
of the 'secured peasant' (*krepostnói krestyanín*) before the la
and distinguished him from the slave (*kholóp*), but these we
in practice speedily effaced. This, then, was the manner in whi
the *boyárs* achieved their second object, the abrogation of th
freedom of labour. This was the present which the Románo
had to make to their most formidable electors, the nobles, f
their support, which was bought at the expense of the peopl

The results of the enslavement of labour were calamitou
Specious order and prosperity were restored, but they ha
no reality and no foundation. Secure, as they thought,
their persons and in their pockets, the landowners, far fro
devoting themselves to works of public utility, became immers
in the sordid and degrading occupation of exploiting the labo
for which they did not need to pay. They found their who
energy engaged in preventing the escape of their serfs and
disputing their possession with their neighbours. The on
object of the landlords being to extract as much as possible, a
that of the serfs being to give as little as possible, abuse
power and evasion of duty became the order of the day. T
landlords had no incentive to thrift, the peasants no incenti
to work. The landlords had no inducement to study domes
or rural economy, the peasants had no inducement to stu

onesty or the rights of property. Fraud became the guiding rinciple in the relations between capital and labour. The one bject of both master and servant was to cheat each other. leanwhile the State, having simplified the structure of society thus reducing the variety of the elements of which it was mposed, achieved a semblance of well-being.

But the revolution had ploughed, however lightly, the popu- r consciousness, the seeds of discontent had been sown, and e result was a series of periodic disturbances and outbreaks, e expression of class-hatred, which were a new phenomenon Russian life, and during this century caused the government ave loss and embarrassment.

External Affairs

As regards foreign policy the general tendency during the ign of Michael was ' go slow '. This was not from choice but m necessity. Russia had suffered a severe loss of prestige as result of the revolution, but the financial situation was so plorable that, however galling such a course was, foreign ventures and projects of revenge had to be rigorously post- ned or reduced to the most modest dimensions. Poland was ll the arch-enemy. Russians could neither forget nor forgive e fact that Moscow had been profaned by Polish occupation, at the Poles had treated them like dirt. But Poland was still ry formidable.

Russia had, however, lost something more tangible than estige, namely, territory. Ever since the consummation of eat Russia by Ivan III and his son Basil (cf. pp. 89–94), the as of Russian foreign policy had become focused on two in objects. The first was to unite politically the various ments of the Russian race, to bring the Russian populations l the Russian lands of the basin of the Dnieper under the ne rule as those of the basin of the Volga, to bring west (or

'White') Russia and south-west (or 'Little') Russia unde the control of Moscow and Great Russia. The second w to extend the political rule of Moscow to the geographic limits of the Russian plain, to make the coasts of the Balt and of the Black Seas the frontiers of the State. The tw objects were, in a sense, complementary, because the larg the purely inland State of Russia became, the more urgent would it need free commercial outlets and inlets on the se coast. The attainment of the first object was largely on th sentimental ground of desire for the reunion of those the same race and religion who were separated by politic accident, though the material advantages to Moscow of th reunion were obvious. The attainment of the second obje was desired purely on utilitarian grounds, regardless of the fa that it violated the principle which animated the first and cou not be gained without bringing large populations of alie race under Russian rule. What concerned contemporary Russ more was the fact that the achievement of the first obje could not be attained without conflict with Poland, or th of the second without conflict with Sweden and Turkey.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century already the Russia had won their way to the Baltic, or rather to the Gulf of Finlan one of its arms. Here they occupied the towns of Yam [1] Yamburg, Kopórie,[2] Koréla [3] (or Keksholm [4]), and Ivan-goro All these places were lost to the Poles by Ivan IV in his unsucces ful war against King Stephen Batory (cf. p. 129), but were r covered again in the reign of his successor Theodore. Duri the revolution the Swedes pushed in these Russian outposts a

[1] Yem or Yam (*Em* in Russian) was the name of a Finnish tribe.

[2] A town on the western shore of Lake Ládoga.

[3] The name of a Finnish tribe from which is derived the name of t district: Carelia.

[4] Cf. p. 128. [5] = 'John-town'.

ook possession of all these places with the addition of Oréshek [1] or Schlüsselburg), situated at the point where the Nevá flows ut of Lake Ládoga. These losses the first *tsar* of the new dynasty ad the painful duty of confirming at the Treaty of Stólbovo [2] 1617. A similar fate befell the two westernmost districts Great Russia—Smolénsk, the much-disputed city on the nieper, the half-way house between Moscow and Warsaw, nd Séversk, the border-province between Great Russia and uth-west Russia. These had been recovered by Basil, who ereby extended the boundaries of Moscow to the river nieper, but were lost again to Poland during the revolution. was against Poland that Russia's principal efforts, such as ey were, were directed during the reign of Michael. Poland ood to Russia in much the same relation as Spain to France this period. Unfortunately Michael was no Henri IV. In 615 a conference was held at Smolénsk to regularize the relaons between the two countries. This was necessary because, ntil peace was formally made, the Poles continued to subsidize nd instigate the Cossacks against Moscow. But Ladislas still aimed the title of *tsar*, and so agreement was impossible.

In 1618 war was renewed. The Poles, under Ladislas and hodkiewicz, took Vyázma and Dorogobúzh, but failed before alúga and Mozháisk. Ladislas thereupon decided to march n Moscow. Michael, supported by the national assembly, cided to make every effort to continue the struggle. The oles actually reached Túshino, but an attack made thence on oscow itself failed. Then another conference was proposed. his met at Deúlino,[3] in 1618, near St. Sergius's monastery of e Trinity, sixty miles north of Moscow, which had withstood

[1] *Orékh* in Russian means *walnut-tree*; its Swedish name was Nöteborg öt in Swedish = *nut*, *borg* = *burg*).

[2] A village to the south of Lake Ládoga.

[3] Known in Polish as Dywilino.

two Polish sieges. As a result a truce of 14½ years was concluded Poland retained the districts of Smolénsk and Séversk, an Ladislas the title of *tsar*, but he agreed to an exchange o prisoners, amongst whom was Michael's father Philaret (c p. 159). The truce notwithstanding, hostilities nearly brok out again in 1621, when Turkey and Sweden proposed to joi Russia in a war against Poland. Michael was willing, and pre parations had begun when news arrived that Turkey had alread been put out of action.

In 1632 occurred the death of Sigismund III, King of Poland This was followed by another war between Russia and Poland which proved calamitous and ruinous for the former. At firs successful, the Russian forces under Shéin and Izmáilov wer held up eight months before Smolénsk. Ladislas, now King o Poland, attacked them there, cut them off, and forced them t capitulate. His progress, however, was arrested at Bély, and a a conference held by the river Polyánovka in 1634 peace wa definitely made. The conditions of Deúlino (1618) wer confirmed, but Ladislas renounced all claim to the throne o Moscow and agreed to recognize the Grand Duke of Mosco as *tsar*.

To the south activity was renewed only after a long perio of enforced quiescence. From 1636 onwards the zone of occu pation was gradually extended southward by the constan building of fresh fortified posts connected with one another b ramparts and palisades ; it was about this time that the town of Tambóv and Orël were founded, amongst many others.

In 1637 occurred an event which was illustrative of Russia plight at this epoch. The coastal regions of the Black Sea and o its arm, the Sea of Azóv, formed at this period part of th Ottoman Empire. The fortress of Azóv, situated at the poin where the river Don enters the Sea of Azóv, was a natura strategic key, as its possessors controlled the water communica

on between central Russia and the Black Sea. It was held by Turkish garrison. In the year 1637 a force of 4,000 Don ossacks captured it by surprise and offered it to the *tsar*. The tional assembly was summoned, and was asked whether it ould sanction war with Turkey and with the Tartars of the rimea for the sake of Azóv. The assembly decided that the ossacks' offer must be declined, as there was no money where-th to wage war and no prospect of obtaining sufficient for e purpose.

The Reign of Alexis (1645–76)

Internal Affairs

Michael died in 1645 at the age of forty-eight, without ever ving made any personal or public mark. Elected for his rmlessness, he had justified the opinion of his electors. He s succeeded by his son Alexis, at that time aged sixteen, whose other was Eudoxia, of the family of Stréshnev. Two independent witnesses have given accounts of his accession. These are earius, an emissary of Holstein who visited Moscow twice ring this period, and afterwards compiled a description of the untry, and Kotoshíkhin, a clerk in the Russian Foreign Office, o fled from Moscow in 1664, made good his escape to Sweden, d there compiled an invaluable account of Russia in the reign Alexis. Both writers affirm that this *tsar* was unanimously cted to the throne on the death of his father by representa-es of all classes of the community. Kotoshíkhin adds that, as was known to be of a mild disposition, no written guarantee s demanded of him and he was allowed to style himself 'auto-it' and to act as one. Contemporary conjecture was right. exis proved to be a just and lenient ruler, with considerably ore character and intelligence than his father. He was a

thinker, and he had a strong sense of his responsibility and of h public duty, but he lacked courage, energy, and initiative: h preferred to follow the line of least resistance, and had a weakne for compromise. His most remarkable personal characteristi were a determination to insist on the recognition of his power absolute autocrat combined with an extreme piety which h allowed to temper the manifestations of his prerogative. H was the most normal, human, and civilized ruler that Russ had yet had. His companion and tutor from early childhoo was the *boyár* B. I. Morózov, who was one of the first Russia grandees to be imbued with a passion for Western civilizatio Subsequently Morózov became the *tsar's* favourite, and prove a skilful diplomat and man of affairs. The connexion betwee them was made closer by their marrying two sisters of th Miloslávski family. One of the features of the new régime ha been the displacement of the old serried caste of families, wh had had an hereditary monopoly of the government, by indiv duals of comparatively mushroom origin and reputation wh wielded great personal influence over the ruler and came to b known as '*vremenshchiki*', which may be translated 'men the hour', or 'temporaries' (*vrémya* = time). Such a one w Morózov, and it was he who guided Russia's destinies durin the first part of the reign of Alexis.

The reign was full of important events, and witnessed man changes. Its outstanding features were: (1) a series of alarmin popular disturbances, born of the profound discontent an misery of the people; (2) the codification of the laws, a measu made urgent by these disturbances and by the new social con ditions; (3) the intensive penetration of Russia by Weste influence; (4) the introduction of reforms, especially militar and ecclesiastical; the latter resulting in (5) the great schis in the Russian Church, which was caused by the introductio of ecclesiastical reforms; and (6) the partial liquidation of th

arrel with Poland and the annexation of Kiev and of Little ıssia east of the Dnieper.

Most troubles in Russia at this time had a financial origin. onomically, the position in the seventeenth century was far ore difficult than it had been in the sixteenth. The wars were ıged on a still more extensive scale and against still better uipped enemies than formerly, while, on the whole, the untry was less prosperous and less loyal than before. The new nasty had not taken root in the affections of the people, while e rigorous stratification of society and the enforcement of fdom had resulted in the estrangement and mutual distrust classes, in the enrichment and demoralization of the land- ners, in the impoverishment and demoralization of the ourers, and in the general exasperation of the whole prole- iate. But the spirit of criticism which was thus generated was t confined to the lower classes. It infected those few of the stocracy and the bureaucracy whose intelligence was able to rceive the need for reform and whose conscience was not deaf the prevalent abuses, and produced a number of men who re the forerunners of Peter the Great and his circle.

The revolution had interrupted the old tradition and under- ined the popular faith in the stability and efficacy of the vernment. Even the most obtuse official minds were aware at new methods must be substituted for old. The difficulty meeting the expenses of government was in itself a sufficient oof. At the same time the collective official mind was ex- emely averse to any radical measures of reform, and it was cided to repair the old edifice in the hope that reconstruction ight be avoided. The whole of the reign of Michael had en spent in legislating on all manner of subjects. Under exis a new codification was undertaken (the last having been ade in 1550), to include all these new laws and all the old ıes which had not been superseded. It so happened that in

June 1648 grave popular disturbances broke out in Moscow an found an echo in many other towns. These were the result oppression by the *boyárs*, whom the new dynasty, owing to i equivocal position, was powerless to hold in check, and wer the expression of general anti-governmental and anti-dynast unrest. The effect of this outbreak was to make the pro jected codification a more urgent matter and at the same tim one of wider scope. The representatives of the people, th *zémski sobór*, were summoned to Moscow to deliberate an advise on the work of compilation and codification. But th wish to accomplish the task rapidly and thereby to anticipat any further disturbances had a deleterious effect on the qualit of the work. The summons was issued on July 16, 1648; th deputies assembled in Moscow by September 1; by October the commission which had been entrusted with the work ha finished nearly half the code (12 chapters out of the 25 which it ultimately consisted), and the *tsar* and the *dúma* bega to go through it. The elected representatives of the peopl influenced the work by consultations with the commissio which consisted of permanent officials from the ministries, b the presentation of petitions to the *dúma*, and also by collectiv consultation with the *tsar* and the *dúma* regarding the decisio of particular points. The whole code was completed b January 1649 and immediately promulgated. This code, ratify ing and embodying as it did the results of all the new legislatio of the preceding thirty-five years, was as it were the matur expression of the ideas of government of the new régime, an remained in force until 1833. Although its value as regard technique was impaired by the haste with which it was compile and by the occasional character of many of its enactments it was nevertheless a much more serious and compendiou work than its predecessors. However, while it undoubtedl infused order and uniformity into the administration of th

v, it failed to conjure the alarming social unrest which was eature of the time. In 1650 risings occurred in Pskov and in óvgorod. In 1662 there took place in Moscow a much more ious affair, known as the revolt of July. In 1656 the govern- ent, in order to meet its financial difficulties, had begun to ue copper money with the forced value of silver. All went ll until the multiplication of sudden fortunes in unexpected arters convinced the people that those in charge of the eration were themselves buying copper and having it minted. gh personages, including the *tsar's* father-in-law, were plicated. A mob issued forth, and meeting the *tsar* in person, en in summer residence at Kolómenskoe, near Moscow, gan to threaten him unless he gave up the culprits. There- on the bodyguard of *stréltsy* (lit. 'shooters') was summoned, e mob was fired on and a veritable terror followed, thousands innocent people being executed, expropriated, and exiled. nally, in 1670–1, there was the rebellion known as that of énko[1] Rázin, its leader. This originated amongst the Don ssacks, spread to the lower Volga, and rapidly developed into campaign of all the discontented elements in south-eastern ssia against the authority of Moscow. Rázin acquired popu- ity by the liberality with which he distributed his plunder, d mustered under his banner, besides the Cossacks and other tential brigands of the neighbourhood, all the riverain ies of the Volga and the alien nationalities, Finnish and rtar, who dwelt on both sides of the Volga and were not reconciled to Russian rule. The revolt spread as far as zhni Nóvgorod, but was eventually quelled by the defeat its ringleader near Simbírsk.

[1] The diminutive of Stepan = Stephen.

Western Influence

One of the most momentous developments of the reign o Alexis was the change which took place during it in the rela tion between Russia and the rest of Europe. In the six teenth century there had merely been surface contact betwee Russia and her Western neighbours. Moscow was then com pletely self-sufficient both mentally and materially. After th revolution things were different. The more intelligent mind in Moscow began unwillingly to admit that Russia could no successfully face the immense and complicated problems o the seventeenth century, especially those of foreign policy with exactly the same equipment, mental and material, whic had sufficed her in the fifteenth century. Byzantium, whon a cynical fate had appointed to be the senile and inadequat nurse of the youngest and most backward child in the Europea family, was of less use than ever since the Turkish conquest Russia, now arriving at years of discretion, began to perceiv that her difficulties could not be solved by merely assertin that Moscow was the third, final, and perfect Rome, an that this was the end of the matter, as she had done for th last 200 years. The only quarter whence help, at any rate o a material kind, could come was central and western Europe and thus it was that the door was opened, with extrem reluctance and misgiving, to European influence. In the reig of Michael it had been a negligible trickle; in that of Alexi it was a measurable stream. The first evidences of this influenc were seen in the satisfaction of the most elementary require ments of the State, those of self-defence. It began in the reig of Michael with the hiring of foreign mercenaries, officers, an soldiers, of whom a number, notably Scotsmen, were at larg in Europe after the Thirty Years' War and ready for furthe adventures; it went on with the formation for the first tim

a regular and permanent Russian army with infantry and illery, trained by these same foreigners, in place of the valry militia of the nobility of which it had hitherto almost olly consisted; it ended, as a natural consequence, with e establishment in Russia itself of foundries and arsenals maintain the equipment of this force independently of the carious and costly supplies from abroad. Expeditions were patched to discover deposits of ore in various parts of Russia; 1626 the English engineer Bulmer was given permission to ry on investigations with this object; in 1632 the Dutchman lius established a factory at Túla, which ultimately became e Russian Sheffield; in 1634 a number of German skilled rkmen were imported; in 1644 other iron-foundries were rted in the basin of the upper Volga. Thoughts were also ned towards the establishment of a mercantile marine, t with Archangel the only Russian port the idea did not sper. But the government did at last begin to realize t the country possessed sources of wealth which could be veloped with advantage to the exchequer. Hitherto its ancial policy had consisted solely in magnifying the burden taxation without doing anything to increase the productivity the land or of the people, regardless of the misery and dis-ntent which the incessant multiplication of levies and taxes oduced.

While Western science proved its value to the State in the rn realms of engineering and metallurgy, Western influence gan to penetrate the homes of the good people of Moscow introducing to them some of the amenities of life of which ey had till then known nothing. The natural intermediary tween Russia and Western civilization was the foreign colony Moscow. This was known as the *Nemétskaya*[1] *Slobodá*, i. e.

[1] *Némets* (masc.), *némka* (fem.), *némtsy* (plur.), derived from *nemói* = nb, is the name by which the Germans of all descriptions, from the Baltic

the German Suburb, doubtless because the majority of i inhabitants were Germans. Already in the previous centu it had been segregated outside the city on the rivulet Yáuz but in the revolution it had been swept away. In the reign Michael its members returned, but began to settle down ar even to build churches anywhere within the city. This prove an offence to the Orthodox conscience and discipline ; in 16 the churches were removed beyond the cincture, and in 16 the whole colony was again relegated to its old home on th Yáuza and confined there. The manner of life of these foreigne could not but influence that of the natives by the dire method. At first it was a question of purely utilitarian innov tions such as furniture, clothes, carriages, and clocks ; but lat the products of musical, pictorial, and theatrical art bega to find their way to the comparatively broad-minded court Alexis and the homes of the more receptive members of th Moscow aristocracy. *Tsar* Alexis actually had a theatre bui at Preobrazhénskoe[1] near Moscow, and the first *régisseur* w a Lutheran pastor from the German colony, the troupe co sisting of foreign amateurs.

At the same time the more reflective minds began to reali that Moscow needed an increase of intellectual nourishment well as of material comfort. Schools did not exist: wh schooling was given was entirely private, haphazard, and piec meal. This neglect of education made itself felt most acute in the spheres of diplomacy and of religious controversy. Whi the purveyors of technique were of Germanic origin, it w Kiev which provided Moscow with mental preceptors. Th reasons for this were religious. Western and south-weste

to the Adriatic, have from immemorial times been known to all Slavs ; t term was often stretched to include European foreigners in general.

[1] Sc. Selo (= village) ; this word means *of the Transfiguration*, the na of the local church which gave its name to the village.

ussia, with Kiev as its centre, was still almost entirely in olish possession, while its population, except the aristocratic nd-owning class which was Polish or had become polonized, as purely Russian and of the Orthodox faith. Exposed the missionary activity of the Jesuits, and at the same me profiting by knowledge and experience of their methods; aded by the zeal of their flocks for the Orthodox faith, and aring for their own ultimate security as a religious body, the rthodox hierarchy of south-west Russia had been stimulated intellectual activity. In defence of their faith they adopted e weapons of their opponents and began to educate themselves d provide for the education of their co-religionists. In this ıy the intellectual awakening of Russia may be said to have gun outside its political confines, namely, in Little Russia d White Russia. In 1633 Peter Mogíla, Orthodox Bishop Kiev, founded an academy in that city for the study of the ssical languages, of theology, philosophy, and rhetoric.

It was to this quarter that Moscow turned in its search for ritual nourishment. The lead was given by the government elf, which in 1650 invited an erudite monk, by name Slavinétski, d two others from Kiev to Moscow in order to carry out omplete translation of the Bible from Greek into Slavonic,[1] ich had never been done hitherto.

Another scholar of west Russian origin who achieved fame a pedagogue was Simeon Pólotski,[2] under whose direction miniature school was formed in one of the monasteries in ɔscow in 1665; he also acted as tutor to *tsar* Alexis's two

Slavonic, or Church-Slavonic, the language of the Orthodox Church in sia, Serbia, and Bulgaria, is essentially the same as Old Bulgarian; it however, inevitably become coloured by the vernacular of each country ıe it is used, so that Russian Church-Slavonic is really Old Bulgarian ı a Russian flavour.

Pólotsk is a very ancient Russian town on the western Dviná.

sons by his first wife, Theodore and Ivan. At court there w
a whole coterie of men who took a more or less serious intere
in the spread of learning, and were sufficiently enlightened t
appreciate the spiritual as well as the material value of weste
civilization. Such men were the *tsar's* three successive foreig
ministers, his old tutor and wife's brother-in-law B. I. Morózo
the skilful diplomat, A. L. O-dín-Nashchókin, a native
Pskov, and A. S. Matvéev, who was the uncle of the *tsar*
second wife, Natalia Naryshkina, married a Scotswoman, a
was the first Russian to start anything in the nature of a *salo*
But the most notable was a man who held no official positio
Th. M. Rtíshchev, a contemporary and close personal frie
of the *tsar*. He was a truly remarkable man for his time a
surroundings, with a passion for learning and an absolu
disregard of worldly success. This scholar-saint devoted his li
and his fortune to education, and the relatively small succe
with which he met proved what a wilderness he had to wo
in. He founded near Moscow a monastery which he fill
with thirty learned monks from Little Russia, whose duty
was to translate learned books into Russian and teach t
humanities to any who should wish to learn; and he w
himself one of their most assiduous pupils.

The Great Schism in the Russian Church

But barely had the movement of reform began to gath
pace when the inevitable reaction set in. The products
science and art were recognized by the Orthodox Church
general only in so far as they promoted an understanding
its dogma. Knowledge which did not directly serve this en
the study of lay subjects and indulgence in all the ameniti
of life, was regarded as useless and superfluous and was ev
discouraged as being potentially subversive. When it w
realized that the learning of Greek and Latin, especially t

tter, and other profane studies, were positively encouraged by ymen in authority, the most profound misgiving was aroused devout circles, which in Moscow in those days meant the whole eople from top to bottom. This feeling ultimately led to ne great schism which at this time rent the hitherto united ussian Church. The schism was actually caused by the decision f the government, at the instigation of Nikon, appointed atriarch in 1652, one of the most remarkable figures in Russian story, to carry out a revision of the liturgical books of the ussian Church, and to purge them of the mistakes which had radually crept into them through the imperfect copying of anuscripts, and had then been multiplied, perpetuated, and sseminated all over Russia after the introduction of printing 1552. But as a matter of fact that was only a peg, and the ovement was really the expression by the mass of the more norant of the people of their mistrust and hatred of the novations introduced by the government.

The views held by Russians about their own Church were nar-w and fanatical, but perfectly natural and intelligible. They ad received Christianity from Byzantium; their missionaries ad all their early bishops had been Greeks; Constantinople ad been to Russia what Rome was to the rest of Europe. But e Greeks never enjoyed in Russia either popularity or respect. Russian a Greek and a rogue were synonymous. For this e Greeks themselves were to blame. Russia in the early nturies was a rich, credulous, and helpless proselyte. The reek prelates sent from Byzantium to watch over the spiritual stinies of the new flock in barbarous Scythia were not men great character, and were more interested in shearing its ool than in the cure of its soul. Moreover, though they may ot have been such profound thinkers or such acute dialecti-ans as the Greeks, the Russians took Christianity far more iously. From the very first the Orthodox faith seems to

have impregnated the Russians far more deeply than any of th
Balkan nationalities. Even to-day it is far more vital to th
mass of Russians than it is, or than it has for long been, t
Greeks, Rumanians, Serbians, or Bulgarians. In the Middl
Ages and in the seventeenth century in Russia the whole peop
may be said to have lived exclusively in and for their Churc
Meanwhile, their faith in their spiritual teachers received on
shock after another. Their position resembled that in whic
English people sometimes find themselves, when they hav
lost respect for their vicar but have not the power to tur
him out. Notably at the council of Florence in 1439 the Gree
accepted the union with Rome and sent their Metropolita
Isidor to try and foist it on Moscow, which 'diabolical scheme
the Grand Duke Vasíli Vasílevich happily frustrated. Finall
in 1453, Constantinople fell before the infidel. The Gree
halo was broken, and the rôles began to be reversed. Russ
emerged from Muhammadan bondage just as the Gree
succumbed to it, and it was natural that after what the
considered the defection of Rome and the eclipse of Constan
tinople the people of Moscow should come to look on the
city as the ultimate and the unique repository of the tru
faith. The creation of the Russian patriarchate in 158
(cf. p. 137) completely and finally emancipated the Russia
Church from Constantinople, and thenceforward for man
years the bonds which united them were purely formal. Th
Greek community became, as it were, Russia's poor relation
and their prelates came to Moscow no longer to levy tribu
but to crave for alms. Thus the Russians, losing sight of th
universal Church, became possessed of the idea of a particulari
national Church; they also became convinced that not on
was their particular form of faith the only true one, but al
that their forms of ceremonial and liturgy were the on
correct ones, that their religion was outwardly as well as inward

allible and incapable of improvement. They did not consider
t they had anything to learn from the Greeks or anything
gain from a study of Greek. As for Latin, Polish, geography
d geometry and such things, their study was regarded as posi-
ely dangerous. This was the general feeling of the masses,
luding the more ignorant of the clergy. The necessity
reforms was realized by only a very limited number of men,
t as these happened to be the men in power their introduction
ame ever more extensive. While they were confined to
rely utilitarian ends, such as the domains of military equip-
nt, mining, and engineering, they were tolerated, though
influence of the heretic Lutherans in these spheres was
oundly deprecated. But when they spread to the realm of
itual equipment and ritual the situation became far more
icult.

The heads of the Russian Church realized the need of reform
their own province just as much as the heads of the govern-
nt realized it in theirs. At this time Russia was about to make
with Poland in order to settle accounts long overdue and
nite with Great Russia the purely Russian districts of
tern or White Russia and south-western or Little Russia.
e quarrel with Poland, besides being political, was also, if
eed not mainly, religious, inasmuch as the Russian subjects
the Polish State who were being coerced into union with
ne were of the Orthodox faith. The Russian Church, faced
h the exigencies of supporting this crusade against Latinism,
nd itself obliged to furbish its intellectual weapons just as
State had been forced to furbish its artillery. As the
te had recourse to Lutheran engineers, so the Church had
ourse to Greek theologians and to the Russian scholars of
v. Intercourse with Kiev and Constantinople was revived,
visits of Greek dignitaries to Moscow were encouraged,
their advice and opinion solicited. A strong movement

was set on foot in high ecclesiastical circles for the close union of the Greek and Russian Churches, to be symbolized by the standardization of their ritual, and for the re-establishment of the 'universal' Orthodox Church as a single whole. It was at this moment, in 1652, that Nikon became Patriarch of the Russian Church. He flung himself heart and soul into the new movement, but unfortunately he had less intelligence than energy. He identified himself with the Greeks and adopted their point of view—that the Russian priesthood in general was appallingly ignorant, and that the errors of formula and idiosyncrasies of ritual which had crept into the liturgy must be forcibly eradicated. Inasmuch as the textual errors had become sanctified by antiquity, and to tell a Russian he does not know how to pray is like telling a gunner he does not know how to shoot, these aspersions and suggested innovations evoked deep resentment. Nikon was one of those reformers who with the minimum of necessity arouse the maximum of opposition. The autocratic and tactless manner in which he enforced his reforms caused a schism. At first confined to the hierarchy, it spread to the laymen and ended in the formation of the community of the Old Believers.[1] These held not only that the Russian faith was incapable of improvement, but also that it was the Greeks who ought to come to Russia, rather than the Russians to the Greeks for spiritual guidance; and, as the reforms were being forced on them with the connivance of 'foreigners', they fancied the whole scheme was a disguised plot to subject Russia to the Pope and to open the way to the Jesuits. As their name implied, they considered that not they but the innovators, from the Patriarch downwards, were the schismatics. Thanks to the uncompromising character of Nikon the dispute, from being one of texts and ritual, became one of hierarchical discipline

[1] *Starovértsy*, from *stáraya véra*, the old belief.

ventually the Patriarch carried the day, but at the cost of e unity of the Russian Church, and the position was regularized nen in 1667 the Old Believers, with the Protopóp[1] Habbakuk their head, were definitely excommunicated.

The *tsar*, over whom Nikon exercised considerable influence ntil he fell out with him and was deprived of his office and sgraced, and the mass of society, including the official circles, ood on one side during this tumult, which by its nature ncerned the hierarchy most closely. If anything, their sym- thies were with the upholders of the old tradition, though eir sense of decorum and their horror of insubordination turally compelled them to support the supreme ecclesiastical thorities.[2] The effects of this commotion were just the posite of what those who took part in it expected. The idence which it gave of what harm could be caused by blind herence to the old order of things only added impetus to e movement for reform in general; at the same time, owing its obvious incompetence in its own domain, the authority the Church was lowered and its political influence lessened, nereby one of the greatest obstacles to the penetration of estern influence was removed.

External Affairs in the Reign of Alexis. The Question of Little Russia or the Ukraine

Russian foreign policy in the reign of Alexis followed two fferent lines. For the first twenty years, when Morózov as Foreign Minister, it was directed above all against Poland, hile during the last ten, under the able guidance of Ordín- ashchókin, conciliation with Poland was aimed at. By

[1] ='Arch-priest', a rank slightly higher than that of the ordinary iest (*pop*), lit. 'first priest'.

[2] Based on Klyuchévski.

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continuing the secular struggle against Poland Russia consistently pursued the traditional aim of recovering Russian lands which were still in non-Russian possession, an aim which was religious and sentimental as well as political. But whereas hitherto it had been especially western Russia, Smolénsk with the upper basin of the Dnieper and Séversk with the basin of the Desná (a tributary of the Dnieper), which had been envisaged, the field of ambition and of operations was now extended southward, and the whole question as between Russia and Poland was made infinitely more complex by the inclusion within it of Kiev and south-west or Little Russia. This made what had been a duel into a triangular struggle, an increase of dimension for which Moscow was neither mentally nor materially prepared. The extremely complicated question of Little Russia may be said to have been definitely opened, as far as Moscow was concerned, in 1654 by the offer of its inhabitants in revolt against their Polish masters, to place themselves under the protection of *tsar* Alexis. The problem of Little Russia had been brewing for many years, but it need never have achieved such importance and would never have become so tangled were it not for the peculiar geographical position and complicated history of the country and the wayward character of its motley population. Geographically, 'Little Russia'[1] in those days comprised the lower basin of the Dnieper from Chernígov, on the Desná, one of its tributaries, and from Kiev southwards, and stretched as far west as the southern or Black Sea Buh; it thus occupied a pivotal position between Russia and Poland and the Ottoman Empire. In itself the whole of this country, being situated largely in the fertile 'black earth' zone, was extremely rich; its surface had, so to say, barely been scratched for purposes of agriculture, though often enough ploughed

[1] In Polish always known as *Ukraina* = 'the Borderland', and now called in English *Ukraine*.

by armies of invasion, and economically, therefore, it was great prize to any possessor.

With the Tartar invasion and the consequent displacement the Russian political centre of gravity north-eastwards, and e general dispersion of the population which simultaneously ok place, the importance and prosperity of Little Russia clined (cf. pp. 85–9). It was then (in the thirteenth century) at there was formed the geographical, political, and ethnical tity which came later to be known as Great Russia,[1] so called cause it was much greater in size than the other territorial d ethnical divisions of the Russian race. In the thirteenth ntury Lithuania conquered western and south-western ssia (the *whole* basin of the Dnieper), and in 1386 Poland d Lithuania were united. While they were under purely thuanian rule these Russian districts exercised a strong ssianizing influence on the Lithuanians[2] who had con- ered them, doubtless because the Lithuanians were relatively v in number and were less civilized than the Russians. But m 1386 onwards Polish influence was introduced into those ne districts, and being that of a stronger and more civilized ople began to get the upper hand. It is important to remem- r, however, that the Polish nomenclature of these districts is

[1] *Rus' Velikaya* in Russian, *Ruś Wielka* in Polish; *Rus'* (a feminine collective noun) was the name by which Russia was from the tenth century known to its own inhabitants and to its neighbours. *Rossiya*, the modern name, was of much later formation and modelled on Latin names of countries. Polish *Rusin* (pl. *Rusi*) means a native of Eastern Galicia, Ruthenia or Little Russia, and their language is called *ruski*; Poles call Great Russians *Moskovjane* (sing. *Rosjanin*) and the (Great) Russian language *rosyjski*.

[2] The Lithuanians are of Aryan or Indo-European race, but not Slavs; they have, however, especially in language, more affinity with the Slavs than with any other European races. Together with the Letts and the Prussians (the almost aboriginal inhabitants of Prussia) they form the 'Baltic' group of languages and races (*baltas* in Lithuanian = *white*).

in some respects different from the Russian. The lower basin of the Dnieper and the district between the Dnieper and the southern or Black Sea Buh was never in Polish called 'Little Russia', but always *Ukraina*, which literally means *the Borderland*, a name also used by the Russians, and, in one form or another common to most Slavonic peoples.[2] The name 'Little Russia' (in Russian *Rus' Málaya* or *Maloróssiya*), which was used in Moscow from the fourteenth century onwards, was used by the Poles for the first time in the Treaty of Andrúsovo in 1667. The advantage of the term from the Russian and its disadvantage from the Polish point of view lay in its elasticity, though for that matter the term *Ukraina* was also in its essence extremely vague. The other Russian districts which were under Lithuanian rule at that time were known as Volýnia,[3] which lay between the *Ukraina* and Poland proper; *Polésie*,[4] which included the central basin of the Prípet; White Russia,[5] the whole upper basin of the Dnieper and the Berézina; and Black Russia,[6] which lay between the Berézina, the Prípet, and the Niemen. The district south of Volýnia, between the Dniester and the southern or Black Sea Buh, came to be known as Podolia,[7] and its extension south-eastwards as *Pobereże*, which is a literal Russian translation of *Riviera* (*bereg* = bank); Galicia, otherwise known as Red Russia,[8] and at a later date as Ruthenia, which lay between Volýnia and the Carpathians, had become Polish in 1340.

[1] *Kraj* = *border* or *edge*; *u* = *along*, *by*.

[2] Cf. the name of the Austrian province of Krain (known to us as Carniola) in Slovene *Kranjsko*; outlying portions of Bosnia and Serbia are also called *Kraina*.

[3] In Russian *Volyn'*, in Polish *Wołyń*.

[4] Lit. 'along the forests' (*les* = forest).

[5] In Russian *Belorússiya* or *Rus' Bélaya*, in Polish *Ruś Biała*.

[6] In Russian *Rus' Chërnaya*, in Polish *Ruś Czarna*.

[7] In Polish *Podole*, lit. 'along the valleys' (*dole* = valley).

[8] In Russian *Rus' Chervónnaya*, in Polish *Ruś Czerwona*.

The political arrangement arising from the personal union Lithuania and Poland lasted from 1386 to 1572, the date the death of the last king of the 'Jagiello'[1] dynasty, Sigis-und II Augustus. During the fifteenth century an intensive atholic propaganda was carried on for political purposes Lithuania (i. e. West Russia) by the Polish government and erarchy, which resulted in a reaction amongst the Orthodox ussian population and the defection of a number of petty rinces in west Russia, with their lands, to Moscow (cf. pp. 88–9). the sixteenth century the situation became very different. he reformation, in spite of the desperate opposition of the olish priesthood, from the first made rapid progress both in oland and in Lithuania; its tenets seemed especially to peal to the landed aristocracy, headed in Lithuania by the agnate Nicholas Radziwiłł. The Lutheran and Calvinist ovement, combined with the religious tolerance of both gismund I (1506–48) and Sigismund II Augustus (1548–72), ted as a check on the Catholic propaganda in Lithu-ia, and consequently the Orthodox population became re-sured and the separatist movement ceased. By the middle the sixteenth century the organization and administration Lithuania had largely approximated to those of Poland. he political power, which had originally been in the hands the great landowners, princes and *boyárs*, had gradually assed, in Lithuania as in Poland, to the much larger class petty land-holders (*szlachta*) who formed the army and ontrolled the diets (*sejmy*). Administrative office, tenable r life and sometimes hereditary, and jurisdiction were in eir hands. The towns, cut off from all connexion with the ountry and confined to purely urban activity, dwindled in nportance, though endowed with the 'Law of Magdeburg',

[1] Cf. p. 87.

which had already been introduced into the towns of Poland in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by German colonists.

As Sigismund II had no heir, it became necessary to determine what should happen at his death, since technically only the person of the sovereign united Lithuania and Poland. With this object in January 1569 a diet (*sejm*) was convoked in Lublin. The petty nobility of Lithuania favoured a continuation of the union, hoping thus to raise their power to the level of their Polish colleagues, while the magnates, fearing this very development, were opposed to it. The king, however, gained the support of the two greatest of these latter, the Lithuanian Prince Alexander Czartoryski and the Russian Prince Constantine Ostrózhski (the owner of a large part of Little Russia, whose income was reputed to be a million sterling), who were the leaders of the Orthodox Lithuanian aristocracy. This settled the question, and it was decided to make the union of Poland and Lithuania permanent and absolute, dynasty or no dynasty. They became two halves of one state, and though they had a king, elective in character, a senate, consisting of the great dignitaries, spiritual and temporal, and a diet, consisting of the deputies of the petty nobility, in common, yet each half retained its own separate administration, army, and laws. The whole state, which was in appearance an elective monarchy, but in essence a republic, was termed the *Rzecz Pospolita*, the Polish equivalent of *res publica*, Poland being known as the 'Crown' (*Korona*) and Lithuania as the 'Principality' (*Księstwo*). At the same time the boundary between the two halves were changed, to the great advantage of Poland; Little or south-west Russia, i. e. Volýnia and *Ukraina*, was excluded from Lithuania and included in Poland.

This arrangement, which was known as the Union of Lublin, had the immediate effect of greatly enriching Poland, though it brought much trouble in its train. The enormous and fertile

acts of Little Russia were thrown open to colonization and speculation in land. The only inhabitants at this moment ere the Cossacks, whose mode of life has been described f. p. 116); and the wholesale arrival of agricultural settlers, llowed by land-grabbers, government officials, the introduc- on of serfdom, and other paraphernalia of civilization, was not all to their liking. The southern limit of the *Ukraina* was ite undefined, and the farther south civilization marched e farther south the Cossacks extended their activities, which ere of such a kind that eventually they threatened seriously embroil Poland and Turkey, under whose sway the steppes [1] the north of the Black Sea technically stood. The govern- ent of Warsaw in 1570 tried to turn a portion of the Cossacks to a regular government soldiery of so-called 'registered' ssacks, compelling the others to resume peaceful and settled cupations, in the hope of thus making them more amenable d no less useful as a frontier police. They so far succeeded at a force of registered Cossacks was formed and gradually ew till in 1625 it reached 6,000, but the hope that the out- d-out Cossack would change his habits proved vain. Those ho were not included in the register, but nevertheless were lled up in thousands when the Polish government needed em, became a discontented and dangerous element; the lder spirits went farther afield, and on the remote and in- cessible islands in the lower Dnieper, below the rapids (*porógi*; *róg* lit. = 'threshold'), founded the famous freebooters' colony own as the *Zaporózhskaya Sech* or *Zaporózhie*.[2] Here, out of ich of the long but weak arm of the Polish administration, the ssacks formed a lawless and joyous community which became e quintessence of Little Russia, the embodiment and symbol the Cossack spirit, which was one of uncompromising opposi-

[1] 'Steppe' implies flat or undulating, treeless, grass-covered country.

[2] Lit. = 'the stockade beyond the rapids', *za* = 'beyond.'

tion to all authority. The *Sech* was a no man's land which wa a magnet to all the discontented elements in the surrounding countries, and its business was to let out its armed services or hire to one neighbour in order to help him plunder another Nominally Orthodox, these Cossacks were just as ready to exercise their art of robbery on Christians of any denomination as on Muhammadans. It was they whose services were engaged by the Poles in the war against Moscow in the Time of Troubles In the seventeenth century the Poles were themselves to learn the quality of this many-edged weapon.

The reason for this was that the Dnieper Cossacks had really no nationality; they spoke a *langue russe à la polonaise sauce Tartare*. Just as the Dnieper gathered its tributary waters from Poland, Lithuania, and west Russia, so Little Russia, geographically the middle basin of the Dnieper, collected stray ethnic elements from these and other countries and the *Sech* was a sort of overflow from it, with the difference that it was still more composite, attracting recruits from the Muhammadan south as well as from the Christian north. It was a sort of international, anarchical, martial brotherhood, in which unanimity was ensured by the total exclusion of female society, with no laws except those of military discipline, no common object save the evasion of restraint, and no common ideal but the achievement of excess. It was this whimsical tool which was forced into the uncertain hands of the Russians in their next war with Poland by no less an agency than the Orthodox Church.

Revolts against the Polish authority began to take place in Little Russia as early as 1591, but at first these were of a purely social character, being risings of the peasants, supported by the Cossacks, against the Polish landlords. But in 1596 an event took place which gave them a different colouring. As a result of the Union of Lublin Catholic propaganda, headed

the Jesuits, had been renewed in Lithuania and Little ssia with great success, and began seriously to undermine e position of the Orthodox clergy. To save this a portion the latter agreed to the union of the Churches, accepting omission to the authority of the Pope and conformity to e rites of the Catholic Church, while retaining the use of e vernacular in the service and certain other local privi-ges. This was decided on at the Congress of Brest [1] held in 96.

The Orthodox community was thus divided; the nobles a body and the majority of the bishops went over to Rome, ile the towns, the mass of the peasants and a considerable mber of priests, remained true to the Orthodox faith. It s under these conditions that the people of Little Russia ade common cause with the Cossacks against the Poles, and at what had been merely the expression of economic dis-ntent became a religious and national crusade.

The motives of the various parties were different, but they re united by their hatred of the Polish government, priests, d landlords, and of their agents the Jews. Consequently the merous anti-Polish revolts in Little Russia during the first lf of the seventeenth century began to acquire a political aracter. They were all unsuccessful and were crushed with eat severity, coming to a temporary end in 1638, when the lish government tried completely to suppress the Cossacks cept those few whom it chose to maintain as a regular force. his policy, however, completely failed to allay the Little ssian Jack-in-the-box. The conditions became ever more mplex; added to the varied antagonistic national and ternational, religious and economic interests which all had

[1] Sc. Brest Litóvsk (= Lithuanian Brest), in Polish *Brześć Litewski*, so lled to distinguish it from *Brześć Kujawski*, a town in western Poland in e district of *Kujawy*, near Thorn.

a stake in the country, the Cossacks themselves were split up into half a dozen different categories and parties, each with its own axe to grind. After these ingredients had simmered another ten years a really big explosion occurred in 1648, which blew the Polish lid off the Little Russian box. This was the great rising under the Cossack chief, Bogdan[1] Chmielnicki.[2]

In anticipation of this result Kiev and Moscow had for some time been exchanging glances and even words; but both words and glances were so ambiguous that they eventually cost both partners very dear. The truth was that Russia, barely recovering from the revolution and still smarting from the effects of the unsuccessful war against Poland in 1632–4, was neither anxious nor yet able to undertake another campaign; at the same time the Little Russians were obviously a useful instrument to beat the Poles with, and failure to make use of them or absolute refusal of support to Chmielnicki might mean that Kiev and the Dnieper would pass for good and all into Polish, or, still worse, into Turkish possession. The Cossacks, as the people of Moscow knew to their cost, were capable of anything. Chmielnicki, for his part, kept invoking the help of the *tsar* and offering to place himself and all the Cossacks under his rule if only Moscow would join with the Cossacks in a concerted attack on Poland. As a matter of fact he really aimed at the autonomy of Little Russia under the rule of himself and the Cossacks, and under the protection of the *tsar*, while Moscow aimed at getting possession of Little Russia without the Cossacks. Chmielnicki, knowing that he and his Cossacks were not alone equal to the Poles, alternately cajoled and threatened the *tsar*, while the people of Moscow, anxious above all to avoid open rupture with Poland and to secure the reversion of Little Russia with the minimum of trouble

[1] This name is the literal Russian translation of *Theodore*.

[2] This is the Polish spelling; in Russian it would be Khmelnítski.

nately encouraged and discouraged Chmielnicki. The result ed disastrous for all parties concerned.

his first campaign against Poland in 1648 Chmielnicki's ess was unexpectedly rapid, and he found himself master of ly the whole of Little Russia. The Poles were forced to e concessions and to recognize him as *hetman*.[1] If Moscow then accepted his offer, proclaimed the annexation of le Russia and declared war on Poland, the matter would have settled; but a policy of interested expectation was erred. Chmelnicki was forced to fight again alone against Poles, and in the second and third campaigns, betrayed is allies the Tartars, lost all he had won in the first.

last, faced with the alternatives of accepting Chmielnicki his Cossacks as Russian subjects or seeing them forced to place iselves under the protection of the Crimean Khan or the ish Sultan, Moscow in 1653 decided on the former course, the following year war was declared against Poland. The year (1654) Charles X of Sweden also went to war with Poles, who thus found themselves in an apparently hopeless ion with three enemies in as many quarters. While the ians quickly took the whole of White Russia and other tracts of Lithuania, including Vilna, Grodno, and Kovno, Swedes overran Great and part of Little Poland,[2] capturing n, Cracow, and Warsaw. But Russia and Sweden then ut over the division of the spoils. Peace was made with Poles, who by the Treaty of Vilna, concluded in 1656, ceded

r *ataman*, supposed to be a corruption of the German word *mann*.

ese terms are misleading because, as a matter of fact, Little Poland *-Polska*) was much larger than Great Poland (*Wielko-Polska*): the latter estern Poland, the country round Posen; the former was originally the upper basin of the Vistula, with Cracow, and was in fact smaller, id gradually grown till it stretched eastwards beyond the river er.

to Moscow all White Russia and Little Russia, and war declared against Charles X. Thus the energy of Russia suddenly diverted from the sentimental task of beating Po and annexing Little Russia to the economic task of bea Sweden and reaching the Baltic—a diversion which pr fatal. It had, indeed, the negatively good result of preven Charles X from establishing himself as King of Poland, w he was preparing to do, but it also gave Poland time in w to recover her strength. Chmielnicki, characteristically eno wishing to ensure himself against a possible Russo-P understanding, had already begun to coquet with the Sw and the Tartars. He died in 1657, but his successors contin this policy, and in 1659, with the help of the Tartars, defe the Russians at Konotóp. This gave courage to the Poles, wi the stress of these years had united and endowed with unexpe strength, and they prepared to denounce the Treaty of V having already driven the Swedes out of their country concluded with them the Peace of Oliva (1660). Russia found herself surrounded by enemies as Poland had a few y previously been. War on three fronts was impossible, an was decided to make peace with Sweden. The war with country had been quite fruitless. The Truce of Valiesar [1] (1 gave Dórpat to Russia, but the Treaty of Kardis [2] which fi terminated the war in 1661 restored this town to Sweden, merely confirmed the old Treaty of Stólbovo (cf. p. 183), d ing Russia all access, not only to the Baltic, but even to Gulf of Finland.

The war which was now renewed between Poland and R proved disastrous to the latter. The affairs of Little Russia by this time so involved that the Cossacks were rather a hindr to Moscow than a help. Of their various factions each h different object and pulled its own way till civil war ens

[1] On the river Narva. [2] In Esthonia.

west or right bank of the Dnieper siding with Poland, the or left bank with Moscow. In the campaign against Poland Russians suffered defeat and lost all that they had gained by Treaty of Vilna. But by this time the economic position of h combatants was extremely serious. Riots broke out in scow, and the Poles rose against their king. Little Russia had n laid waste from end to end, the Cossacks had been embit-ed, and a large number of those on the right bank of the ieper placed themselves under the rule of the Sultan. Faced his new danger, Russia and Poland decided to come to terms, in 1667 concluded the Truce of Andrúsovo.[1] This was the fruit of the new turn which Russian foreign policy took under direction of Ordín-Nashchókin, who had succeeded Morózov, it marked an epoch in the relations between Russia and and. By its stipulations Moscow gained important increases erritory, though seemingly little enough in proportion to the rmous and exhausting effort they had cost, namely the towns l districts of Smolénsk and Séversk and the whole of Little ssia east of the Dnieper as far as the rapids, with the city of v and its environs as an *enclave* on the west bank; Kiev was ed nominally only for two years, but as a matter of fact Poland er regained possession of it. These provisions were con-ned nineteen years later by the Treaty of Moscow (1686), which 'permanent' peace was declared between Russia l Poland.

These events may be said to mark the turning-point in the tions between the two secular enemies. At this period they e about evenly matched; until now the strength of Poland always grown, but from now it began rapidly to decline, le Russia, whose strength had been growing slowly and illy, underground, as it were, rather than visibly, thwarted ts natural development both by nature and by history, now

[1] A village south-west of Smolénsk; in Polish *Andruszowo*.

for the first time began to overtop Poland and to appear a premier Slavonic power.

The Truce of Andrúsovo was, however, satisfactory to nob Moscow was exhausted, Poland weakened, and Little R divided, disappointed, and ruined. It is true that in so far signified the first territorial gain made by Russia for virtua hundred years it redounded to the credit of the new dyn but at the same time it brought Moscow face to face with responsibilities and complexities, notably with the Otto Empire. It was about this time that, influenced by crusade on behalf of the Orthodox Russians under Polish the Russians also first began to think about the other Orth Slavs under Turkish rule. But this path, though inviting dangerous, because, while it was quite true that there millions of Slav Christians in Turkey who were languis under the Crescent, it was also incontrovertible that there millions of Muhammadans in south-eastern Russia pining u the shadow of the Cross. Hence, for the time being, not more explosive was conveyed to the oppressed co-religio on either side than the expression of sympathy and remembr

The Truce of Andrúsovo and the Treaty of Moscow cl period in Russian foreign policy, which henceforward was b on alliance with Poland and directed against Sweden and Tu Unfortunately, varying circumstances compelled it to alte between the two objectives, north and south, a vacillation w naturally prejudiced the speedy attainment of either. T agreements also marked the end of Russia's isolation and beginning of its establishment as a factor to be reckoned wi European politics. The exchange of diplomatic missions other countries during the reign of Alexis became general uninterrupted; Sweden even established a permanent resi minister in Moscow. Ordín-Nashchókin, who was respon for the Truce of Andrúsovo, may be said to have been Ru

real statesman. He designed the foreign policy which was owed in the next generation by Peter the Great. He was not y perspicacious but also high-minded. When the time came restore Kiev to Poland according to the terms of the treaty, proposed to do so, but this was too much even for the philan- opic, easy-going *tsar* Alexis, and Ordín-Nashchókin fell. He succeeded as Foreign Minister by A. S. Matvéev, also a ng advocate of reform and admirer of Western ideas and lization, whose niece, Natalia Naryshkina, became the *tsar's* nd wife. By his first wife (Maria Miloslávskaya) *tsar* Alexis had two sons—Theodore, born in 1662, and Ivan, born in 6—and numerous daughters ; by his second wife he had one , Peter, born in 1672, and two daughters. In the continued ence of a law of succession, *tsar* Alexis settled this question an off-hand and unconventional way : in September 1674, he presence of the highest dignitaries of State and Church, of the foreign envoys then in Moscow, he proclaimed his st son Theodore as his successor. Alexis died in 1676, at the of forty-six. Theodore III was only fourteen at his accession, was of extremely feeble constitution. During his reign desul- warfare continued with the Tartars of the Crimea, which was y terminated by the sterile Treaty of Bakhchi-sarai in 1681. e same year the question of the abolition of hereditary pre- ence (*méstnichestvo*, cf. p. 99) was raised. The *boyárs*, in m at the idea, which if carried out would undermine the ndation of their political power, proposed to divide the ntry into a number of vast satrapies, over each of which one hem should be placed as viceroy for life. This drastic and gerous scheme of decentralization was actually sanctioned the *tsar*, but the Patriarch was fortunately able to veto it, the following year *méstnichestvo* was formally abolished, and famous books of precedence were burnt. In April of the e year (1682) Theodore died at the age of twenty, and the stion of the succession entered on a new and exciting phase.

5.

Expansion Westwards

Peter the Great (1682–1725)

Youth, Adolescence, and Early Exploits

THERE were two candidates for the throne, Ivan and Pe
aged 16 and 10. Sons of different mothers, each was s
ported by his mother's relatives. Both parties, Milosláv
and Naryshkins, had long anticipated the situation. Ivan
priority of birth in his favour, but he was, both in mind
body, a still poorer thing than his late brother. Peter had
advantage of physical vigour and of the prestige of his mot
the dowager-*tsaritsa* Natalia, who was still alive and technic
the head of the family. The Patriarch Joachim and the *boy*
skaya dúma hastily summoned what they chose to call
' assembly of the whole people ' (*zémski sobór*) out of the str
of Moscow in the palace square. A majority of this b
there and then expressed a preference for Peter. The Patria
and the *boyárs* concurred in the choice, the matter was c
sidered settled, and the Naryshkins had won the day. But t
had reckoned without Ivan's sisters—six in number, and
more vigorous than their brother. The most determined
the *tsarévna* Sophia, who made up her mind to fight be
resigning herself to her otherwise inevitable fate, the veil.
circulating rumours against her stepmother's family she secu
the support of the *stréltsy* (the local militia of ' archers ' on f
who formed the permanent garrison of Moscow), and inci
them to revolt. Although her allegations were refuted and
mob temporarily calmed by the appearance of the *tsar*
Natalia with both Ivan and Peter at the palace window,
tumult was renewed and continued until Sophia's object

ained ; the *stréltsy* raided the palace, murdered several men the Naryshkin family and party, and finally sent their leader, nce Khovánski, to demand that both Ivan and Peter should gn together as *tsars* with equal power and with Sophia as ent. The *boyárs* agreed, and this settlement by violence the vexed question of the succession was sanctioned by an which pretended to represent the will of the whole ple.

But disagreement soon broke out between Sophia and her dier-friends. Their enemies were the same, but their aims re not. The *stréltsy* represented the party of reaction and of Old Believers, while Sophia was an enthusiastic modernist. nsidering the absolute seclusion in which women in Moscow l till then lived, she may be considered enlightened. She oured the study of Latin and Polish, and though her intelli- ce was limited and her aspect forbidding, she had many nds, and was supported by the intellectuals of the day, such the 'Latinists' Simeon Pólotski and Silvester Medvédev. ove all she was ambitious and quite unscrupulous and shame- . For their part the *stréltsy* and the extreme conservatives re scandalized at the supreme power being in the hands of a man, in spite of proved Byzantine precedents. A movement inst her was set on foot, and she, together with Ivan and Peter l the latter's mother, had to take refuge in St. Sergius's mon- ery of the Trinity. From there Sophia managed to deal with insurgents. Khovánski and his son were waylaid and killed. e *stréltsy*, suddenly submissive, were given a new commander, klovíty, a creature of Sophia ; and she returned to Moscow mphant, resting on his support and on that of her other ourite, Prince Basil (Vasíli) Golítsyn, one of the most remark- e men of his time. He was well educated and well read nself, and was an urgent advocate of education for others, reform, and for spreading the influence of Western civiliza-

tion. His house in Moscow, on European lines, and his libra
were famous. He inherited the ideas and continued the pol
of Ordín-Nashchókin, but while the latter had been essentia
a practical business man, and was thus the direct predeces
of Peter the Great, Golítsyn was more of a liberal idealist, p
monitory of the ' philosophers ' of the reign of Catherine. C
of his plans was the liberation of the serfs. He was a ke
student of Latin and Polish, and the work which he and Sop
undertook in collaboration was the formation of an alliance w
Poland (then under King John Sobieski), Austria, and Ven
against Turkey. This policy was confirmed by the Treaty
Moscow in 1686, but unfortunately failed in its executi
Golítsyn conducted two expeditions against the Crimea, th
a dependency of Turkey, in 1687 and 1689, in conjunction w
the Cossacks of Little Russia, but both were failures. Otherw
the rule of Sophia and Golítsyn, which lasted seven years, w
an unqualified success. Contemporaries witness to the fact th
under it Russia blossomed and flourished economically. H
their position was equivocal and insecure. The fantastic t
of autocrats which nominally governed the country was t
absurd to last. The two male members, Ivan V and Pet
were both *tsars*, and at public functions actually sat on a dou
throne side by side, but they were as yet minors, and w
merely puppets. The moving power, who at these same fu
tions, like an intangible spirit, used literally to crouch behind t
throne, was Sophia. But she was only regent. Ivan V, it
true, had no mind or will of his own, and was negligible. H
Peter was growing up, he had very definite ideas, and soon ga
expression to them. The stormy events of 1682 had made
indelible impression on him (he was then only ten years ol
though he is said to have displayed the greatest *sang-froid* ami
the riots and the murders of his mother's relations. But
never forgave his sister, and he never forgave those forces

e old régime, represented by the *stréltsy* whom she had used her agents and by the dissenters, whom he regarded as disrbers of the peace. He realized that his sister constituted a ersonal danger to himself and must therefore be eliminated; hile dissent appeared, to his mind, to mean disorder, and he erefore concluded that it was a danger to the authority of the ate and must be suppressed. After these bitter experiences e and his mother settled down in the village of Preobrazhénoe,[1] near Moscow, which had been *tsar* Alexis's favourite sidence. Here they lived in retirement, and virtually on narity.

But Sophia had set her brother a dangerous example, which e took to heart. If she had been the first emancipated Russian yalty, he would be the second. If she had been able to make e of the army he would do so too. During the whole seven years his life at Preobrazhénskoe he was never idle a minute. He as one of those people who could never sit still. Contemplaon or reflection was impossible for him. The first thing he d was to start playing at soldiers. But while others thought e played, he himself took his game in deadly earnest. He uipped his companions, who were the sons of noble families his own age, out of the State arsenal, and drilled himself and em to such purpose that by the year 1690 he had two excellent giments of Russian soldiers to work with. They were officered foreign soldiers of fortune whom he found in the neighbourg *Nemétskaya slobodá* (cf. p. 191), but the actual commander as a Russian. They were named, after the two villages where ey were housed, Preobrazhénski[2] and Semënovski,[3] and rmed the nucleus of the Russian army that was to be.

[1] Cf. p. 192, n. 1.

[2] Sc. *polk* = regiment.

[3] Sc. *polk* = regiment; *Semënovski* is pronounced *Semyónofski* = Simeon's; *ménovskoe* (*seló*) = Simeon's (village); Russian villages are commonly med after the saint to whom the local church is dedicated.

But this was not the only way in which Peter showed his uncon
ventionality. His elementary education had been scrappy an
scanty in the extreme, and for humane letters he never had an
use all the days of his life, but he had a passion for mechanic
and for technical knowledge of all sorts. He studied mathema
tics and all naval and military sciences with fury. His greates
delight was hard manual labour, especially carpentry and th
building of boats, objects the mere sight of which filled th
average Moscovite with terror. His pastimes were drinking an
dancing, in both of which he indulged freely, and he knew nothin
of insomnia or of dyspepsia. As a result of this mode of life h
grew up a handsome giant nearly 8 feet in height, of immens
strength, of iron muscle and iron will, but without sentiment o
intellect. The most attractive things about him were his sim
plicity, his unselfishness, and his absolute honesty, both to himsel
and to others. He only cared for money in so far as it provide
technical equipment or promoted technical efficiency, and t
display and luxury, pomp and ceremony of any sort he showe
absolute indifference. His tastes were coarse and his sense o
humour primitive, and he vastly preferred the company o
soldiers and sailors and mechanics to that of his social equals. H
hated religion : the Church for him symbolized obscurity an
stagnation, the hierarchy obstruction. The one thing he live
for was the good of his country, whether his country wanted i
or not. He was intensely patriotic, jealous, and ambitious—no
for his own reputation or glory, but for the sake of his country
men *malgré eux*. He was conscious of their immense laten
possibilities, and bitterly resented the fact that they were s
much behind other peoples in every respect, and most of all tha
they acquiesced in their own apathy and isolation, and seeme
to have a positive preference for inertia. Unfortunately, h
never learnt to think, and had no intuition. Being born in th
purple he had no idea of personal economy, and he was neve

aught political economy. The first did not matter because his ersonal wants were so simple, but the second did because his olitical aims were so vast and complex. He would not adapt is ends to his means, and he could not adapt his means to his nds. The results were a frightful struggle between sovereign nd people which led to intense exacerbation of both, an appal- ng waste of life and treasure, and successes which were great, t is true, but were won with unnecessarily exhausting efforts. eter had a will and he knew what he wanted, and therefore he orced his way; but his manner of doing it always aroused the naximum of resentment and cost the maximum of labour. He id wonders, but he could not change the character of his eople even in the thirty-six years of his reign, showering *ukázes* n them every day of the year as he did. There is no question hat nobody but a man like him could have done what he did in he time and in the circumstances, but it is a question whether t could not have been done more wisely. Peter was not the first ussian reformer: reform was already in the air, and Russia as already moving when he came on the scene, but it did not nove fast enough to suit his temperament nor in those directions hich appealed to his fancy. The series of violent blows and hocks which he applied certainly made the machinery move aster, and acceleration was doubtless desirable; but he had not he gift of making it work smoothly. He was an enthusiastic, igh-minded, and skilful artisan with absolute power over a vast, ntique and complex empire, and he tried to work it as if it had een a machine. He was a conscientious tyrant and a dis- nterested hustler. He accomplished a great deal, but not half f what he thought he was accomplishing. With a little more magination and thought he would have done a great deal more. ut he had no inclination to think when he was young, and when e grew up he had no time. His father and he were the first ussian rulers with any real sense of duty except to themselves.

But while his father's sense had been merely passive, his own was positive and extremely active. No Russian *tsar*, before or since, and probably no sovereign in any other country, ever slaved for what he honestly believed to be the good of his people more unremittingly.

With such a character it was natural that he should have many enemies, but also that he should have great influence on those who sympathized with him, and especially on the blithe and devoted military brotherhood which he had trained and infected with his ideas. These formed his body-guard and helped him to carry out his plans. The first was to make himself master in his own house. This meant the downfall of Sophia. She knew that a conflict was inevitable, and felt her position grow weaker as Peter himself grew stronger. It was she who made the first move by planning another attack on the Naryshkin family with the help of the *stréltsy*. This was in August 1689, when Peter was seventeen. The *coup* failed because he was warned in the night, and just managed to escape with his mother and his wife Eudoxia (*née* Lopukhiná) to St. Sergius's monastery of the Trinity (cf. p. 161). Here there took place a great rally and public demonstration in favour of Peter, and his emancipation and triumph were complete. Sophia was relegated to a convent, and her partisans were either beheaded or exiled.

This done, with his mother and her friends, who had no idea how to manage affairs of state, installed at Moscow, Peter next began to prepare to put some of his ideas into execution. After a flying visit to Archangel he turned his attention southward. Following the policy of his immediate predecessors he planned a campaign against Turkey, hoping thus, first of all, to gain access to the Black Sea. Whereas Golítsyn had attacked the Crimea, Peter aimed at the Turkish fortress of Azóv, at the mouth of the Don. The first attack, in 1695, failed, because only made from the land side. But Peter, though

isappointed, was not disheartened ; perseverance and willingess to learn from his own mistakes were two of his strongest haracteristics. He spent the winter building a flotilla at Voronezh, higher up on the Don, and the next year Azóv was aptured. This was a great triumph for Russia, and a still reater personal triumph for Peter. His years spent in drilling nd in manœuvres, and in boat-building, had borne fruit.

Peter's mother died in 1694 and his brother, Ivan V, in 1696; nd in 1697—freed from family cares and covered with military lory—he started on his famous and highly unconventional Euroean tour. He was the first *tsar* who had ever left the confines f Russia. Peter's object was to perfect himself and his chosen ompanions in the arts of naval construction and of navigation, o collect all conceivable scientific knowledge and technical quipment, and to bring back to Russia instructors qualified to isseminate and to apply them. Nothing else interested him. Ie spent nearly a year in Holland and England. In the summer f 1698 he was in Vienna on his way to Italy, when he reeived news from Moscow which compelled his immediate eturn. The *stréltsy* were again in revolt. Already in 1694, and gain on the eve of his departure for abroad, there had been rouble with them, and attempts had been made to liberate ophia. Peter's long absence abroad had given the disaffection nd discontent time to mature.

All reformers are unpopular, but Peter had the knack of going gainst his people's grain. He had tried to alter their character y forcibly altering their appearance, and his senseless decrees gainst beards and against the national costume had, in the eyes f the masses of the people, and especially amongst the Old Believers, turned these trivial superficialities into sacred symbols f the true faith. While he was away people averred he had erished, and when he returned some said he was a false *tsar*, ome that he was Antichrist. The *stréltsy* had again been the

organs of disloyalty and disobedience, and this time they were severely dealt with. Peter lost his temper, and hundreds were tortured and executed. Sophia, and also his wife, who had favoured the reactionaries, were both forced to become nuns and imprisoned in convents. In 1705, after a revolt raised by them at Astrakhan, the *stréltsy* were finally abolished.

The Northern War

Barely had he succeeded in suppressing these turbulent elements when he was confronted with the necessity of embarking on a war which lasted, off and on, for twenty years. This was the great war with Sweden, known in Russian history as the Northern War (*Sévernaya voiná*), an undertaking for which neither Russia nor Peter himself were in the least prepared. It was a complete reversal of the policy in hand, and necessitated an absolute dislocation of the national forces which greatly handicapped the operations. The two main objects of Russian foreign policy were still the same as before—the reunion of the whole Russian people, nearly half of which was still under foreign (viz. Polish) domination, and the extension of Russian political power to the natural limits of the Russian continent (viz. the shores of the Black Sea and of the Baltic). The first implied war with Poland, the second war with Sweden and with Turkey. The first had been given a rest by the Truce of Andrúsovo (1667) and the Treaty of Moscow (1686), and during the next ten years all the energies of Russia were directed against the Ottoman Empire in conjunction with the new allies, Poland, Austria, and Venice. This culminated in the capture of Azóv (1696), after which Peter determined to turn the Sea of Azóv into a Russian lake with all speed, and, having furnished it with a navy, to use it as a naval base for further operations against Turkey. But suddenly the relation of all these Powers was changed. Venice and Austria (in anticipation of the War of the Spanish Suc-

ssion), and also Poland, made peace with Turkey, concluding e Treaty of Carlowitz, by which Austria obtained Transyl- nia, Hungary, and Slavonia, and Poland recovered Podolia [1] etween the Dniester and the southern or Black Sea Buh) in 99. The Russians were left in the lurch, being given Azóv, t not Kerch in the Crimea, which commands the bottle-neck it from the Sea of Azóv into the Black Sea, and without the ssession of which the former is useless. Thus all Peter's uthern plans were knocked on the head. But he was no sooner ee from one coalition than he found himself entangled in other. Having built a fleet in the south of Russia for waging naval war, he had to face right round to the north and begin war on land virtually without an army. The new coalition as directed against Sweden.

Sweden was at this period one of the great Powers. The sults of the Thirty Years' War had left her supreme in northern d central Europe. Throughout the seventeenth century the asas held not only Sweden itself, but Finland, Carelia and gria, Esthonia and Livonia, Pomerania and Schleswig- olstein. The Baltic was a Swedish lake, and both Poland and ussia were injured and aggrieved by this state of things. But e organizer of the coalition—a sufficiently incongruous one— as a Swedish subject, one Patkul, a Livonian landowner, who d taken part in the struggle between the Swedish Crown and e aristocracy, had been arrested and condemned to death, but anaged to escape and then began to plot his revenge first ainst Charles XI, and later against that king's son and successor harles XII. He first approached the King of Poland, at that ne Augustus II, Elector of Saxony, whose position on the olish throne was very insecure; he then obtained the adhesion Denmark, while Augustus II invited Peter to join, and the

[1] In Polish *Podole*, lit. 'the Lower Country' (i. e. stretching towards the ack Sea); cf. p. 202, n. 7.

latter accepted with alacrity. Patkul's plan was to secure th maximum of help from Russia with the minimum of cost the small provinces of Ingria and Carelia were to be Peter' recompense. But the campaign by no means went according t the plan of the allies. The Swedes with lightning tactics deal with one of them at a time. Denmark within a few days wa forced to sign the Peace of Traventhal (1700). The Poles a the approach of the Swedish army promptly raised the siege o Riga and retired. Russia and Sweden were left face to face The two armies met at Nárva, on the river of the same name on November 30, 1700. The Russians, consisting mostly o raw recruits and foreign officers, misunderstanding and mis trusting each other, numbered 35,000; the Swedes 8,000 Charles XII, with a surprise attack in a blizzard, stormed th Russian camp and gained a complete victory. The Swedes however, were so uncertain of it at the time that they them selves facilitated the retreat of the bulk of the Russian army only retaining the artillery as booty. Nevertheless, the honour of the first round were with the Swedes: the eighteen-year-old Charles XII leapt on to a pinnacle of European fame, and Pete was correspondingly discomfited. But he was never too proud to learn, and the following year he set to work with a will to mak good his losses in men and artillery. The churches and monas teries had to surrender their bells to be made into guns; a mor rigorous system of recruiting was introduced; and Nóvgorod and Pskov were strongly fortified.

He was aided by the fact that Charles XII, instead of followin up his victory, spent the next seven years in trying to dethron Augustus II of Poland. This gave Peter time to recuperate hi strength and to accustom his new armies to the exigencies o regular and continuous warfare. But he also had to keep hi ally, the King of Poland, supplied with subsidies, which increase the strain on Russia's meagre—because undeveloped—resources

ile the Swedes were preoccupied with the Poles, the Russians lually got to work and secured a number of successes ch, though individually inconsiderable, made up a handsome regate. In 1701 the Russian general, Sheremétev, defeated Swedes at Erestfer in Livonia, for which he was made field-shal, and in 1702 he repeated the process at Hummelshof. Peter's main immediate objective was the Nevá, which s from Lake Ládoga into the Gulf of Finland, and was thus nat time the best and most natural highway between central sia and the Baltic. It was on the banks of the Ízhora,[1] uthern affluent of the Nevá, that Prince Alexander had ated the Swedes in 1240, a victory which secured the use his vital river for Nóvgorod and won him the eponymous of *Névski*.[2]

n 1702 the Russians captured the Swedish fortress of Nöte-[3] (the old Russian Oréshek), strategically important by on of its situation at the point where the Nevá flows of Lake Ládoga. Peter renamed the place Schlüsselburg, ing his curious instinct of trying to bring Russia up to date painting it with Germanic colours. The next acquisition the small Swedish fortress of Nienschantz,[4] situated at the r end of the Nevá where it empties its swift waters into Gulf of Finland. This fort was demolished, and on a neigh-ing islet[5] Peter, on May 27, 1703, laid the foundations nother. This became the famous citadel of SS. Peter and

zhora or Ízhera, a name etymologically the same as that of the district, ngria; in Swedish Ingermanland.

He was canonized, and a subsequently famous monastery and church in ew capital was named after him, and the great thoroughfare leading that church to the Admiralty was named the 'Névski Prospéct' Avenue).

f. p. 183, n. 1.

Another name of this place was Kántsy.

ts original Finnish name was Jeni-saari = 'Hare Island'.

Paul, around which grew up the new capital. At that time must surely have been one of the most desolate spots, in t midst of vast marshes and stunted forests, the victim of perio inundation and of perpetual damp. Nevertheless, such is t fascination of having one's own way that Peter loved the pla from the very first and, personal comfort being the last thing ever thought of, wrote to Ménshikov in 1706 to say that he f as if he was in paradise. The peasants who died in thousar while building this fantastic capital would hardly have agre with him.

In 1704 the Russians secured possession of Kopórie, Yar Dórpat,[2] and finally Nárva itself, all of which were ancie Russian possessions though situated in territory whose inha tants had always been Finns. At the same time Sheremé overran and devastated the whole of the Swedish Baltic provin of Esthonia and Livonia. The next year, 1705, was critic The Russians, directing themselves against the Swedes Poland, had advanced across the western Dviná into Courla occupied Vilna, and established themselves in an entrench camp at Grodno. At this moment a formidable revolt agai Peter's authority broke out among the *stréltsy* at the other e of Russia in Astrakhan, and Peter had to dispatch his best gene Sheremétev with a considerable force to quell it, the disaffecti threatening to spread from the *stréltsy* to the Cossacks alo southern Russia. Meanwhile Charles XII moved away fr

[1] The modern Yamburg; Yam is etymologically the same as Em (p nounced *Yem*), the name of the Finnish tribe which originally inhabi this part.

[2] Called in Russian Derpt, also *Yúrev* (= George's (sc. tow *Yúri* = George), founded by Prince Yároslav, whose monastic na was George, in 1030; it was sometimes known as Yúrev Nemétski (i German Yúrev, because near the territory of the Teutonic Knights), to tinguish it from Yúrev Pólski (*póle* = 'open treeless country'), north Moscow.

rsaw and in January 1706 suddenly appeared at Grodno, and a daring stroke cut the communications of the Russian army. er was alarmed, and, though he had a superiority in numbers, lered a general retreat. This difficult operation was successfully accomplished, at the cost only of the artillery which s sunk in the Niemen, thanks to the skilful plans for it borated by Peter himself. This took place in March 1706, en the ice was breaking; the Swedes were unable to pursue, l the Russian army extricated itself, marching through Brest l round the southern edge of the then impassable Polésie [1] ough Volýnia to Kiev.

The same year Charles XII succeeded in driving Peter's ally, gustus II, from the Polish throne, on which he set up his own ninee, the Pole Stanislas Leszczyński. Augustus's general, ulenburg, had been defeated at the battle of Frauenstadt in 06, and though Ménshikov, towards the end of the same year, n a victory over the Swedes under Mardefelt at Kalisz, gustus had to accept the Treaty of Alt-Ranstädt, one of the ms of which was that Patkul, the cause of all the trouble, was ded over to Charles XII, who promptly put him out of way.

Charles, installed in his armed camp at Leipzig, battening on land of his defeated enemies, appeared for the moment as arbiter of Europe. Louis XIV looked wistfully in his direction. Marlborough thought it prudent to pay him a visit of onnaissance in 1707, and left satisfied that he had no idea of oing France. This military meteor and eighteenth-century *erker* cared only for the glory and excitement of victory, and hing for politics or sentiment or money; his ambition was conquer Peter and to march on Moscow, as being the most ious and therefore the most glorious enterprise. So, having

[1] The name of the vast tract of swamp and forest through which the Prípet flows.

made peace with all his German enemies, he set out, in 1708 to find his quarry.

At the head of more than forty thousand admirable and seasoned troops he marched to Grodno, on the river Niemen where he came in contact with the Russian rearguards. At this moment grave disturbances broke out in Russia—first the revolt of the Bashkir Tartars along the whole middle course of the Volga; then that of the Cossacks of the Don, which embraced all the country from Tambóv to Azóv. These caused the utmost embarrassment to Peter, as he had to detach forces to deal with them. But not only was Charles marching straight on Moscow: his general, Loewenhaupt, with another 16,000 men and large supplies of ammunition and food, was coming from Livonia to join forces with the main army under the king. So anxious was his position that Peter tried to negotiate, but Charles refused. The Russian army gradually retreated before him. Charles crossed the Berézina, and at Golóvshchino met a force of 20,000 Russians who only gave ground after a stubborn fight. He reached the Dnieper at Mogilëv,[1] and advanced as far as Mstislávl. At Dóbroe, to the south of Smolénsk, he again attacked the Russians, but it was an even fight, and he himself had a narrow escape from death. But it was already the end of September, the winter began early, and he was in want of supplies. He was advised to retire on Mogilëv, and there await Loewenhaupt's arrival. But, true vagabond and adventurer that he was, having no fixed plan, he suddenly decided to turn due south towards Little Russia, presumably lured by its traditional abundance and relying on the fickle support of the weathercock Mazeppa. The Cossacks of Little Russia had chosen this opportunity to turn and fight against the *tsar*. Their *hetman* was now the Byronic Mazeppa, who had been appointed to this office by Sophia and Golítsyn. The Cossacks of the

[1] Pronounced *Magilyóf* or *Mahilyóf*.

ieper (or ' of the Ukraine ', cf. p. 117) had for some time been rmed at Peter's energetic use of his despotic power and at his dent determination to unify all the military forces of the pire (the Cossacks had hitherto enjoyed a form of autonomy), to bring them up to the disciplined standard of a regular ıy and under the control of the central authority. They tely anticipated an increase of hard work and a decrease eisure as the result. Mazeppa had long been dallying with gestions emanating from Stanislas Leszczyński without com- ting himself to disloyalty. He had been repeatedly tra- ed to the *tsar*, but Peter chose to trust him, and paid no heed these delations. But when both Swedes and Russians began verge southwards he had to make up his mind on which side would fight, and he chose the first.

The real reason which prompted Charles to move south is cure, but the result was made rapidly and fatally plain. It s the one thing which he ought not to have done. If he had ted for Loewenhaupt to join him, no force which Peter had his disposal could have withstood them. As it was, he pre- ted Peter with his opportunity. The Russians, numbering 000, intercepted Loewenhaupt at the village of Lesnáya [1] the Sozh on October 10, 1708, and completely defeated him. ewenhaupt lost two-thirds of his force of 16,000 men, as well ll his artillery and his immense and valuable convoy. Charles d his army wintered in Little Russia, suffering great hard- ps; the spring brought no improvement to his fortunes, ther did it thaw his obstinacy. Mazeppa indeed crossed the sná to join him, whereupon Peter, in justifiable rage at this achery, sent his general, Prince Ménshikov, to destroy azeppa's stronghold Baturin, and also the Cossacks' nest, the *porózhskaya Sech* [2] (May 1709). Other help which Charles

[1] Sc. Derévnya, or village; *les* = forest.

[2] Cf. p. 205.

expected—Turks and Poles—never appeared, but he insisted on advancing to attack the Russians at Poltáva on the Vórskla, a tributary of the Dnieper. This famous battle was fought on July 8, 1709. The Swedes numbered 30,000, with virtually no artillery: the soldiers' bodies were exhausted by their privations, the generals' tempers by their failures and by their hopeless position. The Russians numbered 60,000, plentifully supplied with guns. The result, in view of these conditions and especially after the battle of Lesnáya, could hardly be in doubt, though the Swedes were an army of veterans, were still formidable, and attacked the Russians with incredible fury. But Ménshikov worked round their flank and separated their army from its camp, which he finally captured. Attacked from behind by Ménshikov and on their front by Peter, Sheremétev, and the other generals, the Swedes were absolutely overwhelmed, and Charles barely escaped capture. He and Mazeppa managed to reach the Dnieper, whence they made their way by boat to Turkey. Of the Swedish army 10,000 perished, 3,000 were captured during the battle, the rest retreated with Loewenhaupt to the Dnieper, but Ménshikov, who had anticipated their movements, intercepted them at Perevolóchna and forced 16,000 to surrender.

This great victory, though it did not prove immediately decisive, was none the less an immense personal triumph for Peter and an immense military and political triumph for Russia. It completely justified all Peter's tireless efforts in the organization of the army, and the people felt that all their sacrifices had not been in vain. Nevertheless, those sacrifices had been very great, and Russia was on the verge of complete exhaustion. It was from this time onwards that Peter had to pay more serious attention to the internal organization of his empire. His ideas of political economy were absolutely vague and therefore generally rose-coloured, and his methods were entirely hand

nouth ; he expected the same flock of sheep to produce s of wool, families of lambs, and supplies of mutton in per- al and unflagging abundance, and was surprised and angry n they did not. But after Poltáva he was compelled to a little more time to thought. Not only had the internal ngth of the country to be restored ; the mere fact of the ory, by enlarging Peter's outlook and making Russia the sure of Europe, tempted him dangerously to increase his lities, forced him to keep up the expensive luxury of prestige, drove him to make ever greater demands on his subjects. t Poltáva Peter laid the foundations of Russian military y and pricked the Swedish bubble. Nevertheless, the war ged on for another twelve years, largely through Peter's doing. Incidentally, at this point a further step was made ards the complete assimilation with Great Russia of Little ia east of the Dnieper. The mass of the population and bulk of the Cossack soldiery had indeed rallied to the *tsar* ; henceforth the privileges of the Cossacks were ignored, ials from Moscow began to share in the government of the ntry, and the office of *hetman* gradually became a decorative cure. Other immediate results of Poltáva were that rles's Polish king, Leszczyński, had to retire to Charles's imonial estate of Zweibrücken in Pomerania, while Peter's sh king, Augustus II, reoccupied Warsaw.

n 1710 Sheremétev again conquered and occupied the whole ivonia (which had been promised to Russia's ally, Augus- II) and Esthonia, and all the coast of the Baltic from at the mouth of the Dviná to Viborg in Finland (Carelia). the same time Peter turned European matchmaker, and ried his half-niece Anna (Ivánovna, daughter of Ivan V) he Duke of Courland, a Polish vassal.

t this point Peter began to suffer from want of concentra- ; his successes somewhat upset his judgement and con-

siderably alarmed some of the other Powers. Notably Turkey incited by the envoys of France and by Charles who was refugee at Bendéry, made as if to threaten Russia, and reclaime Azóv. Peter light-heartedly took up the challenge, and in th summer of 1711 set out to conquer the Ottoman Empire. Th expedition ended in disaster. Peter was disappointed in th hopes he had placed in Balkan help, as Charles had been in th Cossacks in 1709, and met the Turkish army on the Prut ou numbered to the extent of five to one. The Russians inflicte heavy losses on the Turks, but the task was hopeless; Peter him self narrowly escaped capture, and had to agree to the Treaty o the Prut (1711) and to the restitution to Turkey of Azóv an the destruction of all the Russian fortresses erected on Turkis territory. Thus vanished the glory of all his early exploits, sufficiently bitter but possibly salutary pill for Peter. Mean while the northern war went on. During 1712 and 1713 Pete continued to help his allies to drive the Swedes from Pomerani In 1713 a Russian flotilla under Admiral Apráxin capture Helsingfors and Abo, and in 1714 defeated the Swedish fleet a Hangö,[1] at the extreme south-western corner of Finland, an occupied the Åland Islands. In two years Peter had conquere practically all Finland, and Stockholm was menaced.

Unfortunately for Russia, the coalition against her grew sti stronger, being joined by Brandenburg and Hanover. Mor over, Peter of his own accord wandered still farther into th sordid labyrinth of German domestic politics. In 1716 h married his other half-niece Catherine (Ivánovna) to the Duk of Mecklenburg, and began fighting that potentate's quarre with his nobles. This resulted in Hanover and Denmark leav ing the coalition, and further, in a mad scheme concocted i Holstein by an agent of Sweden named Görtz to reconcile Pet with Charles XII, while the new allies were then to restore th

[1] This battle is known in Russian history as *Gangud*.

arts to the throne of England. Peter, on his part, had other
ns, wishing to make an alliance with France. Louis XIV
l naturally never favoured Peter, but the *tsar* hoped more
m the Duke of Orleans, now regent. So in 1717 he journeyed
Versailles, and tried to arrange for the betrothal of his daughter
zabeth to Louis XV. Peter was now a very different figure
m what he had been when he had first visited western
rope. He came no longer as an apprentice, but as a master
l a hero. Paris could not help admiring his intelligence and
appearance, though somewhat shocked by his unceremo-
usness. The matrimonial project never materialized, but
a result of the visit a commercial treaty was concluded
ween France and Russia, and permanent diplomatic relations
re established between the two countries. Meanwhile, the
eful influence of northern Germany over Russian diplomacy,
ich Peter had himself encouraged, grew in strength. Görtz
Holstein had almost succeeded in reconciling Russia and
eden with the object of using Peter to recover for Charles
lost German possessions, which Peter had himself done his
nost to take from him. A congress was even settling the
ails of the scheme, when in 1718 Charles XII, who had
rned to Sweden four years previously, was killed at Fred-
hald in Norway. The Swedes made a *volte-face*, excluded
rles XII's nephew Charles Frederick, Duke of Holstein-
torp, from the throne, chose instead his sister Ulrica as
en, set up an aristocratic constitution, robbed the Crown of
power, made peace with Brandenburg, Hanover, and Den-
k, and determined to fight on against Russia. So Peter was
n left to face his old enemies alone, and only now did what
ought to have done ten years earlier. In 1719 and again in
o Admiral Apráxin landed his troops on the Swedish coast
took punitive measures with such effect that in 1721, through
medium of French diplomacy, the Swedes decided to nego-

tiate, and that year the Peace of Nystadt[1] was concluded. B
its terms Russia acquired Livonia, Esthonia, the islands of Oes
and Dago, Ingria, Carelia, and the south-eastern corner
Finland. Russia went mad with delight, perhaps as much fro
the prospect as from the terms of peace, and the Senate sponta
neously conferred on Peter the title of Emperor (in Russia
Imperátor) and the epithet of 'the Great' (*Veliki*). Peter
dream, and that of his ancestors, had come true. Russia wa
a great Power, with the Baltic coast from Riga to Viborg. H
had secured his port-hole on to Europe, even though the vie
was poor, while the glass itself was frosted for half the year an
during the other half was liable to be destroyed by floo
Sweden, for its part, relapsed into obscurity as suddenly as
hundred years previously it had emerged into the light.

But Peter abhorred repose. No sooner had he secured a broa
footing on the Baltic than with characteristic energy and amb
tion he turned about, and decided to make himself master of th
Caspian. A maritime outlet on Asia seemed a natural corollar
to the acquisition of one in Europe, and the problem of th
Black Sea was not yet ripe for solution. Therefore he discovere
a pretext and declared war on Persia, already then in an anarch
condition. An expedition descended the Volga in 1722 and th
Russians took Dérbent and Baku, though these were later reli
quished.

Peter's Domestic Policy

The year 1724 was the only year of peace which Pet
allowed himself or his country. In the history of Russia Peter
reforms at home, both in themselves and in their results, loo
just as big as his campaigns abroad, but it is impossible here t
describe them in any detail. In their general character the
were essentially and immediately utilitarian. There was nothi

[1] Sc. 'Newtown', on the west coast of Finland.

al or idealistic or philanthropic about them. They were nnical, and though they were revolutionary in manner and ffect, in spirit they were reactionary. They were really less rms than an endless and rather chaotic series of sumptuary designed with the purpose of simplifying the organiza- of society, eliminating the enormous class of drones, lerating the machinery of the administration, and generally easing the efficiency of the State. Peter loved his country onately and infinitely. He deified and worshipped the e—a thing no Russian *tsar* had ever done—and he did his to make all his subjects do the same. He was a tyrant, he ed his absolute power, and was determined to make every- else obey it, but there was sense in his tyranny : it was, if might say so, objective and conscientious despotism. He ner deified nor worshipped himself, and never asked any- else to do so, but he insisted on obedience, honesty, truth- ess, and work. He was neither cynic nor actor, but he had eart, no imagination, no taste. He was not selfish, neither he humane. His reforms were subsidiary to his military y. He judged his campaigns necessary for Russia's benefit, o doubt they were. He saw that their success and, further, maintenance of their results were impossible under the old litions. Therefore, the old conditions must be changed. re were three respects in which changes were most obviously ssary to promote the ends he had in view. Russia must uce more men, more money, and more munitions. The ortune was that neither Peter's own attainments nor those is staff were equal to ensure the co-ordination of these ands and their fulfilment. Hence the irritation which his sures provoked in his people, and the irritation which their ive ineffectiveness provoked in himself. Expansion may be able and even indispensable, but it is impossible to expand tably or successfully, so to say, on an empty stomach,

Russia's misfortune has always been that she has had to expa
before getting, or rather in order to get, proper nutrime
Fate decrees that certain peoples should suffer from cert
elemental and extrinsic limitations. Geographical and histori
circumstances over which the Russian people had no cont
determined the handicaps from which they have always suffe
and still suffer, namely, chronic exaggeration of frame a
simultaneously, chronic malnutrition. Fortunately, the amaz
Russian people, though it has little or nothing of a constituti
has such strength that it has so far survived the strain. Th
is nothing surprising, therefore, that in many respects it
remained comparatively undeveloped. Peter did what
could, and doubtless did more than anybody else could h
done, to rectify these adverse circumstances, but even he
only human. The marvel is, not that he effected so little,
that he effected so much. It was Peter *contra mundum*. He
to contend not only with his foreign enemies but simul
neously with his own people and with nature. In the wo
of the remarkable writer Pososhkóv, the first Russian public
an entirely self-educated peasant, a contemporary and k
admirer of Peter, the *tsar* alone pulled uphill, and milli
were pulling downhill. Klyuchévski compares him to a man w
drives a horse with the utmost urgency and at the same ti
keeps pulling the reins tight. It may be added that he
desperately fond of the horse, but had no intuition and did
understand its temper. Besides, for twenty-one years of
reign it was war-time.

The general object of Peter in his reforms was to imp
equal service on all, and to allow no privilege to any save t
earned by service to the State. The army, from being a mo
poly of certain classes of society, became representative of
of them. A modified, though fairly stringent, form of consc
tion was introduced amongst the peasants, an innovation wh

hose circles evoked loud lamentation and a number of recatory folk-poems. By this means a regular army of 200,000 men was raised, not counting the numerous ments recruited from the Cossacks; and a personnel of ly 30,000 was formed for the incipient navy. At the same e Peter used constantly to commandeer labour on a vast e to carry out works which he had conceived, such as canals, ls, harbours, and the building of the new capital, all of which thousands of lives. His policy with regard to the *dvoryán-* (the aristocratic class of landowners from which the army the government officials were recruited, and with which the remaining old families of the *boyárstvo* had become merged) be described as 'a clean sweep'. He decreed that y single male member of this class must serve the State, er as a civil or as a military or as a commercial servant. quality of nobility could thenceforward only be earned by ice; no other way was recognized, and evasion entailed ropriation and degradation, or worse. Thus was created bureaucracy and the famous 'table of ranks' enumerating fourteen degrees of *chin*[1] which must punctuate the er of any gentleman, whether that career were chosen in army, the navy, the civil service, the palace, or the Church. s obligation to serve caused deep resentment in aristocratic eres of life. It is true that the *dvoryáne*,[2] who had made r careers in the seventeenth century and had largely re- ed the moribund old hereditary ruling class of the *boyáre*,[3] e by their very nature a class who had earned their position ervice to the sovereign. But they had gradually acquired habits of the class they had replaced, and had come to look ervice as a privilege and not as an obligation. Also the new

= Row, rank; hence *chinóvnik* = 'an official'.

Lit. courtiers, household-servants of the sovereign; sing. *dvoryanin*.

Sing. *boyárin*.

service was of a character different from the old. Then th had been able to choose their service and to take their serfs w them as subordinates. Now they found themselves in t ranks with their serfs, inasmuch as all were obliged to be from the lowest rank. One of the results of this novel arran ment was that the regiments of the Guard (cf. p. 217), t kernel of the army, came inevitably to be wholly recruited fro and not only officered by, the nobility. Another developme which applied not only to these regiments but to the wh army, was that the troops lost their territorial connexi (excepting the Cossacks), inasmuch as the new organization the army took no account of these ; all the recruits from all o the country were poured into one machine, and when they ca out of it they had nothing in common but their uniform a their officers. The manner in which this affected the Gu regiments was soon to make itself apparent. Torn from th own territories and shut up in barracks in the damp and disr new capital, it was obvious that they must develop into a for dable instrument which might well serve a strong ruler, b which a weak ruler would have to serve himself. Peter t Great had been able to make an army, but other Peters were find that an army could unmake them.

In financial matters Peter was compelled to adopt a pol of perpetually squeezing his subjects in order to pay for army and his campaigns. But he at least also recognized t fact that one cannot keep taking out without ever putting a thing in. His greatest ambition was to further the developme of trade and the exploitation of the natural resources of t country, and he did all he could and all that the blind obstina of his people would allow in this direction. As regards taxati he did away with the hitherto existing unit of taxability, t household, and substituted a capitation tax, known in Russi as the 'soul tax' (*podúshnaya pódat'*), which caused ma

rchings of heart. Amazement seized the administration
en it was realized that owing to conscription, war, forced
our, and to wholesale flight on the part of the population in
er to escape these unpleasant contingencies, the new tax
uld not, for a long time to come, bring in as much as had
n expected of it. It was characteristic of Peter that when
straits he would put double taxes on nonconformists and
anybody who insisted on wearing the national costume or
eard. Hygiene was promoted by the taxation of baths,
gevity encouraged by that of coffins. In any event, whatever
icism may be made of his methods, it is a fact that Peter died
hout leaving a *kopéka* of public debt. The peasants might
e been able to explain how this was done.

n the reform of the administration Peter, always ready to
n from his enemies, borrowed largely from Swedish, and also
n German, models. The *dúma* and the *prikázy* (i. e. the
ıncil and the Chancelleries) were abolished, and in their place
eared the Senate and the ten 'colleges' or ministries.[1] The
ate was nominated by the Crown, and originally was an
ıinistrative commission appointed to act in the *tsar's*
ence from Russia. But it became permanent, and, replacing
dúma, acquired the character of a cabinet responsible to the
ercign, with the duty of enforcing the execution of his decrees
l, incidentally, of elucidating their meaning), and of acting
superior financial committee and as the supreme court of
ice. Later, the office of Procurator-General was created
ı the duty of supervising the activity or the inactivity of the
ate in the interests of the *tsar*. The provincial administra-
was simplified by the division of the whole country into
vinces or 'governments' (*gubérnii*). The towns were
ıted municipal autonomy. The patriarchate was abolished,

[1] The building in which these were housed is now the home of the
versity of Petrograd.

and the Holy Synod created in its stead. This meant the comple subjection of the Church to the State. The representative the *tsar* who supervised its work was also styled Procurato General, and he was a layman—as often as not an officer. Pet did not venture to lay hands on the fat money-bags of t monasteries, but in the interests of the army and of the capitati tax no man was allowed to become a monk under the age thirty. Peter's especial bugbears were the Old Believers, a against these he fulminated unceasingly and ruthlessly. Th retaliated by dubbing him Antichrist.

His interest in education was frankly utilitarian. Any bran of science which could be turned to the immediate materi profit of his subjects he encouraged. Armies of writers we engaged in translating into Russian scientific works in oth languages. Russians were packed off to other countries to educated, and foreign savants were imported into Russia whol sale. Peter abolished the use of the hitherto prevalent Slavon alphabet except for ecclesiastical purposes, and in its place p that which is now known as the Russian alphabet; it is esse tially the same, but is clearer and less ornamental, the differen between the two being comparable to that between 'Gothi and 'Latin'. In the realm of social intercourse, with whi Peter was most unfamiliar, he forced on his unwilling subjec those amenities which he himself detested. The womenfolk Russia, strange as it may seem to-day, had to be compelled emancipate themselves, just as in the previous century peasan had been forbidden to enslave themselves.

The net concrete result of Peter's 'reforms' must be a mitted to be very considerable, though it was disproportiona to the cost in life, temper, and treasure. He succeeded creating what was for those days a very big and formidab regular army, so big that when the war came to an end he d not know what to do with it, and cheerfully turned it loose

en on the villages whence it had been recruited until its ces were required again. He succeeded in trebling the ic revenue. His conquests brought Russia into the light ay, if rather too abruptly. He gave her means of communi- ng with the rest of Europe which she had not possessed before, gh it was inevitably a long time before she could make proper f them. He put the latest results of applied science into the ls of people who could neither read nor write. He forced to e and to converse those who had hitherto only moved about tters and prayed. He woke the Russian people suddenly, were, by pulling it out of bed and making it stand on its , a process which inevitably induces bad temper; he dressed fferently, and made it do all sorts of things that it had never before; but it was not in his power to transform it, or even form it. Just as New Russia had begun fifty years before r was born, so Old Russia persisted for many years after he . It has been calculated that it would have taken Russia, if o her own natural evolution, 150 years to reach that stage velopment to which Peter brought her by his revolution *achina*; to which it may be replied that potted civilization toriously difficult to digest, and that the shortest cut to a is often the longest way there.

the aggregate, except in externals and in certain imme- ly tangible and visible changes and so-called improvements material order, Peter's reforms left things very much as were, 'only more so'. Under his rule Russia became, if ning, a more absolute monarchy than it had been before. will of the sovereign and of his nominees counted for more it had ever done. The seventeenth century had witnessed ecay of the representative assembly, and of other collective s and institutions of local and central government. In the enth century they completely disappeared. The seven- h century had witnessed the gradual passing of all initiative

and power, legislative and executive, into the hands of in
viduals, as often as not of no experience and of mushro
reputation. In the eighteenth century personality, the opp
tunist, the *arriviste*, whether in the shape of the sovereign
of the favourite, reigned supreme. Peter was no exception.
his own case it did not matter, because his intentions w
good, his plans were bold, broad, intelligent, beneficent, a
ultimately or at any rate intrinsically benevolent; while
character, if cruel and harsh, was noble, unselfish, honest, a
honourable. But though he had many fellow workers wh
he impregnated with his own spirit, there were other compani
who basked in the sunshine, or rather filled their pockets in
protective shadow, of his reputation and of his favour. T
system worked while a despot with an iron will and of an hon
character was on the throne. But under other circumstan
the results were bound to be fatal. Even Peter, by his o
example and in his own all too short lifetime, could not do mu
to palliate, far less eradicate the national failings of ignoran
prejudice, and corruption, or the misfortune of inexperie
against which he had to contend. In the general disposit
of society Peter did not alter but merely confirmed the arran
ments made by his predecessors of the seventeenth century. T
simplified and arbitrary classification of society arranged for
joint benefit of the treasury and of the landowners in the rei
of Michael and Alexis, Peter, in what he considered the b
interests of the State, simplified further and made still m
arbitrary. Those intermediate, semi-free, and often, it is tr
parasitic and drone classes, which had survived in large numb
in spite of the ordinations of the *Ulozhénie* (cf. p. 176),
ruthlessly pressed into the three main classes of the *dvoryán*
(the serving aristocracy), the *meshchánstvo* (the bourgeoisie), a
the *krestyáne* (the peasants), in which he could more easily
hands on them for any service he might require them to perfo

ır was he from attempting anything in the nature of social re- that he made the power of the landlords over their serfs more lute, just as he made his own more absolute over the aristo- y. In his eagerness to make all the male members of land- ng families serve the State either in a military, an official, ofessional, or even—most repugnant of all innovations—a nercial capacity, Peter violated the fundamental principle ussian law by which estates, on the death of the owner, were led equally amongst the members of his family (who were eby weakened and impoverished), and decreed that they be left whole to one son, not necessarily the eldest, while thers were to make their own way in the world, and be e to the State.

ıanks to his will, his character, his physique, his prestige, o the band of faithful admirers and enthusiastic helpers, the us of which he had formed when himself a boy, Peter was to attain a good many of the objects he had in view. But pposition and obstruction which he met with, from the first, in all classes of society at least doubled his difficulties ıalved his success. His absolute power certainly gave him lete control over the destinies of the majority of his help- ıbjects, but when he came up against the resistance of the cracy whose power was rooted in the land, and that of the Believers whose strength was religion in its narrowest and fanatical sense, his success was by no means so complete. pite of all his fulminations, his daily *ukazes* plentifully ıed with threats of exile, torture, and decapitation, and aborate organization of secret police and of delation, were large numbers of the land-owning class who resisted easures by every means in their power. This same class he earliest opportunity after Peter's death to secure the of the law of indivisibility of landed property, and it ot long before it achieved emancipation as complete as of

old. Religious obstruction was still more difficult to deal wi than evasion, and led to many tragedies, one of which (pp. 246–7) gravely prejudiced the destinies of the country.

It is of course a truism to say that the foundation by Pe of his new capital of St. Petersburg in 1703 is symbolic of hi self, of his character, of his policy, and of his greatness. E the part it has played in the history of Russia is apt to overlooked.

Probably no whim of any despot has ever caused such d content or cost so much life and money. Probably no place been so cursed and so hated. Certainly no one has ever sincer loved it except the man who founded it, and he was bound love his own creation, because every one else loathed it. choose a Finnish swamp as the site of the capital of the migh Russian Empire was one of the most unfortunate inspiratio of Peter's quixotic brain. In every respect, literal and figurati physical and political, Petersburg is eccentric.

Petersburg is unique in that, in itself, it has absolutely nothi to recommend it and suffers from every conceivable disadva tage from which a town, let alone a capital, can suffer. reason for its continued existence ceased with the introducti of the steam-engine. Until then it certainly fulfilled its desti during the season of navigation, as a clearing-house betwe Russia and the rest of Europe, although it was a long ti before Russian merchants, creatures of habit, could be persuad to abandon Archangel in its favour. Like the human append which once served a useful purpose, it is now merely a sou of worry and expense. As for making it the capital, there never any valid reason at all. Peter, resolved to jolt the Russ government out of its Moscow groove, characteristically cided to fix it in the most unattractive spot in the wh country. Of its drawbacks he never thought, any more th he did of building himself a palace in his new capital, thou

orced all his wealthier subjects to erect houses there on
of heavy fines.

ut there are other aspects of this amazing migration of which
uthor was utterly unconscious. It was uncannily atavistic.
IV in a mad huff abandoned Moscow and tried to terrify
ia from his police-court residence at Alexándrovsk. Peter,
very different motives, founded or anchored, or rather
red, his residence at the mouth of the Nevá and called it
apital; and the imperial residence (during the reign of
olas II only in theory), the official seat of government, and
artificial and political capital it has since remained. It
r has been, and never can be, anything else. It is far
ved from the heart of Russia and only shares its brain.
estic, spacious, even beautiful, cold, sunless, tragic, mys-
us, dank and gloomy like the forests which surround it, and
althy, it has had a sinister and unwholesome influence on
ian history. It has warped Russia with its damp breath.
e past, divorced from the genuine life of the Russian people,
d no interest but the palace, served no cause but repression,
had no object save the apotheosis of the autocracy. Until
it had no roots in Russia, just as it had no foundation in
earth. But the creation of a purely political capital has
ght its own Nemesis. Now that its population has risen
nas destroyed the chains which riveted it there, the sooner
orrible place is abandoned and Moscow is once more made
apital, the better for everybody. A cross between Byzan-
and Stockholm, it never was anything but foreign, as its
der wished it to be, and it never will be anything else,
ite of its absurd, neo-Slavonic, pseudo-Russian name of
grad.

his domestic life it can only be said that Peter made a
uddle. For him the home did not exist: he preferred the
ac and the tavern; nor was it astonishing, therefore, that

he should mismanage his family affairs. He had married in 168
at the age of 17, one Eudoxia Lopukhiná, or rather she had be
foisted on him by his relations. However, neither her mind n
her body was able to captivate him. Her undisguised prec
lection for the old order of things and her dislike of his innov
tions, her want of sympathy, alone sufficed to alienate his affe
tion, and after the capture of Azóv he banished her to a conve
at Súzdal. Meanwhile she had borne him a son, Alexis,
1690, and, during Peter's protracted absences from home, sh
had succeeded in imbuing him with her dislike of the ne
régime. Rid of his wife, Peter attempted to reform his so
but it was too late. He was completely and irremediab
saturated with the bigoted and narrow views of his mother,
addition to which he was idle, obstinate, and obtuse. While h
mother held court in her convent, he hedged himself round wi
monks and visionaries, and his attitude towards education w
positively mulish. In 1711 his father forced him to travel
Germany, and at Torgau to marry Princess Charlotte
Wolfenbüttel, of the House of Brunswick,[1] a fate for which h
vowed to avenge himself in due course. His son's hostility
all that he loved drove Peter to the verge of despair. H
threatened to disinherit him. It was of no avail. During h
father's second absence in western Europe in 1717 Alexis fl
with his concubine Euphrosine to Vienna, where he was promis
shelter and protection. Thence he journeyed to the Tyrol, a
finally took refuge in the castle of St. Elmo at Naples. B
he was tracked by his father's agents, and with the promise
a pardon was induced to return to Moscow. There he had
appear before a solemn tribunal to answer charges of conspirac
Peter soon learned in the course of this inquiry that his son w
the centre of a vast plot against his life, in which all the forc
of reaction and obscurantism, as well as the services of th

[1] Whose sister became the wife of the future Emperor Charles VI.

trian and Swedish armies, were enlisted. All the ramifica-
s were traced, the plot was crushed with frightful severity,
oxia was whipped and imprisoned, and Alexis was con-
ıned to death and perished in circumstances of ominous
tery. His wife had died already in 1715, after giving birth to
ı, named Peter, who survived him. But the *tsar* now boasted
:ond family. He had divorced his first wife, a proceeding in
eyes of many religious people quite devoid of legality, and
712 had married again. His second wife he first met in 1702
ng the campaign in the Baltic provinces. She was of un-
ain origin, but is thought to have been a Livonian peasant,
ccupation a *blanchisseuse*. She passed blithely from the hands
Swedish dragoon to those of Generals Sheremétev and Ménc
ov before she finally reached the arms of Peter. Though
ırant and illiterate, she had something about her which
inated him, and she obtained a unique hold over his way-
d spirit. She did not accompany him to Versailles in 1717.
iis second wife Peter had no less than twelve children—four
, two of whom were called Peter and two Paul, who all died
ıfancy, and eight daughters, of whom only two, Anne and
abeth, survived. In 1722 Peter, obeying atavistic instinct,
ed the celebrated and baleful *ukáz* publicly arrogating to
reigning sovereign the right to designate his successor. In
words of Ivan III, ' to whom I will, to him I shall give my
;dom '. But fate decreed that he should never avail himself
his right. He died in 1725 at the age of fifty-three, without
ing named his heir—the first and last Russian sovereign who
earned the name of ' Great '.

Après moi les Femmes (1725–62)

While the consequences were equally momentous for classes of the Russian people, the effect on them of the deat Peter the Great was varied. The feeling amongst the mas the people was undoubtedly one of relief mingled, howe with equally sincere dismay. They could not be expected regret the tyrannous author of such upheaval, such innovati and such exactions as they had suffered. Those Russian humble origin who knew him personally indeed worshipped h but their number was relatively infinitesimal. The vast majo were estranged by his personality and his habits, while t bitterly resented both the letter of his decrees and the br spirit in which they were carried out. The whole thing pa their comprehension. In accordance with the popular temp ment their attitude was characteristically expressed in the wil legends and beliefs about Peter. As in other times, when prince was dead and the people, convinced that he was a resurrected countless false *tsars* and died for their belief in t authenticity, so now when they had a genuine live prince persuaded themselves, first, that he was not really the *tsar*, fo Russian *tsar* could do such terrible things, but a changelin German origin, and then, as a result of his journeys abroa things which no *tsar* had ever done—that he had been trap and killed while travelling, and that the man who came and ruled was a false *tsar*. The natural corollary to these sions, in the revulsion of popular feeling at his death, was a b that he had indeed been waylaid in 'Germany' (= abroad), that he was still alive and would one day come to rec his own.

In ecclesiastical spheres, which, with the exception

enlightened divines such as the famous preacher Feofán Theophanus) Prokopóvich, were extremely hostile to Peter, arallel belief was notoriously elaborated to the effect that er was none other than Antichrist. This theory especially ed the imagination of the Old Believers, who looked on istance to Peter's infamous decrees as a means of sanctifica-n. These could hardly bemoan his death. In the governing cial class, the bureaucracy which Peter himself had largely ated and had recruited characteristically from all ranks, even lowest, of society, there were many of his pupils and laborators and admirers who loudly and honestly lamented demise as a national calamity, which indeed it was. But re were also many of these who had only served him half-rtedly. To them must be added almost the entire aristo-cy, both in the capital and in the country, who justly arded him as a pitiless task-master and whose natural feelings his death were that now at last they could breathe again. e position of the whole upper class may be compared to that an unwieldy school of sturdy, self-willed, lazy, and half-ucated boys suddenly bereft of the only person who has herto kept them in order, whom, for the most part, they ve neither understood nor appreciated. Abandoned to the dulgence of his widow, who was the mistress of the most un-upulous of them, they found her as easy as her husband had en impossible to manipulate, and vowed themselves to a pro-ged course of riotous self-indulgence.

Officially, of course, Peter was glorified and bewailed by all d sundry, while by his genuine supporters he was promptly fied and vociferously worshipped. This process of blind and ii-blind admiration continued for half a century. But by reign of Catherine II, when Russia was already more familiar h European civilization, and the standards of the philosophy, art, and the elegance of France held sway in Petersburg,

opinion towards Peter had somewhat chilled. His activi
appeared too material, his personality too undignified to m
more than the respect of a society which hob-nobbed w
Diderot and Voltaire. After the Revolution, to the nerv
conservatives and 'Slavophils', whose mission in life it was
shelter the growth of the tender plant of the pure Russ
nationality from the demoralizing influences of effete
corrupt western Europe, Peter even appeared a danger
revolutionary, who had done more harm than good by tamper
with the primitive, beautiful, and divine simplicity of Russ
home-life. This view again was reversed by Solovëv,[1] the f
really serious and scientific Russian historian, who, writing
the third quarter of the nineteenth century, reverted to
opinion of Peter's contemporaries and extolled his life-work
a veritable, indispensable, unprecedented, and wholly benefi
revolution.

At the same time, as we can now see, the extent and
effect of the 'reforms' were exaggerated and their charac
misapprehended both by those who survived them and by
succeeding generations of critics. It was natural that conte
poraries should glory in having lived in an epoch during wh
they proudly imagined that Russia had been transformed
with a magic wand, and no less natural that many sho
share those feelings who by their own resistance had milita
against any real transformation taking place. Hence Pe
came to be known as 'The Reformer'[2] *par excellence*, thou
all his reforms when reduced to their simplest terms wer
series of measures aiming purely at military and financial e
ciency, all of them devised on the spur of the moment while
country was in the throes of a twenty years' war. Certai
an astonishing degree of efficiency had been achieved,

[1] Pronounced *Salavyóf*.

[2] In Russian *preobrazovátel'*, lit. 'transfigurer', 'transformer'.

zzling results had been obtained. But there had been neither volution nor reformation. Rather, there was an earthquake d a typhoon. And for the Russian aristocracy halcyon days bervened, so that they could afford a generously roseate pression of their recent experiences. Russia had, indeed, had irst coat of European paint, but this had neither obliterated r improved the natural complexion, which reasserted itself th disconcerting celerity.

After his death the general tendency of the mass of the verning class—the bureaucracy and the aristocracy—was to vote itself to the pleasurable and inexacting occupation of ting on Peter's laurels. The real power was concentrated in e hands of a few of his fellow workers and of his widow, but, fortunately for Russia, these were among the least promising his creatures. It may be said that it was the 'reforms' which d promoted them rather than they who had promoted the eforms'. Under Peter's direction they seemed impressive d devoted public servants, but in his absence they rapidly erged in their true colours of selfish opportunists. They have en well compared with a series of noughts without the enuous unit which alone lent them any real value. Whereas ter himself worked and made all classes of society work for e country, his successors were fully alive to the importance of ping up the level of production, but were equally determined invert the rôles and to make the whole country work for m. Peter's great achievement had been to stir up the landed stocracy, drag them from their ancestral lairs, and harness m to the military or the civil or the industrial service of the te. At the same time, by his rigorous, not to say tyrannical, thods of recruiting, both for the army and for labour, and his methods of taxation, he had laid incomparably more rous burdens on the backs of the working-classes, i. e. of the icultural labourers and of their families. In the hands of

Peter's followers, both on the throne and around it, his w
had no prospect of being continued. It is true that what
had built was so strong that they could not entirely destroy
but they did not even keep it in repair, let alone improve
finish it. What met with the full approval of the govern
class and what they were ready to maintain were the exact
standards of productivity which he had imposed on the peo

The great achievement of the Russian aristocracy in
eighteenth century was the complete enslavement of the peo
and the complete emancipation of itself. The enslavement
the people had been the result of a bargain made betw
the State and the nobility, based on the theory that s
labour provided the nobility with the wherewithal to ensure
due efficiency as the class from which the army was drawn. I
true that Peter had strengthened the control of the landown
over the serfs, but he had made the landowners work as w
He had squeezed all society still tighter into compartme
forcing the numerous intermediate and largely parasitic cla
(monastic dependants, mendicants, casual labourers, and oth
either on to the soil or into the army, but at the same time
opened careers to merit and hard work. After his death
huge governing class of the *dvoryánstvo* (lit. 'courtiers'), whi
starting from the civil service at Moscow, had absorbed
the remaining elements of the old aristocracy in the capital
in the country and also included all those of the new bure
cracy recruited from the provinces as well as from the capi
made up its mind to fasten more firmly on the people th
obligation to pay and to liberate itself from the obligation
serve. This process, which began in 1725, ended in 1762 w
the final triumph of the nobility and the total and hope
subjection of the people to a class which was in very fact
idle rich. The other factors in the situation were the old
of the throne, which in such an absolute monarchy as Ru

s the most important factor of all, and the new one of the ular army, especially the privileged regiments of Guards com- ed entirely of scions of the nobility, which henceforward s hardly less important in deciding the destinies of the ntry. Indeed, during the next forty years it may be said t while the bureaucracy which Peter had created to be the vant of the country made the country its servant, the army ich he had created to be at the disposal of the throne had the one at its disposal.

Simultaneously this period of Russian history is remarkable the development of the power of the individual at court. is the golden age of imperial favourites who follow one another, a dazzling though unedifying sequence, throughout the hteenth century. It is also the age of court intrigue. Every- ng was pervaded by a general sense of complete insecurity. ere was no responsibility and there were no guarantees. No e ever knew what was going to happen next. Peter's way of vernment had in some respects been of a hand to mouth aracter, but at any rate it was dominated by a brain. e method was now the same, but it was directed merely by ssion and caprice. There were plenty of decrees, but there re no laws. The need of fundamental laws was repeatedly knowledged, but no one had the energy or the ability to rmulate them. There was theoretically absolute power of the narch, but there was no occupant of the throne fitted to eld it, and therefore it became only nominal. The real vernors of the country were the court favourites, the secret lice, and the regiments of the Guards (*gvárdiya*). But none these again, not even the *dvoryánstvo* itself, of which the Guards ' were really the head, were possessed of any political hts or status, and every one was the potential victim of lation and of arbitrary disfavour. In fact, the system of vernment threatened to revert to that in vogue among the

Golden Horde in the fourteenth century, with this differenc that in Petersburg the potentate was usually a woman an the favourites were men.

The atmosphere of hazard which permeated Russian life a this time is illustrated by an enumeration of the changes o the throne. This period, from 1725 to 1763, is known as tha of palace revolutions. The life of the Empire centred in th palace, which in its turn was controlled by the barracks of th Guards. Its government was in the hands of the sovereign favourite and of the favourite's satellites, as was natural an inevitable with a weak or frivolous occupant of the throne.

The throne changed hands no less than six times betwee the death of Peter the Great in 1725 and the accession o Catherine II in 1762. In almost all of these changes the Guard played a major if not the principal part. The relation of Peter successors to himself, and the order in which they found the way to supreme power, illustrate the complete instability whic prevailed. His successors were his widow, his grandson by his firs wife, his half-niece, his half-great-great-nephew, his daughte his grandson by his second wife, and finally the latter's Germa wife, who cheerfully usurped her husband's throne. For th inconceivably chaotic order of succession nobody was to blam but Peter himself. By his *ukáz* of 1722 he established the free dom of the sovereign to choose his own heir, thus abrogating th privilege of the national assembly of meeting at the death of on ruler and electing or at least confirming the election of anothe Unfortunately he was three years in making up his mind whor to nominate as his successor, and the instructions he gave whe moribund were unintelligible.

Peter the Great's family at the time of his death consisted o the following: his granddaughter Natalia; his grandson Pete born in 1715, the obvious heir, the son of his only son by h first marriage, Alexis, who had perished in 1718 (cf. p. 247)

widow, Catherine; and his two daughters by her, Anne and zabeth. Catherine had, indeed, borne him four sons, Peters d Pauls, but they all died in infancy. Of his two surviving ughters the elder, Anne, had in 1725 married the Duke of lstein, whose mother was a sister of Charles XII of Sweden, d had at her marriage renounced all rights to the Russian rone for herself, her husband, and their offspring. The unger, Elizabeth, born in 1710, who had been flung at the ads of half the royalties in Europe, was still unmarried, and s a rival of her mother for the throne, since, in default of sons, daughter according to Russian law inherits and not the fe.

But for the present Elizabeth had no serious following, and e contest resolved itself into one between the grandson and the dow, or rather between their supporters. Catherine had the ny solidly behind her for reasons of 'auld lang syne', and uld naturally count on Peter's eaglets, who knew that with on the throne they could continue to feather their own nests intensively as theretofore. The chief of these were Prince énshikov, Count Tolstóy, the General-Admiral[1] Apráxin, ron (later Count) Ostermann, the son of a Westphalian est, and Yaguzhínski, the procurator-general of the Senate; arvenus' and bureaucrats, men of temperament and intelli- nce, but without scruples or ideals. The boy Peter, on the ier hand, not indeed through any qualities of his own, but reason of his legitimacy and as representative and would-be mpion of the old tradition for which his father and his grand- ther had suffered martyrdom, rallied to his side the remnants the old aristocracy, notably the two great families of the lítsyns and the Dolgorúkis. While Peter lay in his death- ny the Senate began anxiously to deliberate as to the succes- n. But Catherine's plot was well laid; a few hours after he

[1] This was the highest title in the Russian Navy.

had passed away these deliberations were interrupted by th drums of the Guards drawn up outside the palace, and the Sena obediently proclaimed Catherine empress, on the ground tha she had been actually crowned by Peter the previous year and w therefore his legitimate successor. The accession of Catherin was a great triumph for the followers of Peter the Great an ostensibly a pledge that his work would be carried on. As matter of fact, it was merely a confirmation in power of thos who already possessed it, and a guarantee that they would no be disturbed in their pastimes. Catherine herself was entirel frivolous, and was able fully to indulge her craving for pleasu in the protective sunshine of military favour. The bureau cracy decreed themselves a prolonged holiday from all seriou work—a relaxation amply justified by their unwonted exertion in the last reign. But this millennium was short-lived. Cathe rine's motto was an adventurous and merry life, but havin combined this with consistently imprudent living she had unde mined her health. After a prodigal reign of a little over tw years she died in May 1727.

Already when she had been taken ill the members of the chi government organs, including of course a contingent of office of the Guards, had assembled at the palace to discuss the succe sion to the throne. This time there was a general consensus tha the claims of Peter the Great's grandson could not be agai ignored. To this even the omnipotent Ménshikov agree planning as he was a marriage between his daughter and th emperor-to-be. Catherine herself was violently opposed to th proposed arrangement, as she wished one of her daughters t inherit. But she was overborne and a document was drawn u which failed to carry out, though it succeeded in distortin Peter's decree. It appointed four successors to the throne first Peter's grandson, then, failing his issue, Catherine's tw daughters in order of seniority, and finally, with the san

oviso, Peter's granddaughter Natalia. As he was, in any case, arded as the legitimate heir and had the vast majority of the ople in his favour, there was no opposition to the first of se, and the son of the ill-starred *tsesarévich*[1] Alexis ascended throne as Peter II at the age of twelve. As the accession Catherine had been a victory for the devotees of European ilization, for the advocates of superficial progress and modern- whose motto was 'Russia for the foreigners', whose ward symbol was Petersburg, so that of Peter II was a tri- ph for the conservatives and for the party whose symbol was scow, whose device was 'Russia for the Russians'. 'Back Moscow' became the order of the day, and thither, in fact, court returned. The leaders of this party were the two ient and noble families of the Dolgorúkis and the Golítsyns. e former had virtually monopolized the new emperor, and a rimonial alliance was planned between him and the daughter Prince Alexis Dolgorúki. This was incompatible with the oitions of Ménshikov, who from the start had irritated Peter spoilt his own chances by forthwith assuming and abusing position of a parent. In September 1727 he was disgraced exiled to Siberia, and his vast estates all over Russia, which into millions of acres, were confiscated. But the return Moscow soon proved fatal to the new *tsar*. In the ter of 1729 Peter II contracted small-pox, and he died January 19/30 of 1730, the day that had been fixed for wedding. This was a catastrophe for the Dolgorúkis, who reupon tried to obtain their end by fraud and by force. ey forged a will of the deceased emperor nominating his rothed as his successor, and planned to put this into effect n the help of the Guards, amongst whom they had consider- e influence. But events took a turn entirely unforeseen.

[1] This was the title of the eldest son; the others were called *tsarévich*, gh both are etymologically the same.

The Attempt at a Constitution in 1730

One of the most important results of Peter the Great's rei and of his policy of stirring up the physical energies of subjects, and one which he had scarcely anticipated, was th he had immensely quickened their capacity for political thoug He had forced them abroad to study engineering and anaton and they had observed humanity and the mechanism of stat He sent them on diplomatic missions, and they gained first-ha acquaintance with European society. What impressed the mo reflective among them was not so much the advisability of t enlightenment and enfranchisement of the people as t desirability of putting some check on the absolute power of t Crown, and limiting its potentiality for manifestations c concerting to themselves. History was repeating itself. Iv the Terrible and Peter the Great, as far apart as north and sou —Ivan who was egotism and Peter altruism incarnate—ea succeeded in arousing a similar feeling of apprehension and t same instinct of self-preservation in the ranks of the aristocra The passing of both rulers was followed by an attempt to cu the autocracy. Neither attempt was directly successf Immediately, this led in the seventeenth century to the rule the Poles, in the eighteenth to that of the Germans. U mately, both attempts did strengthen the aristocratic a bureaucratic class.

The first step which the heads of the bureaucracy and the aristocracy took in order to secure their ends was creation in 1726 of the Supreme Secret Council,[1] really handiwork of Tolstóy, and designed by him to conciliate the families which were out of office with the new which were It consisted of six members (Ménshikov, Tolstóy, Golóvk Apráxin, Ostermann, and Prince D. M. Golítsyn), formed a s

[1] *Verkhóvny Táyny Sovét.*

permanent super-cabinet under the presidency of the ruler
en Catherine I), arrogated to itself in council with its presi-
t the sole right of legislation, was responsible to nobody but
lf, raised itself above the Senate which became purely
cutive, and aspired to share the attributes of sovereignty,
reby definitely limiting the monarch's absolute power. But
authority was not firmly founded ; the following year (1727)
extensive powers, which must have aroused alarm, were more
ely defined, and at the same time the initiative of the
ereign and the right to take advice outside the ranks of the
ncil were re-established. During the reign of Peter II the
ncil proved powerless to resist his arbitrariness and that of
favourites, but at his death it vigorously reasserted itself.
this moment there were three vacancies in the council, which
consisted of eight members, of whom one was Prince
M. Golítsyn and two others were Princes Dolgorúki. These
es were hastily filled the same night (January 19/30, 1730)
a process of family gravitation, two more Dolgorúkis and
other Golítsyn being co-opted. The oligarchy then began
deliberate on the succession to the throne, Peter II having
without appointing a successor. The point was that with
death the male line of the family of Románov had become
nct.

rince D. M. Golítsyn, like his namesake of the previous
ury, was the best educated, most cultivated, and most
ightful Russian of his time. He was a distinguished public
ant, especially remarkable among his compeers for his
estness and his integrity, but he and Peter the Great had
been friends. Golítsyn was a warm advocate of reform and
Western influence, but he wished to combine these with the
Moscow tradition and to place the control of the new
ements in the hands of an aristocratic oligarchy by no less
ocess than limitation of the power of the *tsar*. His was the

brain which evolved and directed the plan which was now di closed. Unfortunately for himself, and for Russia, he was n sufficiently trained or experienced in high political tactics t bring it to fruition.

The opening chosen was astute and its very unexpectedne brought it success. In their choice of a sovereign the Counc passed over Peter's daughter Elizabeth on the grounds tha she was born in illegitimacy, and that her mother Catherin had had no real right to the throne and therefore no right t dispose of it. Reverting to the older female Románov lin they elected Anne, Duchess of Courland, the supposititiou daughter of Ivan V, Peter the Great's half-brother, on th condition that their own supremacy should be guarantee The next morning the choice of sovereign was publicl proclaimed to the assembled Senate, Synod, generals, heads government departments and others, and was ratified by them As regards the guarantees no announcement was made, but th conditions demanded by Golítsyn in the name of the Counc were rapidly drawn up and dispatched in secrecy to Anne Mitau for her signature. They were that she must neithe marry nor appoint a successor, and must take no decisions i matters of declaring war and of making peace, nor in the contr of the army, the levying of taxes and the spending of publi money, the conferment on members of the nobility of titles an properties, the confiscation from them of the same and th infliction on them of the death-penalty, without the consent the eight members of the Supreme Secret Council, and failin compliance must sacrifice the throne. On receiving these co ditions Anne decided to accept them, attached her signatur and forthwith set out for Moscow.

Moscow, and indeed the whole of Russia, was going throug an acute and complicated political crisis such as it had n experienced since the Time of Troubles, for it so happened tha

whole of official and unofficial Russia which counted in itics was at this moment assembled in the old capital. nmoned to celebrate the wedding of Peter II, they found mselves instead the bewildered spectators first of his funeral, n of the election of a new sovereign, and finally of an attempt aunch a Russian constitution.[1] This unusual gathering in- ded, besides the high aristocracy and all the dignitaries of e, the regiments of the Guards and all the lesser nobility n the provinces. All of these Peter the Great had, for the poses of his government and of his army, rolled into one class, the nobility (*dvoryánstvo*); but nevertheless they were from a united body and contained a number of layers, circles, parties. It is estimated that outside the actual Council re were as many as five hundred notables involved in the tical agitation. The general attitude of this large body of nion towards the oligarchy which had arrogated to itself the ision in the election of a new sovereign was one of jealousy, rust, and hostility. There were two main factions amongst m. One was for using force in order to overthrow the archy, the other was for obtaining a share in its counsels.

The next step in the crisis was on February 2/13, when, ing received an affirmative answer from Anne, the oligarchy moned a general meeting of the nobility and read the con- ons which the new sovereign had signed. Prince Golítsyn playing a very risky game, for which he was not really ipped. Thinking disingenuousness the best policy, he had n Anne to understand that the conditions imposed repre- ed a popular demand, and he now tried to persuade the nbled notabilities that her agreement to them was a spon- ous act of grace on the part of Anne. At this point he d. The audience was silent and uneasy. Many amongst a had sympathized with Golítsyn's sentiments and wished

[1] See the account in Klyuchévski, vol. iv.

to reduce some of the imperial prerogatives and at the sar time to be absolved of some of their own obligations; but th definite limitation of sovereignty was too much for the Russi conscience. Besides, it soon became apparent that the whc thing was a trick. When asked how the country was in future be governed, Golítsyn naively issued an open invitation for t submission of plans for his consideration. From that mome he had lost the game. He was inundated with projects ar counter-projects, the general tenor of which was a tabulati of claims for class privileges and for a share in the higher orga of government. At the same time, in the less reflective spher notably amongst the officers of the Guards, there was a gre and genuine revulsion of feeling in favour of a complete restor tion of the autocracy. It was naturally and reasonably felt th one ruler, especially if the ruler were a woman, would be mo tolerable, and also easier to manipulate, than many. Peop had experienced the oligarchy of the Dolgorúkis in the reign Peter II. By this time, too, the struggle had so grown in sco that it threatened to end in civil war. It was no longer a que tion of the Council against the Crown, but of the rest of society the army, the other State organs, the Senate and the Synod against the Council. Even most of the old aristocratic famili were now against the ringleaders.

It was at this juncture that Anne arrived on the scene, February 15/26. She had been apprised betimes of the tu things had taken, and, assured of the support of the Guarc handled the delicate situation with skill. The same day in t cathedral the highest dignitaries took the oath to her only sovereign (*gosudárynya*), but later, on being presented with tv petitions from the Senate and from the nobility, one begging h to appoint a commission of inquiry into the various projects government, the other imploring her to assume absolute pow and annul the conditions which had been imposed on her, s

licly exposed the attempt of the conspirators to deceive her
tore up the document she had signed, to the accompaniment
xuberant expressions of fealty on the part of the officers of
Guards. A fortnight later in all the churches the oath was
nusiastically taken to Anne as autocrat and empress (*samo-
zhitsa-imperatritsa*). Thus ended the famous attempt of
ace Golítsyn to limit the monarchy, a limitation not guaran-
l by a fundamental law but merely imposed by a body of
ed origin and irregular composition, itself not secured by
lition or by law. He was bound to fail because he had neither
support of the people nor of his class.

The Reign of Anne (1730–40)

The reign of the Empress Anne, which lasted from 1730 to
o, is one of the gloomiest periods of Russian history. The
ress herself is certainly the most repellent person who has
gured the Russian throne. She was born in 1695. Her mother
a Saltykóv, her father was nominally Ivan V, though he was
eak in mind and body that in all probability it was some one
. In 1710 Peter the Great had married her to the Duke of
rland. Courland had since the sixteenth century been a
of the kingdom of Poland, and by this union Peter hoped to
blish Russian influence in this outwork of his neighbour's
perty. It fell out that Anne's husband died from alcoholic
oning very shortly after the marriage, and she herself was
demned to spend the next twenty years in widowhood in the
gre ducal capital of Mitau. Here, a despised and helpless
carefully watched pawn in the game of international chess,
developed a rancorous temperament and a most unedifying
le of life, the only restraint on which was an inadequate
ply of cash. A diversion was caused in 1725 by the irruption
rince Maurice of Saxony, the natural son of Augustus II,

King of Poland, who made up his mind to waste his good lo on the unattractive Anne if the reward was the duchy. almost succeeded, but was not supported by Warsaw, wh hoped to annex Courland on the death of the old Duke Fer nand (the uncle and heir of Anne's husband, who lived in reti ment at Danzig, and never effectively claimed his inheritanc and was thwarted by Ménshikov, then all-powerful, who hims cast covetous eyes on the duchy.

When, therefore, Anne took her seat on the throne of Rus she was like a poor and embittered relation who unexpecte succeeds to a vast family property. She was now for the fi time able to satisfy her immense lust for pleasure, which s did in the most prodigal way. She demoralized society a impoverished the people by her extravagance, which was co sistently marred by the worst and lowest taste. In herself An had absolutely nothing to recommend her either in mind, body, or in soul. She was merely a very gross, cruel, vindicti and unintelligent woman. To these qualities must be add dislike and distrust of her compatriots, which were inevita increased by the episodes preceding her assumption of pow She gave Russian society, not excluding the army, good cause remember and to regret its insistence on the preservation of t autocracy. Her fury naturally descended first on the Golítsy and the Dolgorúkis, who were exiled, expropriated, and do to death wholesale. But throughout her reign no Russi felt safe, and persecution, torture, and decapitation under t auspices of the Secret Chancellery were the order of the day

The chief characteristic of her reign was the predominan which German influence acquired during it in Russia. N only did she bring with her from Courland her notorious a disreputable favourites Bühren [1] and the two brothers Loewe wold, who ruled the court and ruined the country with th

[1] The Russian spelling of this name is *Biren* or *Biron.*

travagance, but all the chief places and the most lucrative sts in the government and in the army were given to Germans. the head of the former was Ostermann, now Chancellor, ıo, after abolishing the Council, became permanent and ɔreme chief of a nominal cabinet of ministers. The army was der Münnich,[1] one of Peter the Great's latest importations, ıo first achieved fame as the constructor of the Ládoga canal.[2] Outwardly the reign of Anne was a continuation of that of ter the Great, though the spirit which characterized it was not . After the coronation the court returned to St. Petersburg, d foreign influence and fashions remained supreme; but the blic income was year after year wasted on the private extrava- ıces of the court, and commerce and agriculture decreased ıentably. The people was crushed by taxes which it was ver able to pay in full, and expeditions had to be undertaken ɔ the villages to squeeze the money out of the peasants or sell up their homes. This congenial task was assigned to the ny, even to the famous Guards, who thus became police and al agents of the government. To Peter's two famous regi- ents of the Guards, to whom she owed so much but over whom e was careful to place foreign commanders, Anne added two ɔre, the Izmáilovski[3] and the Cavalry Guards.[4]

The cumulative effect of her ten years of tyranny and cruelty, d especially of her handing over of the country to be mono- lized and exploited, and the army to be controlled, by Germans, s to arouse the latent sense of national pride and to provoke widespread, genuine, and profound feeling of hostility to

Written in Russian *Minikh*.

Owing to the stormy nature of Lake Ládoga it became necessary to ke this canal, skirting its southern end to complete and to ensure the safety communication by water between the Nevá and the Volga.

Sc. *polk* (= regiment); thus named after the village of Izmáilovo near scow, where Anne had a country residence.

Kónno-Gvardéiski polk.

foreign influence, and especially to that of Germans. Peter th
Great, in forty years, had hammered into the Russian intell
gence the fact that foreigners in general, and Germans in part
cular, however unpleasant they may be, were the symbols
reform and the sole guarantee of efficiency, wholesome thoug
distasteful, and he had endowed them with an unmistakable
unpopular halo. In ten years Anne and her disreputab
favourites succeeded in dispelling this uncomfortable illusio
and in proving that Germans could be just as lawless and u
profitable as Russians. Their experience in the reigns
Catherine I and Peter II had proved to Russians that th
existence of a multitude of decrees does not ensure an era
equity and security: that in the reign of Anne showed them th
the rule of foreigners does not connote good government. Th
attempts to limit the power of the autocracy had failed becau
the factions amongst the nobility could not agree on a polic
and they consequently ceased dabbling in constitutional arch
tecture. But they were thrown together and reconciled by th
domination of foreigners in this reign, and made up their min
that, if they must have the autocracy, they would have
supported by Russian and not by German shoulders, and th
they would in their own country be as far as they could th
masters of their own destinies. During the reign of Anne th
feeling naturally found only furtive expression; the many wh
shared it had not forgotten what part they themselves took
the events of 1730. Besides, Anne had satisfied many of th
selfish claims put forward in that year by the lesser nobilit
Thus she abrogated Peter the Great's unpopular law of th
inheritance of property. She also alleviated the burdens
military service. In 1731 Münnich founded in St. Petersburg th
Corps of Cadets,[1] a sort of Eton and Sandhurst combined, fro
which sons of the aristocracy who reached a certain education

[1] *Kadétski Kórpus.*

ndard could pass as officers into the services, no longer being liged to begin their career in the ranks according to the terms Peter's doubtless salutary but very unpopular enactment. rther, in 1736 the number of years of obligatory service, ether military or civil, was reduced to twenty-five, and out each family a father was allowed to retain one son permantly at home to look after the estate. But Anne's death noved the factors in the situation which had held this feeling restiveness in check, while it left in power the one person who d done more than anybody else to provoke it.

Anne died on October 17/28, 1740, and the vexed question the succession again emerged. She had not considered it cessary to remarry, but she did appoint a successor. This s her great-nephew Iván Antónovich, at this period aged o months. This infant was the child of her niece Anne opóldovna. It will be recalled that in 1716 Peter the Great, grossed in the sport of European dynastic intrigue, then new Russian royalty, had married his second half-niece Catherine, e sister of the Empress Anne and, like her, presumed daughof his half-brother Ivan V, to Charles Leopold, Duke Mecklenburg. To them was born a daughter, called Anne eopóldovna), in 1718. After much hesitation, and after ving already proclaimed as her successor the son of this niece, one should be born, the Empress Anne, in 1739, married her Prince Antony Ulrich of Brunswick-Bevern. Expectations re fulfilled, and their son Ivan (Antónovich) was born in 1740, o months before the death of his great-aunt the Empress ne. He duly succeeded her and reigned for thirteen months Ivan VI,[1] hypothetical great-grandson of Ivan V. Neither of parents was distinguished by any ability, and moreover they

[1] i. e. the sixth Ivan to rule Russia, counting from Ivan 'Kalitá' 28–41); he was the third *tsar* of this name, counting from Ivan the rible, who is known as Ivan IV, and the first *emperor*.

were hardly on speaking terms with one another. On her death bed Anne therefore confided the regency with autocratic power to the unspeakable Bühren. But while the Russian nobility and their spokesmen, the regiments of the Guards, had tolerated Anne, the prospect of Bühren as regent was more than they could stand, especially as it was known that he distrusted the Guards, whose ranks, it must be remembered, were solidly filled with noblemen (*dvoryáne*), and that he intended to transfer these aristocratic privates as officers to other regiments in the provinces and fill their places with ordinary recruits.

In addition to all this the death of the empress was the signal for all her German favourites to start fighting among themselves. Münnich, who at least enjoyed some prestige in Russia as a great general, espoused the cause of Ivan VI and his parents, and on November 8/19, at the head of his regiment, the famous Preobrazhénski, arrested Bühren in his bed, after which it was not long before the latter found himself in Siberia. Thereupon Ivan VI's mother, Anne Leopóldovna, proclaimed herself regent, a position for which she was notoriously incapable. After this the government became completely disorganized and plot succeeded plot. In particular, the veteran Osterman ousted Münnich from favour and championed Prince Anton against his wife Anne.

The Reign of Elizabeth (1741–61)

This welter was terminated by one of the most famous episodes in Russian history. The younger daughter of Peter the Great (by his second wife), Elizabeth, born in 1709, was at this time still unmarried and resident in Russia. During the reign of the Empress Anne and the regency of Bühren she had been kept in the background and under close watch. But she had a large circle of devoted and able friends and enjoyed great popularity based on the memory of her parentage, with the regiments of

Guards. During the chaotic regency of her cousin, Anne
opóldovna, Elizabeth and her party began to take courage
l to form plans. Both she herself and her immediate circle
lized that the longer any attempt at the assertion of their
bitions was postponed the less likely these would be to suc-
d. Moreover Elizabeth focused in herself the hopes of the
at mass of the people, and of the army, the nobility, and the
rgy, who saw in her the one pledge of their redemption from
rule of the foreigner. These designs were not unknown to
ermann, who, in view of them and of imminent hostilities
h Sweden, decided to remove from the capital certain of the
ops on which Elizabeth counted. Knowledge of this made
nediate action imperative. She knew that it was a question
he convent or of the throne. On the night of November 25/
cember 6, 1741, she repaired with her intimates to the
racks of the Preobrazhénski regiment, where she and the
ardsmen took enthusiastic oaths of eternal mutual fealty.
ence they made their way in company to the palace, which
swiftly mastered, and there and then they arrested in their
ls Anne Leopóldovna and her husband Prince Antony,
l their infant offspring, who were transported in blankets to
zabeth's own palace. All the foreign chiefs of the fallen
ime, Münnich, Ostermann, and company, shared the same fate
not the same respect. The very next day, amid the accla-
tions of the people, Elizabeth entered into occupation of the
cuated palace, where, surrounded by the swords and spurs
he jubilant Guards, she received the unhesitating allegiance
he Senate and other functionaries of State.

van VI was imprisoned in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, where
spent the rest of his life. His unfortunate parents were
gated to Kholmogóry, near Archangel, where Anne Leo-
dovna died in 1746. Her husband survived until 1775. In
o the other children, who had grown up only semi-intelli-

gent, were by order of Catherine II, and much against their wi
conveyed to Denmark, where they were provided for by th
aunt, the queen of that country. Ivan VI perished miserab
and darkly in his prison in 1764. Thus was the first Germ
brood, which the Empress Anne had hoped to acclimatize
the inconstant and inhospitable banks of the Nevá—that
Brunswick—dispersed; but another—that of Holstein—so
took its place and was successfully hatched out, to the bane
Russia, by its thoughtless foster-mother, the Empress Elizabe
herself. The wonderful transformation scene enacted by th
merry Columbine and her grenadier scene-shifters was n
confined to the palace. The great figures of the late reig
including Münnich and Ostermann, were packed off to Siber
Those who had been disgraced, with the surviving Dolgorú
at their head, were recalled to the fickle sunshine of St. Pete
burg and reinstated in favour. Bühren was promoted to li
at Yaroslávl on the Volga.

Compared with the grim reign of the Empress Anne, th
of her cousin the Empress Elizabeth, which lasted twenty yea
from 1741 to 1761, was relatively a millenium. The mater
prosperity of the country and the general contentment of t
people were greater than they had ever been at any time sin
the short administration of the *tsarévna* Sophia. The ma
reason for this was that, not counting the short and successf
war against Sweden with which it was inaugurated, the fi
fifteen years of her reign were spent in peace. Another w
that a share in the government of the country fell to men
intelligence and ability, who, though they could hardly
called wholly disinterested public servants, did nevertheld
look beyond their own pockets. Such was the senator Prin
P. I. Shuválov, who by some of his measures, notably the e
couragement of the credit system and the abolition of t
internal dues in favour of increased tariffs on both export

l imported goods, considerably improved the financial ition of the country. It was now indeed for the first time ce the reign of Peter the Great that any such measures of orm were taken.

Besides these facts a certain amount of credit must be con- ed to Elizabeth herself and to the atmosphere which she ated around her. The watchword of her reign was pleasure the time, and therefore things which interfered with pleasure, h as business, were strictly neglected. Elizabeth possessed father's immense energy, but, while he had devoted his to d work with an intermittent carouse, hers was dedicated reservedly to amusement. In this she resembled her late sin the Empress Anne, but it must be admitted that though zabeth's taste and manners were not those of Versailles, and view of her parentage could not be expected to be so, y were nevertheless an improvement on those of Mitau. In other respects she differed profoundly from her cousin. zabeth was only occasionally cruel and malicious, not oitually so. She could be heartless and implacable when safety of her throne or the supremacy of her own personal rms was involved, but by nature she was undoubtedly d and benevolent. She was excessively vain, a trait justified very beautiful eyes, a dazzling complexion, and a good ure. Her education had been partial; she could dance fault- ly the minuet, but was unaware that Great Britain is an nd. She never read a book, but she had plenty of brains. was, above and before all, an indefatigable and unabashed uptuary. Her thirst for pleasure, which had been severely d in check during her cousin's rule, now enjoyed full , and remained unsated and insatiable till the end. Her ole reign was spent in a continuous whirlwind of excitement jollification. Her dominant passions were for music, the atre, dancing, and costume; at her death she possessed

15,000 dresses. A succession of lively affairs of the heart a
played a great part in her life, the chief being with Alexis Raz
móvski, a Cossack from Little Russia, who began his career
a choir-boy of the Empress Anne, and remained Elizabet
favourite to the last, though he had many rivals. His young
brother Cyril was made President of the Academy of Scienc
and also *Hetman* of the Ukraine, an office of which he was t
last holder.

Elizabeth's accession was generally hailed with favour as
symbol of the determination to eradicate German influenc
and of the reassertion of nationalism. This it undoubtedly w
to a large extent, though the nationalism which asserted itse
was distinctly qualified. The empress prided herself above
else on being the daughter of Peter the Great, and therefo
a return to the old régime was precluded. She had a gre
partiality for Moscow as a place of residence, but neverthele
St. Petersburg remained the official capital and gradual
became a more habitable city. There is no doubt that Elizabe
was intensely, though by no means narrowly, patriotic ; it w
in this that she most closely resembled her father, and by th
that she rallied the nobility to her throne, for her patriotism
though ardent and sincere, did not express itself in ways whic
interfered with their leisure. It is also true that Elizabeth, u
like her father, had a positive dislike of Prussians and Prussi
Therefore, her interests lying not in the realm of metallurg
and mechanics, but in that of art, in its most catholic sense, h
eyes turned naturally towards France, inexhaustible fount
the amenities of life. It was in this reign that intercours
between Russia and France, hitherto confined to the exchang
of diplomats, first became generally extended to the exchang
of commodities and of ideas, and the French language an
French civilization established themselves in Russia in tha
unique position of supremacy from which they have onl

gradually during the last fifty years been deposed. With this Elizabeth showed great lack of judgement and of gination on one all-important point, that of the succession he throne. One of her first acts as empress was to send to l for her nephew with the intention of appointing him as her . She was in this measure actuated certainly by a sense of ily loyalty, wishing to secure the throne for the last descen- t of Peter the Great, and possibly also by a sense of justice prudence, inasmuch as this nephew, being the son of her r sister, had just as good, if not a better claim to the crown ı she herself. At the same time it was a tacit indication that entertained no idea of hampering her personal freedom by riage. Having decided not to found a new dynasty herself, e was no other choice open to her than that which she ɔted ; but nevertheless, for herself, for her country, and for people, it was one that proved calamitous.

he creature she summoned—for he was more marionette . man—was the only child of Elizabeth's elder sister Anne, was born in 1708, and was the only grandchild of Peter the at by his second marriage. Peter the Great in the course of natch-making activities had arranged for his daughter Anne narry Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein-Gottorp, the ıew of Charles XII of Sweden, whose sister had married the e of Holstein. He did not live to witness the event, but nonths after his death, in June 1725, the marriage duly took :. Anne died shortly after the birth of a son in 1728, and ıusband did not long survive her. It was this orphan who destined to play such a momentous, albeit brief, rôle in ian history. His names were Charles Peter Ulrich, and, ; originally considered the probable heir to the throne of len, he had been brought up as a Protestant and taught lish. He was now, at the age of fourteen, diverted from his :al growth, uprooted from his home at Kiel, and planted in

Moscow, where on November 7/18, 1742, Elizabeth proclaim
him heir to the Russian throne under the name of the Gra
Duke [1] Peter Feódorovich,[2] converted him to Orthodoxy, a
told him to learn Russian. He himself deeply resented ev
step in this involuntary process of transformation, and nursed
resentment for nineteen years. Elizabeth ingenuously hop
that, caught so young, this German could be moulded int
Russian, but her hopes were to be sadly undeceived. From t
very first, exile in Russia only accentuated his love for the coun
of his birth and for everything belonging to it. It was a m
tragic irony. Peter the Great, with his passionate patriotis
had laboured all his life to break down the barriers which sh
off Russia from the rest of Europe and to introduce the fru
of European science into Russia. One of the perhaps inevitab
but perhaps also regrettable features of his policy and his des
to fuse Russia with Europe was the discontinuance of the
tradition which compelled the *tsars* to marry some one of th
own faith, i.e. a daughter of the Russian nobility (there had o
been one extra-territorial marriage in the history of Mosco
that of Ivan III), and the substitution of matrimonial allianc
based on reasons of dynastic and international politics.
cannot be contended that the old system had been perfect,
even generally beneficial. It almost always led to distracti
family feuds and to the gross abuse of influence on the part
the *tsaritsa's* relatives. But at least it had given Russia a Pet
the Great. The new system, inaugurated with the best inte

[1] In Russian *Veliki Knyaz*, literally 'Great Prince'; Russian has no ti
literally equivalent to 'Duke'.

[2] From this time onwards it became a convention to give this patronym
(Feódorovna, in the case of women) to members of foreign royal houses a
other faiths on being received into the faith and the imperial family
Russia; thus the consort of the ex-*tsar* Nicholas II was known as Alexan
Feódorovna.

ns by Peter the Great, merely involved Russia still more xtricably and unprofitably in the great game of European itics, in which Russia became a valuable stake; it opened fruitful field for the deployment of European, especially rman, intrigue, and another market for the disposal of German nces and princesses, while it forced the Russian people, with- any justification, to provide armies to fight alien battles for n kings. It gave Russia Peter III and Catherine II, and, er a century of unbridled and unparalleled and picturesque ravagance, punctuated by assassinations and palace revolu- ns—the immediate untoward effect on the Russian system he virus of European civilization with which Peter the Great l inoculated it—resulted in the achievement by the Russian rt of the cosmopolitan dullness and international respect- ity which it maintained until the end of the nineteenth tury.

n the logic of the new order of things it was inevitable that German Grand Duke Peter should have a German wife. was duly provided by Frederick (the Great), who had nded the Prussian throne in 1740, in the person of Princess hie of Anhalt-Zerbst, and sent to St. Petersburg with her her in 1744. She was not a stranger to Peter, as they had ady met at Eutin in 1739. This girl, destined to be the great press Catherine II, was at the moment fifteen years old. father was Prince Christian Augustus of Anhalt-Zerbst— ndigent princely House—and an officer in the Prussian army. had married a Princess Johanna Elizabeth of Holstein, r of a Prince Charles Augustus of Holstein, Bishop of eck, who in 1726 had actually been affianced to the Empress, the Princess, Elizabeth of Russia, but had been carried off mall-pox before the marriage could be celebrated. Both e first cousins of the Duke Charles Frederick of Holstein who married Elizabeth's sister Anne in 1725, and was the

father of Peter. The young Princess of Anhalt-Zerbst was th
the second cousin of her future husband. She found favour
the sight of Elizabeth, and also in that of Peter, and, after bei
duly converted to Orthodoxy, renamed Catherine Alexéievn
and betrothed, was at length, after many delays caused
Peter's ill health, married to him at St. Petersburg in Augu
1745. The bride was at this time sixteen and the bridegroo
seventeen.

To Catherine's credit it must be said that she never pretend
to be captivated by Peter. He was, indeed, in every respect
most unattractive person, resembling in face, in manner, and
character a monkey rather than a man. He was stunted bo
in mind and in body. His education had been neglected whe
he was a child owing to his weak health, and was never subs
quently made good. He astonished even the unstudio
Empress Elizabeth by his ignorance. He was, in general, abs
lutely shallow and flippant, and at the same time vain an
mischievous. Such was the great-nephew of Charles XII an
the grandson of Peter the Great. Catherine, on the other han
in spite of her unpretentious antecedents, was even at this tim
a remarkable princess. She was good-looking and sprightl
She combined ambition with tact. She was relatively well rea
and well educated. She was unobtrusively observant and pr
cociously shrewd. Her most striking characteristic was h
keen and infallible judgement of men and of situations. Th
union of these two persons in wedlock was a matrimonial far
and a political comedy. As *promessi sposi* they had got o
tolerably well together. Both Catherine and her mothe
realized that a throne was at stake, though at one moment th
latter all but ruined the prospect, and brought down on herse
the wrath of Elizabeth, by her tactless and premature politic
intrigues, so that after the wedding she was encouraged to mak
an early start on the return journey to Anhalt-Zerbst. Bu

rriage seemed to divide rather than to unite this already assorted couple, who had nothing in common but nationality. therine soon found the company of other men more diverting n that of her ill-conditioned husband, though she never ordinated her passion to her intelligence. Peter, for his part, s popularly supposed to be impotent, and at the same time naged to acquire the reputation of a profligate.

Years passed: Russia's expectations awaited fulfilment; n VI grew in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, and Elizabeth ndered. A duenna was appointed to watch over Catherine l to promote an atmosphere of domesticity and motherhood the Grand-Ducal household, but the only result was that therine fell in love with the duenna's husband. Nevertheless, ure and dynastic exigencies were not for ever to be defied. 1754 Catherine became a mother, and gave birth to a boy of ose parentage all that can be said is that while his maternity s relatively certain his paternity was absolutely vague. Be t as it may, he was forthwith regarded as the ultimate heir the throne and ravished from his mother by Elizabeth, who arded isolation as the most secure means of ensuring the vival of this supposititious scion of Peter the Great. This the boy who afterwards became the fantastic Emperor Paul. do him justice it must be conceded, with apologies, that h in character and in appearance he later resembled his othetical and worthless father, Peter III. So slender is the ead of authenticity on which the legitimacy of the late asty depended. The purpose for which she came to Russia ing thus been fulfilled, Catherine relapsed into unimportance l neglect. But she had more sense than to waste her enforced ure. She had from the first been the exact opposite of her band in this, that while he never made any concealment of contempt and dislike of his adopted country, and made no rt to overcome them, she had from the moment of her

arrival done everything to ingratiate herself with the Russia people and taken pains to get to know the land and the language and she had in large measure succeeded. It was from no onwards, as it were scenting the great part which destiny hel in store for her, that she devoted herself more intensively t the study of her surroundings and also to the improvement o her own mind.

One of the most striking features in the official Russia of th reign of Elizabeth was the separate existence in the country o two courts, that of the empress and that of the heir-apparen and his consort, and therefore of two separate political camp and two sets of court influences and intrigues. In view of th complete absence of any regular system of government, of th disappearance of such representative institutions as had sti existed in the seventeenth century, of the omnipotence o personal favour, and of the backstairs influence which all thes conditions favoured, it can be imagined what a maze of intrigu grew up and entangled Russian diplomacy at this period Foreign diplomats, when they could not get what they wante from one court, had recourse to the other. Finally, in th Seven Years' War, when Russia fought against Prussia, th 'Young Court', as it was called, became definitely and notori ously a hot-bed of German espionage and the informatio bureau of Frederick the Great in the land of his most formidabl and most implacable enemies. In the end, it is true, even thi succour failed him, and he found himself veritably at bay, hi amorphous and upstart kingdom threatened with disruption when he was saved by the death of the Empress Elizabeth. Thi event, which occurred on December 25, 1761/January 5, 1762 had been imminent for some time past. A combination o worries hastened its consummation. Elizabeth was worried b the war which dragged on owing to the incapacity of he generals, the treachery of the pro-German party within Russia

the endless international intrigues which clouded the issues; was worried by the deterioration in the internal condition Russia which the war had produced, especially in the realm inance; she was worried by the rising star of the 'Young irt' and by the simultaneous eclipse of her own personal actions; at the same time she was desperately anxious to tinue the war to its logical conclusion, which was the total truction of Prussia. But it was not to be. Elizabeth, whose nparative wisdom and goodness of heart, as Russian sovereigns it, had been inadequately appreciated during her lifetime, universally deplored by her subjects after her death.

e Reign of Peter III and the Accession of Catherine II, 1761–2

he was succeeded by her nephew, in accordance with her own positions. The accession of Peter III was unaccompanied by disturbance of peace at home and was the signal for the nediate restoration of peace abroad. Always an admirer of derick the Great, whom he absurdly imagined himself to mble, Peter III immediately on coming to power reversed policy of his predecessor, brought literally to nought all sia's immense efforts and immense losses in the Seven Years' , triumphantly and brazenly inaugurated the era of pro- manism which was to last without intermission for over a dred years, and stretched out the hand of friendship to the g of Prussia. Thereby Prussia was saved, and Poland, in- ntially, doomed.

eter III's reign was brief but eventful. It lasted only six ths, but that period was quite long enough for him to prove, ny who still doubted, his utter and absolute imbecility. he did by two notorious acts. The first was the conclusion eace with Frederick, then as good as vanquished, in April

1762, the restitution to him of East Prussia, that kernel o modern Germany, which he was ready to surrender, a proof o the straits in which he found himself, and the proposal to let hi use the Russian army against Russia's ally, Austria. The secon was the formal liberation of the Russian nobility (*dvoryánstv* from those few obligations to the State, which, after a proce of whittling down during fifty years, were all that remaine of the great universal national service scheme of Peter th Great.

Peter the Great had introduced compulsory service for all th nobility, either civil or military, in return for their possessio of land and of the labour with which to work it. But the sub jection of the peasants to the landholders was still understoo to be the means of enabling the latter to discharge efficientl their duties to the State, and a very large proportion of the lan was still regarded as State property granted to the holders wit the same object. Peter the Great, while relaxing nothing o the rigours of the customs and laws which chained the peasan to the land, yet exacted in return a considerable amount o personal service from the holders of the land, the virtual owne of the peasants. During the thirty-five years which followe his death (1725–60) all these conditions changed. War cease to be a permanent condition and financial requirements cam to take precedence of military. The methods for the collectio of revenue introduced by Peter the Great and his immediat successors were quite inadequate, and failure to pay the tax in full (*nedoímka*) and large deficits became perennial. Com pulsory service, especially of the arduous character demanded b the indefatigable Peter the Great, was very unpopular wit the nobility, and from 1730 onwards they managed to brin about various mitigations of their hard lot. The general sens of these was to lessen the incidence of State service, and t enable the landholders to spend more time on the land whic

y held. Simultaneously the nobility, the controllers of the d and of the labour, were made definitely and collectively ponsible for the collection of revenue from the peasants and due payment to the State; their powers of control over the es of their serfs were made virtually absolute; all the land d by the various grades of the nobility became assimilated, the sense that it all came to be looked on as the absolute perty of the individual holders; and, finally, the ownership land and labour, together with the collection of revenue m the land, was made a close monopoly of the nobility. anwhile the nobility itself (*dvoryánstvo*), to enhance the ue of these privileges, serried its ranks and made it much re difficult than it had previously been for outsiders to ain admission; and all the vague intermediate classes—ual labour, monastic dependents, and so forth—were pt into the net of serfdom or slave-labour. That is to , the nobility tended to become rather the police and al agents of the Government than the exclusively military official caste; and their ardour in their new capacity ld be unquestionably relied on, because their own private ome and well-being was derived from and was dependent on same sources as those which provided the State with enue—the cultivators of the land.

This process, by virtue of which the land-owning class had se-ed in its own hands such immense power, was crowned by the ious manifesto of February 18, 1762, known as the emancipation he nobility. By its provisions service to the State on the part of *dvoryánstvo* was made entirely voluntary, except in moments national crisis when it could still be proclaimed compulsory, the only obligation to the State from which the nobility e not relieved was—to provide for the education of their sons. e emancipation of the serfs, which in reason and in fairness ld have been the natural and immediate consequence of this

enactment, was, as is well known, not promulgated till exactl
a hundred years later.[1] This *ukáz*, which was really the work
Vorontsóv, father of the mistress of Peter III, and of a circl
of nobles of which he was the centre, evoked frenzied enthusias
in the class which it liberated. The nobility was now free t
provide itself with the means wherewith to play a rôle befittin
its dignity in the great times which were to come. Other edic
of Peter III, such as those abolishing the secret police and pe
mitting freedom to the dissenters, were more sensible, but wer
also dictated by officials who hoped by this means to ensure th
popularity of the emperor and thus also the security of thei
own position. But it was all of no use. Do his ministers wha
they would, they could not turn an idiot into a sage. His ow
acts discounted the popularity which his edicts were meant t
win. He alienated the clergy and all the faithful by his ope
contempt for the Orthodox Church, and by suggesting th
secularization of the ecclesiastical and monastic properties; an
he had not the strength of his grandfather to weather the storm
which such action threatened to raise. He alienated the army
by his ostentatious worship of Frederick the Great, by forcing
it to adopt a uniform like the Prussian, by the multiplication o
reviews and the accentuation of discipline, and, finally, by
creating a regiment of Household Guards composed of non-Rus-
sian, i. e. German and other foreign-born, soldiers. The famous
Russian regiments of the Guard saw their position of supremacy
threatened, and Peter III's fate was sealed. Opinion in the
capital was still further exasperated by the fact that, not content
with making peace with Prussia, Peter III was preparing to use
the Russian army in a war against Denmark in order to recover
the province of Schleswig, of which that country had lately
robbed his own microscopic duchy of Holstein. This was the
last straw. Discontent was so widespread and so unanimous that

[1] Based on Klyuchévski, vol. iv.

ple talked openly of the coming change, days before it oc-
red. Only a spark was needed to set all this tinder alight, and
was duly provided by the electric personality of Catherine.
had won the sympathies of the people, and especially of the
rds, by her personal charms, by her identification of herself
h her adopted country, and by the ill treatment to which
outrageous husband subjected her.

The revolution which followed was a very different affair from
e which have been described. It was not a palace con-
acy but a popular movement, at any rate as far as the capital
concerned. It was not provoked by dynastic intrigue, but
ng spontaneously from a deep sense of national injury.
vas made not in the name of any member of the dynasty
whom only two were alive—the prisoner Ivan VI and the
t-year-old boy Paul), but in that of a German princess who
no connexion with Russia except as the consort of its very
Russian emperor. Thus the Russian people, or rather the
ility in the capital and the army, who were then its only
al representatives, abjured the emperor to whom only six
aths previously they had sworn fidelity, and gave Russia a non-
sian sovereign of their own choice. The revolution itself was
hort duration and absolutely bloodless. The preparations
it were rapid and few—such was the strength of opinion in
avour. Catherine was staying at Peterhof, on the shore of
Gulf of Finland, 15 miles west of St. Petersburg, where on
29th of July, his name's-day, she was to be rejoined by her
band; thence he was to proceed to the capital to bid God-
d to his troops on their way to Holstein. He himself was
nwhile merry-making at Oranienbaum, 5 miles west of
rhof, in blissful ignorance of what was afoot. Catherine's
porters-in-chief were Count Cyril Razumóvski, Colonel of
Izmáilovski regiment, the two stalwart and handsome
hers Orlóv, Alexis and Gregory, of the same regiment,

Count Pánin, and Princess Dáshkova, daughter of the Cha
cellor Vorontsóv and sister of the emperor's mistress. T
development of the plot was hastened by its inadverte
betrayal by an excessively zealous supporter, which led to t
arrest of one of its chief agents, and as a consequence it w
unexpectedly rapid. Catherine, summoned post-haste fro
Peterhof on the morning of July 8, arrived in the capital, ma
a tour of the barracks where she received the exuberant homa
of all the Guards' regiments, and thence made her way to t
newly-completed Winter Palace, where the assembled Sena
and Synod took the oath of loyalty to her. She was there a
then proclaimed empress 'by the will of the whole people,
defence of the Orthodox Faith, of the glory of Russia, and
internal order'. The evening of the same crowded day sh
rode on horseback and in uniform, accompanied by all h
newly-found court, to Peterhof. Peter III, meanwhile, wh
had arrived to find an empty palace, had by that time lear
vaguely of the latest events. Emissaries, including Vorontsó
whom he had sent to St. Petersburg to bring the empress
reason, merely and promptly went over to her side. Left alo
with his court ladies, he hurriedly embarked and returned
Oranienbaum. The next day Catherine compelled him to sig
an act of voluntary abdication, had him brought to Peterho
and thence dispatched him to Ropsha, a village to the south
St. Petersburg which the Empress Elizabeth had given hi
There he was interned and placed under the guard of Alex
Orlóv, and there, a week later, as the result of a brawl in whic
the whole party, all the worse for drink, became involved, h
perished. This peaceful revolution was the last of the series
upheavals enacted by the regiments which Peter the Great ha
created. The Russian governing class, controlling as it did bot
financial and military resources, had found itself.

External Affairs from 1725 *to* 1762

n the course of this period (1725–62) Russia became in-
ed in a series of wars of which the general characteristics
e, that though an immense number of lives were lost, vast
sure was spent and many victories were won, no propor-
ate material advantage was gained from them in return,
the main objects of Russian foreign policy, the complete
ion of the Russian nation and the extension of the political
ndary to the natural limits of the Russian plain (that is
ay, the shore of the Black Sea, Esthonia and Livonia being
ady Russian), were not in the least advanced. The reigns of
herine I and Peter II (1725–30) were peaceful. The Russian
es were able to enjoy a few years of rest on the strength of
áva and of Hangö. In 1724 an alliance had actually been
cluded between Russia and Sweden, and this was followed
ne with Austria in 1726, the year in which Russia recognized
pragmatic sanction of the Emperor Charles VI. Russia
in the position of a new boy at school who has unexpectedly
ved the efficacy of his fists on older members of the com-
nity and reaps the novel reward of respect and solicitation.
he two wars which filled the reign of the Empress Anne
novna, 1730–40) were that called ' of the Polish Succession ',
that against Turkey.

oland had already at this time for more than a century
n subject to an almost continuous process of corrosion
in and erosion without. In 1733 it was already no longer
nuinely autonomous state, as events rapidly proved. The
candidates for the throne were Stanislas Leszczyński and
lerick Augustus, son of the last king. The former was
orted by France and by the powerful Polish family of the
ckis ; other Polish magnates also disingenuously urged
exclusion of a foreigner from the throne, knowing that

the neighbouring Powers would not tolerate Leszczyński an hoping to secure the crown for one of themselves. Leszczyńs had paid visits to Vienna, where he promised to recogniz the pragmatic sanction in return for Charles VI's suppor and to Petersburg, where he promised the Empress Anne th Grand Duchy of Courland, on the death of the last of th Kettlers, for her to give to Bühren. In spite of the fact tha both Austria and Russia announced through their ambassado that they would not recognize Leszczyński, he was elected kin in September 1733. But a large party of the electors dissente and withdrew to the right or east bank of the Vistula. There three weeks later, they were joined by a large Russian army under Anne's Scottish general Lacy, and Augustus III wa then proclaimed king by them. Leszczyński in alarm mad his way to Danzig, while Augustus was crowned at Craco (January 1734). Lacy laid siege to Danzig, but the Russia army was no longer equipped as in the days of Peter the Grea The city capitulated to Münnich after four and a half month and at great sacrifice of Russian life, and Leszczyński too refuge in Koenigsberg.

Meanwhile France and Austria were also engaged in hos tilities on the same question. The French armies seized number of Austrian provinces, but the situation was saved b the sudden appearance of Lacy with a Russian army corps o the Rhine, and the result was the Treaty of Vienna (1735), b which Leszczyński abdicated and was given a life interest i Lorraine as a reward, the province afterwards to revert t France. The war of the Polish Succession was followed by on between Russia and Turkey. This was partly instigated b France in revenge for the Russian help of Austria and was partl sought by Russia, who was anxious to maintain her prestige an also to rectify the conditions of the Treaty of the Prut (171 cf. p. 232). In those days the Ottoman Empire occupied, wit

ard to France, the same position as it has done to the modern
rman Empire in the last forty years. The pretext for the
r on Russia's part was to punish the Crimean Tartars, who
re under Turkish suzerainty, for making raids into Russia,
l also to prevent possible intervention of Turkey in the affairs
Poland. The war began in 1735 and lasted four years. The
ssian armies under Münnich covered themselves with glory.
e Crimea was raided and devastated three times. Azóv and
hákov, a fortress on the Black Sea coast between the mouths
the rivers Dniester and Dnieper, were stormed, and finally
ldavia, with its capital Jassy, was conquered and occupied.
nundred thousand lives were sacrificed. But the Treaty of
grade, which in 1739 terminated the war, was little short of
astrous both for Austria and Russia, largely owing to the
itary failures of Austria, to the ineptitude of Russian diplo-
cy headed by the Chancellor Ostermann, and to the skill of
French ambassador at Constantinople. Russia demanded
Black Sea littoral from the Kubán to the Danube, including
Crimea, but in the end secured only a narrow strip of terri-
y between her northern frontier and the Black Sea coast, and
town of Azóv, which she was forbidden to fortify, nor could
even get permission to sail any ships, of commerce or of war,
the Black Sea. Austria by the same treaty lost much of the
ritory which Prince Eugene of Savoy had won for her and
ured by the Treaty of Passarowitz (*Požarevac*) in 1717.

The alliance with Austria, which had been in force since 1726,
olved Russia in two wars during the reign of the Empress
zabeth (1741–62), that with Sweden, and that of the Austrian
ccession which developed into the Seven Years' War.

The Emperor Charles VI had died in 1740, and had been
ceeded by his daughter, Maria Theresa, as Queen of Hungary
Bohemia, and ruler of the various other scattered Hapsburg
inions. Although he had spent the energies of a whole reign

in obtaining the recognition of the pragmatic sanction by th various Courts of Europe, little heed was paid at his death the various agreements, and Maria Theresa found herself bes by enemies. The principal of these was of course Frederick, wh had succeeded to the throne of Prussia, also in 1740. Frederi promptly made war on his neighbour, and after a series victories secured possession of the valuable province of Silesi The arrangement of the Powers was one in which France an Prussia were pitted against Great Britain, Austria, and Russi Sweden, no longer the Power that she was, was still a satelli of France. In order to prevent Russia from helping her al Austria, France and Prussia had provoked Sweden to atta her, on the chance of recovering once more some of th conquests of Peter the Great. The Swedes ingenuously pose as the champions of Elizabeth's rights to the throne; th was in 1741, during the brief régime of Anne Leopóldovn When, therefore, in November 1741 Elizabeth herself seized th throne without the help of anybody, except that of the Guard they no longer knew exactly what to say they were fighting fo The campaign itself was brief and entirely creditable to th Russian army, which was under the command of the Scottis generals, Lacy and Keith. It took place in Finland. Th Russians rapidly conquered the whole south of the countr including Helsingfors and Abo, and in the autumn of 1742 th Swedes sued for peace. This was concluded at Abo in 174 and gave Russia a considerable slice of south-eastern Finland

The war of the Austrian Succession was a more complicate and grander affair. Neither it nor its successor the Seven Yea War had the slightest ultimate effect on Russian history. The were rather luxurious and costly manifestations of Russia newly-acquired power of intervention in European affairs. Th war of the Austrian Succession lasted from 1740 until 174 when it was terminated by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle

ssia took no really active part in it until that year. For six rs she hedged. Elizabeth was absorbed by the newly-found asures of being an empress, and her ministers, the Chancellor stúzhev-Ryúmin and the Vice-Chancellor Vorontsóv, could t agree on a policy. The ambassadors of Great Britain, ance, Prussia, and Austria kept pulling this way and that. ally, in 1746, Russia renewed the treaty of alliance of 1726 h Austria. In 1748 a Russian army corps under Repnín in marched to the Rhine, but never fired a shot, and did not the least affect the issue. That had already been decided in ious European theatres of war. By the Treaty of Aix-la-apelle in 1748 Maria Theresa had definitely consolidated her ition on the throne of the Hapsburgs, and had lived down pragmatic sanction at the cost of Silesia and some less impor-t outlying portions of her dominions. Meanwhile, her husband ancis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine, had in 1745 been elected peror as Francis I, on the death of the Emperor Charles VII e Elector of Bavaria, 1742–5), and thus the imperial dignity d returned to Austria in the person of the queen's consort. During the next decade a complete change took place in the angement of the European Powers. The acquisition of esia by Prussia opened the eyes of Europe to the latent dangers all its neighbours which the rise of that Power contained. ie enmity between Vienna and Berlin grew rather than dimi-hed. Maria Theresa possessed a very able minister in Count unitz,[1] who had represented Austria at Aix-la-Chapelle, and m 1751 to 1753 had been Austrian ambassador at Paris. He ected all his efforts to the isolation of Prussia ; and the result them was the Treaty of Versailles of May 1756, by which ance and Austria, the secular enemies of one another, became ies. About the same time Great Britain became involved in olonial war with France, and in January 1756 concluded an

[1] The real name of this Bohemian family was *Kounic* (lit. *marten*).

alliance with Prussia in order to secure Hanover from Fren attack. The position of Russia, a matter of the greatest impo tance to both sets of Powers, remained ambiguous. Elizabe and Bestúzhev-Ryúmin were notoriously anti-Prussian, but t latter, imagining that in the war which all saw to be immine the old grouping of the Powers would be maintained, had September 1755 concluded an alliance with Great Britai Thus Russia had a foot in either camp. Frederick had al faithful friends in Russia in the persons of the Grand Duc couple, Peter and Catherine. Eventually, owing to the gre activities of French official and unofficial diplomacy at Pete burg, Russia became a party to the Treaty of Versailles January 1757, so that Frederick had Russia, Austria, and Franc not to mention Sweden and Saxony, against him.

Frederick opened the war by invading Saxony and Bohemia May 1757. In East Prussia, which was separated from the rest his dominions by Polish territory, he left a comparatively sm force, judging it a secondary theatre of war and under-estimati the weight of the impending Russian attack. This was launch in the summer of 1757, when the Russian army, under Apráxi invaded Prussia, and, advancing towards Koenigsberg, join battle with the Prussians under von Lehwaldt at Gro Jaegersdorf [1] on August 29, 1757. The Russians, at the begi ning of the battle, were on the point of losing the day, and effect suffered far heavier losses than their enemies, but t valour of young Count Peter Rumyántsev at the head of t Nóvgorod regiment rallied the shaken Russian army and turn what appeared inevitable defeat into a great Russian victo Frederick had already been beaten that summer by the Austria at Kolin in June, and by the French at Hastenbeck in July, a was already in a difficult situation. But, instead of following his victory, Apráxin retreated to Tilsit, and then evacuat

[1] Between Insterburg and Friedland.

ıssia and retired beyond the Niemen. This retreat, which atly helped Frederick and greatly embarrassed Russia's allies, always remained a mystery. Apráxin has been accused of ruption and of having been unduly influenced by the 'Young urt'. The Russian army was also lamentably short of supplies ıll sorts. Probably his action was connected with the health the Empress Elizabeth, which already was very precarious.[1] t at this time she had a stroke which at first all believed to fatal. As her health failed the influence of her heir, the and Duke Peter, and of his wife Catherine increased. stúzhev-Ryúmin had already gone over to their side; and this l been one reason which had inclined Frederick to minimize Russian danger. Her death at this moment would have ant an instant alteration of Russian policy, as it did five years er. But she recovered. Inquiries were held, as a result of ich, in 1758, Bestúzhev-Ryúmin was disgraced and exiled, therine and her husband brought to heel by a threatened eration of the succession, Apráxin died of apoplexy, and Eliza- h determined to prosecute the war with greater vigour than r. This was a triumph for France and Austria, damped as y were by the effect of Rosbach in October, and of Lissa in cember, 1757.

Already in January 1758 the Russian army, under the command of Count Fermor, had again invaded Prussia and, advancing unopposed, had occupied Koenigsberg. Thence it slowly de its way to Küstrin on the Oder, which it reached in July. ederick hurried to save this place, which defended the road to rlin, crossed the Oder and forced the Russians to retire to the age of Zorndorf, where the battle of that name was fought August 24, 1758. The result was a great victory for Frederick; it was followed by the retreat but not the destruction of the ssian army. The following year the command of the Russian

[1] Waliszewski, *La Dernière des Romanov*, p. 449.

army was given to Saltykóv, who was not any more gifted as general than his two predecessors. On August 9, 1759, to place the great battle of Künersdorf near Frankfort (on t Oder), which proved a veritable disaster for Frederick and h army. Here, too, the Prussians were successful in the earli phases of the battle, but the fire of the Russian artillery and t resistance of the Russian troops, combined with an attack Frederick by the Austrians under Laudon, were in the end t much for him, and he retired, himself in despair and his army a artillery in ruins. But once more neither the Russians nor t Austrians followed up their victory, and Frederick was aga given time to recuperate. The following winter was spe in negotiation and in discussion of their respective terms territorial compensation by the allies. In 1760 a joint expediti of Russians and Austrians was planned against Berlin, and if had been properly carried out, would have undoubtedly settl the issue of the war. As it was, it resolved itself into a me raid under the Russian general Totleben, who was all the tim receiving money secretly from Frederick. The Russian a Austrian troops entered Berlin, which the Prussian army h abandoned, on October 8, imposed a levy, ransacked the sho destroyed a lot of property, and left again on the 11th on getti news of Frederick's approach from the direction of Silesia. T following year the Russians conquered Pomerania and Ru yántsev captured Kolberg. The Austrians under Laudon to Schweidnitz. Frederick was exhausted and was no longer a to offer serious resistance. If better co-ordination had exist between the Austrians and the Russians he could not ha escaped destruction. At the end of 1761 he was so despera that he thought of asking Turkey for help. The death of t Empress Elizabeth on December 22, 1761/January 2, 176 and the accession of Peter III, saved him.

The war between Austria and Prussia was continued ha

artedly until 1763, when it was terminated by the Peace of ubertsburg. This stipulated that things should be as they ere before the war. Silesia remained Prussian, and Frederick pt a province—then, as now, half Polish in population—which as the source of a large revenue, and to-day is one of the ain economic pillars of Germany.

7

Conquest of the Crimea and Dismemberment of Poland

Catherine II (1762–96)

Catherine II was thirty-three years old when she became mpress in 1762, and she reigned until 1796. She was a German rincess who usurped the throne, stepping to it across the corpse one legitimate Russian emperor, Peter III, grandson of Peter e Great and her own husband (though not, be it remembered, e husband of her own choice), and across the living skeleton of nother legitimate Russian emperor, Ivan VI, imprisoned in chlüsselburg—brushing aside, too, the rightful heir, her vn son Paul, born in 1754, whom she relegated to the estate Gátchina, near St. Petersburg, where he was forced to spend e next thirty-four years of his life (1762–96), chafing in virtual mprisonment. But all this did not prevent her from being nutterably shocked by the execution of Louis XVI.

Her reign was a great epoch in Russian history, though it is mpossible honestly to concede that epithet to the empress her-lf. Catherine did not make her epoch, as Peter the Great did s, but was made by it. All the conditions which made her hievements and those of her coadjutors possible existed at e time of her accession. The complete emancipation of the

nobility (*dvoryánstvo*) and the complete enslavement of th proletariate enabled the former to develop habits of life both a home and abroad '*dans le grand style, la grande manière*' whic created the tradition of the boundless wealth of the Russia aristocracy—wealth which was produced by the impoverishmen of their estates and the degradation of their serfs and wa squandered abroad—and also forced the latter to express it feelings in the great social revolution of 1773. The anarchy an demoralization of Poland and the decadence of the Ottoma Empire enabled Catherine with comparative facility to acquir enormous territories at the expense of these countries, to gai the merit of having enlarged the boundaries of the empire mor than any sovereign since Ivan IV, and generously to endow he favourites with other people's property. By 1762 two whol generations had passed since Peter the Great had dragged an pushed unwilling Russia to the waters of Western civilization an succeeded with untold efforts in making her drink: it was there fore not surprising that now the upper class of Russian societ should not only look, but should also begin to feel and think, lik their compeers in other European countries, that they shoul dabble in continental freemasonry and in the philosophy of th French Encyclopaedists, and, so far from considering, as the did in the old days, that the acquisition of foreign languages en dangered the salvation of the soul, should come to look on thei mother-tongue as a vulgar and negligible *patois*. The existenc of these conditions and the occurrence of these events cannot b put to the credit of Catherine, though it is undeniable that sh turned them to the best possible account. She gave the im pression that she was pulling hard all the time, but in fact sh was merely borne along on the current. *Imponieren* was ho watchword. Her reign was extremely imposing and so wa she herself, but it was also something of an imposition, and sh herself was something of a humbug. In her self-advertisemen

ere was a good deal of bluff. She was one of those persons who e made responsible for a number of nice things which they do ot do, and escape responsibility for a number of nasty things hich they actually do. In the Russia of those days, after all at had gone before, it did not require a great mental effort to ppear as an enlightened despot, a philosopher, a torch-bearer civilization. When she was young and felt secure she liked to ay with liberal ideas, to shock her ministers, and to astonish e men of letters in Paris. But it only required the events of 89 and advancing age to make her show her true colours.

At the same time, there was much that was good in her, and en much that compels admiration. She offered a great ntrast to all her predecessors on the throne, and in most spects a favourable one. She might almost be called a femi-ne *pendant* to Peter the Great. Once she had achieved her nbition, which was the imperial crown, she applied herself ith skill and energy to what she thought were the best interests her adopted country. Just as he was the first ruler of Russia ho really worked, she was the first who read and wrote and ought. She was the first Russian sovereign who can be termed ducated. She was also really clever. She had a passion for riting and expressed her thoughts with facility and verve. She ppreciated painting and architecture. She also had her foibles. e was notoriously sensual, with a ready passion for large nd handsome men. Her lovers cannot be counted on the ngers of two hands. But she never abandoned herself to easure like her predecessors, and, though she valued occasional mp and luxury, in her personal habits she was frugal. She ver spent an idle moment, used to rise early, wasted little me on her toilet, and did not abuse her servants. On the whole, spite of the resounding political successes which she achieved, cannot be said that the Russian people as a whole in her reign ere any happier than they had been in that of the Empress

Elizabeth. Rather the reverse. Most of the last reign had been peaceful, only the last four years being occupied with the war against Prussia. The reign of Catherine was filled with great events, but included disasters such as the outbreak of the plague at Moscow in 1771 and the great rebellion of Pugachëv[1] in 1773. External successes and expansion of the frontiers coincided with an increase of the burdens of the people. The scope of serfdom was extended to the whole of Little Russia, and was also increased by the bestowal of imperial lands on private owners, entailing the conversion of the semi-free peasants on them to serfs. In addition, the control of the serf-owners was made still more rigorous.

On the other hand, in matters of religion Catherine was quite broad-minded, while Elizabeth had been narrow and fanatically Orthodox. Catherine's reign was remarkable for the toleration extended to all forms of belief, including the Russian dissenters themselves, the Old Believers whom Peter the Great had persecuted.

In the first few years of her reign especially, Catherine made a great display of liberal and even revolutionary views. The fruit of these was the great Legislative Commission summoned to Moscow in 1766 to undertake a new codification of the laws. This was, in effect, a representative assembly of all classes and nationalities in the polyglot Russian Empire, numbering 658 deputies. For its guidance Catherine herself compiled a weighty 'Instruction' (*Nakáz*), founded, as she herself owned, on the works of Montesquieu and Beccaria. This Instruction indeed was so radical that it alarmed her ministers, who insisted on drastic expurgation. The Commission was heralded with a tremendous fanfaronnade, was extremely quaint and picturesque, and ended in nothing at all. More than two hundred sittings were held, every conceivable topic was discussed, all sections of

[1] Pronounced *Pugachóf*.

e community, from the Baltic barons to the Kalmuks and moyeds, were represented and voiced their grievances. But nen certain of the deputies brought forward the question of e serfs and pronounced themselves in favour of their emancition, the Russian nobility considered that matters had gone enough, and cried out in alarm to Catherine to curb the ngerous spirits which she had unchained. Happily this was cilitated by the outbreak of the war with Turkey in 1767, and e Commission fizzled out. Catherine's most notable acts of eform' were the redivision of Russia into fifty 'governments' *ubérniya*) instead of Peter the Great's ten, which were far too wieldy administrative units; a general delimitation of public d private boundaries; the secularization of the vast monastic operties, which were made dependent on the State, as was the nurch; the foundation of a considerable number of schools, phanages, and hospitals; and the colonization of immense aces of empty lands in south-eastern Russia—largely with erman immigrants who remain there to this day—and in the wly-conquered southern territories. Little Russia was also mpletely absorbed; the *hetmanate* of the Cossacks was olished; their *sech* (cf. p. 205) was destroyed by Potëmkin,[1] no was a sort of viceroy and organizer of the extreme south, own as 'New Russia'; and the Cossacks who would not cept the new arrangements were transferred to the territory mediately east of the Sea of Azóv, where they were organized the 'Black Sea Cossacks'.

Catherine particularly prided herself as an authoress and as patroness of art, especially literature. Certainly letters in her gn flourished in Russia as they had never done before. The amatists Fon-Vízin,[2] Sumarókov, and Knyazhnín, the fabulist

[1] Pronounced *Patyómkin*.

[2] A Russianized German name, *Von-Wiesen*.

Khémnitser,[1] the poets Derzhávin and Kheráskov have all made names for themselves which have endured in Russian literature, though Russian poetry of this period is so imitative of the French and Classical Schools, so unspontaneous and un-Russian, that it has little more than historical value. Memoirs (almost always written in French) occupy a place of honour in the literary history of the period, and many illuminating volumes of these have survived, including those of the empress herself and of her friend the Princess Dáshkova, President of the Academy of Sciences, at whose instance the Russian Academy (of Letters) was founded in 1783. Journalism played a great part in the education of the society of the time, and the principal figure in this field was Nóvikov, who made famous the *Moscow News* (*Moskóvskiya Védomosti*) and rendered inestimable service in the popularization of reading.

In the last years of the reign, when it was seen what the effects of enlightenment had been in France, a wave of reaction set in. Catherine became thoroughly alarmed; Nóvikov was imprisoned, and Radíshchev, another writer of liberal tendencies, was exiled to Siberia. But on the whole, it must be conceded that literature flourished, at least relatively, during this reign, and the men of letters of the next generation knew, at all events, what to avoid. The reign of Catherine II was the culmination, though not the end, of an epoch in Russian history. The class which governed the country, the nobility (*dvoryánstvo*), was now a vast conglomeration of landowners, officers, and bureaucrats, more united in spirit and more uniform in aspect than it had ever been before. It no longer hankered after political reforms. It had got what it wanted—a sufficiency of wealth, power, and security, and a sovereign who was an autocrat, a woman, and at the same time a reasonable, intelligent, and thoughtful person with a thorough grasp of international politics, who did not

[1] A Russianized German name, *Chemnitzer*.

op off their heads or make them work too hard, and had some se of dignity and of the fitness of things. The tree planted Peter the Great had indeed flowered and borne fruit, though t exactly of the quality of which he had dreamed.

Events preceding the Partition of Poland

Whatever were its defects, the reign of Catherine II created e impression of greatness and serenity which gratified the verning class of the day and, when it was all over, earned for he complimentary reputation of the 'good old days'. The ents which principally lent colour to these pretensions were ose of external politics with which this reign was filled, successful wars against one hereditary enemy—the Otto- n Empire—and the liquidation of another, Poland. As esult of these it may truly be said that what had been the ef aims and ambitions of Russian foreign policy, not only since ter the Great's time, but ever since the beginning of the teenth century, were at length triumphantly accomplished. nfortunately, the consumption of Poland was such an easy tter that Russia here committed an excess from which she suffered ever since. Catherine looked upon war against rkey, and the liberation of the Christians in the Near East, her historic mission. But in the end it was Poland who d the bill for this unsuccessful crusade. Catherine's first r against the Turks (1768–74) and the first partition of Poland 72) were in reality two parts of a single operation. Poland ring the reign of the Saxon King Augustus III (1733–64), o owed his election to Russian support (cf. p. 286), had been re and more exposed to the effects of Russian influence. The ntry was divided against itself by two powerful parties, ded respectively by the great families of the Potockis and the artoryskis. Both parties were animated by a sense of insecurity d danger in view of the increasingly menacing attitude of the

neighbouring Powers, and both realized the necessity of reform. The Czartoryskis were openly in alliance with Russia, an alliance which they hoped to use in order to force their policy of reform on the country and to secure the throne for their own family, but which the Russians only meant to turn to their own account. The Potockis were in favour of gradual, spontaneous, and home-made reforms, but, as these are notoriously slow in maturing, they earned for themselves the name of conservatives; they looked to France and Austria for support. Until 1751 the Czartoryskis had had more influence at court and with the king's Saxon minister Brühl. But from that year onwards, largely owing to skilful matrimonial alliances, the Potockis ousted them, and they came to rely on Russian support more than ever. In 1755 a Polish nobleman, Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski, whose mother was a Czartoryska,[1] was appointed as Secretary to the British Embassy in Petersburg. He was then twenty-four years old, and a very handsome, eloquent, and cultivated young man. He made friends with the Grand Ducal couple, and soon became Catherine's most ardent lover. Through her influence and that of the Chancellor Bestúzhev-Ryúmin he was shortly made Saxon Minister at the Russian Court. During the Seven Years' War he became involved in the traitorous intrigues which the 'Young Court' were carrying on in favour of Frederick the Great; and these, when they were exposed, led to the temporary disgrace of Catherine, the fall and exile of Bestúzhev-Ryúmin, and the discreet withdrawal of Poniatowski to Warsaw (1758). When the revolution of June 1762 occurred in Petersburg it was assumed that the hands of the Czartoryskis would be still further strengthened by the existence of the affectionate bond which linked their nephew with the new empress, and they took up a menacing attitude towards the reigning king, Augustus III. Civil war was on the point of

[1] In Polish the surname ends in *-ski* for males, and in *-ska* for females.

eaking out between their party and that of the Potockis, when
ly in October 1763 Augustus III died in Dresden.
The troubles attending the election of the new monarch were
olonged and acute. The Potockis supported the late king's
, the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony; but he died
small-pox in December 1763. Thereupon they proceeded
choose a candidate from among their own party. The
artoryskis hoped for the election of one of themselves. The
position to them in the country was so bitter that they had
have recourse to a violation of the constitution before they
uld get their own way. Russian troops were actually on
lish soil supporting them, and in view of this fact the other
ty refused to proceed with the election in May 1764, the
e fixed, and dispersed. The Czartoryskis then proclaimed a
neral secession (*Konfederacja*) and proceeded to hold the Diet
new lines, suspending the right of individual obstruction
erum veto) and legislating by a majority of votes. Under
ese conditions they intended to carry out important reforms
the administration and to pass, amongst others, a law stipu-
ing that future candidates for the throne must be of purely
lish birth. It was under such circumstances that the election
s held in August 1764, and the Czartoryskis received a shock
en they discovered that Russia and Prussia had between them
cided that no Czartoryski, but Poniatowski, was to be king.
nislas Augustus Poniatowski, the last King of Poland, was
us elected on September 7, 1764. Shortly after this hostilities
re declared between Russia and the Czartoryskis, because the
ssian and Prussian ministers would not permit the reforms
posed by the Czartoryskis, and the Czartoryskis would not
ept the demands put forward by Russia, namely, an offensive
d defensive alliance and concessions to the Polish subjects of
thodox faith and Russian nationality, known as *dissidents*
ovember 25, 1764). This power of intervention in the inter-

nal affairs of Poland was the natural outcome of what had gone before, but it was none the less tragic for Poland. It was, in official parlance, blandly termed the preservation of the rights and liberties of the Polish people. Poland was before long to learn the full benefit of this peculiar form of international altruism, in which one country prevents another from reforming itself and then attacks it because it has not reformed itself. In Poland the preservation of all the privileges of the only politically emancipated class, the nobility, had resulted in anarchy. Anarchy was useful to the neighbouring Powers because it gave an excuse for interference; and therefore it must be preserved. This was the vicious circle from which Poland, handicapped in addition by all the difficulties of social and religious cleavage, was unable to emerge. With the amiable, indolent, and malleable Poniatowski on the throne, Prussia and Russia knew that they would be able to do as they liked. It was another nail, by no means the first, in Poland's coffin. The symptoms were multiplying, and dissolution, if not immediately in prospect, was in the long run clearly inevitable.

Besides the prevention of all useful reforms, the weapon which Russia and Prussia used in their undermining of the Polish national edifice was the ever-ready argument of religious grievances. There were large numbers of Lutherans in western, and of the Orthodox in eastern Poland; it was the cause of these which Frederick the Great and Catherine espoused in their joint efforts against the Polish State. Unfortunately, the large majority of Poles were so fanatically intransigent and intolerant in their Roman Catholicism that they may be said themselves to have put this weapon into their enemies' hands. It was not long before the Russian ambassador at Warsaw, Prince Répnin, raised the question of the persecution of the Russian Orthodox communities in White and Little Russia. When, in 1766, the Polish Diet definitely refused to grant

uality of rights and full liberty of conscience to non-oman Catholic subjects of the Polish State, whether Poles not, they produced the spark which lit an immense confla-ation, fatal to themselves. Secessions immediately sprang , one of the Lutherans at Thorn and another of the thodox at Slutsk in White Russia. At the same time at dom yet another was formed by the intransigent Poles, emics of the Czartoryskis and of all reforms, political or igious. When the Diet met at Warsaw in 1767, the position to the granting of religious liberty was so fierce, at the Russian ambassador intervened and had the most emperate Roman prelates, who were members of it, re-oved by force and deported to Russia, in the name of igious tolerance. All the while a large Russian army was ustered on the frontier, and indeed there were Russian oops in Warsaw at Répnin's service. After this the Diet elded and granted equal political rights to non-Roman tholic nobles (November 19, 1767). The following year ebruary 24, 1768) a treaty was concluded between Russia and land which stipulated that no alteration should be made in e constitution without the consent of the former. Hence-rward Poland was virtually a vassal-state of Russia. But her oubles were not at an end, and what had been a semi-domestic arrel between the two premier Slavonic nations now became first-class European *imbroglio*. The secession of Radom, mposed of the Roman Catholic conservative fanatics, was censely dissatisfied at the turn events had taken, and after it d disbanded it immediately re-formed in the guise of the nous secession of Bar, in Podolia (February 28, 1768). This cession, which, like all other movements of the kind, was tuated by hostility to the authority of the king and to the actments of the Diet, rallied together all the extreme con-rvative elements in the country and adopted as its programme

the refusal of equal rights to non-Roman Catholics and the preservation intact of all the idiosyncrasies of the old constitution. Its members promptly proceeded to invoke the help of Austria, Saxony, and France in their domestic dispute, while King Stanislas Augustus and his government, in the face of this formidable insurrection which spread over the whole country, naturally, if unwisely, turned to Russia for support. Meanwhile Frederick the Great watched and waited.

The most striking facts about the Seven Years' War were that its results were exactly the opposite of those which it had been expected to yield. It was to have crushed Frederick, instead of which it merely confirmed the position of Prussia as one of the Great Powers, and left France weakened and discredited throughout Europe. Louis XV's minister, Choiseul, who came to power in 1766, made it his task to rehabilitate his country, and, besides relying on the alliance with Austria, which never brought France any advantage, began to develop great activity in the three minor and Francophil political centres of Constantinople, Warsaw, and Stockholm. But even France was not unanimous. While the Court party favoured the rebellious Poles who had raised the standard of faith and liberty (i. e. the maintenance in full of the political privileges of the Roman Catholic nobles), Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists sympathized with the cause of the dissidents who were claiming equal political rights with Roman Catholics, and with that of the king and the government who favoured measures of reform. Choiseul formed the plan of neutralizing the Continent while France should be left free to deal with England.[1] Austria was to keep Prussia quiet, while Poland and Turkey and Sweden were to be exploited against Russia. None of these plans fructified, because Austria and Prussia in October 1768 came to a formal understanding; because Poland and Turkey were both in

[1] Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 26.

tate of decadence; and because Frederick and Catherine re already united in alliance. The Russian army had placed therine on the throne and deposed Peter III largely on ount of his pro-Prussian sympathies and his alliance with ederick. But Catherine was not long before she showed what r real feelings were. On April 11, 1764, she concluded a treaty lliance for eight years with Frederick, by which they mutually aranteed each other's dominions, and promised each other pport in men or money in case of war. It was on the strength this alliance that the Russian and Prussian ministers hence-ward acted in unison at Warsaw, procuring the election of niatowski (cf. p. 301), and also at Constantinople, where they de it their business to counteract French diplomacy. Ever ce France and Austria had been in alliance the former ntry had lost credit in Turkey, whose whole foreign policy s based on the hereditary enmity between these two ntries.[1] When, therefore, the French ambassador began to ist Turkish sympathies on behalf of Poland and against Russia, had an uphill task, but since the election of Poniatowski, in ich Turkey had evinced no interest, France had no longer minister at Warsaw,[2] and therefore action via Constantinople came more than ever imperative. The Turks were unwilling move, but events soon forced a decision in favour of France d against Russia.

When King Stanislas Augustus appealed to Russia to lend istance, the Russian army with alacrity invaded southern land, defeated the secessionists of Bar and captured Bar itself, rdíchev,[3] and eventually the old capital of Cracow. This mpaign was soon enlivened by a general rising of the Cossacks the Ukraine against their Polish masters, headed by fanatical thodox monks. These had been stung to action by the

[1] Sorel, op. cit., p. 22. [2] Ibid., p. 21.

[3] In Polish, *Berdczów*.

fanatical Roman Catholic priests, who had inflamed all Poland against the dissidents and had largely brought about the fatal secession of Bar. Waged under the banner of Orthodoxy, this rising was really national and economic in character, was directed against the Polish landlords and their Jewish 'farmers', and was accompanied by the usual massacres and devastations. At the same time France was egging on Turkey against Russia and smuggling through military aid to the Polish rebels, and Russia —cross in hand—was egging on the Balkan Christians against Turkey, promising them deliverance from their oppressors. One party was using the crescent to enforce the supremacy of the cross, the other the cross to undermine that of the crescent. Meanwhile, Orthodox and Roman Catholics were massacring each other in Poland, and in the end Turkey survived but Poland went under.

The First War against Turkey (1768-74), *the First Partition of Poland* (1772), *and the Rebellion of Pugachëv* (1773–5)

The explosion occurred unexpectedly on October 6, 1768. A party of Russians, in chasing some Cossack hot-heads whose anti-Polish zeal was even excessive, had inadvertently violated Turkish territory at Balta, between the Dniester and the southern (or Black Sea) Buh rivers, and Turkey declared war on Russia. Every one was taken by surprise, though it was what all had expected; the Russians, although they wanted a war with Turkey, were fully occupied in Poland, and were not prepared to take up the challenge, and the Turks were not prepared to put their threat into effect. Frederick the Great, with friendly candour, called this a war between the one-eyed and the blind, in which the former (Russia) could not help being victorious. The first act of war, as neither

ssians nor Turks were prepared to start fighting, was nmitted by the Crimean Tartars, subjects of Turkey, who :cessfully accomplished their usual rôle of ravaging the con- es of southern Russia during the winter of 1768–9. The same riod was spent in agitated negotiations by the interested wers, who were anxious, if they could not prevent the Russo- ırkish conflict, at any rate to localize it and turn it to their n advantage. Frederick in particular was dreading another ıeral European war after his narrow escape in the Seven Years' ar. Maria Theresa and her son Joseph II, who had been cted emperor in 1765, were apprehensive that a Russian umph over Turkey with large annexations would destroy the ance of power. Catherine was afraid that she would not be ual to the task of conquering the Turks and suppressing the les at the same time. It was in these circumstances that ederick conceived the dismemberment of Poland as the best y out of all the difficulties and a means of reconciling the lousies of the three autocracies. A simultaneous develop- ent was the reconciliation of Austria and Prussia, who were pposed to be deadly enemies, and a cooling of the relations tween the two pairs of allies, Austria and France, Russia and ussia. Frederick was determined not to help Russia actively the coming war against Turkey, and Austria had no inten- n of acting up to her engagements towards France.

In November 1768 Catherine wrote to Frederick to ask for help as her ally. The same month Frederick tried to mediate tween her and the Sultan Mustafa at Constantinople, but led. In December 1768 he wrote to Catherine to say that e could count on his loyalty. In January 1769 it was arranged at Frederick and Joseph should meet at Neisse in August of at year. In February 1769 Frederick suggested a partition Poland between the three Powers to Catherine and her nister Pánin, but they turned a deaf ear, having already marked

out the whole of Poland as their prey. Meanwhile Austria, in view of the imminent outbreak of hostilities, took the precaution of mobilizing troops and placing them along the extremely vague frontiers which separated her dominions from those of Poland and Turkey, and in February 1769 committed the first breach of Polish integrity on her part by occupying the famous county of Zips,[1] which formed an island of Polish territory in the north of Hungary and had been Polish ever since 1412.

Hostilities between Russia and Turkey began in the spring of 1769. In September of that year Prince Golítsyn defeated a Turkish army much larger than his own at Khótin[2] on the Dniester in Podolia (September 16, 1769), which opened the road for Russia into the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. There they set up Russian administrations in the capitals of Jassy and Bucarest respectively. This was Catherine's first military triumph, which was a trifle soured by the fact that on August 25 Frederick II and Joseph II had met and exchanged confidences at Neisse. The year 1770 was still more favourable to Russian arms. A fleet under the command of Alexis Orlóv, and of Admirals Greig and Spíridov, made its way from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, revictualled, and was refurbished in English ports, was not molested by the French, and appeared in the Aegean. The anticipated sympathetic revolution in Greece failed as usual, but the Turkish fleet was located, met, and totally destroyed off Chésmé on the coast of Asia Minor opposite Chios (July 5, 1770). Unfortunately, instead of forcing their way there and then to Constantinople, the Russians wasted time in the Aegean, and when they arrived at the Dardanelles these had been so strongly fortified under French supervision that the Russian fleet could not penetrate them. Nevertheless, it was a shock to the nerves of Constantinople. On August 1,

[1] In Polish, *Spiż*; in Magyar, *Szepes* (pronounced *Sépesh*).

[2] In Polish, *Chocim*.

o, Prince Rumyántsov totally defeated a Turkish army
en times the size of his own at Kagul, on the river Prut,
ich confirmed the Russian hold on the Turkish provinces
th of the Danube.

By this time Austria was thoroughly alarmed at the successes
ieved by the Russian arms, foreseeing a Russian conquest
the Balkans as well as of Poland and therefore a complete
truction of the continental balance of power, and began to
le the sword in its scabbard. On August 12, 1770, Turkey
ided to ask Austria and Prussia to mediate. In September
o Frederick II met Kaunitz and Joseph II at Neustadt, and
urged by the Austrian minister to use his influence at
ersburg to restrain the Russian lust of conquest lest Austria
uld be forced to make war against Russia, which might end
var between Austria and Prussia and in French intervention.
October 1770 Frederick's brother, Prince Henry, visited
ersburg and sounded Catherine. She would not yet formu-
e conditions of peace as the campaign was not yet at an end,
l therefore the mediation hung fire. By November Rumyán-
v had captured all the Turkish fortresses north of the Danube.
December Catherine announced her conditions, which in-
ded a protectorate over the Danubian principalities, Bessa-
ia, and the Crimea. These horrified Frederick, who knew
t they were sufficient to precipitate war with Austria and
nce. Austria threatened that the passage of the Danube by
Russians would be a *casus belli*. Fortunately for all con-
ned, except Poland, Choiseul fell at the end of December
o; France thereafter virtually no longer appeared on the
ne; and the autocrats at Vienna, Berlin, and Petersburg
athed more freely. Meanwhile, Austria had definitely an-
ed Zips on December 9, 1770, and begun to encroach on
licia, and Frederick, in order to prevent the plague which
raging in Poland from spreading into Prussia, drew a sani-

tary cordon composed of soldiers along the frontier between Brandenburg and Poland. Catherine, faced by the military preparations of Prussia and Austria, unable to rely on Prussian aid against Austria, and freed by the fall of Choiseul from the fear of French intervention, now began herself to come round to the view put forth by Frederick a year previously, and, in order to conciliate Austria and satisfy Prussia, she now in her turn proposed to Prince Henry on January 8, 1771, that the three Powers should assuage their mutual jealousies by all joining in the partition of Poland.[1] Russia was in virtual occupation of Poland and had conquered Turkey, but had not the physical capacity to assimilate both at the same time. Therefore, in order to retain some of either, she had to agree to share the former with Prussia and Austria. Thus it came about that France pushed Turkey into war with Russia in order to help Poland and embarrass Russia, but in the end it was Russia who came out the winner and Poland that was sacrificed in order to save Turkey.

The whole of the year 1771 was spent by the three Powers, Russia, Prussia, and Austria, in trying to bluff and to hoodwink each other. The cynicism of those who were planning the partition of Poland was only equalled by their dishonesty. Even France, the friend of Poland, had in March 1769 proposed its dismemberment to Prussia in return for an alliance, but Frederick knew that he would get what he wanted without any condition so embarrassing, and would not listen. In the complicated and delicate negotiations which filled the year 1771 it was inevitable, in view of the alliance between Prussia and Russia, of the understanding between Prussia and Austria, and of the jealousy between Austria and Russia, that Frederick should play the part of broker between the two latter countries. The policy of Frederick was to extort a solid commission for

[1] Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 133.

pains; to prevent a war between Austria and Russia, in ich he would unwillingly have to take sides; to prevent alliance between Austria and Russia, under which he might crushed; and to make both Austria and Russia accomplices the ticklish business of the dismemberment of Poland, since feared that, if Austria did not take part in it, the Poles uld inevitably look to Austria as the protector of their in-rity. Russia did not want a partition for the reason that wanted the whole, but was prepared to agree to partition her than to total loss or to war with Austria. Austria had no ma facie interest (whether economic and strategic, like that Prussia, or racial, like that of Russia) in the dismemberment Poland, whose existence as a large territorial unit acted as a nterpoise both to Russia and to Prussia; but the aggrandize-nt of Russia, especially at Turkey's expense, was the Austrian gbear, and if this could be prevented by the partition of land, Austria was prepared to fall into line on this question d to choose the lesser of two evils. Equivalent compensation ust be obtained somewhere, and the economic loss of Silesia d still to be made good; Maria Theresa, the only one of autocrats who had anything reminiscent of principle, was ongly against the partition of a neighbour who had always en friendly, but Joseph and Kaunitz had no such scruples.

Meanwhile, the war between Russia and Turkey and the war the Russians against the Polish insurgents continued. In the npaign of 1771 Prince Dolgorúki invaded the Crimea, otured all the Turkish fortresses, and finally destroyed rkish power in the peninsula. Turkey turned to Austria for p, and in July 1771 concluded a treaty with that country which, in return for subsidies and territorial and commercial ncessions, Austria undertook to redeem for Turkey some at st of the Russian conquests. In Poland Russia was not so ccessful. The French and the Austrians were helping the

Stockholm
BALTIC SEA
ST PETERSBURG
Novgorod
Pskov
ESTHONIA
LIVONIA
Riga
Mitau
COURLAND
Dvinsk
Polotsk
Vilna
Vitebsk
Smolensk
LITHUANIA
Tilsit
Memel
Koenigsberg
E. PRUSSIA
Grodno
Minsk
WHITE RUSSIA
Mogilev
POMERANIA
W. PRUSSIA
Thorn
Posen
GREAT POLAND
Warsaw
BLACK RUSSIA
Brest
R. Pripet
Lo Russia 1667
Chernigov
Breslau
Kielce
Lublin
Masczowice
POLESIE
LITTLE RUSSIA
Kiev
SILESIA
VOLYNIA
LITTLE POLAND
AUSTRIA
Cracow
GALICIA
Lemberg
RED RUSSIA
UKRAINA
Poltava
R. Dniester
Lo Austria 1770
Zolkiew
Humana
Targovica
HUNGARY
Jassy
MOLDAVIA
WALLACHIA
POLAND
in 1770
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300
Poland & Lithuania in 1770
Greatest extent of Poland & Lithuania during the first half of the 17th Century


TO AUSTRIA
The
First Partition
of
POLAND
1772
English Miles


TO PRUSSIA
TO RUSSIA
The
Second Partition
of
POLAND
1793
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300

TO PRUSSIA
TO AUSTRIA
TO RUSSIA
The
Third Partition
of
POLAND
1795
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300

rebels, and the task of pacifying the country, while the bulk of their army was fighting Turkey, proved too much for the Russians. The fact was that, however anarchic and disorganized, Poland in revolt was more than one of the neighbouring empires could master single-handed. While Russia struggled in Poland and Austria tied herself into intricate diplomatic knots on all sides, Frederick's plan matured. By playing off Russia against Austria and Austria against Russia he eventually brought them both into complete agreement with himself. In January 1772 Prussia and Russia finally agreed to dismember Poland and to invite Austria to take part in the feast; and in February Austria, on her own account, decided to propose partition in order not to be left out in the cold. The treaties of partition were finally signed in Petersburg on July 25, 1772, and were carried out during the same summer. It must be remembered that Russia had been in military occupation of two-thirds of Poland since 1768, so that her soldiers had actually to retire; the Austrian troops had long been percolating into Galicia, planting emblems of Austrian sovereignty far and wide; and Frederick had been gradually extending his military cordons in the part which fell to his share.

Although equality was the principle on which agreement had been originally secured, the lots eventually proved very uneven in size. Russia gained a large slice of White Russia—including the towns of Dvinsk (Dünaburg), Pólotsk, Vítebsk, and Mogilëv[1] (the western Dviná and the Drut, a tributary of the Dnieper, becoming the frontier)—with 1,600,000 inhabitants. Prussia secured Polish or 'Royal' Prussia, except the cities of Danzig[2] and Thorn,[3] and the enclave of Warmia (Ermeland), with 600,000 inhabitants. Austria, in spite of the scruples of Maria Theresa, acquired the whole of Galicia with the valuable

[1] Pronounced *Magilyóf*. [2] In Polish, *Gdańsk*.
[3] In Polish, *Toruń*.

t-mines of Wieliczka, and 2,600,000 inhabitants; this terri-
y was prudently annexed direct to the Austrian crown under
: name of the kingdoms of Galicia [1] and Lodomeria.[2] From
: Polish point of view, while the loss of part of White Russia
s relatively trifling, the loss of Prussia and that of Galicia were
solutely vital. With Prussia went the control of the Vistula,
land's only practicable outlet to the Baltic; with Galicia the
rpathians, Poland's only natural frontier. Poland herself, abso-
ely exhausted by four years of civil war, could not offer any
ned resistance, and the treaties of spoliation were accepted
d finally ratified by the Diet on September 18, and by the
ig on November 18, 1773.

Such was the train of events which actually brought about
d accompanied the first partition of Poland, though the
l causes were very different and far older in origin. In view
the historical development of Prussia, Poland, and Russia it
s almost inevitable that Poland should be crushed between
r two neighbours. For Prussia, with her peculiar geographical
d economic conditions, the partition of Poland was a vital
cessity; for Russia, with her millions of co-nationals in eastern
land and her age-long desire for revenge, it was a natural step
her process of national evolution as soon as she was strong
ough to move in that direction; for Austria it was a luxury
d a question of equilibrium. Whether the Poles themselves
uld have prevented it, if they had been less narrow-minded
d more far-seeing, less individualistic and more united, is
ubtful, in view of all the circumstances which militated
ainst their country. What is certain is that their political
nning was less than that of their neighbours, and that
en they realized this fact and sought to begin to reform

[1] Named thus after the ancient Russian principality of *Halicz*.

[2] Named thus after the ancient Russian principality of Vladimir (in
ýnia), the old Russian form of Vladimir being Volodimir.

themselves, it was too late. Poland was the unhappy medium which reconciled these three Powers and resolved their community of jealousies into a community of interests. The débris of the aristocratic republic of Poland formed the foundation on which the future Holy Alliance of the three military autocracies of Russia, Prussia, and Austria was built. Both sides were to blame; but while the aggressors were guilty of a complete lack of principle, the victim was merely guilty of what may be called exaggeration of principle and political absence of mind.

As soon as Austria had secured compensation in Poland her anxiety to help the Turks against Russia abated; so, having made sure that Russia would not annex the Danubian principalities, Kaunitz advised the Turks to make peace as best they could. The first peace congress met at Focșani [1] in Moldavia in April 1772, but the Turks would not accept the Russian demand for the independence of the Tartars of the Crimea and of the Black Sea coastal region, and negotiations were broken off.

The summer of 1772 was an embarrassing time for the three partitioning Powers. Having decided to dismember Poland they were faced with the delicate task of carrying this decision into effect, and of communicating the news to the victim and to the rest of Europe as decently and plausibly as possible. While engrossed in this business there occurred a *coup d'état* in Sweden which was not at all to the taste of Frederick and Catherine. French diplomacy, which had been utterly discredited in eastern Europe by the defeat of Turkey and the dismemberment of Poland, here achieved its one success. Sweden was at this time governed by its aristocracy under an oligarchic constitution which resulted in a perpetual anarchy similar to that reigning in Poland, and it was in the interest both of Catherine and Frederick, who had their eyes on Swedish as well as on Polish territory (Finland and Swedish Pomerania), that this state

[1] Pronounced *Fokshani*.

things should continue. In February 1771, on the death of ing Adolphus Frederick, his son succeeded him as Gustavus III. le had spent some time in France and was much under French fluence. Seeing the fate of Poland, he determined to save imself and his country from a similar misfortune, and with the elp of the army and of the citizens of Stockholm abolished the isting constitution and promulgated a new one which, while e-establishing the absolute power of the Crown, made the ountry stronger externally and was accompanied by the introuction of many internal reforms (August 1772).

Frederick was afraid now that if Russia attacked Sweden he ould have to help his ally (Russia), and that this again might ngc Austria and France against him, cause a general European ar, and undo all the achievements of his diplomacy. He accordngly decided to keep Russia engaged with Turkey, and therefore rofessed to sympathize with the Turks on the exorbitance of ne Russian demands, while at the same time he encouraged the ussians to insist, knowing that the more the Russians asked the ore the Turks would refuse.[1] Catherine, for her part, could ot think of a war against Sweden until peace was concluded ith Turkey. A second peace congress assembled at Bucarest, nd an armistice was agreed to in the autumn of 1772. This me the Turks conceded the independence of the Tartars, but ne Russians now in addition demanded the retention of the wo strongholds of Kerch and Yeni-Kalé,[2] which, situated at ne eastern extremity of the Crimea, commanded the channel etween the Sea of Azóv and the Black Sea. The Turks aturally retorted that these two places belonged to the now ndependent Crimean Tartars. Upon this the negotiations were nterrupted. When they were resumed, in February 1773, the ussians further demanded the disarmament of the fortress of Ochákov on the north side and the cession of that of Kinburn

[1] Sorel, op. cit., p. 243. [2] = New Fort.

on the south side of the estuary of the Dnieper, and a religious protectorate over all the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. The Turks agreed to everything except the cession to Russia of Kerch and Yeni-Kalé. They even offered to pay for not allowing the Russians to have them, while the Russians offered to pay in order to be allowed to have them. Agreement proved impossible. The congress broke up, and the war was resumed. The year 1773 was not favourable to Russian arms. Catherine ordered Rumyántsov to cross the Danube. Being prudent, he was unwilling to take this risk, but having to obey he carried out the command, crossed the river in June 1773, and laid siege to Silistria. In this he failed, and barely avoided disaster in recrossing the Danube. Meanwhile Joseph II was touring his new property, Galicia, and cast his eyes on the Bukovína,[1] which formed the northern tip of Moldavia, was then still Turkish territory, and appeared to him a desirable and even necessary complement to Galicia, and a small price for the Turks to pay if he used his offices successfully in securing peace between them and Russia. The autumn campaign of Rumyántsov's army went no better than that of the summer. He again crossed the Danube, but was defeated by the Turks, and again had to recross the river with considerable losses. Meanwhile the whole of Russia was turned upside down by the great upheaval known as the *Pugachëvshchina*, so called after the leader of the rebellion, Pugachëv.

Nominally this was a political movement in favour of a pseudo-Peter III and against the rule of Catherine II ; in reality it was a social and economic revolution of the peasants against the landed aristocracy. It started, like the similar movement under Sténka Rázin in the reign of Alexis (cf. p. 189), amongst the Cossacks of the rivers Don and Yaík (or Urál), who banded together under the leadership of one Pugachëv. This extremely

[1] Lit. *Beech(land)*.

prepossessing ruffian gave himself out to be Peter III. He as just as ugly as the late *tsar*, without in the least resembling m, but while nature had been equally unkind to his exterior, e had endowed him with a far keener brain. By displaying clever alternation cruelty, sensuality, and magnanimity, and pecially hatred and disregard of all existing authority, and by e lavish distribution of stolen property, he rapidly gathered nder his banner (that of Holstein !) all the discontented and sreputable elements in the country. For the sake of appear-ces he aped the actual court, giving his confederates the mes of Catherine's favourites, conducting reviews of his tterdemalion troops, calling his strongholds Petersburg and oscow, even producing a boy-heir whom he named Paul, and, a piquant inversion of Catherine's practice, instituting six ncubines whom he called his maids of honour. But the rength of the movement lay in its predatory and revolu-onary character. Driven to desperation by long years of ar superimposed on the longer years of crushing exactions on e part of the landlords, the peasants greedily seized this portunity of expressing their feelings; it was the only eans at their disposal, and was the inevitable outcome of cial conditions. Pugachëv's *ukázes*, although absolutely iterate, promised to liberate the peasants and to destroy e nobility, to grant full religious freedom, and to shut up atherine in a convent. Within a very short time he collected vast rabble of followers, marshalled into the form of an army fugitive Cossacks from the Don and the Dnieper, and for year terrorized the whole basin of the Volga, from Kazán Tsarítsyn, capturing towns, destroying properties, and uding his pursuers. Spreading to the more thickly inhabited untry between Kazán and Moscow the movement became regular *jacquerie*: the peasants rose against the landlords d the landlords fled to Moscow, so that the old capital

itself became infected with the spirit of unrest. As Pugachëv could not be ubiquitous, other pseudo-Peter III's and even pseudo-Pugachëvs began to spring up on all sides. Meanwhile, the troops who were sent against him went over to his side, killing their officers; and the only general who inflicted defeat on him, Bíbikov, died before he finished his task. At length a large force was organized against him, including Suvórov amongst its leaders; Pugachëv was eventually tracked and cornered between the lower Volga and Urál rivers, and in 1775 was brought to Moscow and executed.

It was natural that in these circumstances, compelled to fight the rebels as well as the Turks, the Russians were at some disadvantage. Catherine appealed to Austria to act as mediator with Turkey, offering to agree to territorial compensation, at Turkey's expense, as a reward.[1] Luckily for Russia, the Turks were quite incapable of following up their military advantages of 1773. When the campaign was renewed in 1774, Rumyántsov again crossed the Danube, defeated the Turks, surrounded the army of the Grand Vizier at Shúmla, and compelled it to surrender. In July a third peace congress opened at Kuchuk[2]-Kainardji near Silistria, and here was signed on July 21, 1774, the famous treaty of that name between Russia and Turkey which terminated the war. The only territory which Russia gained by this treaty was the district of Kabardá to the north of the Caucasus, and the strongholds of Azóv, Kerch, Yeni-Kalé, and Kinburn. Far more important than these were the recognition by Turkey of the complete political independence of the Crimean Tartars and of the spiritual protectorate of Russia over all Orthodox subjects of the Sultan, Rumans, Slavs, and Greeks. This was the kernel of the treaty, inasmuch as, purposely and skilfully veiled in obscure phraseology, this stipulation gave

[1] Sorel, *La Question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*, p. 258.

[2] *Kuchuk* in Turkish means 'little'.

ıssia the right henceforward to interfere in the internal affairs Turkey, as she had hitherto so effectively done in Poland, on e pretext of the defence of religious practices and beliefs. o sooner had they signed the treaty than the Turks tried to list Frederick's sympathy in order to have these clauses abro-ted. Austria would no longer help them. By this time the feeling between Vienna and Petersburg had considerably ated. With Galicia in his pocket and the Bukovina within reach, Joseph II was fast becoming friends with Catherine. ederick claimed a little more of Poland as the price of his reement to the Russo-Turkish terms of peace and as equiva-ıt compensation for the Bukovina. Catherine acquiesced. ederick told the Turks that they had nothing more to hope . Still protesting, they ratified the Treaty of Kainardji on ıuary 24, 1775. Meanwhile, the emblems of Austrian sove-gnty had been planted in the Bukovina in September 1774, d on May 7, 1775, this territory was formally ceded by Turkey Austria.

The Change in Foreign Policy after 1775

From this time forward Russian foreign policy took a new ırse. During the first part of her reign Catherine and her ancellor Pánin, who was also a Prussophil, relied mainly on e alliance with Prussia (cf. p. 305) and on an amicable under-nding with Denmark and Great Britain. From 1775 onwards therine began to cultivate more friendly and intimate rela-ns with Austria, though there was no breach with Prussia. om 1780, the year of the death of Maria Theresa and of nin, this tendency became still more marked. The place the former was taken by Joseph II, that of the latter by zboródko. The *northern system* was abandoned, and a conciliation with Austria and with France, leading to an iance, took its place. The years 1777–9 had been critical in

the relations between Austria and Prussia. In 1777 Maximilian Joseph, Elector of Bavaria, the last of the Wittelsbachs, died. Joseph II disputed the succession with the legitimate heir, Charles Theodore, the Elector Palatine. The latter was about to cede half Bavaria to Austria when Frederick in alarm again took up the cudgels and invaded Bohemia. The war did not develop into anything serious, and was terminated in 1779 by the mediation of France and Russia, when a peace conference met at Teschen[1] in Austrian Silesia, and the treaty of that name was concluded between Austria and Prussia. Austria secured only a strip of the desired territory, but Russia established a precedent for claiming a voice in the arrangement of the affairs of the empire. The following year Catherine had a meeting with Joseph II at Mogilëv, on the Dnieper, and he afterwards visited Petersburg.

The year 1780 also witnessed the promulgation of the principle of *armed neutrality* in which all the continental maritime Powers, foremost amongst them Russia, united against Great Britain, claiming the immunity from seizure of all neutral vessels and the right to sail where they pleased as long as they were not actually carrying contraband to belligerents. Claiming the authorship of this scheme, which really originated in Denmark and was adopted by Pánin (the principle had been proclaimed by France in 1778), Catherine now posed as the arbiter of Europe's destinies.

In the year 1783 Russia proclaimed the annexation of the Crimea on the ground, which was perfectly true, that ever since it had been given political independence (1774) it had been in a state of anarchy which was intolerable to the orderly Russian government. Such was the inevitable and also the desired result of the Treaty of Kainardji. Turkey was beginning to experience what Poland had already undergone. France now

[1] In Bohemian, *Těšín*; in Polish, *Cieszyn*.

ayed the exact opposite of her former part, and intervened at onstantinople to appease the indignation of Turkey. In 1784, the Treaty of Constantinople, the Sultan formally recognized e annexation by Russia of the Crimea and of the large district Kubán, the territory between the river of that name which ows into the Black Sea at the extreme north-western end of e Caucasian range, opposite the eastern promontory of the imea, and the river Don. By the acquisition of this territory e of the secular aims of Russian foreign policy—the extension Russian dominion to the Black Sea as well as to the Baltic—d at last, after many delays and checks, been achieved. The ork begun by Ivan the Terrible in the conquest of Kazán and strakhan, and continued by Peter the Great in the capture of e fortress of Azóv, was accomplished. This was the culminating point of Catherine's reign, being really the fruit of the ussian victories over Turkey. The possession of the Crimea d of the neighbouring Black Sea littoral was essential to the ee economic development of Russia. It is essentially part of ussia geographically, if not ethnically, and it cannot be asserted at, in destroying the piratical and barbarous Tartar State, ussia was committing an outrage on civilization or making an njustifiable conquest.

The organization of the new territory, known as New Russia, as entrusted to the empress's new favourite, Gregory Potëmkin, ho first came into prominence in 1774. He was an uneducated start, but his manly if coarse beauty fascinated Catherine, d she called him her 'factotum'. He was a courtier, but no atesman. As a general he was hopeless, but he had considerble gifts of organization, and he soon attained immense wealth d power. Under his supervision the naval ports of Sevastópol the Crimea and Khersón on the lower Dnieper were unded, and the construction of a Black Sea fleet was begun. he 'republic' of the *Zaporogian* Cossacks (cf. p. 205) had

been abolished in 1775 after the alarming experiences of the *Pugachëvshchina*, and at the same time Potëmkin finally destroyed the *Sech*,[1] and scattered abroad the last remnants of the militant and predatory Cossacks, some of whom fled to Turkey while others were in 1792 transported to the new territory east of the Sea of Azóv, where they gradually settled down. Freed from them and from the Tartars, the new provinces quickly began to be colonized and populated, and their future capital was fixed at Ekaterinosláv[2] on the Dnieper. In 1787 Catherine undertook her famous tour of the new territories, during which she had meetings with Joseph II and Stanislas Augustus. Potëmkin was created Prince of Tauris,[3] a title which gave its name to his palace in Petersburg, since 1905 the home of the Dúma.

The year 1782 was also notable in the history of Russia's foreign relations. In that year the Grand Duke Paul, the heir to the throne (cf. p. 277), and his German wife paid a state visit to Paris, where they had a great reception. The result of this was seen in the commercial treaty concluded between France and Russia in 1787.

The Second War against Turkey (1787–91)

With Austria Russia concluded an alliance in 1782. This had special reference to the relations of the two countries in the Near East. Their aims in this direction Catherine and Joseph defined in the so-called *Greek project* which aimed at the creation

[1] From 1711 to 1734 this had been established at the *mouth* of the Dnieper i.e. in Turkish territory, but in 1734 it was again transferred north and re established near its old home and in Russian territory.

[2] Lit. 'Catherine's glory'; cf. *Ekaterinodár* = 'Catherine's gift', on th river Kubán in Circassia; Ekaterinbúrg, in the Urál Mountains, in Siberia was founded by Catherine I.

[3] *Knyaz Tavricheski.*

of an independent State consisting of the Danubian principalities, Wallachia and Moldavia, with Bessarabia, to be called Dacia (the modern Rumania); Austria was to acquire Serbia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; Russia some more territory along the Black Sea coast and some islands in the archipelago; France, Great Britain, and Spain other fragments of the Ottoman Empire; while Constantinople, with Thrace, Macedonia, and other home provinces, should be reconstituted as a Greek Empire under the Grand Duke Paul's second son Constantine. Joseph II claimed in addition Dalmatia, and was ready to compensate Venice with the Peloponnese, Crete, and Cyprus.

In view of all these developments it was not long before the Turks took alarm. Promises of support came to them from Sweden, Prussia, and Great Britain; and France, in her new capacity as a moderating influence, failed to restrain them. In the summer of 1787 they presented an ultimatum to the Russian ambassador demanding, amongst other things, the withdrawal of the Russian consuls from the Danubian principalities and the right to search all Russian vessels passing through the Bosphorus, and upon this being refused, declared war. This second Turkish War (1787–91), which Catherine herself had as good as provoked, took the Russians as usual quite unprepared. The Black Sea fleet was not ready to co-operate, and the army was disorganized and very deficient in artillery and all manner of supplies. Potëmkin's courage failed him when the crisis came, and Catherine with difficulty persuaded him not to abandon the Crimea. No plan of campaign was ready, and finally Rumyántsov quarrelled with Potëmkin and retired. To make matters worse, Gustavus III of Sweden declared war on Catherine in sympathy with the Turks and in the hope of recovering the whole of Finland for himself, and began to besiege the Russian strongholds of Fredrikshamm and Nyslot,[1]

[1] = 'Newcastle' in Swedish.

situated on the Russo-Swedish frontier established in Finl in 1743 (cf. p. 288). During the year 1788 the war against Turks was barely carried into their territory. Large forces to be detached to defend the Caucasus and the Crimea, and army of 80,000 Austrians under Joseph II which co-opera was thrown back across the Danube from Serbia into Hung

It was during this war that Suvórov, who first distinguis himself in the Seven Years' War and had since taken par every campaign, won a series of great victories and laid foundations of his fame. In the campaign of 1788 he defen Kinburn against a much larger army than his own, w Potëmkin after a long siege took the great Turkish fortres Ochákov. In 1789 Suvórov, in conjunction with the Austri inflicted severe defeats on the Turks at Focșani and Rymnil Moldavia, from which battle he derived his title *Rýmnik* The same year the Austrians under Laudon recaptured B grade, while Potëmkin took Bendéry and overran Bessara Meanwhile, the war against Sweden, which at one t assumed a highly menacing aspect, eventually came to a ta end. Catherine herself never lost heart for a moment, tho the guns of the Swedes could be heard in Petersburg. refused to leave the capital, collected what troops she could, s out the Russian fleet to meet the enemy, and trusted to lu In the middle of the campaign Gustavus had to return Stockholm to suppress a revolt of the nobles, many of wh were in the pay of Catherine, against his authority, wh Denmark threatened to invade the south of Sweden. In 1 he resumed operations against Russia, but with no succ There were several naval battles which were indecisive, French Revolution suggested caution, and in the summer 1790 he concluded with Catherine the Peace of Verela,[1] wh left things in the state in which they were before. Freed fr

[1] In Finland, near Fredrickshamm.

the anxiety of the Swedish War, Russia in 1790 was able to devote more energy to that against Turkey. In 1790 the great event was the capture by Suvórov of the immensely strong Turkish fortress of Ismail on the northern bank of the Danube, in Bessarabia, which the other Russian generals had hesitated to attack. The losses were appalling, but the glory was great.

The death of Joseph II on February 20, 1790, led to an early conclusion of peace between Austria and Turkey, in August 1791. The Russians continued the war for some time longer, and in the course of 1791 captured Akkerman and Kilia at the mouths respectively of the Dniester and of the Danube. At the same time the Black Sea fleet threatened Varna and the Turks' communications with Constantinople. The Sultan thereupon sued for peace, and, the affairs of Poland and France demanding full attention at this time, Catherine acceded to his request. Negotiations were opened by Potëmkin, in the course of which he contracted malaria and died ; they were continued by Catherine's much more able minister Bezboródko, and the war was terminated by the Peace of Jassy in January 1792, in virtue of which Russia retained Ochákov and the littoral between the southern (or Black Sea) Buh and Dniester rivers, where the city of Odessa soon sprang up. The Sultan, for his part, definitely abandoned all claims to the Crimea. This war was more arduous and costly in life than that of 1768–74, and brought Russia fewer advantages.

Events preceding the Second Partition of Poland

Ever since the first partition had been completed in 1772–3 Poland had been in an extraordinary state of ferment. The most notable characteristic of this was a radical change in the behaviour and in the outlook of the educated classes, the nobility and the hierarchy. The loss of a third of their territory had brought home to them at last the gravity of the situation

of their country. There was a considerable party which w
still ready to buy the continued maintenance of its privile
and of the old state of anarchy at the price of allowing t
influence of Russia to make itself permanently predominant
Poland, but the vast majority made a serious and relativ
concerted effort to turn over a new leaf.

During the period 1773 to 1791, the eighteen years betwe
the first and second partitions, there was a remarkable econon
and intellectual revival in Poland. Prussia had indeed block
the Vistula and by imposing exorbitant export duties on Pol
produce cut down trade in that direction, but the conquest
Russia of the Black Sea littoral and the opening of the Dard
nelles to commerce gave an outlet to Polish exports in t
south. In the sphere of education new and sustained activ
suddenly manifested itself. Religious fanaticism grew l
intense, the influence of France made itself felt, the universit
of Cracow and Vilna revived and schools sprang up everywhe
King Stanislas Augustus, who was an extremely intelligent a
cultivated man, did much to further the cause of educati
A sign of the changing times and of the revival of the natio
consciousness was the fact that Latin began to fall into d
repute and the Polish language to come into its own. Coin
dent with this was the dissolution of the Society of Jesus
the Pope Clement XIV in 1773. Most notable change of a
a serious attempt was made at political reform in order
strengthen inwardly and outwardly what was left of the Pol
State.

In 1775, after the first partition, Russia had succeeded
imposing on Poland a new form of constitution which impair
the authority of the king, still further increased the power
the nobles, and thus increased the influence of Russia, becau
the Russian ambassador was always able to buy support amon
the latter and thus to secure the passing of measures and t

nomination to office of individuals agreeable to the policy of his government. This had been the Russian practice in Sweden also until Gustavus III's *coup d'état* in 1772. Prussia and Austria having in the treaties of 1773 agreed to guarantee without specification the future form of government, and Russia having now settled that form and proclaimed herself its guarantor, Poland was prevented from reforming herself under pain of incurring fresh intervention at the hands of her neighbours.

But the new political situation which arose after 1780 altered these conditions and made it possible for the Poles to try and set their house in order without the risk of interference from outside.

During the decade 1780–90 the international position underwent great changes. Great Britain quarrelled with Russia; Austria and Russia were completely reconciled, and became absorbed in their projects against Turkey. Frederick the Great died in 1786, and his successor Frederick William II, alarmed at the intimacy of Joseph II and Catherine II and by the prospect of the disproportionate aggrandizement of their empires at Turkey's expense, sought the friendship of Stanislas Augustus, and finally, as we have seen, both Turkey and Sweden declared war on Russia, the eternal enemy. On the other hand, France—Poland's traditional friend—first made friends with Russia and then became too much involved in the Revolution to pay immediate attention to foreign affairs. In 1787 both Catherine II and Frederick William II sought Poland's help, the first in the war against Turkey, the second as a possible ally against Russia and Austria. Poland herself was divided in opinion which side to take. In 1788 Frederick William II offered a definite alliance, and renounced his promise to guarantee the constitution. Thus, relying on Prussian support, the Poles took courage and denounced the hated Russian constitution of 1775. This was a direct challenge to Catherine,

but for the moment, at war with Sweden and Turkey, she coul do nothing, and her ambassador at Warsaw contented himse with threatening vengeance. On January 19, 1789, the con stitution of 1775 was formally abrogated, and a committee wa appointed to undertake the elaboration of a new draft.

Meanwhile, the successes of Austria and Russia against Turke so alarmed Frederick William II that, in view of a possible con flict between himself and Russia and Austria, early in 1790 h offered Poland an offensive and defensive alliance, and also t halve the dues on Polish exports at the mouth of the Vistula Poland would cede him Danzig and Thorn. Poland refuse this trap, but agreed to a defensive alliance, which was formall concluded on March 29, 1790. This was another blow t Russian influence at Warsaw and resulted in the retirement o the Russian ambassador.

But with the change of sovereigns in Austria the aspect o things again changed. Leopold II, who succeeded his brothe Joseph II on February 20, 1790, took the earliest opportunit to withdraw from the war against Turkey and to effect a recon ciliation with Prussia. In July 1790 he had an interview wit Frederick William II at Reichenbach in Prussian Silesia, an with the mediation of Great Britain made an agreement wit him to cease co-operation with Russia against Turkey, while th King of Prussia renounced any claims to territorial compensa tions. This robbed the Prusso-Polish alliance of half its valu and the Peace of Verela (cf. p. 326) was another cause of dis couragement to Poland. Nevertheless, the Poles went on wit the work of reforming their government, and in the followin year brought their labours to a successful conclusion. With un precedented and almost complete unanimity the new constitu tion was ratified on May 3 and promulgated on May 5, 179 Amongst other things it restored the privileges of the king an increased his power, abrogated the right of individual obstruc

tion (*liberum veto*) in the legislature, vested the king and a council of six responsible ministers with executive power, increased the autonomy of the towns and gave them representation in the Diet, granted full religious liberty and decreed that on the death of Stanislas Augustus the throne should again pass to the Elector of Saxony and remain hereditary in his family. By thus increasing the privileges of the Crown and diminishing those of the nobles this constitution resembled that which Gustavus III had imposed on Sweden in 1772, by which he had strengthened his country against its external enemies; it transformed the state from an oligarchical republic into a virtually absolute monarchy with limited popular representation.

The new Polish constitution won universal approval everywhere except in Russia and with a section of the ultra-conservative Polish nobility, who were ready to do anything rather than sacrifice any of their class privileges or submit to the permanent occupation of the throne by any one family or dynasty. It was welcomed in England and in France, and Frederick William II and the Emperor Leopold II agreed to recognize it and to make no further attempt to impair Polish integrity. But in Russia this sign of a new life in Poland met with bitter hostility. Catherine, who was inexpressibly horrified by the destruction of the Crown and the proclamation of popular liberties in France, was equally disgusted by the enhancement of the royal authority and the weakening of the anarchic elements in Poland. The corrupt, factious oligarchies of Poland and Sweden were quite to her taste; the democracy of France was not.

As long as the war against Turkey continued Catherine could do nothing, but the fact that she openly expressed neither approval nor disapproval of the new Polish constitution had a damping effect on the Saxon Court, which hesitated to accept formally the proffered succession to the throne till it knew

whether Catherine would eventually smile or frown. The Pol themselves soon solved the riddle.

In the autumn of 1791, after the promulgation of the const tution and while Potëmkin and Bezboródko were conducting th negotiations with the Turks at Iassy, a group of Polish noblemer the Polish 'last-ditchers', Felix Potocki, Seweryn Rzewuski, th *hetman* Branicki, the two brothers Kossakowski and some other repaired to the Russian camp, and with Bezboródko concerte a plan for the overthrow of the new constitution with the ai of the Russian army, and for the restoration of the form anarchical régime and the preservation of all the aristocrat privileges. To the order of the Polish Diet recalling them t Warsaw they replied by accepting an invitation of Catherin to go to Petersburg. There it was decided, in January 1792, t form a secession with the object of 'restoring the liberty the people', and a Russian army was to aid the secessionis to attain their aims. Catherine was somewhat apprehensive the attitude of Prussia and Austria. But other events helpe her. Leopold II died on March 1, 1792, and his son and succe sor Francis II was more interested in the French Revolutio than in Poland. Catherine indeed, wishing to have her hanc free, encouraged him with promises of help against France. I April 1792 France declared war on Austria. Prussia was boun by a defensive alliance with Poland, but Catherine relied o being able to detach such an ally with promises of compensatio In May the secession gathered at Targovica,[1] a small town i the extreme south-east of Poland, half-way between Kiev an Odessa, belonging to Felix Potocki, whence they issued the proclamation, falsely dated May 14, 1792. On the 18th th Russian ambassador in Warsaw, Bulgákov, informed the Polis Minister of Foreign Affairs that Russian forces had crossed th Polish frontier.

[1] Pronounced *Targovítsa*.

Poland, which had been relying for salvation on the support of Austria and Prussia, found herself absolutely unprepared to meet the crisis and virtually helpless. The available troops numbered hardly more than 45,000, while the Russian army of invasion was 100,000 strong. The Polish army was under Prince Joseph Poniatowski and Duke Ludwig of Würtemberg, who was a cousin of the wife of the Russian Grand Duke Paul, and whose wife was a Czartoryska; the future hero Thaddeus Kościuszko[1] also held a command under Poniatowski. Duke Ludwig turned out to be a traitor, and the army under Poniatowski could do nothing but retire fighting rearguard actions. King Stanislas Augustus appealed to King Frederick William II to help him according to the terms of their alliance, but the latter replied that, as the constitution of May 1791 had been made without his cognizance, he was not responsible for its consequences and considered himself free from obligation to help. Stanislas Augustus, seeing that further resistance was hopeless, decided to negotiate with Catherine, proposing to settle matters by a marriage between Constantine, second son of the Grand Duke Paul, and the daughter of the Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus; the elector had no sons and his daughter was under the constitution of 1791 the heiress to the Polish throne, which Stanislas Augustus by this means offered to bring into the possession of the Russian imperial family. Catherine replied that she could not negotiate until she had restored the freedom of the republic, and would not abandon the secessionists; that the only course for the king was to come over to her side and join the ranks of the secession. On July 23, 1792, Stanislas Augustus summoned the council of ministers and announced his intention of joining the secession. The ministers protested, but could do nothing. Many of those who had made the con-

[1] Pronounced *Kostyúshko*; it is really a diminutive of the name Constantine (*Konstantyn* in Polish).

stitution of 1791 and held prominent office left the capital in dis
gust, migrating to Prussian or Austrian Poland. On receipt of th
news Prince Joseph Poniatowski resigned his command, and th
whole army was indignant. But there was nothing to be done
the war was at an end, and the Russian troops occupied Warsaw
Simultaneously the secession grew in numbers, spread ove
the whole country, usurped all the functions of government
and abolished the constitution of 1791.

The Second Partition of Poland (1793)

Having successfully restored its 'liberties' in this fashion, th
secessionists were now faced with the necessity of surrenderin
half their country. While they were engaged in restoring th
old constitution, Catherine and Frederick William II had bee
busy planning another partition of Poland. Austria was to
much preoccupied with the French war to take any notice. Th
treaty between Russia and Prussia was concluded on January 23
1793, and at the same time the Prussian ambassador announce
at Warsaw that Prussian troops were occupying Great Polan
(*Wielkopolska*, i.e. Poland proper or West Poland, the basin o
the river Warta or Warthe). The second partition was nothin
but the most brazen and cynical robbery of a weaker neighbou
and entirely lacked what justification the first partition ha
possessed. Poland was now far from anarchical, and was at thi
moment in possession of a stable form of government, and we
on the way to a complete national regeneration. But it was jus
on this account that its continued existence appeared dangerou
to its unscrupulous neighbours. The Poles had no soone
framed a new constitution giving a very great measure of powe
to their king than Catherine and Frederick William II agai
dismembered their country on the ground that it was under th
influence of French democracy and a hotbed of Jacobinism
and must therefore be reduced in size in order to be rendere

harmless to its peaceable neighbours. The secession, which had now become the government, protested against the invasion of the Prussian army and appealed to Catherine through the Russian ambassador Sievers. Without waiting for an answer the secession, on February 11, 1793, proclaimed a general *levée en masse* in defence of the country, but the Russian ambassador intervened and prevented the issue of the proclamation, whereupon it was decided to send a diplomatic mission to Petersburg to appeal for help.

Meanwhile Prussia and Russia calmly published their proclamations of annexation and proceeded to take possession of their new territories. Prussia acquired the cities of Danzig and Thorn and the whole of Great or West Poland up to a line running north and south about 25 miles west of Warsaw; this territory included the original kernel of Poland, the country between the Oder and the Vistula, the ancient Polish cities of Gnesen (Gniezno), Posen (Poznań), and the great sanctuary of Czenstochowa.[1]

Russia acquired a whole half of Lithuania, an immense slice of territory including all the rest of White Russia, a large part of Black Russia, and the whole of Little Russia or the *Ukraine* west of the Dnieper. The southern boundary of this space was formed by the river Dniester, then the Turkish frontier; the eastern by the rivers Dnieper, Drut, and the western Dviná; to the south-east, between the Dnieper and the Dniester, the new territory marched with the new southern provinces of Russia, and on the west its boundary was a straight line running from Dvinsk (Dünaburg) in the north, through Pinsk, to Kamieniec Podolski (i.e. in Podolia) on the Dniester in the south.

After robbing them of their country it remained to secure the

[1] Pronounced *Chenstokhóva*; the German name is Czenstochau, or Tschenstochau.

formal consent of the Poles themselves to the robbery. Th leaders of the secession, in despair at the awful consequences o their folly, had by this time mostly left the country, or at leas the political arena, and the virtual ruler was the Russian ambas sador Sievers. He restored the Russian-made constitution o 1775 and forced the unfortunate king to go to Grodno, half-wa between Warsaw and Vilna, where the Diet had been summone to meet. In this town, on June 17, 1793, the Polish Diet me for the last time.

This Diet was held literally under the shadow of Russia bayonets, and had to obey the orders of the Russian and Prussia ambassadors, Sievers and Buchholtz. Nevertheless, considerabl opposition was manifested to their outrageous behaviour. Th Poles in despair sought to divide their enemies and offered t ratify the treaty, embodying the cession of territory, wit Russia alone first, in the hope of then securing the help o Catherine in resisting the demands of Prussia. Their innocenc was soon undeceived. After much altercation and many threat on either side, Sievers agreed to treat with the Poles alone wit respect to Russia's portion of the stolen territory, and th treaty between Poland and Russia was signed on July 22 an ratified by the Diet on August 17, 1793. No sooner had the done this than Buchholtz demanded the ratification of th analogous treaty with Prussia. The Poles appealed in vain t Russia for help; Sievers, on the contrary, joined in support ing the Prussian demands. The Poles then agreed to treat wit Prussia, but only as regards a commercial treaty, not admittin the possibility of a cession of territory. It must be remem bered that the claims of Prussia and those of Russia were fro the Polish point of view not of identical character or valu What Russia claimed was territory which, however valuabl economically to Poland, was not in the first instance Polish, bu Russian. Lithuania had conquered these Russian lands in th

welfth and thirteenth centuries, and they had come to Poland n its union with Lithuania. Though the nobility of Lithuania ad become Polish by education and intermarriage, and Roman Catholic (though by no means wholly) in religion, yet the country :self was only Polish on the cultivated surface ; underneath it ras Russian (White Russian or Little Russian), and in the far orth, between the western Dviná and the Niemen, Lithuanian nd Lettish. The loss of Lithuania and the Ukraine was a great low to the pride and the purse of Poland, but she could have ırvived the blow. What Prussia demanded was the very heart f the original Poland, the cradle of the Polish race. The loss f Great Poland implied the death of the Polish State.

The Prussian demands, even in the reduced and emasculated)iet of Grodno, which was not really in the least representa-ve of the Polish nation, aroused such opposition that Sievers ad to have recourse to measures of violence. Pretending that ıe Poles were plotting against the life of the king, he surrounded ıe chamber with soldiers and guns and refused to allow the)iet to adjourn until the treaty with Prussia had been agreed to. hus terrorized and exhausted, the Diet at length consented) treat, but only on condition that a commercial treaty should e ratified before that of partition. To this both ambassadors plied that, on the contrary, the only treaty to be discussed as that of partition. Thereupon followed the famous *dumb* ssion of September 23, 1793. Sievers had the leaders of the)position forcibly removed from Grodno, and filled the pre-ncts with Russian troops. Russian officers occupied places of ıportance in the actual chamber. In view of these violations e Diet refused to open proceedings and sat in silence until a.m. At last, after the Russian general, Rautenfels, had reatened to apply armed force if resistance were prolonged, e proposition to sign the treaty of partition with Prussia was ad, and to the question, repeated thrice according to the rules

of procedure, whether the Diet consented, no one answered word. Then one of the deputies rose and said it was necessar to conclude that silence gave consent. The treaty was dul signed on September 25, 1793.

Meanwhile, the secession of Targovica had already bee dissolved (September 15, 1793), being no longer necessary t Russia and utterly discredited in Poland in view of the disastrou consequences of its folly, and the Diet of Grodno continue to act in its stead. As the last drop of Poland's cup of humi liation Russia forced her to accept a treaty of alliance, by th terms of which Russia became Poland's suzerain, and to restor completely the constitution of 1775 (October 16 and Novembe 23, 1793).

After this Stanislas Augustus returned to Warsaw with a nev Russian ambassador, Igelström. Meanwhile, numerous ele ments in Polish society were concerting a final effort to free thei country by force of arms from the Russian yoke. Many Pole had emigrated to Saxony, and it was principally amongst thes that the rising was planned. Preparations for it had begun a soon as the king had joined the secession of Targovica. Th head of the movement was Kościuszko, the most famous o Polish patriots, who, born in 1746, had studied military engineer ing in France, taken part in the American War of Independence and returned to Poland in 1785. He was in Saxony in th autumn of 1793, and was still making his preparations, whic were far from complete, when news arrived that the Russia agents in Warsaw had discovered the conspiracy, that Igelström had ordered the numbers of the Polish army to be reduced t 15,000, and that it was time to act.

Kościuszko therefore moved to Cracow, the old capital, whic was still in independent Poland, and there, joining forces wit what was left of the Polish army, he proclaimed the insurrec tion amidst great popular rejoicings on March 24, 1794, an

leclared war against Russia. The Russian forces, meanwhile, oncentrated at Radom, between Warsaw and Cracow. On \pril 4 the Poles and Russians, each about 5,000 strong, met n battle at Racławice,[1] a village to the north of Cracow; he Polish force, under Generals Kościuszko, Zajączek,[2] and Madaliński, mostly consisting of peasants, was victorious and aptured twelve guns from the Russians. Following on this the nsurrection broke out in Warsaw, where the whole population ose and, on April 18, forced Igelström and the Russian garri- on to make a hurried retreat. Vilna followed the example on pril 23. A provisional government was then established in Varsaw by the men who had made the constitution of 1791; : was essentially monarchical and conservative in character, and ecognized the sovereignty of Stanislas Augustus—who remained n his palace—though it counted on the political support of evolutionary France.

In May Kościuszko resumed military operations. By this ime the alarm of Prussia had been excited, and her army was athering on the frontier ready to help that of Russia. Koś- iuszko pressed back a Russian force towards the new Prussian rontier, but there the two enemies joined hands and inflicted defeat on his forces, on June 6, 1794, at Szczekocine. On une 8 Zajączek, too, was defeated by another Russian army ear Chełm, in eastern Poland. Kościuszko then retired owards Kielce and Zajączek to Lublin. Meanwhile, another russian force advanced southwards and captured Cracow, hich its Polish commander treacherously surrendered without ring a shot, on June 15. The loss of the old capital, not of rategic importance, was nevertheless a severe moral blow to ne prospects of the insurrection. It led directly to an alarming evolutionary outbreak on the part of the people of Warsaw gainst the authority of the provisional government, which it

[1] Pronounced *Ratslavitse.* [2] Pronounced *Zayónchek.*

accused of leniency towards traitors, past and present. Many acts of violence were committed, and a general atmosphere of civil strife, mutual distrust, and jealousy was created, which Kościuszko had difficulty in mastering and which militated against the success of the insurrection.

At the same time both the Russian and Prussian armies were threatening the capital. Frederick William II had left his army on the Rhine in order to be present at the capture of Warsaw. This action on his part provoked the just indignation of Catherine, who said that he ought to be leading the holy war of kings against the revolutionary armies of France rather than interesting himself in the domestic affairs of Poland. The occupation of Cracow, too, caused umbrage to Austria. It looked as if the partitioning Powers were about to fall out seriously amongst themselves, and indeed the coalition against France was considerably weakened by the effects of the Polish insurrection.

The Russian and Prussian forces besieged Warsaw from July 1 till September 6, 1794, and then retired ignominiously. This result was brought about partly by the vigour of the Polish defence and partly by a general rising which broke out in the whole of Great Poland—the territory newly acquired by Prussia and therefore in the rear of the Prussian army. The rebels cut off a flotilla which was bringing ammunition up the Vistula to the besieging forces, and this compelled Frederick William II to abandon the siege and take steps to suppress the rising.

In Lithuania, on the other hand, the insurrectionary movement met with no success, and this eventually brought about Kościuszko's failure. On August 11, 1794, the Russians re-captured Vilna, which opened for them the road to Warsaw.

Kosciuszko was now threatened on three sides: by a combined Prussian and Russian army of 100,000 to the west; by an invasion of southern Poland by an Austrian force; and by another Russian army of 18,000 men which, under Suvórov, was march-

ng against him from the east. He had to divide his forces, which consisted of only 70,000 men; he sent Prince Joseph oniatowski westwards to hold up the Russo-Prussian army, enerals Dabrowski [1] and Madaliński to help the rebels in Great oland, and Sierakowski to meet Suvórov near Brest Litovsk. uvórov defeated this force on September 19 and continued his arch. At this moment the Russian army in the west, under ersen, succeeded in crossing to the right bank of the Vistula, id aimed at joining hands with that of Suvórov. In order to revent this junction, which meant disaster to his cause, Kośuszko hurried south in order to intercept Fersen and give attle. He concentrated his small force of 7,000 men at Maciejowice [2] on the Vistula, half-way between Warsaw and ublin.

In the battle which took place here on October 10, 1794, ie Poles suffered complete defeat and Kościuszko himself was ery severely wounded. This disaster decided the fate of the surrection. Wawrżecki, nominated to fill Kościuszko's place, ad not his influence. The armies of Fersen and Suvórov joined ands on the right (east) bank of the Vistula, and the Prussians pproached Warsaw from the west. The citizens of Warsaw which is situated on the left or west bank of the river) raised force to defend the capital; some remained on the left bank hold the Prussians; the majority, 18,000 in number, crossed ie river and took their stand in Praga, the eastern suburb of Warsaw on the right bank. Suvórov's army stormed Praga on ovember 4, 1794, a success which was followed by an appalling assacre of its inhabitants, and Warsaw decided to capitulate.

Suvórov would not treat with the head of the civil government, Ignatius Potocki, and the king had to mediate between

[1] Pronounced *Dombróvski*.

[2] Pronounced *Matyeyovítse*; Maciej is the Polish for Matthew; *-(o)wice* is ommon ending of place-names.

the belligerents. Wawrzecki, with what remained of the army, refused to surrender and marched out of Warsaw southwards. The delegates of the city then accepted Suvórov's terms, and on November 9 he entered Warsaw. Meanwhile, Wawrzecki could do nothing against the Russian forces which he met, and surrendered at Radoszyce near Kielce. This was the end of the insurrection. Kościuszko was imprisoned in Schlüsselburg, the other leaders exiled to Siberia: both he and they were released by the Emperor Paul in 1797.

The Third Partition of Poland (1795)

Stanislas Augustus placed his own fate and that of his country in the hands of Catherine. Both were soon settled. On January 3, 1795, Russia and Austria, and on October 24, 1795, Russia and Prussia, came to terms as to the final partition of the unfortunate country amongst themselves. Prussia secured all the territory between the Niemen and the Vistula, including the capital, Warsaw; Austria a triangular piece of territory north of Galicia, bounded on the north by the western (or Polish) Buh and including the old capital, Cracow. Russia acquired a huge slice of territory which included Courland in the north and all the rest of Lithuania and Black Russia. The Niemen formed the boundary between Russia and Prussia, the Buh that between Russia and Austria. The point of contact of the three states was between Niemirów and Brest Litovsk, on the Buh. Thus was the Polish State destroyed, but not the nation. No partitions and no repressions have succeeded in doing that. Indeed, the destruction of the state may almost be said to have created the national consciousness. It was certainly from this period onward that the Polish people grew in strength and vitality, and, divided politically, achieved a degree of spiritual unity which they had never known before.

Meanwhile the historical and national grievance of Russia

gainst Poland was at last satisfied. Except for Red Russia · Eastern Galicia, which was in Austrian possession, and we consider Brest Litovsk (*Berestie* in Old Russian) as the ctreme western limit of Russian political domination in the eventh and twelfth centuries, as it is the extreme western ographical limit of the Russian race, all the lands that had iginally been Russian were now in Russian hands once more, id all the historical and ethnical claims were met. More than at : Russia acquired the original territory of Lithuania up to e Niemen and the duchy of Courland, which had never been ussian in any sense before. Courland had, it is true, ever since e days of Peter the Great, been a Russian political outpost, d in 1762 Catherine had forced King Augustus III of Poland recall his son, to whom he had awarded this duchy, and had stored it, with the help of a Russian garrison, to the infamous ühren, who thus, after a varied career of thirty-two years, turned to his place of origin.

In January 1795 Stanislas Augustus moved from Warsaw to rodno, at Catherine's suggestion, and there, on November 25 that year, he signed his abdication. After Catherine's death moved to Petersburg, where he died in 1797. The acquisition the Black Sea littoral and the advancement of the Russian ontier westwards as far as the Niemen and Buh fully gratified e secular ambitions of Russian foreign policy, and amply cured the peaceable economic development of the Russian ople. At any rate, with regard to Poland Russia might well ve stopped there. Even so the vengeance which Russia had reaked on Poland was so short-sighted, so unstatesmanlike, so tty, and so excessive, the seeds of Polish hatred had by Russia's vn action been sown so deep, that the fierce and unquenchable mity was engendered which still separates the two greatest avonic peoples and profits nobody but Prussia—the enemy both.

Needless to say, no thoughts of the possible advantages of moderation ever entered the heads of such people as Catherine and her advisers. The problems of Slav and German had not then been raised. Peasants, of whatever nationality, were merely taxpayers and recruits. Catherine's ambition was to enlarge the political boundaries of Russia, and in this she was eminently successful.

The last few years of this outwardly brilliant reign were clouded by the French Revolution, which brought about a severe reaction in Catherine's domestic policy. But though she was shocked and alarmed by the tenets and by the proceedings of the revolutionaries, she felt that distance lent security to her throne and never dreamed of taking an active part in the royalist coalition against republican France. She made first the Turkish War and then the Polish insurrection an excuse for her failure to do so. She claimed as her peculiar rôle the punishment of the Jacobins in Sweden, Poland, and Turkey—a task, as Rambaud says,[1] infinitely easier and more lucrative than the punishment of those in France. As a matter of fact, Catherine was far more interested in pursuing her personal ambitions in the East than in helping the rulers of Prussia and Austria to defend their thrones. Without having conquered Turkey she now meditated a war against Persia, whose sovereign had invaded the kingdom of Georgia, already under Russian protection, and had burnt its capital, Tiflís. But the conquest of the Caucasus was to be left to her successors. Catherine II died on November 17, 1796, leaving behind her a memory comparable to that of Queen Elizabeth in our own history.

Though it cannot be said that the *people* of Russia were happy in her reign, yet its achievements and the atmosphere of success which they created were such as to give it the air of a 'great epoch' in Russian history, and the 'times of Catherine

[1] Rambaud, *Histoire de la Russie*, p. 509.

kateríninskiya vremená) came to occupy a place in Russian ought and literature comparable to what is conveyed by the pression 'Merrie England'. By the conquest of the Crimea d the destruction of Poland Russia achieved the contour, d gave herself the general character, which she retained roughout the nineteenth century. The conquest of the imea may be regarded as having been legitimate in the terests of civilization: it was necessary to the free develop-ent of the Russian people, which was unquestionably of perior 'cultural' value to the Tartar races which dominated e coasts of the Black Sea. The destruction of the Polish ate was indefensible from every point of view, and it can ly be said that its consummation robbed Europe for over undred years of the full value of a valuable member of its nily.

BOOK III

I

Paul (1796–1801) *and Alexander I* (1801–25)

Paul before his Accession

THE personality of the Emperor Paul, which has been the ject of acute controversy amongst historians, entirely domi- ed the last four years of the eighteenth century. By the e he succeeded to the throne, at the age of forty-two,[1] Paul's racter was undoubtedly spoiled, and many of his actions e so strange that they earned him the title of 'the crowned dman'. There is no evidence, however, that in his youth he wed any signs of mental disability or that he was marked by of those mental weaknesses that later became noticeable in 1. He was fond of study, and interested in mathematics; loved reading and serious conversations. But any talents or ous leanings that he may have possessed were never allowed levelop, and the conditions of his early life encouraged only weaker sides of his character. Catherine had a very poor nion of his capabilities, and would not allow him to share in management of affairs of state. She had seized the throne iolation of his right to it,[2] and never ceased to regard him as ossible rival. He was forced to live in complete isolation at tchina, with only his private affairs to occupy his mind,

[1] Paul was born on October 2, 1754. He married (1) Augusta, Princess of se-Darmstadt, who died three years after the marriage, leaving two ; (2) Dorothea Sophia, Princess of Würtemburg, who took the name Iária Feódorovna, and lived until 1828.

Cf. p. 293.

which, restricted in the circle of its interests, became narrowe and shrivelled at a time when he was thirsting for activity Catherine denied him even the rights of a father, by appro priating his children and having them brought up under he own personal supervision. Her attitude was imitated by he favourites, who never hesitated to show their contempt fo the unfortunate grand duke, and never lost an opportunity o insulting him.

For many years Paul endured in silence the indignity of h position, which roused in him a bitter hatred of his mother system and of the people who surrounded her. Toward the end of her reign Catherine formed the intention of ex cluding him from the succession for the second time, by usin the right she possessed, under a law enacted by Peter the Grea (1722),[1] and appointing her grandson, Alexander, heir to th throne. She died before this plan could be put into execution but Paul knew about it, and his resolution to take revenge o those who had for so long injured and insulted him, and t destroy all the work of Catherine's hands, became confirmed.

Internal Affairs, 1796–1801

The first important measure of the reign was the law o April 16, 1797, by which Paul abolished the system that had s nearly led to his complete exclusion from the succession, an directed that the crown should pass from father to oldest son 'in order that it may never be without a legal heir, and that ther shall never be the slightest doubt as to who is to succeed to it From the moment of his mother's death he began to vent hi accumulated wrath on the privileged upper classes, for whom Catherine's reign had been a veritable golden age. Catherine' ministers and favourites were scattered at once, and Paul en trusted with high office only the very few who had consorte

[1] Cf. p. 247.

th him in his retirement at Gátchina. He withdrew the arters that Catherine had granted to the towns and the gentry, l deprived the latter of many of their privileges, such as that presenting petitions directly to the throne. He destroyed therine's system of local administration, and tried to gather o his own hands complete control of all branches of the work government, for which he was quite unfitted. Personal rice became the main principle of government; and if therine had tried to play the part of an 'enlightened' despot, al was a despot without her enlightenment. He was no more nevolent towards the mass of the people than towards the vileged classes, although the wording of a manifesto published ultaneously with the law on the succession (April 16, 1797) led some historians to credit him with the intention of tricting to three days a week the amount of forced labour it the landowners could exact from their serfs. The manifesto ntained a categorical prohibition of forced labour on Sundays, the ground that it was contrary to the laws of God and of the ate, and expressed a pious opinion that the remaining six days the week—equally divided by the serfs, as they usually were, tween the service of their masters (*bárshchina*) and work on eir own land—were quite sufficient for all the needs of agriture. Paul's attitude to the serfs was clearly defined by his atment of those who complained of oppression by their sters: he ordered one such deputation to be publicly gged 'as much as their masters should wish'. Peasant disbances broke out in many parts of the empire early in the gn. They were suppressed by military forces under the leaderp of Prince Répnin, who in some provinces had to fight ched battles against the peasants, killing and wounding many, d burning and levelling with the ground whole villages. ul showed his approval of these measures by threatening the asants with similar treatment if they failed to yield complete

obedience to their lords. Despite his rough handling of t privileged upper section of the gentry, Paul regarded the ra and file of the land-owning class as guardians of public order, a did not hesitate to safeguard their absolute authority over t serfs. He considered that tranquillity was assured while Russ possessed 100,000 such 'police-masters'. He was even qui ready to increase their numbers, and in four years handed ov to private persons state lands with a population of 530,000 fr peasants.[1]

Only the clergy had any reason to be satisfied with Pa who was piously religious. But his attentions to them becam embarrassing at times, as, for example, when he instituted t practice of rewarding high Church dignitaries with medals a ribbons. Plato, Metropolitan of Moscow, who protested th such secular rewards were inadmissible from the point of vie of canon law, and inconsistent with the dignity of the clerg was forced to accept the insignia of the Order of St. Andre though he begged on his knees to be allowed to decline t honour. Paul was tolerant to the Russian sectaries, especial the Old Believers, who for the first time were permitted conduct public services. One of the strangest episodes in h career was the protection he gave to the Knights of St. John Malta, for he not only allowed them to establish a priory Petersburg, but in 1798 became Grand Master of the Order, a thus created a situation without precedent—the leader of t Orthodox Church acting as head of a Catholic organizati subject to the Pope.

In his views on education Paul was entirely reactionar Private printing-presses had been closed down by Catherin and the number of books published each year declined co siderably before she died. Under Paul they became fewer sti and the importation of books from abroad was forbidde

[1] Catherine, in thirty-four years, disposed of 800,000.

ıssian students were recalled from foreign universities, and it came almost impossible for foreigners to enter the country. ul energetically persecuted every outward manifestation of eralism, and his zeal led him sometimes to extremes that now pear ridiculous. All the foreign tastes and habits that had me into Russia during the French vogue of the preceding reign re strictly tabooed. Many people were arrested and even exiled wearing hats or costumes of a prohibited pattern. Officials pected of the least sympathy with progressive ideas lost their sts. Heavy penalties were inflicted for infringements of the lted court etiquette that Paul introduced, and his subjects nsidered a meeting with him a misfortune to be avoided if ssible. Paul's despotism was keenly felt in the army, in which took a personal interest and pride. All ranks, from private general, were compelled to suffer endless parades and were rshly punished for trivial offences. The troops were subjected a discipline and training that seemed more suited for a *corps ballet* than for the army of a great European Power. They re dressed in uniforms that were elaborate and even magnifi-ıt, but impeded their movements and made their service still ore burdensome.

Paul's Foreign Policy

In his relations with other Powers Paul gave to his personal lings the same freedom that he allowed them in his conduct domestic affairs. Towards the end of her reign Catherine had lized the necessity of joining the coalition against republican ance, but on his accession Paul announced that, while he uld remain in firm union with his allies, he could not dertake any active operations, since Russia had been at r 'without a break' since 1756 and was needing a rest. fore long, however, he changed his mind again and joined gland, Austria, Turkey, and Naples against France (1799).

A Russian army under Suvórov was sent to co-operate with the Austrians. Suvórov won a series of brilliant victories, drove the French out of northern Italy, and frustrated all their attempts to regain the ground they had lost.[1] The field of operations was then transferred to Switzerland, where Suvórov soon found himself in a very difficult position, owing to the withdrawal of the Austrian forces that should have supported him. Surrounded and heavily outnumbered by the French, suffering from lack of supplies and food, the Russians broke through in the end, and Suvórov made his famous march over the Alps into southern Germany. Another Russian force, under Rímsky-Korsakóv, had been defeated by the French at Zurich. Suvórov attributed his failure in Switzerland to the treachery of the Austrians, and Paul was so angry with them that he broke off the alliance and recalled his ambassador from Vienna (1800).

Dissatisfaction with the treatment of a Russian detachment acting in Holland led him to break with England also. Napoleon immediately took advantage of the new situation and opened negotiations with Paul. He offered to hand over to him the island of Malta in case the garrison, then closely besieged by the English, should be compelled to evacuate it. He sent some thousands of Russian prisoners back to their own country without ransom, and completely captivated the not unwilling Paul who considered Napoleon's overthrow of the Directory as the beginning of the restoration of order in France. Peace was soon concluded, and Paul entered into alliances with Prussia against Austria, and with Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark against England (the second 'Armed Neutrality'). Active preparations for the new war were carried on. Paul seized English goods and English vessels in Russian ports, and even sent

[1] Battles of the Adda (April 27, 1799), the Trebbia (June 17–19), and Novi (August 15).

orce of Cossacks to conquer India, a project so mad that it e rise to the legend that his purpose was really to destroy Cossacks, whom he suspected of disaffection.

The End of Paul and the Accession of Alexander I

Meantime discontent was beginning to show itself at home, l spread to classes of the population that had, up to that e, suffered least of all from Paul's caprice. After the con- sion of the alliance against England and the consequent ak-down of Russian foreign trade, which at that time was ried on chiefly with England, the rank and file of the gentry e, deprived of the income which they derived from the ort of raw materials, such as flax, hemp, and timber, pro- ed on their estates. During the last two years of his reign il's despotism knew no bounds, and roused terror in those les against which it was chiefly directed. A petty intrigue him to break with his wife, who had been able at times to rt a moderating influence over him. From that time he an to fear the fate that had overtaken his father.[1] He per- ated his own family and intended to have them all put into son. But before he could carry out this plan he was struck wn by a blow even worse than the one he had feared. A small ty at court, led by Count Nikíta Pánin, determined to rid of him, on the pretext that his madness threatened safety of the dynasty. The Grand Duke Alexander was be set up as regent, and Pánin induced him to agree to plan, promising that no harm should come to his father. lin was soon banished from court, and the leadership of conspiracy passed to Count Páhlen, a much more resolute racter, who was determined to remove Paul from the throne all costs'. On the night of March 23, 1801, a number of conspirators penetrated into the palace, apparently with the

[1] Cf. pp. 283–4.

intention of forcing Paul to abdicate, but after a rough alterca tion they attacked and strangled him.

Paul's reign did not last long enough to exert any seriou influence on the destinies of the country. Like a sudden squa it ruffled for a time the surface of Russian life, but did no penetrate to the depths. His successor set out with wide plan of reform, with the definite purpose of diverting the histor of his country into new channels. Though most of his idea turned out to be too visionary for the period in which he lived Russia did indeed begin to cast off the bonds of mediaevalism and advance along the path of progress on which other nation had far outstripped her.

Alexander blamed himself for having consented to a plot tha had ended so tragically. He could not help feeling that he wa partly to blame for his father's death, and feared that othe might be of the same opinion. But his first steps showed tha he fully appreciated the cause of Paul's removal. The Cossack who had been sent to conquer India were at once recalled Thousands of officials and private persons who had bee removed and banished without trial were brought back, and th most hated of Paul's favourites had to retire. Russians receive permission to journey abroad, foreign books were admitted onc more, and the ban on private printing-presses was removed Alexander, further, revived the charters to the nobility and th towns, and granted an amnesty to all refugees except those wh were guilty of murder. In a manifesto published on the day o his accession he promised to rule 'according to the laws an spirit' of his grandmother, and the upper classes fully expecte to see a revival of the age of Catherine, 'the empress of th nobility', as she came to be called. This manifesto, as well a the other early measures taken by Alexander, showed tha he had no sympathy for the policy of his father, and helpe to strengthen his position in the eyes of the people. The da

e of Paul passed away like a nightmare, and did not leave a
igle regret behind it.

The character of the new emperor, like that of his father,
ntained many traits that bewildered his contemporaries, and
ve not been properly explained even by his most intimate bio-
aphers. Some have tried to show that he was weak-willed and
ipulsive in his actions ; but though it is true that he constantly
ted in ways that seem to give ground for such an opinion, and
at he often failed to carry out plans on which he embarked
th every appearance of sincerity, it is not just to him to
ppose that these failures were due to lack of will-power.
any times over, especially in his dealings with Napoleon and
.ring the long struggle for the liberation of Europe, he
owed that he was capable of forming a deep purpose and of
itting it into execution, and his country had reason to be
ateful to him. It must be admitted that he was frequently
.ilty of insincerity, even of duplicity, and could always play
part. Modern historians explain this aspect of his character
· the very unfortunate circumstances of his early life, which
is no happier than that of Paul had been. Catherine kept
exander away from the influence of his parents, for whom he
.d a touching fondness, right up to her death. At his grand-
other's court he could never show any sign of his affection
r Paul, who in turn distrusted him for his submission to
atherine's will. From boyhood he was forced to be insincere,
.d had constantly to conceal his real thoughts and feelings.
. the later years of Catherine's reign his position became
en more uncomfortable. Paul never ceased to regard his
n as a dangerous rival, and during his own short reign sub-
itted him to humiliating treatment that Alexander's love for
s father made only the more difficult to bear.

Catherine personally supervised her grandson's education, and
ought him into touch with the intellectual movements of the

period. She chose as his tutor a Swiss revolutionary, Laharpe from whom Alexander imbibed the abstract theories of the French philosophers. In his early letters he proclaimed himself a believer in free institutions, and even seems to have considered the possibility of using his absolute authority as emperor of Russia to introduce a representative system of government that would set him free to retire into private life. Unfortunately his education was confined to theories, and without real knowledge of the conditions of his country he was unable to judge how far his theories might be put into practice, how far they were only theories. Contact with the hard logic of fact brought him constant disappointment, and although he continued to profess himself an admirer of free institutions to the end of his life, his admiration became purely academic and ceased to have any influence on his actions. The stages by which the liberally-minded young heir to the throne turned into the reactionary emperor of the twenties were quite clearly marked.

First Attempts at Reform

On his accession to the throne in 1801 Alexander undoubtedly had the intention of embarking on a course of political reforms and gathered round himself a circle of men who had been his friends in youth and to whom he now turned for advice. These 'young friends', as they came to be called, were Prince Czartoryski, member of a distinguished Polish family, a man of brilliant mind and talent, and a strong patriot who never concealed from Alexander his hopes for his country's resurrection; Stróganov, once member of a Jacobin club in Paris; Kochubéy who had been educated in England and, when only twenty-four years of age, served as Russian ambassador at Constantinople; and Novosíltsev, a cousin of Stróganov. These four young men formed a 'secret council', which drew up endless

chemes of reform, but effected little beyond the creation of ministries in place of the obsolete colleges set up by Peter the Great, and the reorganization of the Council of State and the Senate. Like Alexander himself, the 'young friends' were equipped in the sphere of politics only with abstract ideas, and failed to grapple with the many problems that were awaiting settlement. The highest point to which they attained in their treatment of the question of serfdom was a law published in 1803, which permitted landowners to liberate their peasants, on conditions fixed by mutual agreement between both parties and approved by the ministers. This law was of little use to the serfs, and very few of them received their freedom under it. But it marked the beginning of a change in the attitude of the government towards serfdom, and showed the gentry that the age of Catherine II was not to return.

As Alexander gained experience of practical affairs the members of the 'secret council' lost their influence over him. They found that he rejected plans of reform drawn up by them in the spirit of his openly declared opinions and intentions, and in the end they gave up trying to understand him. Alexander's conduct of foreign affairs soon gave the whole country cause to wonder.

Foreign Policy, 1801–7

The international situation was unfavourable for Russia in 1801. Paul had been preparing for war against England. Nelson was in the Baltic, and actually reached Rével before Alexander could make peace (June 17). The British government, through its representative Whitworth, had been in touch with the conspirators against Paul, and knowing the inner meaning of his removal, was willing to come to terms with Russia.

Alexander at first took up an attitude of non-interference in European affairs which allowed him to devote all his attention

to internal questions. Relations with France, however, were far from cordial. Each successive step by which Napoleon built up his power in the West set Alexander more against him, and in the end he found himself forced to abandon his original policy and join England and Austria in the Third Coalition. War broke out in 1805. At the beginning Napoleon, by a clever move, isolated the advanced Austrian forces under the command of General Mack, and forced them to capitulate at Ulm (October 20, 1805). Before the Russians, under Kutúzov, could come up he occupied Vienna and crossed the Danube. Kutúzov wished to avoid an unequal meeting with the French, but was overruled by Alexander. On December 2 the Austrians and Russians were defeated at Austerlitz and Austria had to agree to the Peace of Pressburg (December 26). The Russians retired to their own frontiers, and Napoleon turned to deal with Prussia.

Napoleon's seizure of Hanover in 1803 (a measure directed against England) had caused Frederick William III to lean towards the Coalition,[1] but he hoped to gain more by remaining neutral than by interfering in the struggle between France and the other Powers. The help of Prussia in 1805 might have turned the balance of forces in favour of the Coalition, but after Austerlitz Frederick William was face to face with Napoleon, and had to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with him (December 15), one condition of which was that he received Hanover in return for Cleves and Anspach. Soon, however, it became apparent that Napoleon did not intend to keep his promise with regard to Hanover. The death of Pitt (January 23, 1806) opened up the prospect of peace with England, and in the negotiations that followed Hanover

[1] The seizure of Hanover was a direct infringement of the treaty of 1795 between France and Prussia, by which a line of demarcation, beyond which France should not advance, was set up.

as used as a pawn. Frederick William was naturally indignant, ıd at the same time Napoleon's high-handed conduct in estern Germany seriously alarmed him. He renewed relations ith Alexander, and sent an ultimatum to Paris, demanding ıe withdrawal of all French troops beyond the Rhine. But e acted so hastily that Alexander could not move his armies ross in time to support him. Napoleon struck first, and the ussians were defeated at Jena-Auerstadt (October 14, 1806). fter the fall of Berlin, eleven days later, the theatre of war oved to East Prussia. Napoleon entered Poland and was ithusiastically welcomed by the Poles, who regarded him as ieir deliverer. An indecisive battle was fought at Eylau ebruary 8, 1807). After four months' inactivity the summer mpaign began, and was speedily concluded by the French ctory at Friedland (June 14). Russia was not crushed, as ustria had been at Austerlitz and Prussia at Jena, but she ıd lost her allies on land. Alexander, irritated by the failure England to give adequate support, felt himself justified in egotiating for peace, the terms of which he arranged in person ith Napoleon at Tilsit, on the river Niemen (July 9, 1807). e tried to secure favourable conditions for Frederick William,[1] ho had, however, to give up nearly half of his territory and ffer French garrisons in the fortresses that he was allowed retain. Out of Prussia's Polish acquisitions of 1793 and 795 Napoleon formed the Duchy of Warsaw, which he gave the King of Saxony, whilst the district of Belostók went to ussia. By a secret treaty of alliance Napoleon and Alexander greed to help each other in case either of them was involved war with a third Power. If England refused to make peace, ussia was to join the Continental System. Napoleon promised ot to restore to Poland her original frontiers, for this would

[1] Napoleon had the greatest contempt for Frederick William, and but r Alexander's mediation would have destroyed Prussia completely.

have necessitated the cession of a large area of territory by Russia. He secured a free hand in the West, advising Alexander to seek compensation for the growth of France by acquisitions in the East, at the expense of Sweden and Turkey.

Effects of the War and the French Alliance

Alexander came out of an unsuccessful war without loss, but he saw his ally crippled and a strong French post established at his own door. Russia was shackled with the Continental System, which ruined her foreign trade again by cutting off all connexion with England. The mobilization of large numbers of troops and the requisitioning of supplies for the army had imposed very heavy burdens on the people. The financial position was growing worse every year. Revenue declined, while expenditure increased rapidly.[1] Large annual deficits were covered by new issues of paper-money, which depreciated seriously in value; the paper rouble in 1806 was still worth 78 kopeks silver, but in 1808 it had fallen to 48. Taxes were paid in paper, while most of the payments for war material and for the maintenance of the army abroad had to be made in bullion, large amounts of which also found their way abroad to meet the heavy adverse trade balance.

The economic difficulties created by the French alliance caused great dissatisfaction in the country. There was also widespread opposition amongst the people to Alexander's friendship with 'the enemy of the human race', who, it was rumoured, wanted to abolish the Christian faith. Alexander had great difficulty in securing a polite reception in Petersburg

[1]

	Revenue.	*Expenditure.*
1806 . . .	100,000,000 roubles	122,000,000 roubles
1807 . . .	121,000,000 ,,	171,000,000 ,,
1808 . . .	111,500,000 ,,	240,000,000 ,,
1809 . . .	195,000,000 ,,	278,000,000 ,,

ciety for General Savary, the French military agent. Between s own people on the one hand, and Napoleon on the other, exander's position was far from safe. His father's fate was sh in his memory, and he set up a secret police in order to low the course of public opinion. He had given way to apoleon in 1807 only because circumstances made it impossible r him to continue the struggle. During the trying years that lowed, his chief task was to outwit Napoleon, in order to stpone a renewal of the conflict until the country was better epared for war.

Finland, Bessarabia, and the Caucasus

When he entered the struggle against France Alexander d acted in the interests of the balance of power in Europe. ter Tilsit he returned for a time to the traditional policy expanding towards the north-west and the south-west, at e expense of Sweden and Turkey.

In accordance with a promise which he gave to Napoleon, exander addressed a note to Gustavus IV, King of Sweden, ling upon him to abandon his alliance with England. stavus refused to yield, and Russian troops invaded Finland. ey met with little opposition from the Swedish garrisons, d within a few months occupied the whole country. Alex- der at first posed as a conqueror, but soon discovered that had roused the patriotic feelings of the inhabitants, who were dy to prove that they had not been conquered. He then nged his attitude, and promised the Finlanders that they uld be allowed to retain their liberties and institutions ne 17, 1808). This guarantee was repeated in the Diet that t at Borgå in March 1809, and the Emperor of Russia added his titles that of hereditary Grand Duke of Finland. The ole of Finland, including the Åland Islands, was formally

ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Fredrikshamm, September 17 1809.

The constant gravitation of Russia towards the south-west was due, in the first place, to a natural desire to protect the oppressed Slav and Orthodox Christian peoples of the Balkans But racial and religious sympathies were backed up by, and usually served to cover, a much more compelling motive—the need for an outlet in this direction like that which Peter the Great had obtained in the Baltic. The free economic development of Russia was impossible without unrestricted access to the Mediterranean. The 'Greek Project'[1] showed how wide were the aims of Catherine II, and although it was not executed, considerable progress had been made before the end of the eighteenth century, for Russia had gained a firm footing on the Black Sea[2] and the right to send ships through the Straits, and her claim to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey was conceded in part.[3] The opportunity for a further advance came in 1806, when, through the scheming of Napoleon, Russia and Turkey were again involved in war. Alexander's attention was fully occupied at that time in the north, but the Russians seized Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1807, however, Napoleon changed his attitude with regard to Turkey, and in order to gain Alexander's support for his great plan of striking a fatal blow at England in the East, he

[1] Cf. pp. 324–5. [2] Cf. map, p. 376.

[3] The actual concessions made by Turkey were: (1) the right to interfere in certain cases in the affairs of Moldavia and Wallachia, which, unlike the other Balkan lands, were autonomous, under the rule of *hospodars* appointed by the Sultan (Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, 1774, cf. p. 320), and (2) the right to make representations on behalf of the new church which the Russian government was allowed to build at Constantinople (Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji, Arts. vii and xvi). On this slight foundation Russia built up her pretension to a general right of protecting the Orthodox Christians throughout the Turkish Empire.

gested that they should divide the Turkish Empire between em.[1] From August 1807 an armistice had been in force tween the Russian and Turkish armies. After the conquest Finland Alexander sent reinforcements to the Danube, l by the end of 1810, though not without some reverses, main fortresses along the river were reduced. In 1811 prospect of war with France caused Russia to relax her orts, and in the following year the situation in the north came so threatening that peace had to be concluded, on ms which were much more advantageous for Turkey than ey might have been had the Russians been free to press home eir victories. Russia was allowed to retain Bessarabia, thus ending her frontier to the river Prut and the Kilia mouth the Danube, and the obligations of Turkey with regard to oldavia and Wallachia were reaffirmed (Treaty of Bucarest, ay 28, 1812).

Before the end of the eighteenth century Russia had begun advance in the south-east, towards the Caucasus. The tives which impelled her forward in this quarter were ilar to those which had caused her to gravitate towards nstantinople. In the Caucasus, as in the Balkans, there re Christian peoples to protect, and, further, between the ck Sea and the Caspian lay the only practicable land route the East. The effective frontier of Russia at the beginning Paul's reign was formed by the rivers Kubán and Térek,[2] ng which a chain of forts was built. The steppe to the north this line was gradually colonized by Cossacks. To the south a number of small states nominally subject to Turkey and rsia. Some of them were Christian, and at one time had

[1] Russia, however, was not to have Constantinople, a reservation that sed constant friction between Alexander and Napoleon.

[2] The district of Kabardá, ceded by Turkey in 1774, was only subdued he nineteenth century.

been united in the kingdom of Georgia, which reached th height of its power in the twelfth century.

The natural route to the south lay along the narrow stri of lowland between the eastern spurs of the Caucasus Moun tains and the Caspian Sea, but it was not in this direction tha Russia advanced.[1] The kingdom of Georgia, after the Tarta invasions that swept over it in the thirteenth and fourteent centuries, split up into a number of small states,[2] which wer ravaged by Turks and Persians alternately. The Christia princes appealed to Russia for help, but it was not until th end of the eighteenth century that she felt herself stron enough to interfere. Catherine II took Georgia under he protection, and in 1783 Count Paul Potëmkin,[3] after erectin the fortress of Vladikavkáz, built the great Georgian militar road across the mountains, and led a Russian column to Tiflís The Russians retired in the following year, but their inter vention had irritated the Shah of Persia, and in 1795 a Persia army sacked Tiflís and massacred the inhabitants. Russia a once declared war, and occupied the districts of Dérbent Koubá, and Bakú, and a number of Persian khanates farthe south, but after Paul's accession a fresh retreat was made t the original frontier. Russia had apparently not yet decide how far she wished to commit herself in the Caucasus. I 1800, however, a decision had to be made, for King George XI of Georgia died, leaving his crown to Paul, who, after som hesitation, accepted it. Georgia was finally annexed to Russi by Alexander I. Its acquisition led to a long war with Persi

[1] Peter the Great tried the route round the north of the Caspian in 171 but met with disaster. Five years later he led an expedition down th Caspian coast and occupied Dérbent and Bakú, but these conquests wer abandoned by the Empress Anne.

[2] One of these retained the name of Georgia.

[3] Cousin of Catherine's favourite, Gregory Potëmkin (cf. pp. 323–4).

04–13), during which the remaining Christian states went
r to Russia, and all the khanates as far as the river Aras
axes) were overrun. When peace was made (Treaty of
listan, 1813) Persia ceded the regions of Karabágh, Gandja,
ekín, Shirván, Dérbent, Bakú, and Koubá, with part of
lish, and abandoned all claim to Daghestán, Georgia,
ngrelia, Imeritia, and Abkhazia. These important gains
e Russia a dominating position in the Caucasus, and her
sessions now stretched from sea to sea. But it could not
be said that the Caucasus was definitely conquered, for
ween the original frontier and the northern boundary
the new territory there lay a broad belt of hilly country
pled by wild tribes of Tartar origin. Their fate was
eady certain, but half a century passed before they were
lly subdued.

The Return to Reform: Speránsky

After Tilsit Alexander turned once more to the consideration
political reforms. By this time the 'young friends' had
ired into private life, and Alexander relied for help on
chael Speránsky, the most remarkable of all his advisers.
eránsky, the son of a country priest, was educated in a church
inary, but read and studied very widely. He entered the
vice of the government, and his talent and intelligence were
conspicuous that ministers of state quarrelled for his services.
on he came under the notice of the emperor, who put before
n the papers of the 'secret council',[1] outlined his own ideas,
l ordered him to prepare plans for the complete reorganiza-
n of the system of government.

In the 'Constitution' which he drew up, Speránsky divided
iety into groups distinguished by the rights they enjoyed.
classes of the population, including the serfs, were to be

[1] Cf. pp. 356–7.

granted civil rights, while special political rights, i. e. a share i
the government of the country on a representative basis, wer
to be given to all property owners. The grant of civil rights t
all classes implied the abolition of serfdom, which, together wit
the suggestion of a representative system, brought Speránsky
plans into line with Alexander's liberal dreams. At the sam
time Speránsky carefully pointed out that under the extern
forms of a representative system it would be quite possible fo
the autocratic central power to retain its absolute authority, o
which ultimately the whole political fabric could be made t
depend. How far Speránsky's ideas on the abolition of serfdo
went may be judged from his proposal to grant to members
the gentry class the exclusive right of buying *inhabited* land
these lands were to be governed according to law,[1] and th
peasants who lived on them were to receive the civil righ
accorded to all other classes, but Speránsky continued to ca
them serfs.

However liberal in promise its principles might seer
Speránsky's scheme could be made very moderate in applic
tion. But the political institutions which he proposed to s
up marked a serious attempt to meet the ever-growing dif
culty of ruling the country. The whole territory of the empi
was to be divided into administrative areas called 'gover
ments' (*gubérniya*), which were subdivided into 'district
(*ókrug*), each containing a number of 'cantons' (*vólost*). Ea
of these units was to have its own legislative body (*dúma*
That of the 'canton' was to be elected by the owners
property, and to send its deputies to the 'district' dúma ; t
legislature of the 'government' was to be formed of represent
tives from the district legislatures, while an Imperial Dúma w
to meet annually in Petersburg. There was also provision f
a corresponding series of judicial institutions, with the Sena

[1] I. e. not by the uncontrolled caprice of the landowners.

supreme court, and of administrative offices centring in
e ministries. All branches of government were to be united
the Council of State, appointed by the emperor, which was
serve as the link between his autocratic authority and the
ministrative system, and presumably as the instrument
rough which he could exercise that supreme control hinted
by Speránsky.

Alexander adopted only a very small part of this ambitious
n. In 1810 and 1811 the Council of State and the minis-
es were completely reorganized. But no steps were taken
wards the reform of local government. Speránsky's proposals
more important in the history of ideas than in that of
titutions. They represented new tendencies in Russian
litical thought and roused strong opposition from conserva-
es, like Karamzín the historian, who pointed out that their
imate origin was France, which was regarded at that time
the fountain of social and political disruption. Probably
exander did not persist with Speránsky's plan of reforms
cause he felt that it was too complete and too drastic, and
d not wish to do anything that would arouse fresh opposition
court circles.

Although Speránsky's name is always associated with the
Constitution', he was entrusted with other important com-
ssions and occupied the first place among political workers of
e period. He supervised the drafting of a new code of civil
v, which was rejected by the Council of State but served as
important preparation for a much more successful work of
dification which he carried out under Nicholas I.[1] He found
ope for his talents in organizing the territory of Finland,[2] and
ade important proposals for dealing with the financial situa-
n, which showed no signs of recovery from the effects of the
r of 1806–7 and was becoming more critical every year,

[1] Cf. p. 396. [2] Finland was acquired in 1809. Cf. p. 361.

owing to the constant and heavy drain caused by the wars wit Turkey, Sweden, Persia, and Austria,[1] and the economic dis location brought about by Russia's adherence to the Continenta System. Revenue figures showed an increase,[2] which was largel fictitious, for the value of the paper rouble gradually fell until i was worth no more than 20 kopeks in silver (1810). Speránsk proposed to stop the issue of new paper-money, to recognize pape already in circulation as State debt, and to buy it in gradually He suggested, also, that the annual budget deficits should b covered by increases in taxation, and strongly recommended tha State finances should be made public and an effective syster of control set up. He insisted on the widest possible interpreta tion of Alexander's obligations under the Treaty of Tilsit, sinc Napoleon's aim was to ruin, not Russia, but England. Owing t Speránsky's representations Russian ports were opened for a ships under neutral flags, whatever the origin of their cargoe (1810), and a new tariff, with increased duties on articles o luxury, was introduced. These measures relieved the genera economic situation, but Speránsky's other suggestions were no heeded. In 1810 another large issue of paper was made (forty three million roubles), and Gúriev (Minister of Finances) de voted to current needs the proceeds of a special tax imposed fo the purpose of extinguishing part of the State debt.

Speránsky made many enemies, especially at court, where hi birth was against him. His political proposals, based on Frenc models, roused very strong feeling. When Alexander saw that break with France was inevitable he was not unwilling to hav

[1] Cf. pp. 361–5. Russia was at war with Austria in 1809, in alliance wit France, but did not participate actively in operations. As a reward sh received the district of Tarnopol. At the same time a large part of Galic was taken from Austria and added to the Duchy of Warsaw. Both Tarnop and Galicia were handed back to Austria in 1815.

[2] Cf. p. 360, note.

pposed that Speránsky was responsible for the spread of ch influence, and in March 1812 banished him to Nízhny orod.

Break with Napoleon and the Invasion of Russia, 1812

e alliance with Napoleon was unbearable for Russian nal feeling and ruinous for the economic interests of the try. Alexander had reason to know that it was a danger to uture of Russia as a European Power. He had watched suspicion the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw 807 and the extension of its territory at the expense of ria in 1809.[1] Napoleon constantly assured him that he not intend to re-establish the kingdom of Poland, but a t document intercepted by the Russians proved that his aim was to drive Russia back beyond the Dnieper and ern Dviná, and to set up Poland as a barrier to prevent rom advancing westwards. Napoleon's action in depriving possessions the Duke of Oldenburg, a relative of Alexander, his hasty marriage with Marie Louise of Austria before ving a definite answer to his request for the hand of ander's sister Anne, introduced personal motives into the ust that was growing between the two emperors. Napoleon annoyed by Russia's failure to support him effectively st Austria in 1809 and by the virtual abandonment of the inental System. The new customs tariff weighed heavily st French traders. Both Alexander and Napoleon realized the alliance was doomed, and began to prepare for war. ssia's resources in 1812 were insufficient for an offensive. of the army was occupied against Turkey and a hasty peace o be concluded in order to set it free to meet the French.[2]

. p. 368, n. 1.

. p. 363. The Peace of Bucarest was strenuously opposed by the 2.2

The Russian plan, dictated by natural conditions and t discrepancy of forces, was to entice the enemy on into a des lated country without allowing any decisive action to be fough Napoleon would thus be drawn farther away from his ba and his communications lengthened, while the Russians wou be falling back towards their source of supplies. The Russi army was divided into two groups, one of which, under Barcl de Tolly, was to retreat before Napoleon, while the other, l by Bagration, threatened his flanks and rear. The Grand Arn crossed the Niemen near Kóvno on June 24. Napoleon fi tried to get between the two groups and defeat them separatel but after hard fighting they managed to meet at Smolén (August 2). When he found that the Russians continued retire to the east, he made an effort to drive them from t Moscow road and thus cut them off from the fertile provinc of the south. This plan also failed, and after a fierce engag ment with the Russian rearguard at Valyútina-Gorá Napole thought of wintering at Smolénsk.

Meantime, Alexander had left the control of operations the hands of his generals, and returned to Moscow, where received an unexpectedly warm welcome. A wave of patriot feeling swept over the country. The wealthy classes made lar contributions towards the cost of the war, which became a war the people—a struggle for the defence of the fatherland again the invader. Alexander vowed that he would not make pea while a single enemy remained on Russian soil, and, yielding popular demand, appointed Kutúzov commander-in-chief the armies. Kutúzov knew that he was expected to make stand against the French, but determined to retreat until reached a favourable position. On September 7 a great batt took place at Borodinó (75 miles west of Moscow), in which t

French, and its successful conclusion was due largely to the efforts of t English representatives at Constantinople.

es of both French and Russians were very heavy. Both sides med the victory, but Kutúzov saw that he could not hope eep Napoleon back for long, and abandoned Moscow with- another fight. The French entered the city on Septem- 14. They had expected a long rest and plentiful supplies provisions, but found only flames, famine, and desolation. ost the whole population had fled with the army and re- ved everything that could be of service to the enemy. poleon tried to negotiate with the Russian leaders, but with- success. Forced inactivity, starvation, and the terrors of urning city, led to the final demoralization of the seriously leted French forces, and after little more than a month in scow Napoleon decided to retreat (October 15). He empted to break through to the south, in order to avoid old, devastated route by which he had advanced, but was ded off at Maloyaroslávets[1] (October 24) and driven back e more on to the main road from Moscow to Smolénsk. ce rearguard actions were fought at Vyázma and Krásnoe, only a brilliant stratagem saved the remnant of the French es from complete annihilation at the crossing of the river ézina (November 26–8). Winter came on, and the whole ntry rose against the French as they straggled west. Harassed n all sides by guerrilla bands and Cossack irregulars, the nd Army turned into a hungry, frozen rabble, and only all portion of it was left to recross the Niemen.

The Wars of 1813–14

lexander had attained his immediate purpose and might : stopped at his own frontiers, but determined to take ntage of Napoleon's desperate failure and rouse Europe nst him. In January 1813 the Russian army crossed the

[1] One hundred miles south-west of Moscow, on the road to Kalúga.

Niemen, and Alexander embarked on the most brilliant perio of his career. Never at any time previously had Russia mea so much for the fate of Europe.

Frederick William of Prussia had been compelled, early 1812, to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance wi Napoleon, and furnish an auxiliary corps for service with t Grand Army. After the Russian disaster he was anxious sever this alliance, but, mindful of the fate he had so narrow escaped in 1807, he could not make up his mind until force to do so by events that were beyond his control. Gener Yorck, commander of the Prussian corps that had been acti on Napoleon's left, allowed the Russians to cross the Prussia frontier in pursuit of the retreating French (Convention Tauroggen, December 30, 1812), and a national rising bro out in East Prussia. Frederick William fled from Berlin Breslau. On February 27, 1813, by the Treaty of Kalish, formally joined Alexander, and on March 13 declared w against France.

While Napoleon was preparing a new army, the French troo in Germany were pressed back, first to the Oder, and then the Elbe. The allies took Hamburg and Dresden, and the southern army, under Blücher, advanced to Leipzig. But this time Napoleon had arrived with fresh forces. He crosse the river Saale, occupied Leipzig, defeated the allies at Lütze (May 2), and retook Dresden. After the battle of Bautze (May 20–1) the allied armies retreated slowly into Silesi fighting all the way.

At this point an armistice was arranged (Pläswitz, June 4 with a view to peace negotiations. Peace terms were to b offered to Napoleon by Austria, who, if they were rejecte was to join Russia and Prussia (Convention of Reichenbac June 17). Napoleon hesitated until the time fixed by t ultimatum had expired, and on August 12 Austria declare

. Sweden had also joined the Coalition by this time, and gland had agreed to provide large subsidies.

During the armistice Prussia had mobilized all her forces, Russian reserves were moved forward. Operations were ewed in August. The French broke through into Silesia, met with disaster on the river Katzbach (August 25). strong force which advanced towards Berlin was checked Grossbeeren, and later defeated at Dennewitz (September 6). poleon himself won an important victory over the southern ed army at Dresden (August 26–7), and caused it to fall k, but a column which he sent to cut off its retreat was ght in a trap at Kulm, and had to surrender (August 30). e battle of Kulm proved the turning-point in the campaign. e allies slowly converged on Napoleon, and engaged him h their full strength at Leipzig. In the terrible 'Battle of Nations' (October 16–19) the French army was defeated ruined. The survivors fled west, and, after breaking through Bavarian force[1] that tried to bar their retreat (Hanau, tober 30), crossed the Rhine.

n January 1814 the war was carried into France. The n army of the allies concentrated on the plateau of Langres. ther north Blücher advanced almost unopposed as far as enne. On February 1 he defeated Napoleon, who had ened to meet him, at La Rothière, but two weeks later army was shattered and compelled to fall back on Châlons. poleon turned south and checked for a time the main army he allies. His successes in this period were due in part to lack of cohesion amongst his opponents. Selfishness and ousy even threatened to break up the Coalition, but it was d by Lord Castlereagh. When peace negotiations, which been proceeding for some weeks, failed, Russia, Austria,

[1] Bavaria joined the allies in October 1813, and was followed by most of ther German states.

Prussia, and Great Britain bound themselves (1) not t
treat separately with Napoleon, (2) to continue the strugg
until France should be confined once more to her origin
frontiers, and (3) to endeavour to secure a lasting peac
for the protection of which their representatives were to me
together periodically (Treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 1814
Blücher was reinforced, and defeated Napoleon at Lac
(March 9–10). Believing his enemies to be in retreat, Napolec
marched east, and the allied armies, by a rapid convergi
movement, occupied Paris (March 31).

The Settlement of 1815: *Poland*

The first care of the victorious allies was to render impossib
a repetition of the events of the past twenty-five years. Th
were determined that France should not be allowed to tu
Europe upside down again. There was at first some disagre
ment amongst them as to the form of government that shou
be set up. Napoleon, who abdicated on April 11, was pe
mitted to retire to the island of Elba, and in the end t
restoration of the Bourbons, in the person of Louis XVII
was decided upon. In order to avoid a renewal of the politic
conditions which had prevailed under the old monarchy,
which in part the Revolution had been due, Louis was to gra
a constitutional charter. The frontiers of France were defin
as those which she held on November 1, 1792 (Treaty of Par
May 30, 1814).

The second task which faced the allies was the reorganizati
of Europe. This was entrusted to a congress that met
Vienna in October 1814. From the point of view of Russi
the most important question was that of Poland, whi
Alexander had decided to revive, as an autonomous state, rul
over by himself and his heirs. It was thus necessary for hi
to retain the Duchy of Warsaw, of which the greater part h

onged to Prussia before 1807.[1] In order to induce Frederick lliam to abandon his claim he had undertaken to provide n with compensation in Germany. Frederick William hed to annex Saxony, an arrangement which was opposed France, Austria, Bavaria, and the smaller German states, as ly to make Prussia too powerful. Great Britain and Austria, the other hand, were alarmed by the advance of Russia into rope. The Polish-Saxon question thus divided the Powers o two camps, and for a time there was grave danger of a ent rupture, which might even have led to war.[2] In the a compromise was arrived at : Alexander agreed to leave ssia the western part of the Duchy of Warsaw, while derick William contented himself with the northern half Saxony, and important acquisitions in western Germany. tria received back Tarnopol and the portion of Galicia which had been forced to cede to the Duchy in 1809,[3] while the of Cracow became an independent republic.

Alexander thus gained a large part of what he had set out gain. But to carry out his original plan with regard to Poland would have had to cut off from Russia, besides the Polish ds gained at the time of the Partitions, Lithuania and rge expanse of territory, east of the Dnieper, which had n acquired earlier. Owing to the hostile feeling against Poles in Russia at that time, caused by their adherence to oleon, such a step would have aroused a storm of protest. xander therefore had to content himself with turning that of the Duchy of Warsaw which he had just acquired into ngdom, and giving it a constitution.

[1] Cf. p. 359.

[2] Great Britain, France, and Austria provided for this contingency by cluding an alliance (January 3, 1815), which was obviously directed inst Russia.

[3] Cf. p. 368, n. 1.

EUROPEAN RUS
IN THE
19TH CENTUR
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400
Belostok acquired
Finland "
Bessarabia "
Kingdom of Poland "
Caucasia "
Part of Bessarabia
back to Moldavia
Russian again fro
ARCTIC OCEAN
FINLAND
Archangel
R. Dvina
Lake Onega
Lake Ladoga
Helsingfors
Viborg
Revel
St. Petersburg
Novgorod
Dórpat
Narva
Riga
Pskov
BALTIC SEA
Vyátka
Perm
R. Volga
Tilsit
Tver
Borodino
Moscow
Kazán
Nizhni Novgorod
R. Moskva
R. Oka
Vilna
Smolensk
KINGDOM OF POLAND
BELOSTOK 1807
Warsaw
Mogilëv
R. Dniepr
Roslavl
Saratov
R. Volga
Kiev
Khárkov
R. Dniester
R. Donets
Ekaterinoslav
R. Bug
Taganrog
Novocherkássk
Odessa
Rostóv
Astrakhan
Akkerman
R. Danube
Sevastopol
BLACK SEA
CAUCASIA 1801-1878
CASPIAN SEA

By the settlement of the Polish question the western frontier Russia was fixed, and, with the exception of very slight justments in the far south-east,[1] it remained unchanged for entury.

The Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance

Before the Congress of Vienna had completed its work, rope was again plunged into war by the return of Napoleon, o landed on the south coast of France on March 1, 1815, l in less than three weeks reached Paris. Russia, Austria, ussia, and Great Britain at once came to an agreement by ich each of them was to provide an army of 150,000, and keep it in the field until Napoleon, 'the enemy and dis-ber of the peace of the world', 'should have been rendered olutely incapable of stirring up further trouble' (March 25). thin a short time a great new European league had been med. Napoleon proceeded to gather together an army, but, pite his acceptance of the constitution, he could not gain unanimous support even of his own people, while his emies were resolved to crush him. The short campaign ich ended at Waterloo (June 18) decided his fate, and he l to abdicate once more. This time the allies took no risks, l removed him to St. Helena.

The events of the 'Hundred Days' proved that the arrange-nts embodied in the Treaty of Paris did not guarantee the ce of Europe as fully as the allies intended that they should. ey accordingly imposed a fresh settlement, which provided the occupation of the fortresses in the north and east of nce by allied troops for a period not exceeding five years, effected some slight changes in the frontiers laid down in 4 (Second Treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815).

The idea of a European Concert for the maintenance of

[1] Bessarabia; cf. pp. 422–3, 464.

peace, which had been foreshadowed in the agreements con cluded between Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Great Britain o March 1, 1814, and March 25, 1815, took final shape in th convention signed by the four Powers on November 20, 181 Napoleon and his family were to be excluded for ever fro the French throne, and 'since revolutionary principles migh again tear France in pieces, and thus menace the repose o other states', the high contracting parties undertook, in cas so unfortunate an event happened to occur, 'to agree among themselves and with (the King of France) on such measur as they might judge necessary for the safety of their respectiv states and for the general peace of Europe'. Representative of the four Powers were to meet periodically to discuss commo interests and to take measures which they might conside 'salutary for the repose and prosperity of the peoples and fo the peace of Europe'. The terms of this agreement show tha the Powers regarded the spirit of revolution as the mos dangerous enemy of the European system which they ha founded. In its conception the Quadruple Alliance wa a league for the defence of the principle of 'legitimism' which, however, did not necessarily imply the negation of a political progress. Under the influence of later events an the guidance of Metternich, the representative of the mos reactionary state in Europe, it gradually developed into league of reaction, and devoted itself to the suppression o liberal ideas, wherever and in whatever form they showe themselves.

The idea of a European Concert was applied in a novel an interesting manner in the 'Holy Alliance', formed on th initiative of Alexander I. The stirring events of the yea 1812–15 had a marked effect on his character. He declare that the burning of Moscow 'lit up his soul and warmed hi heart with a hitherto unfelt faith'. He had always been a

ılist, and the tendency towards mysticism which had been iceable even in the early years of his reign now showed lf more prominently. Under the influence of Baroness Julie Krüdener, whom he met in Germany, he turned to the le for inspiration and guidance, and began to regard him- as the instrument of Providence, which through him had ıished the too ambitious Napoleon. He conceived the idea reorganizing Europe in accordance with the principles of Christian faith, and the Holy Alliance was to be the means putting this idea into practice. The monarchs who sub- bed to it[1] declared their determination 'to base their duct in the administration of their respective states, and ir political relations with other governments, on no other :s than the precepts of the Christian religion—justice, rity, and peace', and bound themselves 'to remain united the bonds of true and indissoluble fraternity'; 'to assist ı other on all occasions and in all places'; to treat their ples as members of a single 'Christian nation'; and to ern in conformity with the teachings of Christ. This vague harmless confession of faith, which Castlereagh referred to a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense', had no practical ıificance for European politics. It remained a 'sonorous hing' (Metternich's description of it); for the actual ıciples which were to govern the relations between the opean states were laid down with sufficient clearness in convention of November 20.

Economic Conditions after 1815

The brilliant success attained by Russian arms was dearly ght. The provinces over which the tide of war had passed :ctly were quite ruined, and the whole country had been

[1] The original signatories were Alexander I, Frederick William of Prussia, Francis I of Austria (September 26, 1815).

drawn on for men, supplies, and transport. The taxabl resources of the people were exhausted, and the war had bee carried on with the help of English gold. After the conclusio of peace serious attention was once more turned to the financia position of the country. Paper-money to the value of 38 millio roubles was withdrawn in 1817, but no less than 800 million remained in circulation. Russia was saved from bankruptcy a this period only by her foreign trade, for by 1812 there was large excess of exports over imports, and the rouble stoo favourably on the foreign exchanges. In 1816 all prohibitions o the import of foreign goods were abandoned and many custom duties, especially those on raw materials that could not b produced at home, were lowered.[1] In 1819 the tariff becam still more liberal.

Manufacturing industry had made little progress by the en of the eighteenth century, though factories had existed fro the time of Peter the Great. Iron, arms, woollen cloth, an linen were needed for the army and fleet. In order to obtain regular supply of these articles the government supplied th factories with capital and forced labour, but in return demande that they should work only for State needs and refused to allo them to produce goods for sale. Even when this policy wa abandoned the industries that had been affected by it did no make much progress, for owing to the general economic back wardness of the country the market for manufactured good was formed only very slowly. In the younger industries, such a cotton, that were beginning to develop independently of th government, significant changes took place in this period. The superior productivity of free labour, as compared with that o the forced workers whom the government had tied to th eighteenth-century factories, was clearly recognized by the ne

[1] The tariff changes of 1816 were introduced in fulfilment of promis made by Alexander to other Powers at the Congress of Vienna.

neration of manufacturers. During the first half of the nine-
enth century serfs were gradually replaced by hired workers
industry. A few of the more intelligent landowners began
see that even in agriculture the same change would be
ofitable.

Alexander and the Serfs

Serfdom reached the height of its development under
.therine II, but from the reign of her successor the process
decline set in. Although too much importance must not be
:ached to Paul's law of 1797, the one enacted by Alexander in
03[2] clearly showed in which direction official opinion on this
estion was beginning to lean. In the years 1816, 1818, and
19 the peasants of the Baltic provinces received their personal
:edom, but remained in economic dependence on their former
asters, who were allowed to retain all the land. The question
serfdom was constantly in Alexander's mind, and he welcomed
nemes for its solution that were presented to him by persons
terested in the subject. He fully recognized the need for
form, but knew that the great majority of the landowners
ould not tolerate any interference with their privileges,
:hough they had lost all claim to the right of disposing of the
:rson and labour of the peasants when the compulsory service
return for which they had received that right was abolished
1762.[3] In 1818 Alexander ordered his minister Arakchéev
prepare a scheme for *gradually* emancipating the serfs, which
as not to include 'any measure that might be burdensome for
e landowners or likely to necessitate the use of compulsion'.
his was the official attitude on this important question right
to the middle of the nineteenth century.

[1] Cf. p. 349. [2] Cf. p. 357.

[3] Cf. p. 281.

Education

Public education won for itself in this period a definite place in national life. From the time of Peter the Great, and even earlier, the State had encouraged education in the same way that it encouraged industry, and with an equally narrow object —to train officials and administrators. In the nineteenth century education was recognized for the first time as a social need. The first years of the reign were particularly fruitful. An intelligent Minister of Education (Count Zavadóvsky) was devotedly supported by a group of enlightened public workers who endeavoured to organize a national system of education. For administrative purposes the country was divided into 'circuits', each controlled by a 'curator', who lived in Petersburg, sharing in the discussion of the educational affairs of the empire as a whole, but kept in touch with the provinces through periodical visits of inspection. At the beginning of the century Russia possessed only three universities—Moscow (founded in 1755), Vilna, and Dórpat (now Yúriev in Livland). Of these Moscow alone was really Russian, for Vilna and Dórpat represented Polish and German civilization. Soon after Alexander's accession three more universities were opened, all of them in Russia proper—Khárkov, Kazán, and Petersburg[1] —and higher education became for the first time accessible to large numbers of the people. In 1804 the first University Code was published. The universities became practically autonomous, and were made responsible for the supervision of secondary education. Government grants for educational purposes were raised to 2,800,000 roubles a year.[2] Each university received 130,000 roubles, while fixed sums were assigned to the secondary and elementary schools. In the hope of inducing the

[1] Petersburg University was founded as a 'Central Pedagogical Institute'.

[2] From 780,000 roubles under Catherine II.

ntry to have their sons properly educated, instead of employ-
g foreign tutors, as was the custom at that time, the govern-
ent founded the Lycée of Tsárskoe Seló. The Richelieu Lycée,
hich later became the University of Odessa, and the Lázarev
ıstitute of Oriental Languages at Moscow, were the fruits of
ivate enterprise.

This productive work was brought to a standstill by the
ıancial embarassments created by the wars, and after 1815 the
ducational policy of the government changed sharply. The
irit of mysticism which then spread through society found
s way into the educational system. Alexander even joined the
lministration of education and spiritual affairs in one ministry,
the head of which stood Prince Golítsyn, who was charged
ith the task of 'spiritualizing' education. Enlightened
ırators were replaced by confirmed reactionaries. The best
ofessors were removed, and the curriculum and spirit of
ıiversity life changed completely.[1] The obscurantist policy
as further expressed in a strengthening of the press rules, and
though the policy embodied in the 'Ministry of Spiritual
ffairs and Education' was really nothing more than a pass-
g fad, reaction became firmly established under Golítsyn's
ccessor, Admiral Shishkóv.

The Eastern Question, 1813–25: *Greece*

By 1813 Russia had gained a commanding position in the
ack Sea and the Caucasus, and but for events in Europe she
ight have established herself on the Danube. Turkey was
eatly alarmed by the reference, in the agreement signed by
e members of the Holy Alliance, to a single 'Christian
tion',[2] and by her own exclusion from the Concert of

[1] Students who broke the rules had to parade with the word 'Sinner'
scribed on boards hung round their necks.

[2] Cf. p. 379.

Europe. After the conclusion of peace, Alexander kept up a large army, and, in order to be able to pick a quarrel at his own time, delayed the settlement of certain questions arising out of the Treaty of Bucarest by presenting demands which the Sultan would not accept.[1] Agitators who conspired almost openly for a rising of the Christian subjects of the Sultan were tolerated and even encouraged in Russia,[2] and several Greeks, known to be hostile to Turkey, occupied important positions in Alexander's service.[3] Alexander's intentions with regard to Turkey were thus no secret, and caused apprehension to other Powers, especially Austria and Great Britain. Austria was already concerned at the occupation of the mouth of the Danube by Russia, and saw that the next stage in her advance might easily be the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia. British statesmen feared the growth of Russia, and regarded the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey as a matter of life and death for the British Empire in the East.

A general revolt of the Christians in Turkey broke out in 1821. Prince Ypsilanti crossed the Prut and called upon

[1] During the war with Persia, Russia had been allowed to use the military road from the Black Sea coast, up the valley of the river Rion, to Tiflis. Turkey had renewed this privilege on several occasions, and by a secret article of the Treaty of Bucarest had promised to cede this district to Russia, who agreed to dismantle the fortresses of Kilia and Ismail, at the mouth of the Danube. The Sultan refused to confirm this arrangement, and relations between Russia and Turkey were thus governed by the open articles of the treaty, according to which Russia should have evacuated the valley of the Rion. Alexander refused to do this, and pressed for the ratification of the secret articles.

[2] The *Hetairia Philike*, a secret society which prepared the ground for the Greek rising of 1821, was revived in Odessa in 1814.

[3] The two brothers Ypsilanti, one of whom became the leader of a rising in 1821, served as aides-de-camp to Alexander, and Capodistria, later president of the Greek Republic, was Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs.

e people of Moldavia to rise against the Sultan. This ›vement had no chance of success, and was easily suppressed. ıe real revolt took place in Greece, where the ground had en thoroughly prepared beforehand. Before long the Turks re completely driven out of the Morea.

Alexander now had to clear himself in the eyes of Europe ·m the suspicion of collusion with the insurgents to which policy had laid him open.[1] He therefore disowned Ypsilanti l the Greeks, whom he denounced as revolutionaries, un- rthy of sympathy. But soon the excesses of the Turks and : growing popularity of the Greek cause in Russia seemed justify him in intervening. On June 28, 1821, he sent an imatum in which, besides demanding the settlement of estions that had been in dispute since 1812, he declared ıt the Sultan would find himself faced with the hostility of : whole Christian world, if he did not promise (1) to rebuild : Greek churches which had been destroyed by the Turks, to protect the Christian religion, (3) to grant an amnesty those rebels who submitted to him within a given period, l (4) to remove his troops from Moldavia and Wallachia, l respect the autonomy of those provinces. A few days er he addressed a note to the allies, asking them what would their attitude if war broke out between Russia and Turkey, l what measures they proposed to take in the Balkans if, a result of the war, the authority of Turkey should be erthrown.

The Sultan rejected all Alexander's demands, and on gust 8 the Russian ambassador left Constantinople. Russian ops were massed in the south, ready for action against rkey. In answer to Alexander's note, Great Britain and

[1] In his proclamation to the people of Moldavia, Ypsilanti claimed that was supported by a 'great Power', which, under the circumstances, ld only mean Russia.

Austria replied that they would protest against any schem for the dismemberment of Turkey, and would try to persuad the Sultan to grant Russia the satisfaction to which her treati entitled her. As for the Greeks, they were rebels, and th Sultan, their legitimate ruler, should be left to deal wit them as he thought fit. They were no more worthy of con sideration than the rebellious peoples of Naples and Piedmon These representations influenced Alexander, especially as the were couched in language which made it clear that the tw Powers would not allow Russia to intervene alone. The nec for caution was further brought home by the course of even in Greece, where the national assembly adopted a liberal con stitution and declared Greece to be completely independen of Turkey (January 1822). Alexander therefore accepted th offer of mediation between himself and the Sultan, and con sented to modify his demands.

Towards the end of 1822 the struggle between the thr Powers entered a fresh phase. Sympathy with the Gre cause was just as warm in England and France as it was Russia. There were even rumours that the Greeks were pr paring to elect a French prince as their ruler. At the sam time their military position became so much improved th it seemed possible that they might win, and Great Brita could not afford to allow them to attribute their success Russian intervention. The British government therefo countenanced the organization of relief for the Greeks b private persons, while Canning (who had succeeded Castlereag at the Foreign Office in 1822) tried to get the dispute betwee Russia and Turkey settled as quickly as possible, so that the should be nothing to prevent the renewal of diplomat relations between the two countries, an event that, to th Greeks, would seem to signify the abandonment of their cau by Alexander. In answer to an inquiry addressed to him fro

ndon as to his views on the ultimate settlement of the eek question, Alexander proposed that the revolted terri- y should be divided into three provinces, autonomous as as internal affairs were concerned, but dependent on the tan. This plan angered both Greeks and Turks. The tan would hear of nothing but the complete submission of rebellious subjects, who in turn rejected the idea of being uced to a condition of vassalage. Canning thus attained object, which was to compromise Alexander in the eyes of Greeks, and make them regard Great Britain as their chief tector.

At Alexander's suggestion a conference met at Petersburg in ruary 1825, to consider the question of a collective offer the Powers to mediate between Turkey and the Greeks. this time the Sultan had procured help from Ibrahim ha (son of Mehemet Ali Pasha of Egypt), who landed in Morea and soon reduced the Greeks to a desperate con- on. Great Britain interfered dramatically to save them n complete destruction. Relations with Russia at once ame very strained, and Canning declared that if Russian ops crossed the Prut, the British would occupy the Morea the Greek islands. Europe was waiting in suspense to see at would happen, but the crisis was resolved by the death Alexander (December 1825).

Political Development, 1815–25

The struggle for the liberation of Russia from the French, owed by Alexander's military and political successes in West, had roused patriotic feeling and wakened the ional consciousness of the people. Interest in public affairs not subside when peace was concluded, and to many people time seemed to have come when the government might

return to the policy of reform which had apparently been inte
rupted by the outbreak of war in 1812.

Alexander still posed as a liberal. He gave Poland a co
stitution, supported the moderate liberal régime in Franc
and encouraged the German princes to grant free institutio
to their subjects. In 1818 he had Speránsky's 'Constitutio
taken out of the archives for further consideration, and at t
opening of the Polish Diet in the same year he hinted th
he was preparing a surprise for his own people. But h
liberalism was no longer the sincere faith that had inspir
him in his youth. He was becoming an opportunist, a
allowed ulterior motives to influence his political viev
Though not yet a reactionary, he had one important comm
interest with his colleagues of the Quadruple Alliance. Ev
in his most liberal moods he insisted that freedom was a gi
to be bestowed by monarchs, not snatched from them
their peoples. It was this hatred of revolution that bound hi
originally to his allies. In the name of 'established authorit
he agreed to, even insisted upon, the use of force for the su
pression of popular risings in Italy and Spain. His full co
version to the doctrine of which Metternich was the leadi
exponent was hastened by events at home. In 1820 a muti
took place in his favourite Semënovski Guards, which seem
to indicate that Russia herself was becoming infected wi
the spirit of revolution. The attitude of the second Polish Di
which, after a series of hostile speeches, rejected most of t
legislative proposals of the government, alarmed Alexand
even more. After 1820 he no longer believed that liberali
and revolution were two entirely different things. Long bef
this, however, he had lost interest in domestic politics and
chance of further reforms had disappeared. The conduct
affairs passed into the hands of Arakchéev, who acted
intermediary between the emperor and his ministers.

ived their reports and passed them on, in the form of
t summaries, along with his own conclusions, for Alexander's
roval.

n the last ten years of his reign Alexander's attention was
oted mainly to foreign affairs and the maintenance of his
tion as leader of Europe. He kept up a large standing army,
in order to attain the maximum of military preparedness
n the least expenditure he resorted to a plan that had been
is mind for several years. In certain districts 'military
lements' were established; the population of each settle-
it was freed from all ordinary taxation and State burdens,
had to maintain a unit of the army. Large sums of money
e spent in securing the prosperity of the settlements, but
were hated and feared by the people. The inhabitants
e placed under strict military discipline, every detail of their
s was controlled, and their position became worse even than
of the serfs working on private estates.

lexander's loss of interest in internal affairs came at an un-
unate time. The wars of 1813–15 took the armies of Russia
Europe, and with them large numbers of the younger
better educated members of the gentry, who thus be-
e acquainted with the intellectual movements and political
s that had moved the Continent during the revolutionary
od, and with the political and social forms that pre-
ed in the West. In this way the educated classes of Russia
e drawn more intimately than ever before into the intel-
ual interests of the Western world, and this contact with
ope caused many Russians to look at the conditions that
ed in their own country from a new point of view. The
tion of Western ideas on Russian minds provided a directing
ence on the development of opinion for many years to come,
led to the development of two distinct tendencies of
ght. One of these is often referred to as 'practical',

since those who adhered to it sought to transfer to Russian so the political and social forms of the West, and in particul aimed at securing representative government, or even a republi The second or 'theoretical' tendency passed through sever stages, and in the end split up into two distinct currents political philosophy that went by the names of 'Westernism and 'Slavophilism'.

Though most of these developments came later in th century, important movements of opinion took place in th last years of Alexander's reign. When the armies returne from abroad, many groups were formed amongst young office who wanted to study social and political questions. As th government turned farther and farther from reform, the moo of discontent in educated society became stronger. Vagu desires hardened into well-defined aims, and the isolated study circles united into a secret society. The doctrinaire elemer predominated, but there was a small group of ardent revolu tionaries led by a young officer named Péstel, who in the en formed a separate society in the south, where he was stationed with his regiment. The 'southern' group definitely aimed at republic, and were ready to adopt the most violent methods— even to the assassination of the emperor—in order to attai their ends. The majority of the conspirators adhered to th much more moderate 'northern' society, which advocated monarchy with the safeguards of a constitution.

Alexander's attention was repeatedly drawn to the existenc of these secret political societies, but for a long time he refuse to take any measures towards their suppression. At last, aft much persuasion, he ordered an inquiry to be instituted. Ver little progress had been made with it when news came th Alexander had died suddenly at Taganróg in the south Russia (December 1, 1825).

2

Nicholas I (1825–55)

The December Rising, 1825

Alexander's death was followed by a period of confusion, ised by the uncertainty that surrounded the question of the :cession. He had no sons, and under Paul's law of 1797 [1] his ›ther Constantine was heir to the throne, and after him ›ther brother, Nicholas. Constantine contracted an irregular ond marriage and renounced his rights, whereupon Alexander :w up a manifesto in which he announced that Nicholas was succeed him. This manifesto was not published. Sealed ›ies of it were deposited with the Metropolitan Seraphim, : Council of State, the Senate, and the Synod, with instruc-ns that they were to be opened on Alexander's death. cholas himself—the person most concerned—was not icially informed of his position, and only knew about it m some chance remarks let fall by his brother in private iversation.

When the news of Alexander's death reached the north, nstantine, who was acting as commander-in-chief at Warsaw, ›claimed Nicholas emperor. The manifesto was opened in tersburg, but Nicholas feared to publish it, knowing that he s disliked by the Guards regiments and their officers. He uld not accept the throne unless Constantine formally refused and even took the oath of allegiance to his brother, though e latter wrote to him from Warsaw, in a private letter, that he d long ago renounced all his claims. Nicholas tried to rsuade him to come to Petersburg and clear the air with a blic declaration, but he still refused to move. Messengers

[1] Cf. p. 348.

flew between the two cities, and in the end Nicholas very reluc tantly decided to act on the basis of Alexander's manifest December 26 was fixed as the day on which the troops wer to take the oath.

During the three weeks' interregnum the members of th 'northern' society met daily, and decided to turn the prevailin confusion to their own account. They hoped that, if they pu Constantine on the throne, they would be able to extort fro him the promise of concessions that would limit the power o the monarch and lead to the establishment of a constitutio By telling them that Nicholas was a usurper they gained over t their side several units of the Guards regiments, and believed tha once the rising started other bodies of troops would join them On December 26 the disaffected regiments assembled on th square before the Senate, and began to cheer for the Empero Constantine. Nicholas sent messengers to talk them over, bu they mortally wounded the military governor Milorádovich fired at the Grand Duke Michael, and refused to listen to th Metropolitan Seraphim. An attempt to disperse them wit the help of Horse Guards who remained faithful to Nicholas me with no success, and as crowds of people were gathering and th movement seemed to be spreading, strong measures had to b taken. The order to fire was given. Many of the mutineers an the public were killed and wounded, the crowds dispersed i disorder, and the whole affair was over.

The revolt never had any real chance of success, for it leaders gained their small following by false declaration acted without any clear plan, and were themselves too fe and too weak to be dangerous. The whole movement was th private venture of a group of officers, a parody of the cou revolutions of the eighteenth century, when the aristocrati Guards regiments had played a decisive part in the making an unmaking of emperors and empresses. Nevertheless, the govern

nt was very seriously alarmed and set to work to root out the itical societies. Searches were conducted in Petersburg and e provinces, hundreds of arrests were made, and all the leaders re caught. Nicholas conducted a thorough inquiry in person. e conspirators made no secret of their intentions and plans. e of them were executed, and the others sentenced to penal vitude or exiled to Siberia.

The Condition of Russia : Nicholas I and Reform

Unlike his brother Alexander, Nicholas[1] had been brought by a French *émigré*, who taught him to hate liberal ideas. had travelled considerably in Russia and abroad, and though mother, the Empress Mária Feódorovna, feared that he ght become infected with liberalism during his stay in gland, his education had inoculated him against this danger he returned politically sound. In 1817 he married a ghter of Frederick William of Prussia and settled down a quiet family life and the zealous execution of his military ies. He was appointed commander of the brigade of Guards, occupied himself with restoring their discipline, which had n seriously weakened during their long period of foreign ice. His strictness created that discontent among the iers and their officers which made him so disinclined to ant the throne without absolutely unassailable evidence of right to it.

The facts that were revealed by the inquiry into the Decem- rising gave Nicholas a clear picture of the causes of discon- and of the condition of the country. He knew that among conspirators there were, besides ardent young idealists, men a wide experience of administrative work, including some he most brilliant minds of the period. Some of those who e brought up for trial, on their own initiative or at Nicholas's

[1] Nicholas, the third son of Paul, was born on July 7, 1796.

direct request, drew up detailed and valuable memoranda which showed that the sharp turn in the policy of Alexander I after 1815 had disturbed and irritated the educated classes. The hope of reform had been roused by Alexander's early measures, inflamed by the awakening of national feeling during the struggle against Napoleon, and intensified by the promise of better things that Alexander's activity in western Europe had seemed to give—only to be cruelly disappointed in the end. The condition of the country, the complete disorganization of all the machinery of government, fed the general discontent. The laws were in a chaotic condition, and so full of contradictions that 'the strong triumph, and the weak and innocent suffer'. The machinery of justice was complicated and corruptly managed. Catherine's provincial institutions had been distorted, and the governors ruled like satraps. The central government was disjointed and out of touch with its representatives in the country. The Senate had become a mere office for registering the decisions of the person who for the moment enjoyed the confidence of the monarch. The State economy was badly conducted, the budget never represented the real financial position and State monopolies hindered the growth of industry and demoralized the country. The peasants on State lands were given over to the arbitrary rule of the police, whilst those on private estates were subject to the uncontrolled caprice of their masters.

From the beginning of his reign Nicholas was aware of the need for reforms. That he had, however, very definite ideas as to how these reforms should be carried out is proved by the following statement: 'I have always distinguished, and always will distinguish, between those who wish for just reforms and desire that they should issue *from a legally constituted authority* and those who would like to undertake them on their own initiative and use God alone knows what kind of methods.

manifesto published at the time of the coronation (July 25, 26) stated that 'not by insolent, and always destructive, eams are the institutions of the country to be perfected, eir shortcomings made good and abuses corrected. We shall cept with goodwill every modest expression of a desire for provement, if it implies improvement that shall be *gradual*.' These declarations expressed the policy of Nicholas with gard to reform. They clearly indicated that if anything was be done, it could only be on the initiative of the govern- nt, which was determined to act only by its own methods d without any pressure from outside. Public initiative was pect from the beginning of the reign, and as time went on s attitude of distrust was expressed even more sharply and phatically.

Nicholas's theory of government owed much to the influence the historian Karamzín, who had opposed reforms under xander I, but was by no means an obscurantist reactionary. ramzín believed that autocracy was the only possible form government for Russia ; but he also held that absolute power s a sacred trust that imposed very definite obligations on the narch who wielded it. Nicholas himself would have nothing do with the reactionaries who had ruled during the last years his brother's reign, and preferred men who represented the derate conservatism propounded by Karamzín. Among his isers were Kochubéy and Speránsky,[1] who had by now grown the idealism that had guided them in the time of xander. Speránsky's administrative work under Nicholas was irely in practical fields. Kochubéy presided over a secret mittee (founded December 18, 1826) that for ten years tried draw up a scheme of reforms, but only succeeded in leaving

[1] After his disgrace in 1812 Speránsky acted as governor of the province énza, and, from 1819, of Siberia. He was recalled by Alexander I in , and became a member of the Senate.

things exactly as they were before. It drafted endless projects and enunciated many high-sounding principles, but astonished even Nicholas by its talent for contradicting itself.

No improvement was effected in the organization of central government under Nicholas I, but there were negative processes at work that led to important developments. The Council of State, as reorganized by Alexander in 1810, was mainly an advisory legislative institution to which all laws had to be submitted before receiving the emperor's approval.[1] But its rights had been gradually usurped by the Council of Ministers, and under Nicholas secret committees for the discussion of proposed legislation were constantly set up, and the functions of the Council of State reduced to a mere formality. In several cases Nicholas wanted to sign and publish forthwith projects sent up by the secret committees, and was with difficulty persuaded to submit them to the Council.

The authority of the Council of Ministers suffered in the same way. Nicholas tried to extend to current affairs of government that absolute personal control that he had succeeded in establishing over legislation. For this purpose he made use of the Emperor's Personal Chancellery, an institution that managed affairs of a semi-private, semi-official nature. In 1826 a special department of the Chancellery, under Speránsky's direction, was entrusted with the codification of the laws. In 1832 there was published the first complete Code, a massive work, which was not only Speránsky's greatest achievement, but one of the greatest monuments of Nicholas's reign. In 1826 the organization of

[1] The Council of State was appointed by the emperor; the paragraphs of the law of 1810 that defined its legislative functions were as follows: '2. All projects of laws and decrees shall be submitted to, and examined by, the Council of State, and shall then enter into force by the authority of the autocrat. 3. No law or decree shall issue from the Council and become active without the approval of the supreme authority.'

e secret police was vested in a new department of the Chancel-
y, which later became famous as the ' Third Section '. This
ep was the direct outcome of the revelations made at the trial
the Decembrists[1] and of Nicholas's conviction, formed at that
ne, that the secret police was one of the most important
struments of government. In 1828 a fourth department was
eated, to look after the charitable and educational institutions
unded by Nicholas's mother, the Empress Mária ; and in
36 and 1843 two more departments were founded for special
rposes. The idea underlying all these changes was that
ly ordinary routine business should be left to ministers, while
affairs that the emperor wanted to keep under his own close
servation were entrusted to special institutions over which
could exercise a more effective control than he could over
ordinary executive organs. The departments of the Chan-
lery were ministries in all but name, and their directors were
equal rank with the ministers.

No progress in local government can be noted in this period,
l indeed in the existing conditions of local life it was not to
expected. The majority of the population were serfs, ruled
itrarily by their masters. The free classes were isolated from
h other by wide differences of rights and duties. The people
e regarded as an aggregate of units paying taxes or perform-
definite services for the State. Administration was purely
eaucratic, and the officials ruled arbitrarily and corruptly.
asures for establishing a closer control over their actions were
gested by the secret committee, but nothing was done.
attempt was made to give the inhabitants in country
ricts a share in the management of purely local business,
as the making of roads, by setting up local committees,
-bureaucratic, half-elective in composition. But the official

[1] Those who took part in the rising of December 1825. The Russian
is *Dekabristy*, from *Dekábr* = December.

element always took control and the scheme failed. The not of the period was distrust of public effort and public initiative and local government continued to be thoroughly bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt.

The gentry possessed their own elective organs, but most of them felt that self-government, even for a highly privileged class, was impossible under existing conditions, and chronically neglected the exercise of their rights.

Catherine's municipal charter of 1785 enunciated the important principle that all the inhabitants of a town formed one community, which should have the right of managing independently its own affairs. But she did not apply this principle fully in the detailed provisions of the charter, and under her successors it became distorted beyond recognition. Class divisions could not be smoothed over by the mere enunciation of a principle, any more than uncontrolled officials could be restrained from using their powers in order to rob municipal institutions of their independence. Nicholas tried to revive the activity of the towns, but interest in municipal affairs was too weak. The reform of the administration of Petersburg (1846), which represented the highest point attained under Nicholas, only perpetuated all the evils of the existing system.

The Problem of Serfdom

The condition of the peasantry was rapidly becoming the most important problem in the life of the country. During the first half of the century a very notable change took place in the views of a large part of society and even of the government itself on the question of serfdom. The serf population was rapidly increasing, and the landowners, who were bound even in years of famine to feed their serfs,[1] could not find employment for all

[1] This obligation was incorporated into the Code of 1832.

them. They were allowed to hire them out, but only to sons who possessed the right to own inhabited land, i. e. to mbers of their own class, who already had more serfs than y could use. The land was not exploited to its fullest acity, but improved methods of cultivation demanded ital and knowledge that the gentry had no means of obtain-.[1] Some of them tried to utilize the labour of the serfs by ting up factories, but found that they could not compete h the factories in which free hired workers were employed. The position of the gentry was serious enough, without the cial difficulties created by the serf question. They had de great sacrifices in 1812, and in the succeeding period ial developments led to a change in their manner of life. ey acquired new tastes and new needs that could not be isfied without money, which they had to raise on the security estates that in a simpler age had supplied all their wants. By 43 no less than 54 per cent. of all private land in the country s mortgaged at heavy rates of interest.

Impelled by purely material considerations, many landowners ne to the conclusion that the liberation of the serfs would be fitable, so long as they could retain all the land in their own nds. They would still be able to keep the peasants economi-ly dependent on themselves, and draw from them a supply cheap labour that could easily be dispensed with when it s no longer wanted. The government regarded the matter m a different point of view. The frequency of serious orders amongst the peasants made the question one of vital

[1] The gentry were not really an *agricultural* class. They were originally itary or civil servants of the State, which paid for their services with nts of land, and, since land without labour was useless, fixed the peasants m to the land thus granted. The obligation of State service ceased 1762, but the gentry retained the land, and the peasants were not set until 1861.

AUGSBURG LIBRARY MINNEAPOLIS

importance for the State. During Nicholas's reign nearly s hundred disturbances took place, and half of them had to b suppressed with the aid of troops. This aspect of the questio was not without influence on the gentry, who went in fear f their lives and property.

There was a real need for serious measures, and during th period the peasant question was constantly under consideratio Many secret committees discussed it, but none of them cou formulate any practicable measure for its solution. Th government feared to take any step that might rouse oppositio from those landowners (the large majority) who still clun fanatically to their privileges, or raise the hopes of the peasant disturb their minds, and make them even more dissatisfied wit their lot. The secret committees, almost without exceptio came to the conclusion that while some change was undoubtedl necessary, it should be gradual and imperceptible.

The nearest point to a solution ever attained before 1861 w a law published in 1842, which permitted landowners to libera their peasants, who were to have the use of any land the already cultivated, in return for payment in labour or mone The Council of State pointed out with perfect justice that th law would mean nothing if it were not made compulsor Nicholas's reply was characteristic of the attitude taken up b the government throughout his reign: 'I know that I am a autocratic, all-powerful ruler, but I could never force myse to go so far as to order the landowners to enter into agreements Though it proved of no value as a practical measure, the law o 1842 marked an important stage in the development of goverr ment policy. In 1803 the landowners had been permitted t liberate their serfs,[1] but were not required to supply them wit land, whereas in 1842 the grant of land was made an essenti condition of emancipation. The government could not y

[1] Cf. p. 357.

ıg itself to make emancipation, *with the land condition*, com-
ory,[1] but it saw the danger of creating a huge landless
.etariate and steered a middle course by making the law of
2 facultative.

ı 1847 peasant communes were permitted to buy themselves
of serfdom, with the land they cultivated, if the estate of
r master was sold publicly by auction for debt. Such sales
e frequent at this period, but the concession was subsequently
ıedged round by restrictions that it became worthless. In
condition of the 'State' peasants[2] some improvement was
cted by the creation of a Ministry of State Property (1837),
:cted by the enlightened Kiselëv,[3] whom Nicholas fre-
ntly referred to as his 'chief of staff' on the peasant
stion.[4]

)nly in one direction did the government feel itself able to
decisively. In the south-western provinces[5] the peasant
blem had developed under historical and political conditions
ering widely from those that prevailed in the rest of Russia.
:e Russian peasants were ruled by Polish landowners, whose
:rests the government had no reason to consider. After
Polish rebellion of 1830–1, and in view of the known hos-
:y of the gentry, it felt its hands free, and was in fact
ious to gain the peasants as allies. It determined to regu-
: strictly the relations between them and their masters,
in 1847 put into force a series of regulations drawn up

This was the solution which it eventually adopted in 1861 (cf. p. 428).
'State' peasants were the largest class of the 'free' (i. e. non-serf)
:ant population: they cultivated land belonging to the State, for which
' paid money dues: their position was always much better than that of
so-called 'private' peasants (serfs).
Pronounced *Kiselyóff*.
Kiselëv was a leader of progressive opinion on this question: the
ıge in official policy indicated by the law of 1842 was due to his efforts.
Lands that had formerly belonged to Poland.

by General Bibikov (governor-general of the south-weste provinces—Kiev, Volynia, and Podolia). The amount of la to which the peasants were entitled, the payments in money labour that they were to make, and the obligations of the lan owners, were all carefully defined. In 1846 similar rules we enforced in the kingdom of Poland.[1] The government i tended to introduce them also in the Baltic provinces (whe the gentry were of German origin) and Lithuania, but owi to the strong protests of the landowners of those regions,[2] wh had powerful representatives at court, it decided to defer i decision.

Financial and Economic Conditions

The condition of State finances and of the currency had go from bad to worse during the reign of Alexander I. Lar annual deficits caused by the wars of the earlier half of the reig were met by issues of unsecured paper-money, which depr ciated enormously in value. After 1817, when the total amou of paper-money in circulation was no less than 800 millio roubles, the government bought in large sums, but the valu of the rouble increased only very slightly. The currency di order had a very depressing effect on the economic life of th country, for there were several distinct rates for the pap rouble. Its value on the foreign exchanges was determine by the special conditions of international financial relation The government accepted 'assignations' in payment of tax at a fairly uniform rate, but in commercial usage there w complete chaos. The ordinary rates varied constantly in eve locality, and there was no fixed relationship between the rat in different places, for the country was split up into more less independent economic regions. Further confusion w

[1] Polish peasants were made *personally* free by Napoleon in 1807.

[2] Their protest was supported by the heir to the throne, the Grand Du Alexander.

sed by the circulation of large numbers of foreign coins with itrarily fixed values.

This was the situation which Kánkrin (Minister of Finances, :3–44) was called upon to deal with, and so difficult did he l it that only after some years of preparation was he able to lertake a complete reform of the currency. In 1839 the silver .ble became the unit of currency, and its value was fixed at) kopeks in paper. A further step was taken in the following r, when the State Bank began to issue, against deposits of er, 'deposit certificates' circulating at par. These were reat success, and besides bringing in large amounts of silver, ped to popularize the silver rouble. In 1843 the final reform the series was carried through; all existing forms of paper-ney were replaced by 'State credit notes', freely exchange-e for silver and guaranteed by a metal fund equal to one-sixth the total amount of credit notes issued.

The complete reorganization of the currency system gave commercial and financial dealings the element of stability it had been so conspicuously lacking, and helped to clear the y for the remarkable development of Russian economic life it came later in the century. Kánkrin's attempts in other ections to set the finances of the country on a sounder basis re not so successful. He was always careful in the expenditure public money, but circumstances were against him in his uggle for economy. The wars with Turkey and Persia,[1] and e operations necessitated by the Polish rebellion, forced him conclude loans for 400 million roubles, and absorbed reserves it he was putting by in order to finance the currency reforms. was unfortunate also in his treatment of the spirit trade, for e gross corruption that had prevailed under the State mono-y set up in the preceding reign did not cease when the right manufacture and sell spirits was again farmed out (1826).

[1] Cf. pp. 410–14.

Kánkrin believed that financial stability could not be attaine until the resources of the country were more fully utilized, an its industries developed. Before he was appointed Minister o Finances he had taken part in the preparation of the protectiv customs tariff of 1822,[1] and throughout his long period of offic he used protection for the purpose of fostering home industry He did not build up a high tariff wall, but by constant revisions o the duties tried to force Russian manufacturers to devote thei attention to technical progress, judiciously admitting foreig competition where he saw that it would serve as a stimulus, an excluding it when he thought that some particular branch o industry required that form of support.

During the second quarter of the century industry continue to develop along lines already marked out in the precedin period. Industries that had arisen without any support from th government continued to make progress, owing to the appear ance of an open market for their goods, a sure sign that Russi was passing from a period in which each household and eac economic area was practically self-supporting, into one in whic exchange and division of labour were the dominant features o economic life. The number of factories and of factory-worke increased gradually. New branches of industry took root. Fre labour came more and more into use. In the thirties an forties the cotton industry became firmly established. Impor tant developments in the English cotton industry in this perio led to a fall in the prices of cotton goods, which were admitte into Russia under a very low tariff. To meet this increase competition from abroad Russian manufacturers had to adop improved methods and new machinery. The cheapness o cotton goods led to a great increase in the demand for them, an consequently in production. The staple textile industries of th eighteenth century, linen and hemp, fell on evil days, and thei

[1] Which replaced the liberal tariffs of 1816 and 1819.

oducts were driven from the market, at home and abroad, cotton goods. The woollen industry, owing to the primie character of its methods, could make no headway against lish competition.

Education and Political Opinion

Nicholas I had very definite ideas on the subject of education. e believed that, carefully managed, it might become a useful apon in the hands of the government, enabling it to control e development of public opinion and protect the mind of the untry from revolutionary influences. Uvárov (Minister of ucation, 1833–49) expressed Nicholas's views in a report that drew up in 1832 : 'The younger generation can be turned o useful and zealous instruments of the government, if oughtful guidance be brought to bear on the development their spirit and attitude of mind. . . . They can be led into nood of devoted and humble love for the existing order,' the nciples of which Uvárov defined as 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, tionality'.[1] When he became minister Uvárov declared that aim was to construct 'dams' which would 'hold up the flow new ideas into Russia, and prolong the period of her youth', d confessed that he would die happy if he managed to 'retard e development of the country by fifty years'.

This combination of Nicholas and Uvárov did not promise uch good for education. The first 'dams' were constructed the early part of the reign, while Shishkóv was still minister. May 1827 orders were given that peasant children were to be mitted only to elementary schools. In 1828 elementary and condary education were made entirely independent of each ner. Up to that time pupils who finished the elementary nool course had been able to pass into the secondary schools.

[1] This formula—Altar, Throne, and People—remained the watchword of ction throughout the remainder of the century.

This was now forbidden. The elementary schools were to provide all the education that was considered necessary for the lower classes. Preparatory departments were added to the secondary schools, which thus became complete in themselves. They were intended for the children of officials and gentry. Shishkóv adopted an almost purely classical programme for secondary schools, and Uvárov systematically reduced the number of subjects taught. At the same time the number of schools increased, and the gentry began to use them more freely, for the school certificate was necessary for entry into the government service.

In 1835 the educational system was burcaucratized. Control over secondary education, which had been entrusted to the universities in 1804, was now vested in the curators, who lived permanently in the centres of their circuits and acted as agents of the ministry.[1] The independence of the universities was severely restricted. They retained the right to elect their own professors, but had to have them approved by the minister. A university was opened at Kiev in 1834, but since it only replaced that of Vilna, which was closed after the Polish rebellion, it represented no real gain for the cause of higher education.

The stimulus given to Russian thought by contact with the intellectual movements of the West was too strong to be countered by methods such as those adopted by Nicholas I and Uvárov. The events of 1825 had a depressing effect on the educated classes, but intellectual activity soon revived and, in spite of efforts to repress it, spread wider and deeper. The new generation of educated society studied the works of Fichte, Hegel, Kant, and Schelling, and discussed abstract questions of social and political philosophy. A small but brilliant group at Moscow University in the thirties contained, according to Hérzen, 'Russia of the future'. Among its members were

[1] Cf. p. 382.

Belínsky, Aksákov, Bakúnin, Katkóv, Granóvsky, and Yúry Samárin, each of whom played a prominent part in the development of Russian politico-philosophical thought and exerted a strong influence on the next generation of the educated class. Another group, led by Hérzen, was attracted by the socialism of Saint-Simon and his followers. By the beginning of the forties two important schools of opinion were clearly defined. There was, in the first place, a very strong 'westernizing' tendency, led by men like Belínsky, Bakúnin, and Hérzen. The 'Westerners' were strongly antagonistic to the existing political and social order, but under the circumstances of the time their antagonism was purely literary and theoretical, and did not lead to practical action. The 'Slavophils' worked out an original philosophy of history. They idealized political, social, and religious principles which they claimed to be inherent in Russian society, and opposed everything that came from the West. The influence of the Westerners was much stronger than that of the Slavophils, and for a long time Belínsky ruled the minds of the younger generation.

After 1848 the policy of the government took a very sharp turn. All consideration of reform, even in the vital question of serfdom, was abandoned. Thoroughly alarmed by events in France and by the revolutionary movements in other countries, the government embarked at once on an orgy of repression, calculated to crush the rising intellectual movement and stifle all signs of life in Russian society. The censorship rules were made even harsher than they were before, and above the ordinary censorship, controlled by the Ministry of Education, a special committee was appointed (April 14, 1848) which terrorized the press. The universities were attacked, the number of students in all faculties except medicine and theology was cut down, and the curriculum was pruned of such subjects as metaphysics and the history of philosophy. The pressure

on the universities was too strong even for Uvárov's taste. H resigned his post, and was succeeded by Shírinsky, one of hi assistants, a thorough reactionary. Many well-known writer suffered for their progressive sympathies. Ṣaltykóv was sent awa to Vyátka (in the north-east); Ṭurgénev, the Slavophil Yúr Samárin, and Iván Aksákov, with other leaders of thought, wer arrested on various pretexts. There were, however, no *activ* revolutionary tendencies in this period and the most dangerou enemy that the secret police could discover was a small circle o young literary men and officers,[1] who met to discuss socialis literature and indulge in Utopian dreams of future socia organization. Twenty of them (including Dostoévsky) wer condemned to death.[2] The government struck out blindl in every direction, until society seemed to be stupefied an paralysed.

Poland after 1815

Alexander I gave Poland a liberal constitution, which pro vided for a Diet, or legislative assembly, consisting of a Senat nominated by the king and a Chamber of Deputies electe by the propertied and professional classes. The Diet controlle taxation, and the executive was responsible to it. The use o the Polish language was permitted. Liberty of the perso freedom of the press, and religious toleration were guarantee There was a separate Polish army, and all civil and militar posts were to be held by Poles. Alexander sincerely desired t rule as a constitutional monarch in Poland, but unfortunatel he assigned the command of the army to his brother, th Grand Duke Constantine, an overbearing tyrant and a thoroug

[1] The 'Petrashévtsy' or followers of Petrashévsky.

[2] The sentence was commuted to penal servitude and exile to Siberi Dostoévsky was reprieved only on the scaffold, and served ten years Siberia.

eactionary, who gained a complete ascendancy over the weak iceroy, General Zajonczek. The Diet was rarely summoned, nd in the intervals Constantine ruled arbitrarily, breaking ne article of the constitution after another. All the Poles ere irritated by his conduct. Open protests were impossible, ut secret societies flourished. The Poles followed attentively ne course of events in western Europe, particularly in France, nd the national rising that broke out in November 1830 as partly inspired by the July Revolution and by events in elgium.[1] The army joined the national standard, and soon ne whole country was up in arms. The great landowners, igher officials, and clergy (the so-called 'White' party) dvocated an appeal to the Powers based on the guarantees ontained in the Treaty of Vienna.[2] The more active 'Reds', d by the students, aimed at a republic, completely in- ependent of Russia. The Diet proclaimed the dethrone- nent of Nicholas and the union of Poland and Lithuania, nd invoked the protection of the Powers, but in vain. A rge Russian army defeated the Polish forces in a series of attles (February–May 1831), drove them back steadily, and n September occupied Warsaw. In spite of the heroic resis- nce offered by the rebels, they were completely overpowered efore the beginning of the winter.

The Russians followed up their victory with ruthless energy. n 1832 the constitution was formally abolished. The use of ne Polish language was forbidden, and the Polish army was erged in that of Russia. The Polish ministries were made to

[1] Nicholas intended to send the Polish army against the revolutionaries France and Belgium.

[2] The Treaty of Vienna provided that 'the Poles who are respectively bjects of Russia, Austria, and Prussia shall obtain a representative and ational constitution regulated according to the degree of political con- deration that each government to which they belong shall judge expedient nd proper to give to them'.

depend on the Russian central government. The Roma Catholic Church, one of the emblems of Polish nationality, ha to endure relentless persecution. All who were suspected c participation in the rebellion, or of disaffection to the Russia government, were arrested and banished to Siberia, and ha their property confiscated. From 1831 Poland was treated a a conquered country, and kept in subjugation by an army c occupation.

The War with Persia, 1826–8

During the years that followed the conclusion of peace i 1813[1] relations between Russia and Persia were disturbed b disputes that arose over the exact definition of the territor ceded to Russia. The border tribes gave constant trouble b moving from one side of the frontier to the other, and comin alternately under Russian and Persian jurisdiction. Th Persians did not give up the hope of reconquering the lan they had lost, and a favourable opportunity seemed to hav come in 1826, when Russia was apparently on the verge o a struggle with Turkey. Persian troops suddenly invade Karabágh (July) and found the Russians quite unprepared t meet them. They overran the border regions and gaine a number of successes over small isolated Russian detachments They advanced so far into the Caucasus as to besiege Bakú but they were unable to capture it. The situation was com plicated by the revolt of the native tribes, and for some week the Russian hold on the southern Caucasus was seriousl threatened. The tide turned in September with the appoint ment to the command of the Russian forces of Paskiévich, wh routed the main Persian army near Elizabetpól (September 14) In the spring of 1827 Paskiévich, detaching a small force t invest the important fortress of Eriván, marched south an

[1] Cf. p. 265.

cupied the khanate of Nakhicheván (June–July). He was called from there by events in the north. Owing to the at and the lack of water, the siege of Eriván had to be aban-oned. The Persians advanced from the south and made an fort to march on Tiflís. This move, which threatened the ussians in the south with disaster, was stopped after a desperate ttle, and the Persians retired. Paskiévich attacked Eriván ith such energy that it soon fell (October 2). In his absence e defence of Nakhicheván was entrusted to Prince Eristov, Georgian, who, after repelling an attempt made by the rsians to reconquer the khanate, conceived the bold plan invading Persia. He crossed the river Aras and in a very ort time had taken the important city of Tabriz (October 13). his success was followed up early in 1828 by the capture of rmia, and the Persians, thoroughly beaten and demoralized, id to abandon the struggle. By the Treaty of Turkmanchai ebruary) they granted to Russia the khanates of Eriván and akhicheván and the right of navigating the whole of the aspian Sea. By these gains Russia consolidated her position the south-east of the Caucasus and acquired a strong ontier in that quarter.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1828–9

Soon after his accession, Nicholas declared that he would ke up the quarrel with Turkey at the point where his brother ad left it. In March 1826 he sent an ultimatum to the ultan demanding the settlement of the points that had been dispute since 1812, and indicating that a refusal to grant tisfaction would lead to the suspension of diplomatic rela-ons, an event that might have 'consequences' for Turkey. aced with this threat, and hampered by the Greek insurrec-on, the Sultan yielded. Turkish and Russian envoys met in

August 1826, and after two months of bullying and bargainin the Turks agreed to Nicholas's demands (Treaty of Akkerma October 7).[1]

The Greek question, which had not been mentioned in th Russian ultimatum, still remained to be settled. Canning wa determined not to allow Nicholas to act alone, and tied h hands by the Protocol of April 4, 1826, which stipulated tha Great Britain should join in demanding autonomy for Greec under the sovereignty of Turkey. France adhered to th arrangement, and the three Powers agreed to use force if the conditions were not accepted (Treaty of London, July 1827). The Sultan, secretly encouraged by Metternic declared that he would not tolerate any interference in h affairs, and coercive measures became necessary. The com manders of the allied squadrons, which were cruising in th eastern Mediterranean, were instructed to propose an armisti to both sides. The Greeks at once accepted the proposal, bu Ibrahim Pasha, acting on orders from Constantinople, defie the allies and continued operations on land. The allied com manders then demanded the evacuation of the Morea, an decided to make a demonstration before Ibrahim's flee which was lying at Navarino, on the south-west coast of th Morea. While this was being carried out a slight incident tha occurred between Turkish and allied units led to an exchang of fire, and a battle developed, which ended in the destructio of the Turco-Egyptian fleet (November 20, 1827). Th

[1] By the Treaty of Akkerman the conditions of the Treaty of Bucare were confirmed, and the Black Sea and the Straits opened to Russian shi The *hospodars* of Moldavia and Wallachia were henceforth to be elected the local *boyárs* or nobles, and approved by the Sultan, but could only removed with the consent of the Russian ambassador at Constantinop The autonomy of Serbia was formally recognized, but the fortresses wo to remain in Turkish hands.

ltan was more indignant than ever, and demanded com-
ısation for the loss of his ships. The utmost concession that
ıld be extracted from him was the promise of an amnesty
the rebels if they submitted to him. On December 8 the
itish, French, and Russian ambassadors left Constantinople,
ł in spite of Metternich's appeal to Nicholas to remain
thful to the principle of 'legitimism', Russia declared war
pril 26, 1828), after arranging for the co-operation of Great
itain and France in the Mediterranean. Early in May the
ıssian army crossed the Prut.

The first campaign did not yield the Russians any striking
:cesses. They advanced to the Danube and captured the
tresses of Braila and Varna, but were held up by Silistria
ł Shúmla. In the meantime Austrian troops were being
ssed in Transylvania, and Metternich tried to form a
ılition against Russia.

Early in 1829 Great Britain and France made a fresh attempt
mediate between Turkey and the Greeks, but the Sultan
s obdurate, and the war continued. The Russian army in
e Balkans, reinforced and placed under the command of
ebitsch, an audacious and confident leader, began the second
npaign by defeating the Turks at Kulevcha (June) and
iving them back on Shúmla. Resisting the temptation to
down before this fortress, Diebitsch pressed forward with
mall force across the Balkan Mountains, seized Adrianople,
d sent a detachment on towards Constantinople. On the
ıtern front Paskiévich had gained a series of important
:tories, culminating in the capture of Erzerum. The
ltan saw that further resistance was impossible, and peace
s made.

By the Treaty of Adrianople (September 14, 1829) Turkey
:eived back all the territory lost in Europe, while in the east
ıssia retained the fortresses of Anápa, Póti, and Akhalkalaki,

with part of the pashalik of Akhaltsykh. Russian troops wer to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia until the indemnity exacte from Turkey was paid.[1] The Sultan renewed the pledg which he had repeatedly given, but only half-heartedly fulfille with regard to the Danubian principalities and Serbia, an accepted the demands of the Powers with respect to Greece Ships of all countries were allowed to pass the Bosphorus an the Dardanelles, while Russian subjects received complet liberty to trade in Turkey.

Foreign Affairs, 1830–49

In the case of Greece Nicholas had placed the easter interests of Russia before his own personal sympathies, whic were entirely on the side of 'legitimism'. He soon foun occasion to return to the path to which Metternich had vainl recalled him in 1828. The outbreak of the July revolution i France and the revolt of Belgium against the settlement c 1815, which had yoked her to Holland, threatened to over throw the European system which had been established a Vienna. Community of interests in the West caused Austri and Russia to forget their differences in the East, and o August 6, 1830, the project of an alliance, to which Prussi also adhered, was agreed upon. The three Powers prepare to interfere in the West, and war seemed inevitable. But th Polish rebellion[3] diverted the attention of Russia, and withou her aid Austria and Prussia feared to move, for France ha

[1] These provinces were evacuated in 1834..

[2] The final settlement of the Greek question took place in 1832. Gree became a kingdom completely independent of Turkey, under the protecti of Great Britain, France, and Russia. Otto, second son of the King Bavaria, became the first king.

[3] Cf. p. 409.

ne to an understanding with Great Britain. The eastern ies, reduced to impotence, had to accept the new situation :ated by events in France and Belgium.

As soon as the crisis caused by the revolutionary movement 1830 had passed over, the attention of Europe was once more :en up with events and possibilities in the East. Mehemet i, Pasha of Egypt, irritated by the Sultan's failure to reward n adequately for the services he had rendered in Greece, termined to help himself. An Egyptian army, under rahim Pasha, invaded (November 1831) and overran Syria, vanced into Asia Minor, crushed the Turks at Konieh ecember 1832), and marched triumphantly against Con- ntinople. The Sultan, in terror, appealed to the Powers om he had so often flouted and defied.

France had ambitions in the Mediterranean which inclined r to support Mehemet Ali. For the moment, however, the nger of becoming completely isolated restrained her from ing any step that might lead to a rupture of the *entente* with eat Britain. The attitude of Great Britain was determined her traditional fear of Russia, which recent events had only hanced. Neither France nor Great Britain knew that the ws of Russia with regard to Turkey had changed since 29. Nicholas saw that the establishment of independent tes in the Balkans, a solution of the Eastern Question that e other Powers might insist on if the Turkish Empire were break up, was not in the interest of Russia, for it would rob r of all excuse for interference in the affairs of south-east rope. The preservation of Turkey—a weak Turkey, who ght be induced to regard Russia as her protector—thus came the main aim of his eastern policy. Had this change en made known to all the Powers interested in the Eastern uestion, the situation would have been very much simpli- d. But Europe was now divided into two camps. The

revolutionary peril had reunited Russia, Austria, and Prussia while on the other side stood France and Great Britain, wh to the eastern group seemed hardly less dangerous tha France.

This new international grouping was reflected in the attitud which the Powers took up with regard to the Turco-Egyptia dispute. Russia at once declared her readiness to help th Sultan. Great Britain and France, on the other hand, trie to persuade him to settle his differences with Mehemet Ali b negotiation, in order to make Russian armed interventio unnecessary. But in their eagerness to bring about a settle ment, they pressed the claims of the stronger party (Meheme Ali) too forcibly, and thus threw the Sultan into the arms o Nicholas, giving the latter the very opportunity for which h had been waiting. On February 20, 1833, a Russian squadro anchored before Constantinople, and two months later Russia troops landed on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus.

The quarrel between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan wa finally settled early in May. Mehemet Ali was left in possessio of the whole of Syria, together with the province of Adana The Russian naval and land forces were withdrawn on July 9 but not before Nicholas had gathered the fruits of his ne policy—a defensive alliance with the Sultan, the terms o which entitled him to demand the closing of the Dardanelle to the warships of any foreign Power (Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, July 8, 1833).

Two months later Nicholas met Francis I of Austria a Münchengrätz and came to an important agreement on th affairs of the Near East. Russia and Austria were to respe the integrity of Turkey, and to act together if, in spite of the efforts, the Turkish Empire were to break up. Nichola promised to accept the mediation of Austria in all cases i which the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi might be appealed t

Münchengrätz the alliance between the three absolutist narchies, which had been foreshadowed in 1830, was finally ıcluded. In October 1833 Russia, Austria, and Prussia ognized 'the right of every independent sovereign to ımon to his assistance, whether in the internal or external ,irs of his country, any other independent sovereign whom shall deem best able to assist him'. This counterblast to the :ral *entente* of the Western Powers was a triumph for Metter- h. But Nicholas had not lost hope of coming to an under- ıding with Great Britain, and watched attentively the .tions between that country and France, which from 1834, ng to rivalry in the Mediterranean and elsewhere, became .dily worse. The visit of the Grand Duke Alexander[1] in y 1839 created a good impression in England. A few ıths later Nicholas informed the British government, ɔugh a special envoy, Baron Brunnow, that if he was called ın to help Turkey under the terms of the treaty of 1833, would act as the mandatory of Europe, and affirmed his ingness to accept the principle that the Straits should be ed to the warships of all nations. He further declared that Russia and Great Britain came to an agreement on these ıts he would not seek the renewal of the Treaty of Unkiar- lessi, which was to expire in 1841.

y this time a fresh crisis had arisen in the East. The Sultan, sting for revenge on Mehemet Ali, ordered his army to ıde Syria (April 1839). It was met and completely eated at Nezib (June 24) by Ibrahim Pasha, who once more ıd the road to Constantinople open before him. On e 30 the Sultan (Mahmud) died, leaving the throne to his son, dul-Mejid, a youth of sixteen. Four days later the Turkish t went over to Mehemet Ali. The complete collapse of Turkish Empire seemed imminent, and the new Sultan's

[1] Afterwards the Emperor Alexander II.

advisers were on the point of capitulating to Mehemet A when the five Powers offered to mediate (July 1839). In t negotiations that followed British diplomacy obtained decisive victory, for the Powers guaranteed the neutrality the Straits (1841), and Russia was thus deprived of the exclusi protectorate over Turkey which she had established in 1833

This fresh check only stimulated Nicholas's efforts to cor to an understanding with Great Britain, the most consiste opponent of his Eastern plans. During his visit to England 1844 he sounded the British government on the question joint action in the event of the fall of the Turkish Empi which he personified as the 'sick man' of Europe. Lat events showed that the cold reception with which the overtures met did not make him abandon all hope of an agre ment with Great Britain. But for some years his attenti was occupied with other matters. In 1846 Austria, with t consent of Russia and Prussia, occupied Cracow, the la remnant of free Poland,[2] on the pretext that it was the cent of Polish revolutionary propaganda. The revolutionary mov ment that swept over Europe in 1848 raised many fresh pr blems. In spite of the assurance given by the new Fren government that its intentions were not aggressive, there w no certainty that the incendiary elements would not preva and bring the whole European system crashing to the ground Nicholas was most concerned for his own country, and afte wards for his neighbours. The position of Austria becar desperate, and in March 1849 the young Emperor Fran

[1] Egypt became the hereditary possession of Mehemet Ali and heirs.

[2] Cf. p. 375.

[3] On receiving the news of the outbreak of a revolution in France, Nicho is reported to have said, 'Saddle your horses, gentlemen; a republic proclaimed in France'.

seph[1] turned to Russia for help. Nicholas might abandon
ıstria to her fate, and thus get rid of at least one rival.
ı the other hand, he could turn her into a grateful client,
d pose as the saviour of the conservative principle. His
lp was called for against the Magyars, whom he hated for
e encouragement they had given to the Poles and for their
stility to the Slavs in Austria-Hungary and to his own plans
the Danube. He therefore decided to intervene, and a
ıssian army, which was already concentrated on the frontier,
ırched into Hungary, under the command of Paskiévich, in
ay 1849. With this help the Magyar rising was suppressed,
d in August Paskiévich was able to declare to Nicholas, 'Hun-
ry is at your Majesty's feet'.

The Crimean War

In spite of the general confusion and uncertainty of affairs
Europe, Nicholas's attention was not entirely diverted from
e Near East. In 1848 he occupied the Danubian princi-
lities, on the pretext of suppressing a revolutionary move-
ent that broke out there, but Great Britain and France
rced him to come to an understanding with the Sultan and to
omise to withdraw his army. Another conflict occurred in
e following year, for the Sultan, backed up again by the two
estern Powers,[2] refused to hand over to Russia and Austria
rtain Hungarian refugees who had fled to Turkey. Nicholas
ıs alarmed by the efforts of the Turkish government to
roduce reforms throughout the empire, and by the growing
fluence of Great Britain and France at Constantinople. An
en struggle seemed to be inevitable. Nicholas believed that

[1] Francis Joseph succeeded his uncle Ferdinand, who abdicated in
cember 1848.

[2] British and French squadrons were sent to the Dardanelles.

he could count on Austria, and still did not despair of comin to terms with Great Britain. He was not unwilling to try con clusions with France alone, and a very slight incident—a dis pute between the Orthodox Greek and the Catholic Churche over the custody of the Holy Places at Jerusalem (1851)– provided him with the opportunity that he sought. Lou Napoleon, anxious to conciliate Roman Catholic opinion an to consolidate his own position on the throne by elevating th prestige of France in the East, took up the cause of the Lati Church. Nicholas, on the other hand, stood forth as th protector of the Orthodox faith. A long diplomatic quarr ensued, and the Sultan, pressed by both sides, made concessio first to one and then to the other, until Nicholas lost his tempe and sent a special envoy, Ménshikov, to demand recognitio of his right to protect all the members of the Greek Churc within the Turkish Empire (February 1853). The Sulta after consulting with the British and French ambassador rejected this demand. Ménshikov left Constantinople, an early in July a Russian army occupied Moldavia and Wallachi as a pledge for the execution of the treaties.[1] In answer t this move the British and French fleets were ordered to th Dardanelles.[2] A conference of representatives of Gre Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia, held at Vienna in July endeavoured to mediate between Russia and Turkey, bu without success. The Sultan, encouraged by the attitude o Great Britain and France, and by a violent anti-Russia agitation amongst his own people, summoned the Russians t evacuate the Danubian provinces (October 10). When h ultimatum was rejected, Turkish forces crossed the Danub and a state of war arose.

[1] For the actual rights accorded to Russia by treaty, cf. p. 362.

[2] Early in 1853 Nicholas had approached the British ambassador Petersburg on three separate occasions with proposals for the partition the Turkish Empire.

Although the British and French fleets sailed up to Constantinople, Nicholas did not believe that Great Britain would ak her differences with France and join her in taking extreme easures. The situation was, indeed, not entirely hopeless, ıtil after the destruction of the Turkish fleet by the Russians Sinope (November 30), when the British and French uadrons entered the Black Sea and 'invited' all Russian ips to return to their ports. Fresh diplomatic efforts early 1854 were of no avail, and Great Britain and France, after manding the evacuation of the principalities, concluded an iance with Turkey and declared war on Russia (March 27). Russia was now faced by a dangerous combination of enemies, d soon found herself completely isolated, for Austria, on ıose gratitude Nicholas had counted, entered into a defensive reement with Prussia, by which both parties undertook to mand the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia, and to pose Russia if she advanced south of the Danube (April 54). Russian troops had failed to make any progress during e winter, and when the Austrian ultimatum was presented ıne) there was no alternative but to yield. As the Russians tired, the Austrians, in accordance with an agreement conıded with Turkey, marched into the principalities, which ey were to hold and defend until the end of the war.

The main object of the allies was attained, but they cided not to make peace without at least seriously weakening ıssia. It was by no means easy to decide where to strike. ints as far apart as Odessa and the Solovétski Monastery (on e White Sea), the Åland Islands and Petropávlovsk (Kamatka), were attacked by allied squadrons. Finally the Crimean pedition was decided upon.

In September 1854 English, French, and Turkish forces ıded at Eupatória, under the protection of a large number warships, with the object of taking Sevastópol, the head-

quarters of the Russian Black Sea fleet. The landing wa unopposed, and the defeat of the Russians on the river Alm (September 20) opened the road to Sevastópol, before which the allies disposed themselves for a siege. Assisted by Todleben one of the most brilliant military engineers of the century the Russians erected a strong system of earthworks, and were able to withstand several violent attacks. They took the gun from their warships, which they sank in the narrow entrance o the harbour, and energetically answered the bombardmen of the allies.

The struggle lengthened out. Threatened by Austria i the west, and hampered by lack of transport facilities, Russi could not gather together a large army with which to driv her enemies out of the Crimea. A small force, under Princ Gorchakóv, that tried to enter Sevastópol was defeated a Inkermán (November 5). Repeated attempts to storm th Russian positions failed almost completely each time, and ever slight gain was bought by the allies at fearful cost. In Septembe 1855 the French, though beaten off at every other point, too the Malákov redoubt, a commanding position, the loss of which made it impossible for the Russians to hold out any longer They retreated to the northern side of the bay, and after siege of 350 days—one of the most brilliant episodes in Russia military history—the allies occupied the ruins of Sevastópo (September 9, 1855).

In Asia Minor the Russians were more fortunate, an succeeded in taking the important fortress of Kars (Novembe 26). Nicholas I died early in the year (March 2), and hi successor, Alexander II, was anxious to make peace. Russi was completely exhausted, and accepted an offer of mediatio made by Austria. Peace was finally concluded at Paris o March 30, 1856. Russia received back Sevastópol, but had t restore Kars to Turkey and give up the south-western corne

Bessarabia to Moldavia, being thus thrown back from the nube. The Black Sea was declared neutral, and the con- tion of 1841 with regard to the closing of the Straits to eign warships was confirmed. Turkey was admitted to the ropean Concert. Great Britain, France, and Austria pro- ed to respect her integrity, and declared that they would interfere, either collectively or individually, in her internal irs, though the Sultan was to grant better treatment to his ristian subjects. Russia thus lost all claim to protect her religionists. Moldavia and Wallachia were to enjoy the vileges guaranteed to them by former treaties, and were ced under the protection of all the Powers.

3

lexander II (1855–81): 1. *The Great Reforms*

The Condition of Russia

THE shock of failure in the Crimean War roused public opinion of the mood of depression into which it had been forced by policy of the government after 1848. Interest in public irs revived, and all thinking people recognized that serious nges in the system of government were necessary. Many nch patriots felt that if change could only come through eat, then defeat was preferable to victory, which would only ngthen the existing order.[1] The general belief was that out

Sevastópol fell in order that 'God might reveal all the rottenness of the em of government, all the results of the principle of "throttle"' (Iván kov); the successes of the allies 'did not mortify us too much, because vere convinced that defeat would be more endurable and more beneficial Russia than the conditions under which we were living' (Koshelëv). m the very beginning of the Eastern War, when as yet no one could ee its unfortunate issue, the enormous preparations of our enemies

of the ruins of Sevastópol a new, regenerated Russia would rise.

Open discussion of political affairs in the press was not allowed before the death of Nicholas I, but many manuscript articles on the situation and the needs of the country circulated from hand to hand in educated society, and were eagerly read and discussed. The most remarkable production of this kind was Pogodín's *Political Letters*, which contained a merciless criticism of Nicholas's internal and external policy, and particularly blamed him for having assumed the duty of policing Europe in the interests of absolutism.[1]

disturbed those of us who understood the position of Russia much less than our own internal disorganization. Events have justified our fears. We have fallen, not before the forces of the Western alliance, but as a result of our own internal weakness' (Samárin).

[1] Pogodín wrote that: 'The emperor, charmed by the brilliant report [of his ministers], has no real knowledge of the condition of Russia. Having taken his stand on an unassailable height, he has no means [of learning the truth]. All the ways through which thought might find expression have been closed. There is no publicity, no public opinion, no appeal, no protesting, no control.' Each of the ministers 'is autocratic ruler in his own department, and (like the emperor) cannot know the truth, for no one dare tell it to him, for fear of earning a rebuke or of rousing suspicion'. The officials 'think only of how to gain the goodwill of their superior, by foreseeing his thoughts and wishes, and guessing his intentions'. Those entrusted with authority 'have their heads turned by endless flattery, are demoralized by imaginary success, and think themselves infallible geniuses. . . . They take every critical remark as a personal insult, and attribute it to want of respect for their authority or to the influence of liberalism. They consider "restless" any one who does not praise them, and do all they can to keep him back, to the profit of the incapable and base-minded, who rush into our public departments like flies to a pot of honey. These all form one friendly secret, masonic society. They regard every thinking man as an enemy. They support each other and the system of which they form a part—a system of paper-spoiling, of deceit and secrecy, of darkness, evil, and immorality under the mask of subservience and legal order.' Pogodín's exposure of the positio

Nicholas I died unmourned by his people. An immense gh of relief went up from the whole country, as if it had just ast off an intolerable burden. An important turning-point had een reached. A whole epoch of Russian history was ended. very one felt that reforms were bound to come, whatever the pinions of the new ruler might be.

Although his reign took Russia farther forward on the path progress than that of any of his predecessors since Peter the reat, Alexander was not a 'born reformer', and his administra- ve work under Nicholas was no preparation for the rôle that story forced him to play. Nicholas, resolved that his son ould not suffer, as he had done himself, from lack of train- g for the position he was to occupy, kept him constantly nployed with responsible work which was intended to give m an insight into the conduct of affairs of state. Alexander came a warm admirer of his father's policy, especially after 348, and constantly defended serf-right and the privileges of ie gentry.[1] But before he succeeded to the throne he witnessed ie complete break-down of the system in which he had so mly believed. Even Nicholas himself was beginning to lose ith in its efficacy. Death saved him from the necessity of andoning the principles that had guided him for thirty years. lexander was left with an enormous and responsible task, and w that heroic measures would have to be taken to save Russia.

the people was no less trenchant: 'The people labour, pour out their ood, bear all kinds of burdens and suffering, and at the same time think ly with love, with the purest devotion, of their Tsar and fatherland. Yet one troubles himself about them, they exist only on official papers.' specially emphasized the need of peasant reform, since it was not revolu- n, but something worse, that was to be expected: 'It is not Mirabeau at we have to fear, but Pugachëv. . . . No one will go over to the side of azzini, but only let another Sténka Rázin appear!' Pogodín claimed that criticisms and ideas were only representative of those current in society.

[1] Cf. p. 402, n. 2.

During the first months of the reign his attention was occupied with the war, which was exhausting the country and bringing financial and political bankruptcy nearer every month. When peace was concluded Prince Gorchakóv wrote to the emperor: 'It is fortunate that we have made peace, for we could have fought no longer. Now we can turn our attention to internal affairs.' The whole country agreed with him in blaming Russia's internal disorder for her failure in the war. Alexander at once relieved his people of some of the most oppressive burdens imposed on them in the previous reign, and raised their hopes for the future still higher. The censorship rules were so far relaxed that within moderate limits the press could discuss political questions. The prohibition of travel abroad was withdrawn. The position of the universities became easier, and the restrictions on the number of students were removed. These changes roused enthusiasm and gratitude amongst all sections of the educated classes, and seemed to promise a complete reversal of government policy. During these early months Alexander had no definite programme of reforms, though, in a manifesto published at the conclusion of peace, he expressed a hope 'that the internal order of the State may be settled and brought to perfection; that justice and mercy may reign in our law-courts; that the desire for education and all manner of useful activity may spread and grow stronger'. He gave no clear indication of his plans until March 1856, when, in addressing the gentry at Moscow, he used the words: 'It is better to begin the abolition of serfdom from above, than wait until it begins to abolish itself from below,' and asked the gentry 'to think out how this may be accomplished'. This declaration came as a complete surprise to Alexander's ministers, but it committed the government to definite action on a question which, as Alexander saw, had to be settled before any progress could be made in other directions.

The Emancipation of the Peasants

For some time after the Moscow speech the government :med to be waiting for the gentry to take the initiative. Un-:cessful attempts were made to interest those of them who embled in Moscow for the coronation in the summer of 1856. ough many of the landowners realized that emancipation uld now be postponed no longer, they preferred to wait for e government to announce its intentions in more definite ·ms before expressing their own views. Only the gentry of e Lithuanian provinces (Vilna, Kóvno, Gródno) seemed in-ned to proceed farther in the matter.[1] The Governor-:neral of Vilna, Nazímov, received a rescript ordering him explain to the gentry that: (1) they were to be allowed to tain full rights of ownership over all their land, except that which the peasants' houses stood; (2) the peasants should be owed the *use* of portions of land, sufficient to enable them to scharge their obligations to the State, for which they were to y rent in money or service. The government sent copies of e rescript to all the provinces of Russia, hoping to get the ntry to discuss emancipation on these terms. By the autumn 1858 the proposals were being actively debated in local mmittees of landowners in every province.

There were serious differences of opinion, based on differences economic conditions, between the landowners of two clearly arked regions. In the fertile provinces of the centre and south e landowners derived their income from the cultivation of the nd with the unpaid labour of the serfs, whom they were quite illing to liberate, without reward, so long as they could keep l the land in their own hands. Such an arrangement would lieve them of the burden of maintaining, the whole year

[1] They still had the Bibikov regulations hanging over their heads (cf. 402).

round, large numbers of serfs for whom they could not find con stant employment, and at the same time it would ensure them plentiful supply of cheap labour, since the peasants, if left with out any land of their own, would be compelled to work for thei former masters. In the provinces north of Moscow the positio was different, for there the landowners drew most of thei revenue, not from agriculture, which in face of the competitio of the south was becoming less and less profitable, but fro payments made by the peasants for being allowed to work i the towns and factories. They accordingly demanded a hig reward for the loss of their right of disposing of the labour o the peasants, but had no objection to parting with some o their land.

At the beginning of 1858, when the rescript to Nazímov wa published, the government clearly favoured the view of th centre and south, and seemed still afraid of taking the ste that Nicholas I had refused to take.[1] But when the claims o the landowners of the different provinces were considered, i became clear that some compromise would have to be arranged In the end the government, urged by Count Rostóvtsev an Nicholas Milyútin, who were entrusted with the work o drafting the reform, came to the conclusion that all the peasant should be allowed to acquire portions of land, to be paid for b instalments; and this principle, which involved compulsor expropriation on a limited scale, was applied in the Act o Emancipation, published on March 3, 1861.

The liberation of the peasants was an event of first-rate im portance in Russian history, but the law of March 3 was by n means a full and final settlement of all the economic and socia problems connected with serfdom. It contained plentiful trace of compromise with powerful vested interests and with ol conceptions of the relationships between the State, the land

[1] Cf. pp. 400–1.

vners, and the peasants, on which serfdom itself was based. or the first time the peasant became a member of society. He uld no longer be bought and sold, nor could he be turned to a mere slave. But as a class the peasants did not become lly free. They did not receive the same civil rights as the st of the population. Part of the authority formerly exersed by the landowners was transferred to the communes. Where the land was held in common, the village commune signed to each household the amount it was to cultivate, and ctated the way in which the land was to be used. It assessed ie share in the common burden of taxation that each of its embers had to bear, and had the power of withholding the assport without which a peasant could not leave the district id seek work elsewhere, unless he guaranteed to continue the ayment of his contribution.

The land assigned to the peasants did not become their roperty, but they could not be deprived of it. They held it i 'perpetual possession', and paid fixed yearly dues for the use f it. By agreement with the proprietor they might acquire ie complete ownership of their holdings. The transaction as financed by the government, which paid the proprietor sum equal to the amount he would receive for the use of ie land for $16\frac{2}{3}$ years, and recovered the money from the easants by small annual instalments.[1]

The amount of land assigned to each household was not the me in all districts. Three standards were adopted. In the rich lack-land provinces a much smaller average holding was fixed an in either the newly colonized steppe region of the south and ast, or the industrial provinces of the north. But even in laces where land was plentiful the holdings were never larger, nd in most cases were much smaller, than those which the easants had cultivated when they were serfs. As serfs they had

[1] The 'redemption payments'.

spent no more than half their time on their own land, devotin the rest to the service of their masters. The liberated peasant therefore, found that their holdings occupied them no mor than two or three days a week, and in most cases were barel sufficient to keep them in food. In order to pay their taxes an local rates, and provide money for other expenses, they had t rent more land, sell their labour to the large landowners, o take up some occupation other than agriculture. The reform of 1861 thus contained the seeds of agrarian trouble, and th difficulties it created became ever more serious as the popula tion increased.

In the years 1863 and 1866 the government set free th 'apanage'[1] and 'State' peasants, who had always been mor favourably situated, with regard to the amount of land the cultivated, than the serfs living on the estates of private owners the settlement in their case was much more generous than tha arranged for the 'private' peasants in 1861.

Local Government: Zémstvos and Town Councils

After the emancipation of the serfs the problem of loca government became of vital importance. The existing syste was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, and for a long time ha failed to meet the needs of the people, even when most of them were serfs, governed and controlled by the absolute authorit of their masters. As early as 1859, before the Emancipatio Act was completed, the government saw that many new loca needs would arise, which only a properly organized system o local government could satisfy, and set about preparing scheme. Unfortunately the reforming zeal of the bureaucrac reached its highest point in 1861, and the Zémstvo Law, whic

[1] 'Apanage' peasants cultivated the lands set apart for the maintenanc of the imperial family.

ppeared on January 13, 1864, was much less progressive than had promised to be. In the conflict of ideas and interests iat went on in this period round all questions of reform large ncessions had to be made to conservative influences.

The law of January 13 entrusted the management of local fairs in each district (*uyézd*) to a council elected by the habitants. The original plan had been to unite all classes the population into one electoral body, the emancipated serfs ting on equal terms with their late masters. Strong opposi-on was raised to this proposal by a section of the gentry, who w that if they could, through the zémstvos, gather into their nds the control of local government, they would be able to gain the commanding position in local life of which they nsidered that they had been robbed in 1861. The new stitutions were accordingly based on the representation of operty. In each district the inhabitants were divided into ree groups. The peasant elections were indirect: each mmune first chose a number of 'electors', and all the lectors' of the district formed one body which elected fixed proportion of the members of the district zémstvo uncil (*uyézdnoe zémskoe sobránie*). The other two electoral oups contained (1) all owners of a fixed amount of land (the inimum varied from 200 to 400 desyatíns[1] in different dis-icts), and (2) inhabitants of towns who either had the right engage in trade or owned business undertakings or real operty within the urban boundary.[2] In fixing the number members of the zémstvo council elected by each of the three oups, account was taken of the proportion that the property vned by each group bore to the aggregate amount of property the district that was entitled to representation, but the

[1] From 550 to 1,100 acres.

[2] Many towns, of course, governed themselves independently of the nstvos.

area of peasant land that sent one member was, as a rule about twice the corresponding area of private land. The large landowners were thus much better represented than the peasants, but they did not secure the absolute predominance in the zémstvos for which they strove, since the law laid down the rule that no single group should have a larger number of representatives assigned to it than the other two groups combined, i. e. no one of the three classes into which the population was divided might possess a legally-secured majority in the zémstvo council.

Thirty-four provinces of European Russia, divided into about 360 districts, eventually received self-government under the law of 1864. Each district had its own zémstvo council, which elected an executive board (*uprâva*) sitting constantly and reporting to the annual meeting of the council. The provincial councils (*gubérnskoe zémskoe sobránie*) were formed of deputies elected by all the district councils in the province,[1] and also appointed their own executive boards. They were supposed to co-ordinate the work of the district zémstvos and manage affairs[2] that could be more conveniently dealt with by an authority controlling a large area of territory, but the relations between the two units were never exactly defined, and varied considerably in each province. No provision was made for a self-governing unit smaller than the district and in close touch with the needs of the population.[3]

[1] The number of districts (*uyézd*) in the province (*gubérniya*) varies from six to fifteen.

[2] Such as the upkeep of main roads.

[3] The provinces and districts vary enormously in size. Taking only the territory covered by the zémstvos, the largest province is Vólogda (approximately 155,500 square miles, i. e. larger than the United Kingdom), and the smallest Kalúga (12,000 square miles), while the average for thirty-four provinces is 32,000 square miles ; the districts range from 24,500 square miles to 668 square miles—the average being about 7,000 square miles.

The zémstvos were obliged to keep up roads, look after the eds of agriculture, provide for relief in famine years, and aintain existing elementary schools, hospitals, and charitable stitutions; but the set duties laid down for them by law rmed only a small part of the work they eventually took up in der to satisfy the needs of the people. Funds previously used support the public institutions that they took over were given to the control of the zémstvos, and they were allowed to levy tes.

The position of the zémstvos was in some ways very anomalous. ne ordinary administrative system, controlled by the central vernment, continued to exist unchanged, and many matters at in western European countries are considered as part of e work of local authorities were left under the control of the vernment officials. Even the police were directed from the ntre, and by a curious arrangement collected the rates for the nstvos.[1] Local self-governing bodies were thus left in such an definite position that they could always be interfered with the administration. Despite these and other defects, the v of 1864 conceded one principle of enormous significance for e future of Russia—that of representative government. In 64 it was applied only to local affairs, but, as intelligent con-nporaries could foresee, its extension to affairs of state was ly a matter of time. From 1864 a wide sphere of useful public rk became opened to that increasingly large section of the ucated class which could not accept the ideals of public service at animated the bureaucracy, and in the zémstvos the progres-e forces of the country were able for the first time to reunite. Town life stood still throughout the first half of the century. ne towns remained poor and undeveloped. Even in Moscow d Petersburg the great majority of the buildings were of wood.

[1] By contemporaries the zémstvos were said to be 'floating in the '.

Self-government existed only in theory. No registers of electors were kept, and very few of the electors ever exercised their rights. In many places town councils were not elected, and where they existed they became submissive instruments of the administrative authorities and the police. The population were everywhere apathetic and indifferent. About the middle of the century, under the influence of a general revival of economic and political life, important developments took place. The movement of political unrest that marked the early years of Alexander's reign awakened in the inhabitants of the towns the desire to free themselves from the tutelage of the bureaucracy and manage their own affairs. In 1862 the government began to prepare a measure of reform, but the matter dragged on until 1870, when reaction had established itself and the forces of progress had lost whatever influence they possessed in the beginning of the reign.

The Municipal Government Law of June 30, 1870, made the franchise conditional on the payment of rates. There were three electoral groups, each of which paid one-third of the whole amount of rates collected in the town and elected the same proportion of the town council. The first group included only the largest ratepayers, who thus secured in the municipal councils a position similar to that held by the large landowners in the zémstvos. Municipal authorities had the right of imposing rates, but in such a restricted form that they were constantly in financial difficulties and could never raise money for the work of development. They also had the right to issue by-laws on such matters as public health and sanitary conditions, but they had no means of enforcing their decisions except through the police, who though paid and maintained by the towns, were controlled by the central government. Local officials continued to interfere in the affairs of the towns, and their interference was no less effective when regulated by law than it had been

en purely personal and uncontrolled. The law of 1870 thus t municipal government in much the same condition in which vas before.

Legal Reform

Very valuable reforms were effected by the law of December 2, 64, which substituted a judicial system based on the results ained by theory and practical experience in western Europe for obsolete institutions and forms of procedure that Russia had erited from the eighteenth century. For the first time there s laid down the principle that justice should be equal for all.[1] ceedings in the law-courts were made public, and were con- cted on a regular system of prosecution and defence instead by antiquated rules handed down from mediaeval times. al by jury was introduced for all except political cases and tain offences committed by government officials. The icial system became completely independent of the admini- ıtion. Educated jurists were appointed as judges. They were perly paid and could not be arbitrarily removed. Small cases e submitted to the jurisdiction of special lower courts, pre- d over by justices of the peace elected by the zémstvos and n councils, for which a simplified form of procedure was pted.

The legal reform was the most thorough and radical of all se introduced by Alexander II. It marked a complete ak with the past, and its importance can be estimated by bitterness with which the reactionaries later attacked every of the principles on which it was based.

Education

mportant changes took place also in education. After the ession of Alexander II, when the most irritating of the

[1] Within the limits of class-rights, for the different classes of the popula- did not enjoy equal rights (cf. p. 429).

restrictions imposed in the previous reign were removed, there was a stir in university life. The number of students increased rapidly, and they were allowed a fair amount of liberty. They showed great interest in political affairs, and gave themselves up to violent criticism of the existing order. Soon the government felt itself called upon to interfere, and the weak Minister of Education, Kovalévsky, was replaced by a reactionary Admiral Putyátin, who at once abolished all forms of corporate organization among the students. Great demonstrations of protest in Moscow and Petersburg ended in conflicts with the police and troops. In Moscow the police hounded the mob on to attack the students by spreading a rumour that they were dispossessed landowners agitating for the restoration of serfdom. Many students were arrested and dismissed from the universities. Alexander was extremely dissatisfied with Putyátin's methods and appointed the enlightened A. V. Golovnín in his place. Golovnín began at once to draft a new code for the universities. Professor Kavélin was sent abroad to study the organization of foreign universities, and other prominent scholars were invited to take part in the work of reform. When the draft was ready it was even translated and circulated abroad so that European scholars might express their opinions upon it. At the same time it was actively discussed in Russian academic circles and in the press.

On June 30, 1863, this new University Code was published. It restored to the universities the autonomy they had enjoyed under the Code of 1804. The professors of each university were formed into self-governing bodies, managing affairs through the council and boards of faculties. The powers of the curator of the circuit, which since 1835 had been almost unlimited, were severely restricted. The evidence collected by Kavélin in western Europe was overwhelmingly in favour of allowing the students to organize their own corporate life, but the reactionaries vigorously resisted the proposal and it had to be abandoned.

A new Secondary Education Code was published in 1864 ecember 1). Two types of schools were recognized, the assical gymnasium' and the 'real gymnasium', preparing ils respectively for the universities and the higher technical itutions. There was very little provision for the education girls. Existing State institutes for the daughters of the try did not meet the needs of the more democratic classes, began to take an interest in education in this period. m 1859 girls' secondary schools were founded by private erprise, and the Empress Mária took them under her own tection.

The government left elementary education to public initia-, and the Elementary Schools Code of June 26, 1864, wed the zémstvos and town councils to provide and main- schools, which were supervised by specially formed district ool boards.

Changes in the Army

The last of the great reforms, that of the army, was carried ough in a later period, but in spirit and purpose it belonged he first part of the reign. Before the Crimean War, and cially in the years after 1848, Russia seemed to dominate ope by her colossal military strength. By 1856 over two lion men had been mobilized, yet despite these enormous urces in men and the bravery of the troops the compara- ly small army of the Western alliance was victorious. sia's failure was undoubtedly due, in part, to the general rnal disorganization of the country, and to the backward- s of her economic life. The lack of proper communications means of transport, for example, directly influenced the rse of the campaign, and contributed to the disaster of astópol. But there were also special points of weakness ch showed that radical changes were necessary in the military

system if Russia was to maintain her position in Europe. The leaders of the army were totally unfitted for their work, and with one or two brilliant exceptions showed a complete lack of initiative. In technical equipment and armament the Russian were far behind other countries. Their medical and sanitary services proved hopelessly inefficient and the administration of the army was full of abuses and corruption.

In 1861 Dmítry Milyútin, who had served as professor in the General Staff Academy and as Chief of Staff of the Army of the Caucasus, became Minister of War. During the twenty years in which he occupied this responsible position he devoted all his talent and energy to the task of reorganizing the army and the military system of which it formed only a part. The conditions of service in the ranks were improved, and the period of service reduced from 25 to 16 years. Shameful and cruel punishments were abolished, and the code of military offences and court-martial procedure was readjusted to bring it into harmony with the progressive civil law reforms of 1864. In order to raise the educational standard amongst the officers and remove them during the first years of their training from the exclusively professional atmosphere in which cadets were brought up under the old system, Milyútin radically reformed the military schools and paid more attention to the development of wide cultural interests. These and other similar changes, conceived in a humane and liberal spirit, were of great service in increasing the efficiency of all branches of the service. Milyútin's greatest achievement, however, was the Military Service Law of 1874, which extended the obligation of military service to all classes of the population and brought Russia into line with other continental states. Youths attaining the age of twenty were automatically called up at a fixed date every year, for six years with the colours, followed by nine in the reserve and service in the militia up to the age of forty. Total

emption, or a considerable reduction of the six years' period, as granted to men who could bring proof of exceptional mestic obligations, and those who had completed the course the elementary or secondary school or the university received ivileges corresponding to the standard of education they had tained. The army was placed on a territorial basis, and the nual quota of recruits required from each military district was osen by lot. The efficiency of the army was further increased the introduction of a new system of training which included ovision for the teaching of general subjects (1876). Each ldier at the end of his service returned to his home literate, d in Milyútin's hands the army became an important auxi- ry in the work of educating the masses of the people.

Political Movements, 1855–66

For a century and a half no period in Russian history was so ll of change as the first part of the reign of Alexander II. The 'reat reforms' set free new social and political forces and arted processes of development that, though they might be strained, could never be arrested. Many millions of new embers entered Russian society after the emancipation of ie peasants. Local self-government was to provide the epping-stone to political freedom. Russia acquired a properly 'ganized legal system and a modern army. Education was put i a sounder basis and the instruction of the masses entrusted public institutions.

A new Russia was indeed rising from the ruins of Sevastópol. lexander was inspired by a sincere desire to help the country rward, and as a reformer he was enthusiastically supported by is people. But unfortunately he held firmly to the old adminis- ative system, and by trusting bureaucratic institutions to carry it liberal reforms, and denying any share in their preparation the people whose vital interests they concerned, he lowered

very considerably the value of the reforms and came into sharp conflict with public opinion.

Before the Emancipation Act was published the gentry showed their resentment at not being properly consulted on the matter. Alexander promised that they would be allowed to send delegates to discuss the reform before it was finally shaped. The delegates were actually summoned to Petersburg in the autumn of 1859, but they were not allowed to express their views freely. They were questioned by government officials on points of detail, and when they asked to be allowed to present a collective expression of opinion on the whole question of emancipation they were only rebuffed by the emperor. From this time the opposition movement amongst the gentry developed rapidly.[1] A large section of them strove merely to assert their class interests. Tired of bureaucratic tutelage and resentful of interference with their rights and privileges, they wanted to secure a share in political power as compensation for the abolition of serfdom. There was also a strong liberal group which was opposed to the bureaucratic principle, in the interests not of any particular class but of the people as a whole, and agitated for freedom of the press, responsibility of officials to the courts, an independent judicial system, and local self-government on a true representative basis.

Of these two tendencies, oligarchical and liberal, the latter found strong support in educated society for a time, but in view of its origin the liberalism of the gentry[2] did not appeal to the younger generation of the educated class,[3] which from the

[1] 'The government itself acts arbitrarily, but demands blind submission from every one else. . . . In Petersburg, Moscow, and the provinces there is growing dissatisfaction, even bitterness, against the government' (Koshelëv).

[2] Or 'conscience-stricken gentlemen' (*káyushchisya dvoryáne*), as they were later called by Mikhailóvsky.

[3] 'Men of mixed class' (*raznochíntsy*).

eginning of the reign had been largely recruited from the ıore democratic sections of the people, to which the schools nd universities had previously been almost inaccessible. adical opinion, led by Chernishévsky, Dobrolyúbov, and their ournal *Sovreménnik* ('The Contemporary'), did not trust the berals and was turning more and more towards socialism.

The Act of 1861 caused much disappointment. The radicals ame to the conclusion that the official and propertied classes ad conspired to rob the peasants of the land, in order to e able to exploit them. Chernishévsky inveighed against the ureaucratic methods of reform adopted by the government, nd was strongly supported by the liberals, who, in the province f Tver, declared that reforms ought to be carried out with ıe help of 'an assembly of elected representatives of ıe people, without any class distinctions'.[1] But in 1861 the olicy of the government began to turn towards reaction. n order to appease the conservatives Alexander got rid of Nicholas Milyútin and appointed Valúyev, a supporter of the ristocratic party, to the post of Minister of the Interior in lace of Lanskóy.[2]

Meantime, radical opinion was becoming more and more xtreme. Under Chernishévsky and Dobrolyúbov the spirit of riticism fastened upon social and political questions, and was irected towards the emancipation of society from political ppression and the tutelage of the State. The field of criticism as enlarged by Písarev, who advocated a much wider emanci- ation than that which formed the ideal of the *Sovreménnik*—

[1] 'The gentry are firmly convinced that the government is incapable of rrying out reforms. The free institutions to which these reforms should ad can only issue from the people itself, otherwise they will only be a dead tter, and will place society in an even more critical position. In order to ve itself and society the government should call an assembly of elected presentatives of the people, without any class distinctions.'

[2] Lanskóy had held this position since 1855.

the emancipation of the human mind from all the religious, moral, and intellectual bonds that held it down, as serfdom had held down the peasants, from family and social traditions, dogmas, ideals, emotions, and all general principles of conduct. Písarev's 'nihilism' caught the imagination of the younger generation, and though it was not revolutionary, i. e. did not demand an open political struggle, it served as a preparation for revolutionary agitation. In 1861 active revolutionary groups began to be formed, some of which aimed at an immediate social revolution, while others preferred to propagate socialist ideas amongst the people and wait until revolution came of itself. In the autumn of 1861 revolutionary proclamations containing wild demands were distributed among the people.[1] In 1862 (May–June) a series of mysterious fires, which destroyed whole quarters of the city, broke out in Petersburg. Popular rumour blamed the revolutionaries, but the real origin of the fires was never discovered. The public were terrorized, and the government became so alarmed that it determined to make a stand against the rising revolutionary movement. The *Sovreménnik* and Písarev's journal, *Rússkoe Slóvo* ('The Russian Word'), were suspended for eight months. Many arrests were made, and Chernishévsky, on very slender evidence, was sentenced to fourteen years' penal servitude in Siberia for his connexion with the proclamations.[2] In May strict rules for the supervision of printing-presses were issued, in order to stop the production of 'underground' literature.

At this juncture a fresh turn was given to political affairs in Russia by the outbreak of the Polish rebellion. The severe repressive measures that had been adopted in Poland after

[1] One of these proclamations advocated the wholesale massacre of all who defended the existing order, in place of which a federal-communist system was to be set up.

[2] The sentence was eventually reduced to seven years.

831 remained in force until the end of Nicholas I's reign. Alexander showed an inclination towards more lenient treatment of the Poles. Some concessions made in 1861, such as he creation of a separate ministry for Polish educational and eligious affairs, seemed to foreshadow the grant of a certain legree of autonomy. But this attempt to conciliate the Poles ame too late. The country was already divided between two evolutionary parties (aristocratic and democratic), neither of vhich would accept the Russian programme. In 1863 the Russian authorities put into force a new conscription law, and arried out a sudden raid with the purpose of taking off as ecruits all young men suspected of disaffection. An armed ising broke out, and the Poles turned to the Western Powers or support. Russian opinion had for a long time been sympathetic to the Poles, but the diplomatic interference of Great Britain, France, and Austria on their behalf caused an explosion of patriotic feeling that made it easy for the Russian government to disregard the representations of the Powers. The Poles fought heroically, but there was no centre of resistance such as the Polish army had been in 1831. The insurrection was limited to a series of sporadic outbreaks, which, though difficult to deal with, were foredoomed to failure. By the spring of 1864 Russia was once more in complete possession of Poland. All idea of reconciliation was abandoned. The government tore up the last remnants of Polish freedom and embarked on a policy of active russification. In this it was supported by public opinion, for Russian hostility against the Poles became even more violent when the people learned that they had planned to spread disorder in Russia, in order to distract the attention of the government from the revolt. The influence of Polish agitation on the students' disorders of 1861 was established, and it was discovered that the Russian revolutionaries had been negotiating with the Poles. The

revolutionary movement, already seriously compromised in public opinion by the Petersburg fires, was now discredited. Even moderate liberalism lost many of its supporters. The government declared that its policy would be 'neither weakness nor reaction', and proceeded with necessary reforms. But the bureaucratic principle was energetically reasserted. When the Moscow gentry asked the emperor to 'crown the edifice of State' by calling a general assembly of 'representatives of the Russian land', in order that 'truth might penetrate unhindered to the throne' (January 1865), he declared that the reforms which he was introducing were sufficient evidence of his unfailing determination to improve and perfect the organization of the State, and emphasized his own exclusive right of initiative. Liberal advances were thus completely rebuffed, and the government began to think that revolution was dead. Suddenly the whole of Russia was horrified by Karakózov's attempt to assassinate the emperor (April 16, 1866), which was immediately attributed to a wide revolutionary organization. The most patient investigation brought to light only an insignificant group in Moscow, to which Karakózov belonged. But radical and revolutionary tendencies were finally compromised, the liberals lost their heads, and blind reaction set in almost before the smoke of Karakózov's pistol had floated away. Alexander was deeply impressed by the attempt on his life, and thus all the readier to listen to the reactionaries. Count Dmítry Tolstóy (Procurator of the Holy Synod) attacked Golovnín's policy in the Council of Ministers (April 17), and blamed his laxity for the spread of revolutionary ideas among the students. Golovnín was at once removed and Tolstóy took his place. Similar changes were made in other ministerial posts. The *Sovreménnik* and *Rússkoe Slóvo* were stopped altogether, and the government appealed to the people for help in the struggle against 'disruptive forces'.

4

Alexander II: 2. Reaction

Tolstóy's Educational Policy

The full force of reaction was immediately directed against the schools and universities, in which revolution was supposed to have its roots. Tolstóy held that the study of natural science had fostered the spirit of criticism and negation that carried away the younger generation in the sixties. His new programme for secondary education (approved by Alexander after it had been rejected by the Council of State) banished science altogether from the schools, and considerably reduced the time devoted to Russian language and literature, modern languages, history, and geography. Mathematics, Latin, Greek, and a third dead language—Church Slavonic—became the cornerstones of the new curriculum. The teaching of the classics was intentionally made as lifeless as possible, most attention being paid to formal grammar. The teachers' councils lost all their rights, which passed to 'directors' appointed by, and responsible to, the ministry, and virtually its agents, through whom it could exercise a close supervision over the whole course of school life. The spirit of the schools was distorted. Absolute, unquestioning obedience came to be demanded of the pupils, and though they were encouraged to be 'frank' with their teachers, 'frankness' took the form of spying on fellow pupils. 'Real schools', with a narrowly technical course lasting for six years only, replaced the 'real gymnasia' of 1864.[1] The new 'real school' did not prepare pupils for the higher technical institu-

[1] Under the Code of 1864 the course of both the 'classical' and the 'real' gymnasium lasted for eight years.

tions,[1] entry into which became possible only for those who had passed through the classical mill.

The new secondary-school system was intended to lower the general standard of knowledge, to deaden thought, and check the development of wide cultural interests, by providing a course of mere mental drill. It subjected the pupils to a severe process of selection; in the years 1872–90 only a very small proportion of them succeeded in finishing the school course in the proper time, while as many as 63 to 79 per cent. were rejected at different stages. The system was bitterly criticized from all sides until Tolstóy persuaded Alexander to issue an order forbidding the press to discuss the plans of the government. With the universities he did not get so much of his own way, though he managed to strike several hard blows at the none too liberal Code of 1863, which he would have abolished altogether but for the support it still enjoyed even in official circles. In 1867 very close police control was established over the students, both inside and outside the walls of the universities, and the powers and independence of university councils were considerably reduced. Serious student disturbances took place in 1869, 1874, and 1878.

The existing girls' secondary schools were not under the jurisdiction of the ministry, but Tolstóy brought such pressure to bear upon Vyshnegrádsky, head of the department which supervised them, that he had to resign. A number of State secondary schools for girls, with a programme similar to that of the classical gymnasium, were founded in this period, and the question of higher education for women came up in a form particularly serious from Tolstóy's point of view. In order to complete their education women were forced to go to Germany and Switzerland, where they came under the influence of revolutionary propaganda carried on by political refugees. In self-

[1] Cf. p. 437.

efence the government was forced to move in the matter, and the seventies allowed courses of higher study for women to e opened by private persons at Petersburg and Moscow, in rder to keep the women students at home. Tolstóy refused, owever, to allow medical subjects to be taught, though from 872 to 1881 medical training for women was provided by the Ministry of War (under Milyútin). The first medical institute r women students was opened only in 1897.

The zémstvos had taken up the work of elementary education, nd were making good progress with the very modest resources their disposal. They built and paid for the upkeep of many ew schools, which were managed by the district school boards.[1] ut Tolstóy could not reconcile himself to this system, and anted to vest the control of elementary education in officials sponsible to himself. With this object he began to appoint overnment inspectors (1869), and in a new Elementary Educaon Code, prepared in 1874, provided for a very considerable crease in their number, but owing to lack of money could not rry his proposal in full.[2] In the same measure he tried to crease the official element in the school boards, but met with nexpected opposition from the gentry, who persuaded lexander to allow their district marshals (elected heads of ne corporation of gentry) to preside on the boards, which ere thus kept in close touch with the zémstvos.[3] The plan of bjecting elementary education to purely bureaucratic control us failed, but Tolstóy led an active and unceasing campaign gainst the zémstvos, which became so difficult to bear that many them in despair thought of abandoning the schools altogether.

[1] Cf. p. 437.

[2] Instead of one inspector for every district he had to be content with two every province, or about one-fifth of the number he wanted.

[3] The district marshal (*predvoditel*) was by law president of the zémstvo uncil.

The Early Years of the Zémstvos

The zémstvos had to carry on their work under very difficult conditions. Their resources were quite insufficient for the tasks they had to perform, and in 1866 (December 3) their right of levying rates was severely restricted. From that time they were compelled to derive most of their income from the already over-taxed land. At first they made the peasants pay for schools and medical attention, but later it became possible for them to provide these and other services free of charge out of the general funds. In most of the zémstvos the gentry predominated, since they alone, by education and previous experience, were fitted to take an active part in public work. Even the peasants elected many of their representatives from this class.

For the first two or three years the zémstvos were on fairly good terms with the government and its agents in the provinces. From 1866 the position changed, and they were subjected to constant attacks on their authority and independence. In 1867 the powers of the presidents were enlarged, and they were made responsible for preventing the discussion of subjects that did not enter into the competence of the zémstvos. All accounts of the annual meetings were subjected to the governor's censorship, and the zémstvos were not allowed to publish their printed materials and reports on different branches of their work. The right of the public to attend the meetings was curtailed. These and other similar measures had the effect of rallying progressive forces in defence of the zémstvos. The unceasing struggle which they were forced to wage embittered and drove into opposition the best minds of the country, and kept alive in a dark period the liberalism that had made an unsuccessful effort to assert itself in the sixties.

Reaction in the Law Courts

The legal reform of 1864 was introduced at first, owing to ancial difficulties and a shortage of suitable officials and lges, only in the Moscow and Petersburg circuits. Despite e fact that it was based on methods and principles entirely w for Russia, the system worked well and was a great improve- nt upon the one it replaced. But the government soon came dissatisfied with it, and particularly with the way in ich offences against the press laws were treated by the juries. many cases where convictions and heavy penalties would have en secured under the old system, the new courts either quitted or imposed light penalties. On one occasion Valúyev nt so far as to demand the dismissal of a judge, and Alexander l to save the law from violation. In another similar case he nself had to be reminded that he could no longer arbitrarily nove judges, though for daring to mention the fact the Minis- of Justice, Zamyátin, had to leave his post. His successor, unt Páhlen, encouraged by the reactionaries, began an active npaign against the new system and its principles. By tamper- with the appointments of prosecuting officials he turned em into instruments of the policy of the government. He ed to restrict the influence and independence of the corpora- n of advocates, and wanted to do away entirely with the ed jury system. It was saved only after a stiff contest, which the chief protagonist on the side of progress was F. Kóni, the enlightened president of the Petersburg Circuit urt. In 1871 Páhlen changed the procedure for the investi- ion and trial of political cases, which from that time were dually withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the ordinary rts and subjected to that of uncontrolled and irresponsible ice officials.

The Press

While thus engaged in getting rid of the inconveniences of the reforms which it had so recently carried through, the government was busy gagging the press and public opinion, so that there should be no protest against its actions. During the first ten years of the reign the position of the press had been uncertain. Periods of comparative freedom alternated with periods of repression, but it had been able to reflect the main currents of public opinion on the great questions of the time. In 1865 the newspapers and journals of the two capitals were freed from the preliminary censorship, but the natural feeling of relief caused by this concession was short-lived. In the provinces the press remained subject to the preliminary censorship, while the punitive censorship set up in Moscow and Petersburg was unceasingly vigilant.[1] Infringements of the press rules were treated so lightly by the courts that the government began to take 'administrative' measures.[2] Newspapers and journals were warned for a first offence, then stopped for months at a time, or crippled by being forbidden to print advertisements. In 1869 a committee that was set up to draft a new press law advised the government to relax its strictness, but the number of prosecutions increased. Radical journals suffered heavily, and moderate liberalism was represented by only one serious organ, *Véstnik Evrópy* ('Messenger of Europe').[3] Thus reaction met with hardly a protest,

[1] Under the preliminary censorship newspapers and journals had to be submitted to the censor *before* publication. Under the punitive system the editors were made responsible, and might be punished by fine or imprisonment for allowing the publication of anything that contravened the press rules, the interpretation of which was left to the discretion of the officials.

[2] Substituting the summary jurisdiction of police officials for that of the ordinary courts.

[3] Founded in 1866, and still in existence.

d public opinion, robbed of all means of expressing itself, hausted and disappointed at the turn that affairs had taken ter the promising years of reform, sank once more into mood of depression.

Economic Expansion

Economic conditions were still primitive at the beginning of exander's reign. Russia's backwardness was accounted for the conditions of her history, for she had been forced to pand over an enormous stretch of territory, and engage in a ruggle for existence so incessant that all internal development d been subjected to the special, immediate needs of defence. ne process of expansion was practically completed by the ginning of the nineteenth century, at least on the west and ıth, and the time had come for consolidation. Henceforward onomic questions were bound to attract attention if Russia s to keep the place she had won in Europe.

The Crimean War showed how little progress had been made the first half of the century, and brought Russia near to nkruptcy. It led first of all to serious reforms in the adminis-tion of State finances. The system of independent treasuries each government department—a relic of the Moscow period was abandoned in favour of a single central treasury. All enue and expenditure were diverted to the Ministry of nances. Public accounts were verified by an independent ite control, and in 1862 the first regular budget was issued. hough these changes led to a more efficient, honest, and eco-mical administration of finances, they were purely external, l did not touch the real problem, which was to increase the ources at the disposal of the government. Reitern, appointed nister of Finances in 1862, saw that only an active economic icy could save Russia.

Three important obstacles had hindered economic progress

in the first half of the century. The first of these, serfdom, fell in 1861. Reitern devoted himself to the removal of the other two—lack of means of communication and the absence of an organized system of credit. Russian roads were quite undeveloped, and very little use was made of the wonderful system of waterways which intersect the country in all directions. At the outbreak of the Crimean War there were only two railways—one a short line of 25 versts, of no economic or strategical importance, from Petersburg to Tsárskoe Seló (opened in 1837), and the other the Nicholas Railway from Petersburg to Moscow (605 versts), built by the State at enormous cost and finished in 1851. A line from Petersburg to Warsaw had been begun, but lack of funds had prevented its completion. After the war the government began systematically to encourage private enterprise, for its experience of State railway construction had not been very encouraging. Concessions for new lines were freely granted to private companies, which were guaranteed a minimum dividend on their capital by the government. The first experiments of the kind, however, caused heavy losses to the Treasury, until a new venture in State construction showed that railways could be made to pay. The great boom of the seventies gave Russia a system of railways that changed the face of the country. The grain-growing provinces of the south were linked up with the great consuming centres (the capitals and the industrial provinces of the north) and with the Black Sea and Baltic ports, while the industrial regions were joined to the southern coalfields.[1] Of no less importance for the economic development of Russia was the creation of a system of banks and credit institutions, in which a very large amount of capital was invested in this period.

Industry passed through a very critical time after the emanci-

[1] By 1876 Russia possessed over 19,000 versts (13,000 miles) of railway, two-thirds of which were built in the years 1868–76.

pation. Those industries, such as iron [1] and wool, which had continued to use forced labour, found themselves suddenly deprived of labour, for the liberated peasants left the hated factories and went away to the towns. The cotton industry suffered heavily from the effects of the American Civil War—a shortage of raw cotton and the consequent dearness of English yarn. Trade also was very depressed after 1861, and the returns of business done at the great fairs held at Nízhny Nóvgorod and other places, which at that time approximately reflected the general condition of trade in the country, declined very considerably. In the seventies, in close connexion with the railway boom, both trade and industry recovered, and a period of feverish expansion followed. The economic life of the country was beginning to respond to conditions more favourable for its development, but there was unrestricted speculation, and production became inflated. Towards the end of the seventies there was a marked reaction, leading to a period of depression that lasted up to 1887.

The Conquest of the Caucasus

Half a century of almost unceasing warfare was required for the subjugation of the tribes of the northern Caucasus. The Georgian military road, the main line of communication with the south, divided the unconquered territory into two parts. In the west the Cherkesses gave constant trouble by their raids into Russian territory, but they were gradually hemmed in and limited in their sphere of activity. In 1864 the last of them were allowed to migrate to Turkey. By the end of the first quarter of the century considerable progress

[1] The production of iron declined from 20,468,000 (1860) to 17,027,000 poods (1863) (Tugán-Baranóvsky, *The Russian Factory*, p. 309). There are about 62 poods in a ton.

RUSSIAN CONQUEST
OF THE
CAUCASUS
Land acquired under Alexander I 1801-25
" " " Nicholas I 1825-55
" " " Alexander II 1855-78
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200 250
BLACK SEA
CASPIAN SEA
R. Kubán
Ekaterinodár
Stávropol
Anápa
ANAPA
KUBÁN REGION
Kizliar
Mozdók
R. Terek
CHECHNIA
Vladikavkaz
Petrovsk
KABARDA
ABKHAZIA
MINGRELIA
IMERITIA
DAGHESTAN
Dérbent
Póti
POTI
GÚRIA
GEORGIA
Batúm
Akhaltsikh
Tiflis
R. Kur
SHEKIN
AKHALTSIKH
KARS
GANDJA
Kars
R. Chórok
ARDAHAN
ERIVAN
Erivan
SHIRVAN
Baku
KARABAGH
NAKHITCHEVAN
R. Aras
TALISH
Lenkoran

had been made in the east, for the Russians had brought under their rule the greater part of Daghestan and lower Chéchnia, and built a line of forts that kept the tribes of the interior in check. But all this work was undone in 1829 by a rebellion, and for thirty years the peoples of the north-eastern Caucasus, united by religious passion and hatred of Russia, maintained the struggle for independence. Their first leader, Kazi Mulla of Ghimri, who was originally the head of a religious sect, declared a holy war. In 1831 he took and sacked the Russian town Kizliar, on the lower Térek, and attacked Dérbent and Vnezápnaya,[1] from which he was driven off. In the following year the Russians entered the difficult mountain country, forced Kazi Mulla to retire into Daghestan, and captured his stronghold Ghimri. Kazi Mulla himself was killed, but his friend and lieutenant, Shamil, escaped and took his place as leader of the rebels. A strong Russian column entered northern Daghestan again in 1837. Shamil was surrounded in the fortress of Akhulgo, but when it fell, after a siege lasting eighty days, he managed to escape. The following years brought Russia many disasters, for Shamil, with his mobile forces, swooped down upon isolated groups of his enemies without allowing himself to be drawn into any serious fighting. In 1846 he tried to break through into Kabardá, to the west of the Georgian road, in order to join forces with the tribes of the north-west. This movement failed, and for several years hostilities were confined to raiding expeditions carried out by each side in the territory of the other. During the Crimean War the allies failed to take the opportunity of seriously embarrassing Russia which the situation in the Caucasus presented to them, and when the war was over the Russians determined to rid themselves of the danger that threatened them in this quarter from the existence of unconquered

[1] In eastern Chéchnia.

territory within the Empire. In 1856 a number of stro columns were set in motion from different points. Advanc slowly, they consolidated all their gains by building brid and roads. The long period of comparative inactivity h seriously undermined Shamil's power. The tribes went o to the Russians as they advanced, and in the end Shamil w shut up with a mere handful of followers at Gunib. Af a short but eventful siege the main defences of this last stro hold were taken, and Shamil, seeing that there was no hope escape, at last surrendered to the Russians (August 25, 185

Foreign Policy, 1855–75

For some years after the Crimean War France and Rus seemed to be drawing nearer to each other. The old allia of the three Eastern Powers had been shattered by Aust whom Alexander could not forgive. During the strug between France and Austria in 1859 Russian influence w exercised in favour of France. Russia and France acted unison with regard to Rumania (1858–61)[2] and on ot Eastern questions. But Napoleon III's intervention in fav of the Poles in 1863 put an end for the time being to t development of a Franco-Russian understanding. Russ policy received a new orientation. The traditional friendsh between the Russian and Prussian courts became strengthene At the time of the Polish rebellion Prussia rendered import

[1] For ten years Shamil lived at Kalúga. In 1870 he was allowed to m the pilgrimage to Mecca, and died at Medina in the following year.

[2] Moldavia and Wallachia were partially united in 1858. In the follow year both the provinces elected the same *bospodar*, Alexander Cuza, an 1861 the Powers formally recognized the new state, Rumania, which, h ever, remained subject to Turkey until 1878.

[3] Alexander II was the nephew of William I of Prussia, whose si Nicholas I had married in 1817.

help to Russia,[1] who in turn supported Prussia against Austria in 1866. During the Franco-Prussian War Russia prevented Austria from joining France, and Prussia acquiesced in the repudiation of the articles of the Treaty of Paris which had prohibited Russia from maintaining a war-fleet on the Black Sea (November 1870).

From 1870 Bismarck's chief object was to isolate France. He had dealt very lightly with Austria in 1866, and after 1870 he was able to come to an understanding with her. With Russia the ground was already prepared. In September 1872 Alexander I and Francis Joseph met William I in Berlin, and the so-called 'Three Emperors' League' came into being. No formal treaty was signed, but an agreement was arrived at for (1) the maintenance of the new frontiers established in recent years, (2) the settlement of difficulties that might arise out of the Eastern Question, and (3) the suppression of revolutionary movements.[2] This new combination, however, was seriously weakened in 1875 by the intervention of Alexander II at a time when war between Germany and France seemed imminent. The three Powers hung loosely together for some years longer, but the semblance of friendship became ever more difficult to keep up.

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877–8

The affairs of the Near East occupied the attention of Europe almost unceasingly during this period. The Peace of Paris apparently deprived Russia of all excuse for interfering in the Balkans, but it did not solve the question of the rela-

[1] Prussian troops were posted along the frontier to prevent the escape of Polish refugees into Prussian territory. Russian troops were allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of those who managed to flee.

[2] There is evidence that about the same time Germany and Austria secretly arranged for the latter to receive compensation in the Balkans for the territory she had lost in 1859 and 1864.

tions between the Turks and the Christian peoples. Reforn were promised, but never introduced, and several isolat risings took place. There was, however, no serious troub until the summer of 1875, when an insurrection broke o in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Had it been confined to the provinces the occasion for European intervention might n have arisen. But the rebels received secret encouragemen and assistance from Serbia and Montenegro, and the prospe of a general rising of the Slavs seriously alarmed the Austri government. Count Andrassy (Foreign Minister), after con municating with Petersburg and Berlin, drew up a note co taining a scheme of reforms intended to pacify the revolt provinces. With the consent of France and Italy, and t grudging concurrence of Great Britain, this note was present to the Sultan (January 30, 1876), who at once accepted But the rebels had had enough of Turkish promises in t past, and declined to lay down their arms. A second a much sterner note, obviously inspired by Russia, was draft at Berlin (May) by Andrassy, Bismarck, and Gorchakóv (Russi Foreign Minister), but the British government refused support it, and sent the fleet to Besika Bay, near the Da danelles (May 24). Disraeli, whose imperialist policy in t East implied the close identification of the interests of Gre Britain with those of Turkey, would doubtless have gone mu farther in defining his attitude towards Russia, but for t pressure of public opinion, profoundly shocked by the Bu garian massacres (May), and the opposition which he met wi even within the Cabinet. Alexander II and Francis Joseph Austria met at Reichstadt (in Bohemia) and came to an agre ment by which Austria, in return for certain concessio guaranteed to observe a friendly neutrality if war broke o between Russia and Turkey (July 8).

Early in July 1876 Serbia and Montenegro had declar

war on Turkey. By the autumn the Serbians were reduced to such straits that they had to ask for the mediation of the Powers. Russia compelled the Turks to agree to a two months' armistice (October 30). Alexander informed the British ambassador at Petersburg that although he sought no territorial gains and had not the least wish to possess Constantinople, he might be compelled to interfere alone if the other Powers refused to deal firmly with the Turks (November 2). Proposals for a conference at Constantinople were under consideration, and there seemed to be some hope of restoring unity. But after Lord Beaconsfield's speech at the Guildhall on November 9, in which he asserted that while the policy of Great Britain was peace, no other country was so well prepared for war, all hope of a diplomatic settlement of the crisis disappeared. The next day, Alexander, speaking at Moscow, reasserted, and in stronger terms than before, his determination to interfere alone if the Powers would not help him to obtain the guarantees that he had the right to demand from Turkey. The Conference of Constantinople met in December, but the Turkish government promulgated a bogus constitution, and referred to the Treaty of Paris, by which the Powers had engaged not to interfere in the relations between the Sultan and his subjects. In spite of warnings issued by Lord Salisbury, the British representative at the conference, and the withdrawal of the British fleet from Besika Bay, the Sultan rejected all the proposals of the Powers. For some months past Russia had been arming. In January 1877 the agreement of Reichstadt was converted into a formal treaty, by which the neutrality of Austria was assured. A final effort to impose the will of Europe proved unsuccessful (Protocol of London, March 31), and on April 24 Russia declared war. The obstinacy of the Turks was due to their conviction that the interests of Great Britain would not allow her to remain neutral, a conviction which

Beaconsfield's actions had tended to deepen. But the even
of May 1876 had made an alliance between Great Britain an
Turkey unthinkable, and when the critical moment arrived th
British government announced that it would not intervene s
long as Russia did not occupy Constantinople and the Straits o
extend her operations to Egypt or the region of the Suez Cana

Russia was not prepared for war, and there was no certaint
that in the end she would not have to fight Great Britai
Financial affairs were beginning to assume a brighter aspect—
in 1875 Reitern succeeded, for the first time, in balancing th
budget with a surplus—but Milyútin's military reforms ha
not had time to become thoroughly rooted. Operations wer
begun with considerable success. After passing throug
Rumania, in accordance with an agreement arrived at before
hand, the Russian army crossed the Danube (June 26–7), and
with Sistova as a base, seized the towns of Biela and Nicopoli
in order to protect its flanks against large Turkish forces con
centrated in the Quadrilateral[1] and round the fortress o
Widdin. General Gúrko, with a small column, occupie
Tirnova, the ancient capital of Bulgaria (July 7), crossed th
mountain barrier at a point where it was only feebly defended
occupied the important Shipka Pass by an attack from the rea
and advanced towards Adrianople. But the tide soon turned
for Osman Pasha, commander of the Turkish western army
hurried forward and seized Plevna (July 19), which the Russian
had neglected to secure. Two desperate attempts to dislodg
him failed (July 20 and 31), and the position of the Russian
in Bulgaria became seriously threatened. The Turks wer
pressing from the east, while Gúrko was driven back, and ha
to defend the Shipka Pass against a series of assaults by th
Turkish southern army under Suleiman Pasha. In Asia Mino
as in the Balkans, the campaign opened successfully for th

[1] The four fortresses of Silistria, Rustchuk, Shumla, and Varna.

Russians, who occupied Batúm, Bayazid, and Ardahan, laid siege to Kars, and advanced towards Erzerum. But in July the Turks took the offensive, and began to drive the invaders back to their own frontiers.

Throughout the month of August 1877 the situation in the Balkans was critical. A combined movement by Osman from Plevna and Suleiman through one of the undefended passes of the mountains would have meant disaster for Russia. But the Turkish leaders did not act together. Reinforcements were brought down, and the Rumanian army joined the Russians. A great assault on Plevna (September 11–12) caused the allies very heavy losses, but failed to make any impression on the defences. A regular siege was then undertaken, under the direction of Todleben, the defender of Sevastópol. By the end of October Plevna was completely invested. The Russians gradually gained ground, and on December 10, after an unsuccessful attempt to break out, Osman Pasha surrendered.

After having been held up for five months the Russians were now free to advance. Gúrko crossed the western Balkans, occupied Sofia (January 4, 1878), and defeated Suleiman Pasha at Philippopolis (January 17). The Turkish forces guarding the southern end of the Shipka Pass were taken in the rear and forced to surrender. Adrianople was entered on January 9, and a few days later the Russian advance guard had reached the shores of the Sea of Marmora. Meantime, on the eastern front the Russians had been reinforced, and in the autumn moved forward once more. After storming Kars (November 18, 1877), they entered Armenia and pressed on towards Erzerum.

The Treaty of Berlin

The progress of the Russians was watched with the greatest anxiety by Great Britain. Three days after the fall of Plevna, Lord Derby (Foreign Minister) had reminded the Russian

government of its promises with regard to Constantinople, and when the Russian army entered Adrianople the British government ordered the fleet to proceed to the Bosphorus. This order was cancelled the day after it was issued, but on January 28 the ministry, having learned that Russia intended to demand, besides territorial compensation, an understanding 'for the safeguarding of her rights and interests in the Straits', introduced in Parliament a credit of £6,000,000 for purposes of defence. Preliminary conditions of peace were signed by Russia and Turkey at Adrianople on January 31. Six days later Russian troops advanced to the line of demarcation that had been agreed upon by the belligerents, and next day the British fleet was sent to Constantinople, where it anchored within sight of the Russian positions.

Early in February the Austrian government suggested that the peace terms should be discussed by an international congress. Great Britain, France, and Italy agreed to this, and Bismarck announced his willingness to act as 'honest broker'. The Russian government also accepted the Austrian proposal, but on March 3 forced Turkey to sign a treaty of peace based on the preliminary conditions agreed upon on January 31 (Treaty of San Stefano). The independence of Montenegro was proclaimed, and her territory quadrupled. Serbia and Rumania were also to be independent of Turkey, and the former received a considerable extension of territory. A 'Greater' Bulgaria was created, with frontiers extending from the Black Sea to the Aegean, and in the west as far as the mountains of Albania. The Bulgarians were to elect their own prince, who was to be approved by the Powers and remain a vassal of the Sultan. Their constitution was to be formulated under the supervision of a Russian commission, and Russian troops were to remain in occupation for a period not exceeding two years. Turkey agreed to pay an indemnity, and to cede to

ussia the regions of Kars, Batúm, Ardahan, and Bayazid, ogether with part of the Dobrudzha, which Russia intended o force upon Rumania in exchange for that part of Bessarabia hich she had lost in 1856.

Great Britain and Austria immediately protested against his settlement, which meant nothing less than the end of urkey in Europe, and demanded that it should be submitted a whole to the Congress that was to meet at Berlin. The ustrian army was mobilized, and Rumania protested in- ignantly against the ingratitude of Russia. The British overnment called out the reserves and the militia (April 3), nd ordered Indian troops to sail for Malta (April 17). Russia oked to Berlin for support, but Bismarck was not unwilling o see her quarrel with Austria and Great Britain, or even to ecome involved in a war that would leave him free to fish in oubled waters. After this 'great betrayal', Russia had to ome to terms with Great Britain (May 30).

The Congress of Berlin, which sat in June and July, under he presidency of Bismarck, completely remodelled the Treaty f San Stefano. Bulgaria was confined to the territory north f the Balkans, which was little more than a third of what had een given to her in March. Russia was to occupy and admin- ter the principality for nine months only. The southern part f Bulgaria, under the name of Eastern Rumelia, was to have Christian governor and autonomy in local affairs, but to emain under the direct political and military control of the ultan. Montenegro and Serbia lost a part of the territory ssigned to them at San Stefano. In order to keep down the an-Slav movement in the western Balkans, Austria was allowed o occupy the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to aintain garrisons in the district of Novi-Bazar, thus driving wedge between Serbia and Montenegro. This arrangement pened a new chapter in the history of the Eastern Question

and of European relations. Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumani were declared completely independent of Turkey. Rumani was compelled to agree to the exchange of Bessarabia for th Dobrudzha. Russia's gains in the east were only slightly modi fied: Batúm was to become a free port, and Bayazid had to b given up to Turkey (Treaty of Berlin, July 13, 1878).

Political Developments, 1866–81

All movements of opposition to the government seemed t be suppressed after 1866. The liberals amongst the gentry though they had voiced the desires of a large part of educate society, were in fact rendered quite helpless. But the radical did not allow themselves to be so easily discouraged. Th extreme nihilism of the sixties carried them away for a time but it failed to provide them with any positive ideals, any activ policy that would satisfy their growing interest in socia questions. P. L. Lavróv skilfully combined the old idea o personal emancipation with a social teaching that became th starting-point for a new revolutionary movement. Lavró enunciated a new formula of progress—'the physical, intellectual and moral development of the individual, and the embodimen of truth and justice in social forms.' He declared that every *civilized* minority should become a *civilizing* force, and urged the educated younger generation to devote themselves to th service of the people from which they had sprung. Lavróv's ideas were developed farther by N. K. Mikhailóvsky. They did not necessarily lead to active revolution, and left room for choice of methods. A more definite and purely anarchist programme was advocated by M. A. Bakúnin, who accepted Lavróv's for mula, but believed that the social and economic emancipation of the people could not be accomplished without the complete abolition of all authority, including that of the State, by means of a social revolution.

All types of revolutionary opinion were actuated by one mmon object—to advance the interests of the people—and ough they disagreed as to the methods by which this ject could best be served, they all came to the conclusion at in order to help the people it was necessary to *go to the ople*. Early in 1874 large numbers of young men and women grated to the country, in order to live with the peasants and se them to a realization of their needs. Some of the more rward spirits even hoped to stir up a rebellion. The move- ent ended disastrously for the young enthusiasts, who acted naively and carelessly that they were easily tracked down by e police. They found that the ideas that they propagated did t appeal to the peasants, whose needs were much more ngible and immediate than those to which the propagandists ed to awaken them. This first attempt to get into touch th the people, though it was outwardly a complete failure, d one important positive result: it showed the revolutionaries e need for bringing their programme into line with what they d learned of the real wants of the masses. In 1876 they formed new society, 'Land and Liberty',[1] the aim of which was to tract the interest of the peasants to social questions by rousing nongst them the hope of a fair distribution of the land. The ciety contained a 'disorganizing' group, which carried on an tive struggle, by means of terrorist acts, against the govern- ent and its agents, but the majority resorted once more to e country, this time with a much more practical programme. The work of peaceful propaganda became more and more fficult, owing to the vigilance of the police. Groups of volutionaries were arrested from time to time, often with the lp of police spies, and political trials became frequent in the er seventies. Perhaps the most sensational and instructive se was that of Vera Zasúlich, arrested for the attempted

[1] *Zemlyá i vólya.*

murder of Trépov, the city prefect of Petersburg, who h ordered a political prisoner to be flogged for refusing remove his hat before him. The trial roused great intere and public opinion was so clearly against the accused that t government thought it could safely leave the case to t ordinary courts. But when the real facts came to light t public began to sympathize with Zasúlich just as strongly it had previously censured her, and she was acquitted by t jury. As she was leaving the court the police attempted to r arrest her, but the crowd that had been waiting to give her ovation tore her from their hands and she succeeded in escapi across the frontier.

Zasúlich had acted on her own initiative in attacking Trépo but her deed served as the signal for an outburst of feveri activity on the part of the ' disorganizing ' group of ' Land a Liberty '. At the same time, owing to the failure of the prop ganda work in the country and the increasing severity a alertness of the police, many of the more peacefully inclin members began to demand a change of programme and adv cated an immediate political revolution. Murders of spies a policemen became very common in 1878, and on April 14 attempt was made on the life of the emperor. ' Land a Liberty ' remained officially opposed to terrorism, but split in 1879 into two distinct parties, the ' Black Partition ' (peaceful propagandists) and the ' Will of the People ' [2] (acti terrorists).

The rising revolutionary movement caused serious anxie in official circles, expecially when the number of terrorist a increased. The government spread abroad its secret age and punished more severely those conspirators whom arrested. But it had comparatively little success, and f that public sympathy was on the side of those whom it w

[1] *Chërni peredël.* [2] *Naródnaya vólya.*

rsecuting. It was also faced with a marked revival of oderate liberal opinion, centred in the zémstvos, while satisfaction with the treatment of political cases, with icial abuses, police repression, and the educational policy Tolstóy, was growing rapidly amongst the people. The r with Turkey provided a fresh indictment of the existing tem, and the failure of Russian diplomats to prevent the miliation of their country at the Berlin Congress roused e resentment of all patriots. Russia's victories, on the other nd, had enabled Alexander to secure a constitution for the lgarians, while his own people remained under the absolute le of police and bureaucrats. The government began to see at repressive measures alone would be of no avail in the uggle with revolution. In the sixties it had deliberately cut elf apart from the people, but now it felt its own helpless-ss, and appealed to society for help against 'a handful of ildoers'.

The appeal was answered by the zémstvos, the only channels rough which public opinion could express itself. At Kharkov e zémstvo declared that it could give no help unless the vernment changed its internal policy. At Chernígov an dress to the emperor, proposed by Iván Petrunkévich, erted that 'society could only struggle against subversive eas if it possessed the necessary weapons—freedom of speech, opinion, and of the press'. Petrunkévich was arrested and iled. The Tver zémstvo replied: 'The emperor, in his re for the welfare of the Bulgarian people, whom he has ed from the yoke of the Turks, has considered it necessary grant them true self-government, inviolability of person, independent judicial system, and liberty of the press. The mstvo of Tver dares to hope that the Russian people, who ve borne with such readiness and love for their ruler all the rdens of the war, will enjoy the same blessings.'

Towards the end of the seventies a number of leadi
zémstvo workers had met occasionally at Moscow to discu
practical matters connected with their work, and had form
a loose organization known as the 'Zémstvo Union'. After t
government had issued its appeal, these liberal workers invit
some of the revolutionary leaders to a conference at Kiev, a
asked them to stop the activity of the terrorists for a time,
order to see if a series of more moderate appeals would indu
the government to return to the path of reform. But all t
peaceful and perfectly loyal representations of the zémstvos we
rejected, and the government resorted once more to repressio
Governors-general, with dictatorial powers, were appointe
at Petersburg, Khárkov, and Odessa, and a special commissio
was set up to draft more decisive measures for the suppressio
of revolution. Perhaps as a result of the Kiev conference, the
were no terrorist acts for some months, but the revival
repression led to a fresh outbreak, and from November 18
the terrorists undertook an active campaign against Alexand
himself. They mined the railways leading from the south,
the hope of blowing up the train that was bringing him hom
from the Crimea. After these attempts the government mad
arrests right and left, but on February 16, 1880, a gre
explosion took place at the Winter Palace in Petersburg, a
the whole imperial family only escaped destruction owing
the fact that they were a few minutes late in entering th
dining-room.

The failure alike of the appeal to society and of the strugg
against terrorism, combined with the explosion at the palace, le
to an important change of policy. On February 21 a 'Suprem
Executive Commission' was appointed, under the presidency
General Lóris-Mélikov,[1] for the purpose of rooting out th

[1] Lóris-Mélikov had distinguished himself as commander of an army
the Caucasian front during the Russo-Turkish War. As Governor-General

olutionary movement. Lóris-Mélikov, who was entrusted
h absolute dictatorial powers over the whole empire, firmly
d actively pursued his main object, the restoration of tran-
llity in the country, but respected the rights of the popula-
n, which had up to that time suffered very heavily from
indiscriminate application of repressive measures.[1] He
olished unnecessary restrictions and insisted on the proper
ervance of the law by those in authority. He loosened the
nds of the censorship, and caused universal rejoicing by
noving Count Tolstóy and appointing in his place Sabúrov,
ncere liberal who tried to revive the system of Golovnín.
en the Supreme Commission, which seemed to have suc-
ded in restoring order, was abolished, Lóris-Mélikov was
ointed Minister of the Interior. He sympathized with the
wing desire for some sort of a constitution, and began to
sider what could be done to meet the wishes of the people.
ecting both the constitutional forms of western Europe
t were suggested by the liberals and the idea of a new
zski sobór advocated by the Slavophils, he proposed that
portant legislative measures should be formulated by 'draft-
commissions' and then discussed by representatives of the
nstvos and the chief towns, nominated by the government
summoned specially for each measure.[2] Though this plan
by no means a constitution in the accepted sense of the
rd, it would have gone far towards satisfying the general
nand that the people should be allowed some share in the
duct of affairs.

rkov he had actively pursued the revolutionaries, but gained the
pathy of the inhabitants by safeguarding their rights and interests.
Mélikov's rule is frequently referred to as the 'dictatorship of the
t' (*diktatúra sérdtsa*).

The plan resembled that adopted during the preparation of the Emanci-
on Act of 1861, with the difference that the government then summoned
esentatives *elected* by the *gentry*.

The ranks of the revolutionaries were by this time serious thinned, but they had not given up their objects. In t autumn of 1880 the campaign against Alexander was resume The streets of Petersburg were mined in several places, a other measures were taken. On March 13, 1881, while drivi home after a review, he was mortally wounded by the explosi of a bomb, and died the same day.

5

Alexander III (1881–94) *and Nicholas II*

The Triumph of Reaction

After the murder of Alexander II the public no longer h any sympathy with the revolutionaries, but there remain a large section of opinion in favour of reform. The ne emperor, who was known to be conservative by inclinatio announced that he would follow the example set by his fath Lóris-Mélikov's scheme had been approved by Alexander II the morning of March 13, and Alexander III hesitated renounce a measure which under the circumstances he regard as 'the last will and testament' of his father. An inten struggle broke out between opposing parties at court. T reactionaries urged that what Lóris-Mélikov was proposi to grant was nothing less than a constitution, which wou be the ruin of Russia. Seeing the emperor's hesitatio they pressed their advantage and persuaded him to iss a manifesto (May 11) in which he asserted his 'faith in t force and justice of the principle of autocracy', which was 'called to strengthen and protect, for the good of t people, from all infringement'.[1] Lóris-Mélikov and t

[1] Lóris-Mélikov's scheme did not raise the question of imposing limitatio on the autocracy at all.

nisters who supported him—Abazá (Finances), Milyútin Var), and later Sabúrov (Education)—resigned. The new nisters were not chosen from amongst the extreme reaction- es. The head of the government, Ignátiev (Minister of the terior), was a Slavophil; Búnge (Finances), though conserva- e, sincerely believed in the reforms of the sixties; Baron kolái (Education) was no less devoted to the ideals of Golovnín an his predecessor had been. Ignátiev announced in his first cular (May 18) that the government wished to re-establish ntact with the people, and would allow local workers a share the conduct of the affairs of the country. The rights of the nstvos and towns would be restored and respected, and ecial attention was to be devoted to the peasants, their rdens (taxation) and needs (land). All this was much in the rit of Lóris-Mélikov, and in June 1881 Ignátiev even invited umber of zémstvo workers[1] to express their views on certain portant economic and social questions.[2] This promising ginning to the reign did not last for long. The reactionary rty used all their influence over Alexander, and in May 1882 nátiev was forced to give way to Count Dmítry Tolstóy. he policy of the government now became definitely and un- ervingly reactionary. The revolutionary movement was ily broken up, owing to internal dissension and the treachery some of the revolutionaries. The moderate liberals who had gun to make themselves heard once more in the zémstvos lost eir hold after March 13. The government felt itself safe m opposition, but in order to make quite certain it took a ht grip on the press and closed the last outlet for criticism its actions.

Reaction, as a theory of government and a practical policy,

[1] Many zémstvos asked to be allowed to *elect* their representatives.

[2] E.g. the reduction of the 'redemption payments', the encouragement migration, and the provision of land for the peasants.

had never before been so clearly defined as it was in this period. On the theoretical side its strongest exponent was K. Pobedonóstsev, who has been called the 'nihilist' of reaction. According to Pobedonóstsev political freedom was a failure everywhere, and freedom of thought a humbug; parliaments and other organs of self-government were mere 'places for talk' and nests of sordid selfishness. In the law-courts, he held, the 'art of casuistry' were practised, while murders and other serious crimes went unpunished; the press only spread falsehood and roused the passions of the people. His ideal was to preserve the principles of the Byzantine State and the Byzantine Church—autocracy and orthodoxy—and to guard them from contact with the disruptive influence of western Europe, from which he urged Russia to take solemn warning. The practical side of the same doctrine was formulated by Pázukhin, a landowner of the province of Simbírsk, who found the root of all evil in the breaking down of class-partitions that had followed the emancipation and the other reforms of Alexander II. The 'great reforms' had created, quite outside the limits of the existing class-system, an amorphous mass called the *Intelligéntsia*, which had lost touch with the people and selfishly aimed at shattering all the foundations of the State system. Pázukhin pointed out that the remedy for these evils was 'the restoration of all that has been broken up', a course that appealed to many of the gentry, who from 1861 had been steadily losing their predominant position in the country. With Tolstóy, Pobedonóstsev, and Pázukhin working together, the idea of 'restoration' became the guiding motive of government policy in the eighties.

[1] Pobedonóstsev was a brilliant jurist, and had helped to draft Alexander II's judicial reforms. He was a member of the Supreme Commission under Lóris-Mélikov, and from 1889 to 1905 occupied the post of Procurator of the Holy Synod. He had been one of the tutors of Alexander III, whose close confidence he enjoyed.

As in the previous reign, the schools and universities were the st to feel the effects of reaction, under the rule of Tolstóy's minee Delyánov. A new Code issued in 1884 deprived the iversity councils of the last remnants of their authority, and e ministry assumed complete control of all sides of university e. All forms of corporate organization among the students ere finally crushed out. Protests were met by stronger re-essive measures. Students were exiled or dismissed, only become ardent revolutionary workers. Secondary education s made, as far as possible, a class privilege. In 1887 the pro-rtion of Jews in the schools was restricted to a fixed percentage, d Delyánov issued a circular proclaiming that 'the children coachmen, servants, cooks, laundresses, small shopkeepers, d such-like people' should not be encouraged to rise above e sphere in which they were born. The classical system[1] was -enforced. Tolstóy resumed his campaign against the elemen-ry schools, and proposed that, while the zémstvos might be owed to pay for and support the schools, they should hand em over to the Church, i. e. into the safe keeping of Pobe-nóstsev. Most of the zémstvos refused to consider the sug-stion, and the government, being without the funds necessary r the maintenance of the schools, could not take them over by rce.

A constant struggle went on between the government and e zémstvos, which, towards the end of the eighties, were hting for existence. Failing in the attempt to rob them of eir schools, Tolstóy tried to subject all their work to the ntrol of the Ministry of the Interior and its agents. In llaboration with Pázukhin he drew up a new Zémstvo Law, nich was intended to 'restore' the system of close class-rtitions that had been abandoned in 1864 only after a hard ht. The electoral groups of 1864 were based on property

[1] Cf. p. 445.

distinctions, and not on the three historical social classes.[1] No single group was allowed to have a numerical majority in the zémstvo council, but owing to their monopoly of education and experience the gentry were in practice able to shape the policy of the zémstvos, and occupied all the leading posts in the executive. In most of the districts the zémstvos worked sluggishly. The ruling class did not, on the whole, seek to further their own material interests, but they showed themselves indifferent to those of the peasants. Zémstvo work was carried on in a broad-minded, progressive spirit only in those few cases where the liberals managed to get the upper hand.[2] The new Zémstvo Law of 1890 (June 24) completely distorted the principles of that of 1864. It conformed entirely with Pázukhin's ideas, and gave the gentry a legally secured majority in most of the zémstvos. The electoral rights of the peasants were considerably restricted. Their representatives were appointed by the governor from a list of candidates submitted by the communes, and they could only choose members of their own class. The law embodied also much of the experience that the government had gained in its struggle with the zémstvos. Controlling committees,[3] composed of local officials, were appointed in each province and the authority of the governor was enlarged [4].

[1] Gentry (*dvoryáne*), townspeople (*meshcháne*), and peasants (*krestyáne*).

[2] Many of the most progressive zémstvo workers were members of the gentry class elected to the councils by the peasant groups (up to 1890).

[3] The 'provincial committees on zémstvo and municipal affairs' (*gubérnskoé po zémskim i gorodskim delám prisútstvie*) were formed almost exclusively of local representatives of the central government. Their function was 'to discuss the regularity and legality of the resolutions and orders' of the zémstvos and town councils.

[4] Tolstóy's original proposals would have annihilated self-government by substituting official boards for the elected executives, and giving the council only a consultative voice. He died in 1889, and his plan was subjected t

The same principle guided the government in its treatment the peasants. In order to revive the patriarchal authority at the landowners had exercised over their serfs, a law ublished in 1889 (July 24) provided for the appointment of and captains',[1] chosen from the gentry in each locality. he 'land captains', who possessed practically dictatorial powers er the communal life of the peasants and even interfered their private affairs, ruled quite arbitrarily and became oroughly hated. They served as local agents of the police d the officials, and united with their ordinary administrative nctions those of judges in all small cases. This new arrangeent broke up the system of lower courts of justices of the eace,[2] and dealt a heavy blow at the judicial reforms of the receding reign. Breach of contract by an agricultural labourer as made a criminal instead of a civil offence (1886). The eriodical redivisions of communal land were subjected to the ntrol of the land captains (1893).

Reaction spread to the army, and the enlightened principles troduced by Milyútin gradually disappeared. The material osition of the officers improved, but the narrow spirit of caste as revived. Officers were granted the monopoly of the right fight duels, and the atmosphere of the military schools became strictly professional as it had been before Milyútin.

The Land Problem and the Peasants

The economic position of the peasants, bad enough after the nancipation, became worse as the population multiplied. he grants of 1861 had not given them enough land to occupy em fully or even to keep their families properly, and as me went on the original holdings became subdivided into

me modifications, being considered, even in high official circles, too actionary.

[1] *Zemskie nachálniki.* [2] Cf. p. 435.

still smaller portions. The land was of the poorest quality or exhausted by bad cultivation. The peasants were without capital, and could not improve their methods of cultivation. The communal system hindered progress where, under other conditions, it might have been possible. In many parts the peasants could not even rent any extra land, since the growing market for grain at home and abroad made agriculture so profitable that the owners preferred to keep all the land in their own hands and thus compel the peasants to work for them. In the north-central provinces the gentry readily sold their land, but it was bought as a rule only by the richer peasants, while those most in need of it had to go without. Many of the peasants went away to work in the towns. Though migration was very difficult, owing to restrictions imposed by the government, there was a steady flow of settlers to the south-east or to western Siberia, where land was more plentiful. The position of those peasants who stayed in the country became steadily worse. The land difficulty and the excessive burden of taxation forced them to cut down their needs to a minimum, and they lived constantly on such a narrow margin that a poor harvest inevitably brought famine. They were badly housed and fed, disease was widespread, and the death-rate heavy. The peasant class has always been the economic backbone of Russia, and it was becoming so impoverished that the government was forced to take action. In 1881 the redemption of the holdings granted in 1861 was made compulsory[1] for both peasants and landowners. The government found itself able to grant considerable reductions in the 'redemption payments' (1882) and to abolish the poll-tax[2].

[1] In 1861 the peasants had been given the *option* of buying out their holdings. By 1882 the great majority of them had already exercised this right.

[2] The poll-tax was introduced by Peter the Great; cf. p. 238.

883–4). These concessions meant an appreciable relief in e burden borne by the peasants (over 50 million roubles nually), but no general revision of the system of taxation was ndertaken, and the amount paid in various ways by the peasants ntinued to be out of all proportion to their earning capacity. he second vital problem, that of the land, was treated just as perficially, though the government knew that the peasants ere excited by rumours of a general redistribution of all the nd, an idea fostered by the 'Black Partition' propagandists. order to help the peasants to buy land a Peasant Land Bank as founded (1881). At first loans were given to the needier easants, but the bank had at its disposal only a limited amount capital, and after a time began to make advances only to the ore prosperous peasants who could be trusted to repay them omptly. Thus the poor who really needed help found they uld not get it. Some relief was afforded by making easier e conditions on which land belonging to the State might be nted, but this measure could only be useful in regions where e State properties were extensive, which did not coincide th those in which the land problem was most acute. Measures ere taken for the encouragement of migration to Siberia.

All this activity on the part of the government came too late avert the national catastrophe of 1891–2. A series of poor rvests in the eighties was followed by the total failure of the ops in 1891, and twenty provinces, including the most fertile ain lands, were plunged into the horrors of famine and sease. The government organized relief with delay and ite inefficiently, and showed its usual distrust of public itiative. The educated classes—especially the students—ne the less threw themselves devotedly into the work of lping the peasants, and came into closer contact with them an had ever been possible before. The experience gained in

[1] Cf. p. 502.

this way of the appalling conditions of peasant life led to a remarkable revival of interest in public work during the nineties and served as a powerful stimulus to the activity of the zémstvos.

Labour Legislation

The industrial boom of the seventies was followed by a period of depression. The results of inflation showed themselves at once, and many enterprises were ruined. The crisis seriously affected the workers, many of whom had to be discharged when the rate of production decreased. Wages fell and strikes were frequent. The situation became so threatening that in the end the government had to interfere. The question of State control over the conditions of factory labour was raised as early as 1859, but no action was taken, owing to the opposition of the manufacturers of the Moscow region, who were well supplied with cheap labour and refused to tolerate any interference in their relations with the workers. The Petersburg manufacturers, on the other hand, had to draw on the provinces for labour and pay higher wages, and it was in their interest to make industrial conditions more attractive. Their factories were technically much better equipped than those in the provinces, and they knew that improved conditions would give them a better return from machinery and labour. They constantly supported the recommendations of committees appointed to inquire into the subject of State control which the Moscow manufacturers consistently opposed. In 1882 the government began to take action, and published a law (June 13) totally prohibiting the employment in factories of children under twelve years of age, fixing a maximum eight-hour day for children between twelve and fifteen, and forbidding the employment of children on night-work. Factory inspectors were appointed, but they had great difficulty in enforcing the law. Their investigations revealed the abominable conditions

at prevailed in the factories. Hours of labour were unbearably
ng (as many as sixteen daily in some occupations), while wages
ere low. The masters imposed heavy fines on their workers,
d treated them despotically. Sunday labour was usual, while
e sanitary and hygienic conditions in the factories were
scribed as horrible.[1] In many cases wages were paid only
ce a year, and the workers were forced to buy all they needed
credit at the factory shops, from which the owners derived
ormous profits. In the years 1884–6 the government issued
series of laws that effected considerable improvements in the
ndition of the industrial classes. Provision was made for
e education of children working in the factories, and the
nditions of their employment were strictly defined (1884).
omen and young persons under seventeen were not to be
nployed on night-work in the textile industries (1885). In
86 an important law set out recognized grounds for dismissal
for leaving work, and ordered that wages should be paid at
ast once a month. The powers of the factory inspectors were
tended: they had to revise all contracts with workmen, the
ices of necessaries in the factory shops, and the scale of fines
nposed by the employers. They were backed up by factory
mmittees, which were allowed to issue by-laws regulating
nitary conditions in the factory areas. On all sides the
ploitation of labour was restricted and controlled, and though
e masters fought hard against this new legislation, they
ined nothing but small concessions that did not affect the
inciples adopted by the government. The workers were left
ith one serious grievance, for they were deprived of the right of
oking after their own interests. Participation in a strike became
criminal offence, and severe punishment was prescribed for
rike leaders or those who incited workmen to leave their work.

[1] In many factories no living accommodation was provided for the workers, who slept in the work-rooms, on benches or on the floor.

State Policy and Economic Development

From the time of Kánkrin[1] the customs tariffs had bee judiciously manipulated, with the object of encouraging th development of industry, but there had been no marked ten dency towards extreme protection. From 1877 the tariff wa constantly raised, and by 1891 Russian industry found itsel surrounded by a high wall of protection from foreign competi tion. In 1891 Germany tried to force a reduction in the Russia tariff by raising the duties on Russian grain. Russia replied i the following year with a slight reduction of duties on Frenc goods, and heavily increased those on imports from Germany On February 10, 1894, a commercial treaty, to last for ten years was concluded. German trade secured a favourable positio in the Russian market, which enabled it gradually to drive ou competitors and establish a complete domination that in th end cost Russia very dearly.

Protection imposed heavy burdens on the mass of the popula tion, but it enabled the manufacturers to draw large profits Russian and foreign capital began to pour into industry. Witte currency reforms[2] were intended to make the conditions o investment in Russia more attractive. The government con tracted large loans abroad and used the proceeds to financ industry. Private banks lent capital freely and thousands o factories were built.[3] The total value of goods produced in a branches of industry was more than doubled in ten years.

[1] Cf. p. 404.

[2] In 1894 the value of the paper rouble was fixed at two-thirds of a silve rouble; in 1897 the gold standard was adopted.

	1887.	1893.	1897.
Number of factories and works . . .	30,888	30,333	39,02
Number of factory workers	1,318,048	1,582,904	2,098,26
Value of goods produced (*in thousands of roubles*)	1,334,499	1,734,997	2,839,14

(Tugán-Baranóvsky, *op. cit.*, p. 342.)

y important changes took place in the cotton industry, in ch the number of mills and spindles doubled during this od. The machinery and technical equipment for this rmous expansion came chiefly from England. But the most arkable progress was that made in the coal and iron industries. e production of coal in the Donéts region, which was in o less than half of the 200 million poods mined in Russia, e than doubled during the eighties, and by the end of the tury it amounted to about 70 per cent. of a total production ver 1,000 million poods.[1] Much of this coal was used as on the railways, while the rest went to meet the needs of factories, including the new iron-works of the south. In 4 the Donéts coalfield was joined by railway with the rich -ore deposits of Krivói Rog.[2] The quantity of iron ore ed in south Russia rose from 5½ million poods in 1886 to million poods in 1900. Before 1887 there were only two ortant iron-works in the south,[3] but in the following ten rs fifteen more large undertakings and some dozens of smaller s sprang up. Foreign, and in particular British, capital ed a prominent part in the development of the iron industry he south, which quite overshadowed that of the Urals, up that time the greatest iron-producing centre in Russia. rmous quantities of iron and steel were used in the con- ction of railways,[4] which created new markets and stimulated

Production of coal in the Donéts basin :

1880	86,300,000 poods
1885	114,900,000 ,,
1890	192,300,000 ,,
1895	298,300,000 ,,
1900	691,500,000 ,,

e are about 62 poods in a ton.

On the borders of the provinces of Khérson and Ekaterinosláv.

The first of these was founded in 1870 by an Englishman, Hughes.

The railway boom of the nineties exceeded in intensity that of the

the economic life of the whole country. The geographi distribution of Russian industry changed completely. Ma industries were attracted to the south by the presence th of coal and iron, and the southern provinces were transform beyond recognition.

In the last ten years of the century Russia was passing throu an industrial revolution that finally committed her to capitalis with all its economic and social consequences. Enorm amounts of capital flowed into Russia from the older capitalis countries of the West. Money was plentiful, and private ba lent freely to industrial companies,[1] many of which w founded almost entirely on credit. Cheap capital favou speculation, and the process of inflation was further facilitat by the policy of the government, which helped new und takings financially and gave them large orders for their man factures. But the period of feverish expansion came to an e in 1899, when the demand for capital began to exceed t supply, and rates of interest increased considerably. Ba called in loans, and the market was flooded with shares. 1900 the results of over-production made themselves felt : t market was overstocked with manufactured goods of all kin and prices began to fall rapidly. Production had to be d down and large numbers of workmen were discharged. T crisis developed further in the following year and reached climax in 1902. Many firms were ruined and had to close do their factories. In 1903 the position improved, but producti

seventies. A large section of the Siberian line was built in that period. growth of the railway system is indicated by the following figures of length of line completed at different dates :

	Versts.		*Versts.*		*Versts.*
1861 . .	2,191	1888 . .	29,015	1898 . .	43,541
1870 . .	10,643	1891 . .	30,298	1899 . .	48,091
1879 . .	22,179	1897 . .	40,472	1905 . .	57,054

[1] Frequently on the security of shares.

eased only slightly. The market continued to be weak and al was scarce. The Japanese War and the events of 1905–6 ıer hindered recovery.

Home and Foreign Trade

rade grew very slowly in the first half of the century. Owing e lack of proper means of communication the country was up into a number of economic regions, each almost self-orting. In the absence of an organized system of credit centred in the fairs,[1] where all the processes of exchange carried on. In the ordinary life of the people trade d a negligible part, for most of them lived on their own ucts.

new epoch opened in the sixties. The emancipation of peasants, the construction of railways, the development of t, and the growth of industry led to an enormous expansion ade. Regions previously isolated came into contact and n to depend on each other. The growth of exchange welded country into one economic whole.

reign trade in the first half of the century, though steadily asing, was insignificant in amount. From the reign of ander II exports, especially of grain and other food-stuffs, actively encouraged. The grain-growing provinces were d up with the ports, and the manipulation of the railway rates inted at times to a premium on export. But the increase e export of grain[2] exceeded that in production, and there a marked decline in home consumption, especially among peasants. From 1877 imports were restricted by the im-ion of heavy customs duties. At the close of the century

[1] *ármarki*, e.g., at Nízhni Nóvgorod, at the junction of the Oká and the and Irbit, across the Urals.

[2] p. 452.

the trade balance was heavily in favour of Russia.[1] The gove
ment acquired a steadily increasing income from custo
duties[2] and accumulated an enormous gold reserve,[3] wh
was very considerably increased by annual free balances on
budget. The excess of revenue over expenditure amounted
1899 to no less than 226 million roubles,[4] while the total amo
derived from this source in the last ten years of the century
over 775 millions. Revenue increased much more rapidly t
expenditure. Interest on state debt accounted for one-fi
and the army and navy for more than a quarter of the wh
expenditure in 1898.

The economic and financial policy of the government in
period, closely associated with the name of Witte, produ
outwardly an appearance of prosperity, increased the credi
the Russian government abroad, and enormously strengthe
its position at home. But it imposed great burdens on the m
of the population, which through the customs duties and o
forms of indirect taxation provided the greater part of

[1]

	Exports	*Imports*	*Balanc*
	(*in millions of roubles*).		
1900	716·4	626·3	90·1
1901	761·5	593·4	168·1
1902	860·3	599·1	261·2
1903	1,001·1	681·6	319·5

[2] The revenue from this source, about 55½ millions in the seve
amounted to 218½ million roubles in 1904. From 1877 customs dues
paid in gold.

[3] Gold reserve in 1886, 56 million roubles; 1893, 236 million rou
1900, 842 million roubles.

[4]

	1889	1899	*Increase.*
	(*in millions of roubles*).		
Revenue	914·5	1,584·9	73 per cent.
Expenditure	868·8	1,358·2	56 ,,
Balance	45·7	226·7	

revenue. Industry escaped with very light taxation, while government lavished on it large sums of public money n in many cases were totally lost. Government orders were to Russian firms at prices two or three times higher than quoted by foreign contractors, and in this way the prices any kinds of manufactured goods, already increased by the ctive tariff, were artificially forced up still higher. The debt increased by 1,000 million roubles in ten years. Out e proceeds of foreign loans enormous sums were spent on onstruction of railways and the purchase of private lines. he state railways could rarely be made to pay, while the ury was frequently called upon to provide the dividends it guaranteed to private companies.

The Work of the Zémstvos

ucation and other cultural objects were entirely neglected he State, and the people looked more and more to the tvos for the satisfaction of their needs. The famine of 1891 ned the social conscience of the educated classes. Pro- ve forces rallied to public work in the zémstvos. Under influences their methods and objects became more demo- c. They got into closer touch with the people. Social ges of first-rate importance, set up by the emancipation, working themselves out. The gentry were rapidly losing conomic basis of a ruling class. The money they received he land allotted to the peasants in 1861 went to liquidate contracted with the government in the first half of the ury. After the emancipation the gentry lost the monopoly nd-owning and as cultivators of the land had to face com- ion for the first time. Most of them had neither capital xperience enough to be able to exploit their estates on ess lines. By the end of 1903 almost one-half of the private

land in Russia (i. e. excluding peasant land) was mortgag
Many of the gentry sold their estates, cut themselves off fr
the country, and joined the professional or commercial a
industrial classes. Their special privileges disappeared one
one. From 1874 they were no longer exempt from milit
service,[1] and immunity from personal taxes was no advanta
when the peasants were relieved of the poll-tax[2] and the St
began to draw the larger part of its revenue from indirect ta
tion. In the eighties the government tried to bolster up t
gentry, gave them financial assistance through the Gen
Land Bank, and handed the zémstvos over to them (189
But except for the liberal group, they took little interest in lo
affairs, and the work of the zémstvos came to be directed
the progressive councillors, who joined forces with the hir
specialists—doctors, teachers, engineers, statisticians, veterin
surgeons, and agricultural experts—the so-called 'thi
element', drawn from the educated classes, and as a rule ve
radical in political opinion.

From the beginning of the nineties rapid progress was ma
with the provision of schools and medical help, and the econ
mic needs of the peasants were attended to. The organizati
of the medical service was taken in hand. The number
doctors, medical outposts,[3] and hospitals increased, and the
was a marked improvement in the quality of the attenti
given. Provision was made for the treatment of the insan
and measures were taken to combat and prevent epidemi

[1] Cf. p. 438. [2] Cf. p. 476.

[3] These outposts were situated in the larger villages, and usually to
the form of small hospitals, with several beds for in-patients, and a d
pensary for out-patients. They were managed either by doctors, w
looked after all the peasants in a given area, or by assistant-doct
(*féldsher*); in the latter case they were visited regularly by a fully quali
doctor.

doctors won the confidence of the peasants by their oted service. Similar progress was made with elementary cation. Many of the zémstvos mapped out their areas drew up programmes of school construction, while the dard of the instruction provided in the schools was raised. raries and bookshops were opened and lectures organized the peasants. The zémstvos provided expert advice on cultivation of the land, started experimental stations and cultural schools, organized the sale of agricultural imple- ts and seeds, investigated soil and climatic conditions, and ouraged home industries as an auxiliary to agriculture. staff of experts engaged in this work increased from 29 in o to 601 in 1908. By 1904 the turnover in zémstvo dépôts the sale of agricultural implements and of the products of ie industries amounted to over seven million roubles. The ices of veterinary experts were secured for the peasants, and zémstvos founded laboratories for the study of the numerous lemic diseases to which horses and cattle are subject in sia. Insurance of cattle against death from disease was ely developed, and measures were taken for the prevention res. The condition of the roads also attracted attention. n all this important work the provincial zémstvos took the . They gave financial support to progressive district stvos and tried to co-ordinate all their activity. The most rprising of all was the Moscow Provincial Zémstvo, headed Dmítry Shipóv, who first formulated the normal relations ween provincial and district authorities.

Zémstvo Workers and the Reform Movement to 1903

xpenditure increased rapidly in the nineties, and still more he early years of the present century. By the end of the first y years of their existence the zémstvos were spending very

large sums of money on objects that the government neglected They had won the confidence of the people and the sympath of the educated classes. Their work flourished and their sphe of usefulness extended, despite the law of 1890, the object which was to curb and restrain them. The government bega to take severer measures, but every attack only increased th solidarity of the zémstvo workers and public sympathy for ther The temper of the zémstvo men in the early nineties may b judged from their addresses to Nicholas II on his accessio (1894). The zémstvo of Tver hoped that 'the voice of th people's need would be heard from the heights of the throne that the laws would be unswervingly observed 'alike by th people and by those in authority, since law represents the wi of the monarch and should stand higher than the casual view of individual representatives of authority'. Other zémstvo asked for unity between *tsar* and people. There was n mention of a constitution. The addresses were perfectly loya and much more moderate in tone than those of 1880.[2] None th less, the emperor expressed his 'extreme astonishment and di satisfaction' at the 'tactless sally' of the Tver zémstvo, and i a general reply to the addresses made the following uncompro mising declaration: 'It has come to my knowledge that of la there have been heard the voices of people lured by *senseles dreams* of representatives of the zémstvos sharing in the conduc of internal affairs. Let it be known to all that I, devoting all m

[1] *Expenditure on (in roubles)*:

	1871.	1890.	1900.	1911.
Elementary education	1,600,000	7,225,800	15,970,900	42,882,00
Medical help	2,229,200	10,908,500	24,601,900	48,103,00
Economic and veterinary work	54,300	30,212,700	4,291,500	11,347,00
Other objects	17,625,500		44,277,700	69,355,00
Total	21,509,000	48,347,000	89,142,000	171,687,00

[2] Cf. p. 467.

ength to the pursuit of the good of my people, will maintain principle of autocracy as firmly and steadfastly as did my e father.' Most of the zémstvo men wanted only to be left ne, and allowed to devote themselves to public work without nstant interference from outside, to choose their own officials, nage their own schools, and meet together as they thought

From the beginning they had tried to discuss practical tters with their fellow workers in other provinces, to share ir experiences, and formulate plans for further development. e tendency to unite gained in strength as the practical rk of the zémstvos developed, but the government always isted that, by the terms of the law, each zémstvo should ncern itself only with its own affairs. Zémstvo men neverthe- found several opportunities of meeting in private in the eties, though as time went on the practical side of their work upied their attention less than the general position of the nstvo and the attitude taken up by the government towards

By the end of the century there was a very clearly defined position movement amongst zémstvo workers, which grew ler and stronger every year. The struggle between them and government was the outward expression of a conflict between o fundamental principles, self-government and autocracy, nciples that could not stand side by side in the same political tem. When Goremýkin (Minister of the Interior, 1895–9) posed to apply the Zémstvo Law (in a modified form) to tain of the western provinces, Witte wrote a memorandum [1] which he pointed out that, since local self-government was nd to lead ultimately to constitutionalism, there were only o courses open to the government: either it would have to ognize self-government as a 'natural and healthy growth' inging from the seed sown in 1864, or, if constitutionalism

[1] *Autocracy and the Zémstvo*, which was later used by the liberals to fortify r case for reform.

was 'the greatest falsehood of the age', it would decline to extend the zémstvo system as Goremýkin proposed to do. On this point Goremýkin fell,[1] and from 1899 to 1904, under his successors Sipyágin and Pléhve, the campaign against the zémstvo was carried on with redoubled energy. Petitions presented by the zémstvos on matters closely connected with their work were either rejected or totally ignored. Zémstvo men were refused permission to join together. The zémstvos were forbidden to increase the rates on real property by more than three per cent. each year[2] (June 24, 1900), and were deprived of the right of organizing famine relief, in which they had been uniformly successful.

A new campaign was undertaken against the zémstvo schools, and a scheme drawn up in 1901, had it been put into effect, would have established a purely bureaucratic control of elementary education in town and country. The government tried to prevent the zémstvos from publishing popular literature for the use of schools and country reading-rooms. In 1902 the right to collect statistical material in rural districts was limited. Statistical inquiries were prohibited altogether in eighteen provinces, and many of the officials were dismissed, on the pretext that they were carrying on a propaganda of revolutionary ideas amongst the peasants. Provincial governors had the right of protesting against all appointments of paid zémstvo workers, and would not allow any one who was not politically 'sound' to be employed. The government constantly refused to ratify the elections of presidents and members of the executive boards,

[1] Owing to the complete inefficiency of the local administrative system in the western provinces, it was reorganized in 1903, but on bureaucratic principles.

[2] This law was not always enforced, even in the years immediately following its publication, but it gave the administration unlimited opportunities for restraining the more forward zémstvos.

nd many of the most active workers suffered in this way for
eir progressive views. Distrust of public initiative was
xpressed in two laws dealing with sanitary and veterinary
ork (1902 and 1903), which were so universally disapproved
at they could not be put in force. Resolutions passed by
mstvo councils were held up by the governors and frequently
toed by the special committees set up in 1890.[1]

Meantime the opposition movement in zémstvo circles
ew stronger, and became more definitely political. Even the
oderate elements, who were hardly prepared to enter on an
pen struggle for political reform, supported the liberal group
its defence of the zémstvo. In 1902 a congress of zémstvo
en, led by Shipóv, passed resolutions dealing with such general
uestions as the rights of the peasants, the hindrances to the
velopment of education, the restrictions on the zémstvos, the
nfairness of the electoral system, the need of a free press,
nd the financial policy of the government.[2] In April 1903
nother congress asked that all laws dealing with local affairs
ould be submitted to the zémstvos for criticism, and rejected
only two votes the suggestion that elected deputies of the
mstvos should share in the drafting of such legislation. Local
mmittees set up by Witte to inquire into the condition of
riculture, on which the zémstvos were represented, talked
out general subjects, though Pléhve tried to stop them. The
eat majority of the committees were openly hostile to the
vernment and its policy, and some of the proposals they put
rward were very advanced. Zémstvo councils also, in many
aces, raised political questions, though offenders were punished
ith imprisonment and exile.

[1] Cf. p. 474.

[2] The congress condemned in particular the imposition of excessive
rdens on the peasants, the unnecessarily large free balance in the budgets,
d the heavy taxation of necessaries.

The zémstvo movement continued to spread in 1903, but Shipóv had great difficulty in maintaining unity. The most advanced elements were in touch with the opposition groups in the professional and educated classes. In 1902 the foundation of a new liberal movement was laid with the publication (abroad) of *Liberation*,[1] a journal which was intended to unite all who were fighting for political reform. A series of conferences that took place between the liberals in the zémstvo and outside of it led to the formation in January 1904 of a 'Union of Liberation',[2] which declared its aim to be the political emancipation of Russia, through the abolition of autocracy and the establishment of a democratic constitutional régime.

Revolutionary Movements

The economic and political conditions of the period favoured the revival of the revolutionary movement, and diverted it into new channels. The revolutionaries of the seventies had relied on the peasants. In the nineties they turned to the rapidly-growing class of factory workers, and found that the struggle between labour and capital offered a wide field for the pursuit of their objects.[3] Marxist socialism, with its synthesis of political and economic aims, supplied them with a set of theories that fitted, or could be made to fit, the new situation. They determined to organize the labour movement and use it, as they had planned to use the peasants, as a lever for the overthrow of the

[1] *Osvobozhdénie*, edited by Peter Struve, and published first at Stuttgart, later at Paris.

[2] *Soyúz osvobozhdénia.*

[3] The number of factory workers increased from 1¼ to 2⅓ millions in thirteen years (1887–1900). Up to the eighties most of them were peasants who left the country temporarily in order to supplement the income they derived from the land: later they became a real industrial proletariate, cut off entirely from the country and depending solely on industry.

xisting political order. The workmen were at first no more esponsive to political propaganda than the peasants had been. The economic side of the Marxist theories appealed to them, ut they wanted leadership in their fight for better material onditions.[1] The Social Democrats were thus led away into economism', and their political aims retreated into the back-round. They took advantage of the labour unrest that came o a head in 1895–6, and helped to organize strikes which so larmed the government that it published a law restricting ours of labour to 11½ for day and 10 for night work (1897). At the same time the government saw that labour movements vere inevitable, and determined to encourage the workers to nite for the improvement of their economic position, hoping y this means to divert their attention from politics and cut the round from under the feet of the Social Democrats.[2] There vas thus a prospect that the mass movement from which the evolutionaries hoped so much would turn towards trade nionism, and the Social Democratic Party,[3] founded in 1898, nade no headway.

But 'economism' was always opposed by the more active lements amongst the Social Democrats. In 1900 a bitter truggle began between the 'economists' and those who vanted to concentrate on the political aims of Social Democracy. External conditions favoured the latter. The labour movement

[1] The factory legislation of the eighties (cf. p. 479), though it led to important improvements, had left many questions unsettled. Sanitary and housing conditions remained bad. Employers were not compelled to protect workers against dangerous machinery, and medical attention was provided in only 40 per cent. of the factories. But the chief grievances of the workers were long hours (generally more than twelve per day) and low wages (the average for men was less than 200 roubles a year), and these questions caused most of the strikes in this period.

[2] Hence the movements associated with the names of Zubátov and Gapón.

[3] *Sotsial-demokratícheskaya pártia.*

secretly promoted by the government attracted large numbers of workmen, but its origin soon became known and the 'economic' tendency was seriously discredited. The workmen, on the other hand, were taking great interest in the growing revolutionary movement among the students, and soon began to join them in open political demonstrations. By 1902 the political tendency had triumphed over 'economism'.

The Social Democrats now went to the other extreme, and establishing a dictatorship of the labour movement, hurried it forward along the political path at an unnatural pace, completely neglecting the economic struggle caused by the clash between the interests of labour and capital, which might have been taken as the starting-point for a real socialist movement. They were led away by the expectation of a sudden political upheaval, and tried to adapt the mass movement to their own purposes. They organized political demonstrations all over the country. In the great strike that took place in south Russia in 1903 political demands were put forward, while the treatment meted out to the strikers roused among the workers increasing resentment against the government.[1]

The two tendencies, extreme and moderate, were clearly defined at a party conference held in Brussels in July 1903,[2] at which the extremists, though a minority in the movement as a whole, were more strongly represented than their opponents. From this accident of representation the two wings of the Social Democratic party have ever since been known as the 'majority' and the 'minority'. The moderate 'minority',[3] representing orthodox Marxism, believed in peaceful methods

[1] Demonstrations were dispersed by Cossacks, and troops frequently fired on crowds of strikers.

[2] This conference had its first sittings at Brussels, and later moved to London.

[3] *Menshéviki* (cf. *menshinstvó* = minority).

d were not unwilling to work with other parties or even to ake use of parliamentary institutions for the pursuit of their ns. The revolutionary 'majority',[1] led by Lénin, wanted overthrow the existing system at once, before the reform ovement amongst the 'bourgeois' elements could attain such neasure of success as would satisfy the majority of the people d delay indefinitely the triumph of the proletariate.

Social Democracy was a purely class creed, but the Social evolutionaries worked on a much broader basis. They were e direct successors of the 'Will of the People',[2] and clung to e idea that the revolution was to be brought about by the ople as a whole, and not by any particular class.[3] They vided the socialist forces into three groups—the educated ss, the town proletariate, and the peasants, whom they still unted as socialists.[4] The mass movement of the peasants only eded to have its ideals and aims clearly formulated, and the ucated class were to serve as leaders. The proletariate of the wns was too small a body to act alone, but it might serve as strong vanguard. The Social Revolutionaries revived the adition of terrorism, which the Social Democrats deprecated. ney regarded terrorism as a useful auxiliary weapon, and lieved that isolated protests would stimulate the mass move-ent.[5] The Social Revolutionary Party attracted many of the

[1] *Bolsheviki* (cf. *bolshinstvó* = majority).

[2] Cf. p. 466.

[3] There was another important distinction between the two socialist dencies which is of special interest at the present moment: the Social mocrats stood for the idea of an international proletariate, while the ial Revolutionaries were purely national in their aims.

[4] The Social Democrats considered the peasants to be merely 'bourgeois', l evolved the theory that they would have to pass through the stage of italism and then become 'proletarized' before they could become ialists.

[5] The chief terrorist acts of this period were the work of Social Revolu-naries, e. g. the assassinations of Sipyágin (1902) and Pléhve (1904).

workmen, but it was strongest in the younger generation of th educated class, amongst whom the wave of opposition wa rapidly rising. It represented the general mood of protest, an was in close touch with the 'Liberators', into whose rank many of its followers passed. From 1902, however, the Socia Revolutionaries began to pay more attention to the peasant Spontaneous disorders that broke out in the provinces o Poltáva and Khárkov seemed to confirm their hope of an activ socialist movement in the country. They founded an 'Agraria League' to propagate the idea of the nationalization of land

Poland from 1863

After the rebellion of 1863 the Russian government tried t win over the Polish peasants as allies against the gentry an the educated class, the leaders of the national movemen For this purpose it introduced a great scheme of agraria reforms (1865). The peasants, who had been made personall free under Napoleon, became the owners of the land whic up to that time they had only rented. The dispossessed pro prietors were indemnified at the expense of the revenues o Poland. Village communes, from which gentry and pries were excluded, were set up. This policy, however, was soo abandoned in favour of more active measures for the assimila tion of Poland with the rest of the empire. Every effort wa made to stamp out Polish nationality. The Roman Catholi Church was deprived of its revenues and the parish pries became salaried state officials. Most of the monasteries wer suppressed. Their lands were confiscated and sold to Russian The use of the Russian language became obligatory in offici transactions, in universities and secondary schools, whil Polish was forbidden in newspapers and even in private con versation. Poles were excluded from government posts i their own country. In 1866 Poland was divided into te

vinces (*gubérniya*) and incorporated into the empire. In
4 the viceroyalty was abolished, and two years later the
sian judicial system was introduced. Dark as was the
tical horizon, the last thirty years of the nineteenth century
e a period of great social and economic progress. The
rian reforms of the sixties created a class of small peasant
ners, and led to a considerable advance in agriculture. Many
ditions favoured the development of manufacturing in-
try. Poland possessed important coalfields and a rapidly
easing population. The removal of the customs barrier
ned up to Polish trade vast markets in Russia and the East,
brought Polish industry under the protection of the
sian tariff. Warsaw became the third city of the Empire,
its population quadrupled in forty years. Lodz and other
ustrial centres grew even more rapidly. The development
rade and industry brought about the formation of a middle
and a large industrial proletariate. These changes had
mportant effect on the political outlook of Poland. There
a reaction against the narrow ideals of the aristocratic
onal leaders of the preceding period. The middle class
ed aside from politics, and adopted a broad national
gramme based on the development of all the spiritual and
erial forces of the Polish people. The Polish Socialist
y, founded in 1893, aimed at separation from Russia and
creation of a democratic republic, but the attitude of
majority of the Poles towards Russia changed completely.
y saw that separation would mean the loss of all the
nomic advantages which the union brought to Poland,
ntages which were essential for the creation of a strong
onal centre which should ultimately attract to itself all
scattered fragments of the Polish people. The immediate
of Polish policy thus came to be autonomy within the
sian Empire.

Finland

The position of Finland was defined at the time of i annexation in 1809.[1] Alexander I promised to respect t Finnish constitution [2] and the religion, laws, and liberties the people. This promise was renewed by his successors, a though the presence of a free, autonomous people within t empire was always regarded by extreme reactionaries as insult to the principle of autocracy, the liberties of Finla remained unimpaired through the greater part of the centur The first blows were struck in the early nineties. A n criminal code that had been approved by the Diet was su pended and referred to a commission in the Russian Minist of Justice. Finns were replaced by Russians in the offices the governor-general at Helsingfors and of the Secretary State at Petersburg, while instructions were issued that in t appointment of all Finnish officials preference should be giv to those having a knowledge of the Russian language. At t same time the Finnish press was subjected to a strict censo ship. In the first years of the reign of Nicholas II Finla enjoyed a short respite, but the appointment of Bóbrikov governor-general in August 1898 marked the beginning a new Russian offensive movement. The manifesto of Fe ruary 15, 1899, practically abolished the Finnish constit tion, by introducing important changes in the legislative fun tions of the Diet and reducing it to the position of a mere consultative body. In August 1899 Pléhve was appoint

[1] Cf. pp. 361–2.

[2] The constitution provided for a Senate, or national executive coun nominated by the grand duke, which carried on the actual government the country, and a Diet, elected on a very limited franchise by the fo estates (nobles, clergy, burghers, and peasants). Senate and Diet co municated with the grand duke through the Secretary of State for Finland

etary of State for Finland, though under the constitution a Finnish citizen could hold this post. A few months (June 1900) the use of Russian as the official language in nd was prescribed. In 1901 a new military law approxi-d the conditions of military service to those that obtained ussia, and abolished the hitherto independent Finnish r.. In 1902 all government posts were thrown open to ians, and the governor-general was empowered to dismiss inistrative and judicial officials. The culminating point is policy was reached in 1903, when Bóbrikov, invested dictatorial authority, proceeded to introduce in Finland hose measures of repression, such as domiciliary searches, rrary arrests and imprisonments, which were already liar in Russia. The people of Finland did not suffer e attacks on their freedom without opposition. Their ests at first took the form of popular petitions, which were eeded, and deputations to the grand duke, which were even received. When these forms of protest failed, they rted to boycott and passive resistance. There were no outbreaks or disorders, which would only have led to ner severities on the part of the Russian authorities, but the osition movement developed underground, and in touch the corresponding movements in Russia.

Western Siberia

he conquest of Siberia began in the last years of the enth century. Ermák's enterprise[1] showed the way, in 1585–6 the first Russian settlements appeared—Tyumén, he river Turá, and Tobólsk, at the junction of the rivers ól and Irtýsh. These two towns served as bases for farther nce, which at first was directed north and east. The n of the river Turá was secured in 1592–3 by the founda-

[1] Cf. p. 130. Ermák and his followers perished in 1584.

tion of Pelým. Farther north Russian posts were establish at Berëzov (1594) and Obdórsk (1595), on the lower reach of the Ob. Along the Ob, above the mouth of the Irtýs settlements arose at Surgút (1592), Narým (1595), and Kéts Ostróg[1] (1597). Early in the seventeenth century the Russia crossed to the Eniséi, where the towns of Eniséisk and Kra noyársk were founded. The tributaries of the Eniséi—t lower Tungúzka and the Angará or upper Tungúzka—l to the Léna. By 1632 the mouth of that river had be reached, and a fortified post established on its middle cours at Yakútsk. Within a few years the rivers of the north-eas were explored, and in 1639 the first Russian settlemen appeared on the Sea of Okhótsk.

The Russians crossed the Urals in order to gain control the fur-bearing country of northern Siberia, which had attracte them from very early times.[3] Bands of Cossack adventurer inspired by dreams of rich booty, sailed along the great river imposing tribute on the scattered native tribes, and meetin with little resistance in their headlong advance, which cou not stop until it had reached the natural limits of the countr The territory occupied by the Russians was almost useless f permanent settlement or colonization, and the fertile stepp region to the south hardly interested them in this perio For a long time to come they might have confined the attention to the north, but for the fact that their positio was constantly threatened by the presence of semi-barbaro nomadic tribes on their borders. When they first started the movement towards the south they could not have foresee that it would involve them in a struggle that was to last f nearly three centuries, and lead them on to the conquest Central Asia.

[1] Near the mouth of the river Ket, a tributary of the Ob.

[2] The rivers Yána, Indigírka, and Kolymá.

[3] Cf. pp. 47-9.

he first step was taken in 1594, when a forepost was estab-
ed at Tára, on the Irtýsh, about 250 miles above Tobólsk.
next important move was made farther east by the
ıdation of Tomsk (1604) and Kuznétsk (1618), both on the
r Tom, a tributary of the Ob. In the thirties of the
eenth century a number of fortified places were built
g the rivers Toból, Vagái, and Ishím,[1] and the Russian
in this direction was gradually pushed forward until by
middle of the eighteenth century it ran almost due west
ı Omsk to the river Toból, and then south-west to Oren-
g. Under Peter the Great the line east of Omsk was
ınced as far as the Irtýsh. Meantime progress had been
e along the upper Ob, and a line of settlements joined that
r with the Irtýsh at Ust-Kamenogórsk, 100 miles above
ipalátinsk. The Russian frontier at this point was
rminous with the present southern boundaries of the
vinces of Orenbúrg, Tobólsk, and Tomsk, and the whole
vestern Siberia was thus brought under Russian rule.

rom the very beginning of the forward movement the
scow government realized that if the occupied territory
to be held permanently it would have to be populated.
oughout the seventeenth century a stream of 'official'
nists[2] crossed the Urals, until Siberia was, though not
led, at any rate made independent of Russia for its food
olies. When that point had been reached official interest
olonization declined, and for a century and a half Siberia
regarded merely as a place to which all dangerous or
esirable elements of the population might be removed.[3]

[1] The rivers Vagái and Ishím flow north and join the Ob above
lsk.

[2] Official colonists were recruited by two methods, 'invitation' (*pribór*),
transfer', or forced removal (*perevód*).

[3] Peter the Great exiled the rebellious *stréltsy* (cf. p. 221) and also Swedish

Parallel with the 'official' colonizing movement, 'free emigration went on unceasingly. Many thousands of peasant in order to escape from the burdens of serfdom, or, in the ca of free peasants, from over-taxation and the oppressive recrui ing system, crossed over to Siberia and settled down ther in spite of measures taken to prevent them. By the beginnir of the nineteenth century this movement had grown to suc dimensions that some measures had to be taken to regulate it though not until the last quarter of the century was th importance of Siberia, as an outlet for the surplus populatio of European Russia, fully realized. After 1861 the peasan were almost as closely bound to the land as they had bee before,[2] for it was feared that if they were allowed comple liberty of movement the landowners would be left witho agricultural labourers. But no artificial restrictions could che the perfectly natural movement to new lands, for the nee for expansion became more and more pronounced as th population increased. In the eighties emigrants were num bered in tens of thousands, and the conditions under whic permission to emigrate could be received had to be mad easier. In 1889 some attempt was made to regulate the numb of emigrants in accordance with the amount of surveyed lan

prisoners of war. During the eighteenth century new categories of exi were constantly being created, e. g. escaped or wandering serfs whom lan owners refused to take back on to their estates (1729); factory worke who drank to excess or played cards or dice (1739). In 1754 exile to Sibe replaced the death penalty as a punishment for certain offences. Fro 1760 landowners were allowed to exile unruly serfs, and later the peasa communes received the right to send undesirable members to Siberia. 1754, 150 families of Zaporógian Cossacks, and under Catherine II ma 'Old Believers' (*raskólniki*), were exiled.

[1] In 1806, 1822, and 1837 steps were taken to help 'state' peasan who suffered from lack of land, to emigrate.

[2] Cf. p. 429.

t was available. At the same time licensed settlers were mpted from taxation for a number of years, and received :erial help for the journey and in their new homes. Un-nsed settlers were threatened with repatriation, but they tinued to form no less than half of the annual contingent :migrants. After the famine of 1891 the wave of emigra-ı mounted higher and higher, and a more active and pro-ssive policy became necessary. In 1896 a special Emigration partment was created under the Minister of the Interior. asures were taken to provide holdings for settlers, and to ourage peasant communes to send delegates (*khodoki*) to ose land and investigate possibilities of settlement before y decided to move.[1]

The Conquest of Central Asia

y the middle of the eighteenth century Russia had acquired whole of western Siberia. To the south lay a broad belt arren steppe country, inhabited by nomade Kirghíz tribes, o constantly raided Russian territory and attacked caravans their way to Bukhára and Khíva. The establishment of sian authority in the Kirghíz steppes thus became neces-as a measure of defence. The process of penetration and quest occupied a whole century, but one by one the nomade es were brought under control, and the frontier gradually anced until it rested on the Caspian, the Aral Sea, and e Balkhásh. Having moved forward so far, however, the sians once more found themselves unable to stop; the estab-ment of an advanced post at the mouth of the Syr-Dariá artes) in 1847, and the occupation of the Semiréchie ven Rivers) region (south of Lake Balkhásh, where the ns of Kopál (1847) and Vérny (1854) were founded), though

[1] Most of the earlier colonists had migrated quite independently, and red great privations both on the journey and in Siberia.

intended to consolidate the Russian hold on the Kirghíz stepp proved the first stages in the conquest of Turkestán.

Trade relations between Russia and Central Asia had existe from very early times. They were interrupted in the Midd Ages, but resumed after the fall of the Tartar Empire. In th seventeenth century the Moscow government sent sever missions to investigate conditions in Central Asia and explo the routes to India. But the establishment of regular trad relations with the East was hindered by the disorder tha prevailed in Central Asia and in the steppe country. Pet the Great had the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea surveye and sent a military expedition to Khiva in 1717 to open u a road to India, but it met with disaster. Further progre in this direction was impossible until order was established the steppe. The Kirghíz were supported and encouraged their resistance by the khanates to the south. In 183 a fresh expedition was sent to Khiva, but, like that of 171 it ended in disaster. Relations with Khiva were not improve by the settlement of the Russians at the mouth of the Sy Dariá in 1847. Nomade tribes nominally subject to Khi and Kokánd attacked the Russian line, and once more th Russians began to move forward. In 1853 they captured th Kokándian stronghold of Ak-Mechét (about 275 miles up th Syr-Dariá), which they renamed Peróvsk ; a line of forts w built between this point and the mouth of the river. Eigh years later they advanced as far as Dzhulék, and in 1864 the seized the town of Turkestán. Meanwhile a column advancin from the Semiréchie region had taken Tokmák, Pishnék, an Aúlie-Ata. By the capture of Chimként in 1864 the two lin of advance were joined up. Tashként fell in the followin year, and Khodzhént in 1866. These conquests brough Russia into conflict with Bukhára. The Emir's army w twice defeated in 1866 and the town of Dzhizák occupie

o years later, after capturing Samarkánd (the capital of nerlane's empire), the Russians began to advance on hára, but the Emir made peace (June 1868), ceding the er half of the valley of the river Zarafshán, and becoming ssal of Russia. Khiva, surrounded by deserts and feeling from attack, continued to incite the Kirghíz and Turkoman es to attack Russian territory. In 1873 five separate mns were directed against it. After suffering great hard- s from heat and lack of water, four of them achieved their ct, and in August 1873 Khiva at last submitted to the sians. In 1875 trouble arose in the east, and operations e renewed against Kokánd. The towns of Kokánd, nangán, and Andizhán were occupied, and the whole of khanate of Kokánd was joined to Russia as the province ergána. The final stage in the conquest of Central Asia the subjection of the Turkoman tribes who lived between Amú-Dariá (Oxus) and the Caspian Sea. Some of them mitted to Russia after the fall of Khiva, but the Tekke komans of the oasis of Akhál remained hostile. Operations nst them began in the spring of 1879 with the capture of ýl-Arvát. In 1881 Skóbelev stormed the stronghold of k-Tepe, seized Askhabád, and forced the Tekkes to submit. ee years later the tribes of the oasis of Merv voluntarily t over to Russia.

ussian statesmen claimed that the advance of Russia in tral Asia was in the interests of civilization. The establish- ıt of a strong authority over the warring and fanatical es and minor states of this region made possible, at any , the peaceful development of its rich natural resources. ge sums of money were spent on irrigation, and hundreds square miles of desert were brought under cultivation. sian trade and industry found in Turkestan a wide market manufactured goods and valuable supplies of cotton and

other raw materials. Economic development was hastened
the construction of railways. The Trans-Caspian line w
begun in 1880, in order to provide transport for the expediti
sent against the Tekke Turkomans. Starting from Mikháilov
on an inlet of the Caspian Sea, it reached Kizýl-Arvát
September 1881. After the submission of Merv, when rel
tions with Great Britain became strained, it was continu
through Askhabád and Merv to the Amú-Dariá (Decemb
1886), and thence by way of Bukhára to Samarkánd (1888
In 1897–8 a branch was built from Merv to Kushk, on th
frontier of Afghanistan. The line was carried to Tashké
in 1899, with a branch to Kokánd, Namangán, and Andizhá
The length of the main line from Krasnovódsk, which becam
the western terminus in 1896, to Tashként is 1,748 vers
(about 1,200 miles), and that of the whole Central Asiat
system south of Tashként 2,370 versts (1,600 miles).[1] I
1909, 3,000,000 passengers and 7,000,000 tons of goods we
carried.[2] The importance of the Trans-Caspian railway
increased enormously after the construction of the Orenbúrg
Tashként line (1905), which joined them up to those of Euro
pean Russia.[3]

The development of the railway system, though it ha
proved an important economic factor, was undertaken in th
first place on strategical grounds, to facilitate the defence o
Central Asia and enable Russia, in case of need, to strike a
India. The possibility of an attack on India from this quarte
made the question of the north-western frontier a matter o
vital interest for Great Britain. In the early years of th

[1] The total cost of construction was nearly 80,000,000 roubles.

[2] In 1899, 443,000 passengers and 330,000 tons of goods.

[3] A line now in course of construction will unite Tashként, via Aúlie-At
Vérny, and the Semiréchie region, with Semipalátinsk, and continue dow
the Irtýsh as far as Omsk, through which the Siberian line passes.

eteenth century a French invasion through Persia seemed be imminent. From the thirties, however, Russia appeared the scene, and through Russian intrigue Great Britain was olved in the Afghan War of 1838–42. In 1844 Nicholas I, irous of coming to an understanding with Great Britain the affairs of the Near East, offered to refrain from any vement against the khanates of Central Asia, which were be left as a neutral zone between the possessions of Russia l Great Britain. Twenty years later Gorchakóv (Foreign nister) declared that Russia's policy was not aggressive, that was compelled by the presence of semi-barbarous predatory ɔes and states on her borders to push on until she came o touch with the territory of another civilized state, and justice of this claim was admitted by many British states- n. In 1873 Gorchakóv announced that Russia had no ention of occupying Khiva, and a delimitation of 'spheres interest' was arrived at. Reassuring declarations and agree- nts notwithstanding, Russia continued to approach the ɔuntain barrier of north-west India. There is reason to ieve that some of her conquests (Tashként and Samarkánd) re made without the consent of the central government, l even against the emperor's wishes. There was undoubtedly 'forward' military party, and plans for the invasion of dia were formulated.[1] Although the conquest of India s never seriously considered in responsible circles, the vernment was ready to embarrass the British whenever an portunity occurred, in return for their hostility to Russia, ɔecially in the Balkans. This policy was applied with con- cuous success in 1878, when relations between the two wers were strained almost to breaking point by Disraeli's erference in the conflict between Russia and Turkey.[2] On ne 13, the day on which the Congress of Berlin met, a Russian

[1] e. g. by General Skóbelev. [2] Cf. pp. 461–3.

diplomatic and military mission set out for Kabul. T
Amir, Sher Ali, alienated by the attempts of the British
interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan and by their repeat
refusal to conclude an alliance except on terms that he cou
not accept, was persuaded to place himself under the pr
tection of Russia. The direct consequence of Russia's inte
ference in this quarter was the Afghan War of 1878–81. Wh
peace was made, the new Amir, Abdur-Rahman, agreed
allow his relations with other states to be controlled by t
British government. In return he received a subsidy and
guarantee of support against aggression on the part of a
other Power. After the fall of Merv in 1884 fresh complic
tions arose between Great Britain and Russia over the definiti
of the frontier between Russian territory and Afghanista
The Afghans claimed and occupied in force the oasis of Penjde
but they were attacked and driven out by Russian troo
(March 1885). This incident seemed likely to lead to a ru
ture between Great Britain and Russia. Parliament vot
£11,000,000 for war purposes. The reserves were called o
and other preparations made. But the storm passed ove
and a settlement was arrived at by peaceful methods. A joi
Anglo-Russian commission was appointed, and in 1887 a
agreement with regard to the north-western frontier
Afghanistan was concluded. Farther east, in the Pam
region, the boundary was fixed by another joint commissi
in 1895 : a narrow strip of Afghan territory was interpos
between the Russian frontier and the Hindu Kush, whi
Great Britain regarded as the natural boundary of India.
1907 Russia agreed to regard Afghanistan as outside h
sphere of influence and to communicate with the Amir on
through the British government. At the same time an impo
tant agreement was reached with regard to British and Russi
interests in Persia.

6

Alexander III and Nicholas II (continued)

Foreign Affairs after 1878 : *the Dual Alliance*

No great changes took place immediately after the crisis 1875–8, but the complete re-orientation of Russian foreign icy became inevitable. Encouraged by Bismarck, Austria s seeking compensation in the Balkans for her territorial ses in Italy and her political exclusion from Germany ;[1] and interests clashed too decisively with those of Russia to mit of reconciliation. Russia had been drifting away from rmany since 1875. During the Eastern crisis German ndship proved 'too platonic' for Russian patriots, who ributed the humiliation of their country at the Congress of rlin to Bismarck's 'ingratitude' and 'treachery'. Bitter acks on Germany appeared in the Russian press, and Alexan- II expressed his resentment at Bismarck's conduct in a long ter to the Emperor William I. A large army was mobilized the western frontier, threatening both Germany and Austria. ced by a hostile Russia, these two Powers drew closer together, d on October 7, 1879, entered into a defensive alliance, agree- (1) to assist each other with all their military resources if her of them should be attacked by Russia, and (2) to observe nevolent neutrality in case of an attack by any other Power, less Russia intervened. This compact was clearly more ourable to Austria than to Germany, for Austria was eatened only by Russia, while Germany's chief danger was m France, against whom Austria was not pledged to help

[1] By Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin Austria was allowed to occupy and inister Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to maintain garrisons in the rict of Novi-Bazar.

her. Bismarck felt that Germany needed further protectio and sought to paralyse France by isolating her diplomaticall With this object he approached Italy and Russia. In May 188 Italy, embittered against France by the latter's seizure of Tuni consented to join Germany and Austria, and the Triple Allian was formed. Russia was bound to Germany only by the frien ship that still existed between the two emperors. On th slender foundation Bismarck proceeded to build up a ne understanding. William I had signed the treaty with Austr in 1879 very unwillingly, out of respect for the feelings Alexander II, whom he assured that neither Germany n Austria entertained any aggressive designs against Russi Before Alexander II's death in 1881 relations between Russ and Germany improved slightly. His successor, Alexander II distrusted and even detested Germany, but in the early yea of his reign he did not allow his feelings in this respect influence his policy. In 1882 one serious obstacle to the renew of friendly relations was removed by the resignation of Gorch kóv (Russian Foreign Minister), who since 1878 had been th enemy of Bismarck. In the following year Bismarck began sound the Russian ambassador at Berlin with a view to th revival of the 'Three Emperors' League'. His advances we well received, and Giers, Gorchakóv's successor, travelled Germany to negotiate with him. In September 1884 th three emperors met at Skierniewice, in Russian Poland, an signed a definite treaty for three years, by which Russi Germany, and Austria agreed that (1) if any one of them shoul be forced to make war on a fourth Power, the other two we to observe friendly neutrality ;[1] (2) in case of a dispute betwee

[1] Bismarck wished this condition to apply if *two* of the contracting parti should be at war with a fourth Power, but Alexander would not promise remain neutral in the event of a combined attack by Germany and Austr on France.

two of them over Balkan affairs, the matter was to be re-
ed to the third for decision ; (3) no one of the three was to
upy the Balkan principalities. About the same time Ger-
ıy secretly entered into the so-called 're-insurance' com-
t with Russia, either side engaging to remain neutral if the
er was attacked by a third Power. Bismarck's object was
achieved. He had built up a new diplomatic system, and
ed Germany in a position of complete security. But this
system was not destined to last long. Though Russia and
tria had been brought together once more, their funda-
ıtal differences remained unsettled. Bismarck hoped to be
: to hold the balance between them. The first crisis that
e in the Near East proved, however, that their hostility
too deep-rooted for them to remain allies any longer.

y the Treaty of Berlin Russia was allowed to occupy Bul-
a for nine months and to organize the administration of the
ntry. By the wise use of the powers thus conferred upon
she might have won the lasting gratitude of the Bulgarians
recovered a good deal of her prestige in the Balkans. But
agents treated Bulgaria as a conquered province, gave all
chief civil and military posts to Russians, and completely
nated the population. Prince Alexander of Battenberg, the
ıince of Alexander II, who became Prince of Bulgaria in
9, was content for a time to rule under Russian tutelage.
even he grew tired in the end of the tactless, high-handed
duct of his advisers, and in 1883 broke with them and went
r to the side of his people. Relations between Russia and
garia were thus severely strained. A series of events that
ırred in the years 1885–7 led to a complete rupture. From
3 Russian agitators had taken part in a movement for the
ɔn of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, which had been left by
Powers under Turkish control.[1] After the quarrel with

[1] Cf. p. 463.

Alexander, however, Russia became opposed to the idea of
'Greater' Bulgaria, evidently fearing that it might prove ev
less tractable than that part which had been liberated in 187
The people of Eastern Rumelia acted independently of Russi
In September 1885 they drove out their Turkish governo
proclaimed the union, and offered the crown to Prince Alexa
der, who accepted it. Alexander III was thus faced with t
accomplished fact, and in a fit of rage he struck Prince Alexa
der's name off the Russian army-list and recalled all his offic
from the Bulgarian army. He also tried to persuade Turk
to protest against the union, and demanded an internation
conference at Constantinople to discuss the situation which h
arisen. But the next move took place in an unexpected quart
Serbia, jealous of her neighbour's increase of strength, and i
cited by Austria to seek compensation, declared war (Nover
ber 14) and invaded Bulgaria. The Bulgarians complete
defeated the Serbian army at Slivnitsa (November 17–19) a
advanced victoriously into Serbian territory. Before they h
gone very far they were stopped by the intervention of Austri
and in March 1886 a barren peace was concluded. Meanwhil
Turkey and the European Powers, with the exception of Russi
had agreed to the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumeli
After his military and political successes Prince Alexand
became the hero of the Bulgarians. Russian influence was co
pletely discredited, and Alexander III saw no other way
restoring it than by having his 'ungrateful' protégé remove
With this object Russian agents entered into negotiations wi
certain discontented Bulgarian officers, and on August 21, 188
Prince Alexander was seized and, after being compelled
abdicate, carried off down the Danube to Reni, in Bessarabi
From this place he was allowed to proceed to Austria, whe

[1] In a disguised form—Prince Alexander was recognized as governor
Eastern Rumelia for a term of five years.

was sympathetically received. Soon after his abduction a nter-revolution, headed by the Bulgarian patriot Stambulov, taken place at Sofia, and the people began to demand the rn of their prince. Alexander yielded, but sent a telegram ubmission to Alexander III.[1] The angry reply that he ived convinced him that he would have to face the constant ility of Russia. He therefore abdicated again, and on tember 7 left Bulgaria, never to return. Russian agents set ork to secure the election of a prince who would favour their ntry's interests. But the anti-Russian party secured an rwhelming majority in the Sobranie; candidates put forward Russia were rejected; and in July 1887 the Bulgarian people se Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, who was strongly ported by Austria. Alexander III refused to recognize him, withdrew all Russian officials, including consuls, from garia. The open breach thus created lasted for nine years. y after the death of Alexander III and the fall of Stambulov Russia become reconciled to Bulgaria.

he Bulgarian crisis led to the dissolution of the alliance veen Russia, Germany, and Austria. Russia felt that her usion from the Balkans was due largely to the intrigues of tria. Thus, when the Treaty of Skierniewice expired in 7, no steps were taken towards reviving it. Russia and many remained bound to each other by the separate secret ement of 1884,[2] which was renewed for a further term of e years. But relations between them were severely strained, ng to the support that Germany had given to Austria, and drifted farther and farther apart, in spite of Bismarck's rts to maintain the old friendship. The last years of

Russia having given me my crown, I am ready to give it back into the s of its sovereign.' But the Treaty of Berlin provided that 'the Prince ulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the e, with the assent of the *Powers*'.

[2] Cf. p. 511.

Alexander III's reign were marked by the growth of a stro anti-German movement, led by Katkóv's ultra-Slav *Mosc Gazette*.[1] The policy of russification, as applied to Germ institutions and German civilization in the Baltic provinc caused great irritation across the frontier. Increases in t Russian customs dues brought on a sharp tariff war with Ge many, which ended only in 1894, when a commercial treaty w concluded. In 1888 there was a panic on the Berlin Bour caused by the large accumulation of Russian securities in t hands of German capitalists, and from that time it becar impossible for Russia to borrow money in Germany except prohibitive terms. Several incidents that occurred increased t tension. In 1887 Alexander III interfered between Germa and France when the two countries seemed on the verge war over the Schnaebele affair. In the following year he hi self nearly involved Russia in war with Germany by his decisi protest against the proposed marriage between Prince Alexa der of Battenberg and Princess Victoria, daughter of t Emperor Frederick. After the accession of William II June 1888 the personal bond that had kept Russia and Germa together so long was broken. Bismarck's fall in March 18 removed another link with the past and its traditions, and t secret treaty of 1884, which had been one of the corner-sto of his policy, was allowed to lapse.

As Bismarck had all along foreseen, the break with Germa drove Russia into an alliance with France. The two countr had been gravitating towards one another ever since t Franco-German War. 'We need a strong France,' Gorchak said to Lord Odo Russell at Berlin in 1872, and Alexander I action in 1875 showed that he did not intend to allow Fran to be weakened any farther.[2] Up to 1887 the formation of clos

[1] *Moskóvskiya Védomosti.*

[2] Cf. p. 457. After the crisis Alexander said to the French ambassad

was hindered by Bismarck's policy of division and by the tical instability of France herself;[1] while, apart from his ural distrust of a country that had always been the home of revolutionary spirit, Alexander III feared that if he gave any encouragement France would embark on a war of enge in which Russia might have to support her. After the nco-German crisis of 1887 and the break-down of the alliance ween Russia, Germany, and Austria, both France and Russia the danger of remaining isolated.[2] Public opinion in both ntries set strongly in favour of a closer understanding, and unofficial *rapprochement* of the two peoples took place. m 1888 economic ties began to be formed, for when Russia nd difficulty in obtaining loans from Germany, France went ner assistance. During the nineties the Russian government rowed large amounts of French capital,[3] which was used for reorganization of the defences, the extension of the railway ēm, and the financing of industry. In 1889 Russia, with permission of the French government, placed an order for 000 rifles with French firms. The first official steps towards lliance were taken in 1891, when a French squadron visited nstadt, under Admiral Gervais, who was graciously received Alexander III. Probably no definite agreement was reached, during and after the visit Russian and French military ers discussed plans for joint action in the event of the two ntries having to fight on the same side in any future war. further development of the *entente* was delayed by the

etersburg: 'Our relations will become more and more cordial. We common interests and should hold together.'

Fourteen ministries succeeded one another in the period 1880–90.

About this time Alexander III on one occasion drank the health of the ce of Montenegro, 'Russia's only sincere and faithful friend'.

French loans raised by the Russian government in the period 1888–1900 unted to nearly 8,000,000,000 francs, or £320,000,000.

political scandals that arose in France over the Panama affai but a commercial treaty was concluded in 1893, and in Octob of that year the Russian fleet paid a return visit to Toulo receiving an enthusiastic welcome from the French peopl Alexander III took the opportunity of sending a telegram the President of the Republic, in which he referred to 'tl bonds that unite the two countries'. This was a mere figu of speech, for at that time France and Russia were not boun to each other by any definite obligations. The military co vention had been approved by the governments of the tw countries in August 1892, but the actual treaty, which define the circumstances under which it was to come into force, seen to have been signed only in March 1894.[1] No announceme of the alliance was made at the time of its conclusion,[2] and i precise terms have been kept secret up to the present da There is reason to believe, however, that it was strictly defe sive and related only to European affairs, i. e. that it was intended to act as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance, an thus restore the balance of power in Europe.

After her defeat in the Balkans and the formation of th Dual Alliance Russia withdrew for a time from Europe. Durin the first ten years of Nicholas II's reign her attention w diverted towards the Far East, where the opportunity for wide extension of her influence seemed to present itself.

Russia in the Far East

The movement of exploration which in the early years the seventeenth century established the authority of Russ

[1] Debidour, *Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe depuis le Congrès de Ber jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. i, p. 193 (Paris, 1916).

[2] On June 10, 1895, Russia was referred to in the French Chamber 'our ally'. Two years later, during a visit paid to him by President Fau Nicholas II spoke of France and Russia as 'friendly and allied nations'.

oughout the length of Siberia[1] turned south when it reached
Pacific. Cossack bands appeared on the river Amúr in 1643,
l for some years sailed up and down it, meeting with little
position from the tribes along its banks. But China set a
it to expansion in this direction, and Russia, having at that
e no particular reason for remaining there, withdrew from
Amúr region in 1689 (Treaty of Nerchinsk). As the settle-
nt of eastern Siberia proceeded, however, the need for
outlet to the sea became felt. The Chinese persistently
ised to allow free navigation of the Amúr, and towards the
of Nicholas I's reign Russia turned from persuasion to force.
sack settlements, and even towns,[2] were established along
left bank of the river, while, in defiance of the Chinese
horities, Russian vessels began to navigate its waters. China,
racted by the Taiping rebellion and engaged at the same
e in a struggle with Great Britain and France, could not
st, and ceded to Russia all the territory north of the Amúr
eaty of Aigun, 1858) and the maritime region east of the
r Ussuri, from the mouth of the Amúr to the boundary of
rea (1860), including the fine harbour on which Vladivostók
soon founded. The Treaty of Aigun provided for the
igation of the Amúr and its tributaries, the rivers Sungari
Ussuri, by Russian and Chinese vessels exclusively. Russia's
cy was already sufficiently aggressive to rouse the suspicions
other Powers intimately concerned in the affairs of the Far
t. In 1861 she attempted to establish a naval base on the
nd of Tsushima, midway between Korea and Japan, but
frustrated by Great Britain, while in 1873 a Japanese
esman declared that 'Russia, always advancing southwards,
ne chief peril for Japan'. For some thirty years, however,
sia was content to consolidate the positions she had already

[1] Cf. pp. 500–1.

[2] Nikoláevsk (1851), Blagovéshchensk (1856), Habaróvsk (1858).

occupied, and for this purpose the construction of a railway acro Siberia was undertaken (1891). From the accession of Nicholas I a more active policy was adopted. In 1894 Japan went to wa with China, and after a series of striking victories forced her, b the Treaty of Shimonoseki (April 17, 1895), to pay an indemnit and cede Formosa, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotun peninsula. The unexpected success of Japan closed the door t Russia in the Far East. Steps were at once taken to reopen i and to make sure that it should never again be closed. Havin secured the support of France and Germany, Russia urge Japan to withdraw from the Liaotung peninsula, on the groun that its acquisition by any Power would be prejudicial to th interests of the others. Japan was forced to yield, but fro that time she prepared actively for the inevitable struggl Russia proceeded on her way. As a reward for her interventio on behalf of China she was allowed to lay the eastern section o the Trans-Siberian Railway straight across Manchuria, by wa of Harbin, to Vladivostók, instead of taking it round by th Amúr valley ;[1] to build a branch line from Harbin to Mukde and Talienwan ; and to guard all her railways on Chinese terri tory with Russian troops. These successes led her into a polic of pure adventure. In 1898 she bullied China into grantin her a twenty-five years' lease of the Liaotung peninsula, fro which, only three years before, she had driven Japan. Th Boxer rebellion of 1899–1900 gave her the excuse for pourin troops into Manchuria, in order to protect her interests in tha quarter. At the same time there were unmistakable signs tha she was beginning to penetrate into Korea. Japan had watche her progress with the closest attention, and when Korea becam threatened she felt that the time had come for her to interven Having completed her military preparations and concluded a alliance with Great Britain (January 1902), she approached th

[1] The line along the north bank of the Amúr has since been built.

ssian government and proposed a definite understanding h regard to Manchuria and Korea. Throughout the negoions that followed the Russians treated Japan with contempt, urning very unsatisfactory replies to all her proposals. In end Japan lost patience, and on February 5, 1904, broke off lomatic relations. Four days later the Japanese fleet, under miral Togo, suddenly attacked Russian warships anchored tside Port Arthur, with the result that a number of them re put out of action.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–5)

Russia was quite unprepared for war, had very few men conntrated in the Far East, and depended entirely on the Siberian lway.[1] The Japanese had been gradually making ready. thin a few days of the outbreak of war they were able to secure mmand of the sea, by shutting up the Russian fleet in the rbours of Port Arthur and Chemulpo. Troops were poured o Korea and concentrated on the river Yalu, the frontier of orea and Manchuria. The first great event of the war was e battle of the Yalu (May 1). Large forces that had been embled at Chinnampo on the Korean coast were thrown across the Liaotung peninsula, and by May 14 Port Arthur was lated. The Russians were gradually driven back on to the fensive works of the town, and the useful harbour of Dálny l into the hands of the Japanese. The main body of the oops landed in Liaotung turned north along the railway wards Ying-kow, in co-operation with the forces acting under uroki on the Yalu. The Russians, commanded by Kuro-tkin, had taken up a position at Liao-yang, on which the panese were advancing in three columns. On the way they ok Ying-kow, which served as a sea-base for their left wing. At

[1] The last section, round Lake Baikál, was completed only in 1905.

this moment Kuropátkin might have inflicted a serious chec on the enemy by undertaking a bold stroke against one of th advancing columns. The Japanese were not in such force as h thought them to be, and, moreover, were suffering at the tim from lack of supplies. But he took no action, and the enem had time to concentrate and organize his communications. O August 24 Kuroki began the nine days' battle of Liao-yang Though it was by no means decisive, Kuropátkin retired nort and took up a position in front of the river Sha-ho. Here h received reinforcements, and on October 10 began a great attac on the Japanese in front of him. After a desperate struggle lasting ten days, the Russians were thrown back across th Sha-ho, and the campaign of 1904 was at an end.

At Port Arthur the Russians were much stronger than th Japanese had expected to find them. Progress was very slow and costly general assaults had to be abandoned for sieg operations. The command of the sea was never secure, for th Russian ships made frequent sallies from Port Arthur. I August the whole fleet tried to break through to Vladivostók but it was caught by the Japanese. A few ships succeeded i escaping to neutral ports, some were sunk, and the rest had t retreat into harbour. In mid-October the Baltic Fleet, whic had been preparing all summer, set sail for the Far East unde the command of Admiral Rozhdéstvensky. The Dogger Ban incident of October 21, when Russian ships fired on Englis trawlers, roused a wave of indignation in England. War wa only avoided by an immediate apology and a promise of com pensation from the Russian Government. The sailing of th Baltic Fleet roused the Japanese to fresh efforts at Port Arthur Nogi was reinforced and resorted once more to storming tactics The Japanese advanced steadily, but with very heavy losses. A they came nearer serious disagreement broke out amongst th Russian leaders. Some of them wanted to abandon the struggle

le others were in favour of resistance to the end. On uary 1, 1905, the commander of the garrison, Lieutenant- ieral Stoessel, without making his decision known to his cers, sent out a white flag and surrendered Port Arthur to Japanese, although there was still a three months' supply of visions and plenty of ammunition in the town.

The fall of Port Arthur released Nogi's forces, which were t to strengthen Oyama, commander-in-chief in the north. ring the winter Kuropátkin had gathered together over ,000 men. The battle of Mukden, which began on Feb- ry 23, ended in the retreat of Kuropátkin and the occupation Mukden by the Japanese. But they were too exhausted to n the retreat into a rout, and the two armies continued to e each other.

Meantime, the approach of the Baltic Fleet was being closely ched. Early in May it reached the China Sea, and owing to ling difficulties Rozhdéstvensky decided to make for Vladi- tók by the direct route that lay through the Straits of shima (between Japan and Korea). Admiral Togo was lying wait for him at Masampo, on the Korean coast. On May 27 Russian fleet approached and was at once attacked. All its orts to break through were foiled, and the next day it was ng in all directions, hotly pursued by the Japanese. Two- rds of the Russian ships were sunk. Six were captured, only r managed to reach Vladivostók, while six got into neutral ts. Thus, only 600 miles from its goal, after a seven months' age, the Baltic Fleet was completely broken up, and Russia's hope of regaining the mastery of the sea disappeared.

After the battle of Mukden military operations had reached a dlock. Japan knew that she could not hope to bring the to a decisive conclusion, even after Tsushima, for her ources were exhausted. Russia, hindered by events at home, de every effort to strengthen her forces in the East, but

Tsushima was too crushing a blow to leave any hope of succes
Peace negotiations began on June 10, on the initiative of th
President of the United States. No armistice was concluded
and the Japanese proceeded to strengthen their positio
for peace by driving the Russians out of the north-easter
corner of Korea. They also occupied the island of Sakhalín
and landed troops at the mouth of the Amúr. By the Treat
of Portsmouth[1] (August 29, 1905) Russia ceded to Japan th
remainder of her lease of Liaotung and Port Arthur, along wit
the southern half of the island of Sakhalín; promised to evacuat
Manchuria; and recognized Japanese influence in Korea. Th
relative smallness of the gains, after a series of apparentl
brilliant victories, roused great indignation in Japan, but th
Japanese leaders knew that they could not hope to gain anythin
more from an enemy whose strength was constantly increasing

The Reform Movement in 1904

The foundation of the Union of Liberation in January 1904
marked an important stage in the development of the reform
movement. Branches of the Union were formed in the pro
vinces, and round them the liberal elements of the populatio
gathered. Pléhve continued his repressive policy in the hop
of stopping the rising tide of opposition. The zémstvo of Tve
suffered heavily for its 'harmful tendencies'. Several of it
leading workers were exiled, while others resigned in protes
A large number of officials were dismissed, and a new executiv
board was nominated by the government. At Moscow Pléhv
refused to sanction the re-election of Dmítry Shipóv, who ha
served as president of the executive board for eleven yea
and made Moscow the most enterprising and progressive of a
the zémstvos. Shipóv was leader of the zémstvo movement, bu
he exercised a restraining influence over the zémstvo men, an

[1] Portsmouth, New Hampshire, U.S.A. [2] Cf. p. 492.

ed to keep them moderate in their demands. Many zémstvos
l other public bodies demonstratively expressed their sym-
:hy with him, and the Moscow zémstvo elected one of his
leagues, F. A. Golovín, in his place. Incidents similar to
ose that took place at Tver and Moscow were common in
ıer provinces.

By the middle of 1904 the government had not a friend left
the country, yet Pléhve found it possible to declare that
evolutions are made by majorities, and the majority are for
'. On July 28 he was killed by a bomb thrown by Sazónov,
ormer student of Moscow University. His successor, Prince
yátopolk-Mírsky, who was not appointed till September,
pealed, like Lóris-Mélikov in 1880, for 'mutual trust'
tween government and people. He declared that no great
anges need be expected, but promised to put into force a very
odest programme of reforms that had been announced in
arch 1903. The position that confronted Mírsky in 1904 was,
wever, very different from that of 1880. The people were
tter organized for the struggle, and were not to be cajoled
o trusting the government. The zémstvo party still led the
untry. The advanced (constitutional) elements had joined
e Union of Liberation,[1] but they continued to regard them-
ves as zémstvo men, and tried to keep the movement united.
ıe progress it had made was shown by the resolutions (the
leven points') passed at a congress held in Petersburg (Novem-
r 19–22, 1904), at which the leaders of the reform party in
the zémstvos were present. The congress drew attention to
e gulf that had grown up between the government and the
tion, and declared that the constant fear of public initiative
d the excessive development of centralization, which had led
evitably to administrative abuses and the arbitrary rule of the
icials, had undermined the trust of the people in their rulers.

[1] Cf. p. 492.

It urged the need of securing the rights of inviolability o person and domicile, proposed to make officials responsible t the ordinary law-courts, and asked for liberty of conscienc speech, and the press, of meeting and association, and fo equal political, civil, and personal rights for all classes. Othe resolutions dealt with the reorganization of the zémstv electoral system on a more democratic basis, the creation of smaller zémstvo unit, the enlargement of the powers and inde pendence of the zémstvos, and the extension of self-governmen to all parts of the empire. The congress asked unanimously fo a freely elected national assembly, but disagreed as to th powers that it should possess. The majority advocated a assembly with full legislative authority, with control over th budget and over the actions of officials ; but a minority, unde Shipóv, supported the Slavophil view and did not want to limi the autocracy.

The November congress brought the reform movemen into the open. Shipóv communicated the resolutions t Prince Svyátopolk-Mírsky, who put them before the empero They were received with enthusiasm in the country. Th Union of Liberation tried to get into touch with the revolu tionary parties, and organized demonstrations by differen sections of the public. The professional classes expressed thei opinions at a series of banquets, at which literary men, engi neers, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other similar groups pu forward demands based on those of the November congres The banquet movement spread all over Russia, and showe how popular the demand for radical reform had become. Th resolutions of the congress were actively discussed by many o the zémstvos and in the press, which enjoyed comparativ freedom for a time after Mírsky's appointment.

At this stage two official communications showed the irreso lution that prevailed in ' higher spheres '. A decree publishe

December 25 promised several reforms, but two days later
e demands put forward by the reformers were declared to be
ıtrary to the fundamental laws of the empire, and they them-
ves were denounced as enemies of public order. Meetings
re forbidden, and the zémstvos were told to discuss only
›jects that came within their competence.

The Revolution of 1905

The events of the early months of 1905 marked the entry of
e workmen into the movement. The government had con-
ved at the formation of a Factory-Workers' Society in Peters-
rg (directed by Father Gapón), with the object of engaging
e workers' attention with purely economic questions. But
›m the time of the strikes in 1903 the influence of the revolu-
›naries had been growing constantly, and by the end of 1904
ıpón had great difficulty in keeping political elements out of
; organization. In January 1905 over 13,000 metal-workers
the Putílov works came out on strike, demanding an eight
urs' day, increased wages, and better treatment. These con-
tions were rejected by the employers, and all the large factories
Petersburg ceased work. When negotiations failed, the
›rkmen decided to march with their families in a procession,
aded by Gapón, and present a petition to the emperor. The
›lice had been watching the change in the mood of the work-
en's organizations and took elaborate precautions. On Sun-
y, January 22, orderly processions of men and women marched
to the city, but were everywhere met and turned back. The
›ops fired repeatedly on the crowds, although there was
› active resistance, and the revolutionary element in the
rocessions was negligible. Accounts of the number of victims
ıry, but the estimate of the workmen (500 killed, 3,000
ounded) shows the impression made on their minds by the
ents of 'Bloody Sunday'.

The petition that the workers had intended to present dea chiefly with labour conditions, but it contained also the politic demands that were being put forward everywhere by the pr fessional classes. The government hastily set up commissio to draft labour legislation and study the causes of disconten but in February 1905 a fresh epidemic of strikes broke out Many of them, especially in Poland, the Caucasus, and th Baltic provinces, were open protests against the action the government on January 22. The Gapón labour move ment and other official labour organizations were discredite The workers had lost all faith in the government and wer ready to listen to the revolutionary propagandists. In sympath with them the students struck, and the universities had to b closed down. Terrorist acts became common. Many polic officials were shot, and on February 17 the Grand Duke Sergiu (Governor-General of Moscow) was blown to pieces in th Kremlin. The disorder spread to Poland and the Caucasus.

Meantime, Mírsky had been replaced by Bulýgin. A numbe of half-hearted reforms were hurried through, and on March the emperor announced his intention of 'summoning th worthiest persons, elected by the people, to share in th drafting and discussion of legislative proposals'. Ministe were instructed to consider suggestions sent in by privat persons and institutions.

The promise of an advisory legislative assembly, howeve could not satisfy public opinion at this stage. In March th zémstvo constitutionalists declared for 'universal, equal, secre and direct' suffrage, with a two-chamber system, and adopte an agrarian programme, in which the chief point was the com pulsory expropriation of private land for the benefit of th

[1] According to official statistics, over 700,000 men were on strike i January and February. Besides the factories, many of the railways wer affected.

sants. This step was taken in order to counteract the grow- influence of the Social Revolutionaries and gain the support the masses. The agrarian programme was endorsed by a gress of zémstvo liberals in April, while another congress t met in May demanded a national assembly with full legisla- e powers instead of the advisory institution foreshadowed by manifesto of March 3.

By their aggressive policy the zémstvo liberals alienated moderate men in the zémstvos, especially the landowners, l during the remaining months of 1905 the split between the o groups grew constantly wider. The liberals were in close ch with the radical educated classes, who, after the banquet vement in the end of 1904, organized professional unions ich went so far as to demand a constituent assembly. In ay a 'Union of Unions' was formed, under the presidency P. Milyukóv, whose plan was to form a solid liberal party t of the zémstvo liberals and the right wing of the pro- sional classes.

The crowning disaster of Tsushima (May 27) roused the ormers to fresh efforts. Shipóv summoned a coalition con- ess of both groups[1] of the zémstvo party, along with repre- tatives of the town councils, which were beginning to take active part in the movement (June 6–8).[2] The congress olved to send an address directly to the emperor, and for at purpose elected a deputation, which was received on ne 19. In presenting the address[3] Prince Sergius Trubetskóy,

[1] Constitutionalists, who had joined the Union of Liberation (cf. p. 492), d moderates, under Shipóv.

[2] Representatives of 86 town councils met at a special congress in June d passed resolutions similar to those of the April and May zémstvo etings.

[3] Text of the address: 'By the criminal negligence and misgovernment your advisers Russia has been precipitated into a ruinous war. Our army not been able to vanquish the enemy, our fleet is annihilated, and even

leader of the deputation, described the condition of the count and urged the emperor to stand face to face with his peopl Nicholas replied: 'Cast aside your doubts. My will, the w of your *tsar*, to call together the elected representatives of t people, is unshaken. You can tell this to all your friends. . I hope that you will co-operate with me.' The emperor's la words were interpreted as a direct invitation to discuss reform A great congress of zémstvo and town workers that met Moscow on July 19–22 not only refused to obey an order disperse, sent by the director of police, but appealed to t people to meet together, regardless of the police, and expr their opinions, and itself examined and approved of a dra constitution drawn up by Múromtsev, Kokóshkin, a Shchépkin.

The manifesto published on August 19, 1905, granting Imperial Dúma, with advisory functions, was thus condemn by public opinion beforehand.[1] Many radicals thought th the Dúma should be boycotted, but the last congress of zémst and town workers (September), which was attended by repr sentatives of the minor nationalities, decided to accept t

more threatening than the danger from without is the internal conflagrati that is blazing up. . . . Your Majesty, while it is not too late, for the salvati of Russia and the establishment of order and peace in the country, comma that the representatives of the people . . . be summoned immediately. . . . your hands are the honour and might of Russia. . . . Do not delay. In t terrible hour of national trial great is your responsibility before God a Russia.'

[1] The creation of a Dúma had been promised on March 3 (cf. p. 526). T draft scheme, drawn up by Bulýgin, Minister of the Interior, was thorough discussed at a special secret conference of grand dukes, ministers, and oth high personages, presided over by the emperor himself. The conferen met in the Peterhof Palace on August 1–8, and the report of its proceedin which was afterwards published in Berlin, reveals with extraordinary cle ness the state of opinion in court and official circles on the question political reforms.

sto and use the advisory Dúma as the stepping-stone roper constitutional assembly. The congress asked for ıtees for the free cultural development of all peoples the empire, for self-government for the different s and autonomy for Poland. It repeated the demand e expropriation of private land.

h fresh step forward taken by the constitutionalists ed the gulf between them and the moderate zémstvo men, of whom would have been satisfied with the manifesto of st 19. The Union of Unions was becoming more and more l and getting out of Milyukóv's control, and he saw that me had come for him to act. On October 25 the right of the Union of Unions and the left wing of the zémstvo nent joined together and formed the Constitutional-cratic Party.[1]

this time an open revolution had broken out throughout untry. Peasant disorders, which had begun in February, ıe more frequent and widespread during the summer. At he peasants simply burned the houses of the landowners, own trees, and carried away corn and cattle. In August sants' Union was formed and the movement became ized. The revolutionaries tried to induce the peasants t forward general political demands, but their chief in- s were not political. They asked for the withdrawal of all estrictions, the abolition of the hated 'land captains', bove all for land—'all the land for those who labour '.

kes had continued sporadically throughout the summer, October they became general. The railwaymen were the o cease work, and within ten days railway communication topped all over the country. Factory workers joined in diately, and their example was followed by all the pro-

[1] *Konstitutsiónno-Demokratícheskaya Pártia*, or 'Cadets' (*Kadéty*).

fessional unions. The strike fever spread with elemental f and rapidity. Banks, law-courts, and public offices cl down. Telegraph and postal officials ceased work and the w country was thrown into chaos. Trade stopped. There neither water nor lighting in the large towns, and no f came from outside. Even the schoolboys held political m ings. Large crowds of strikers and of the general pu assembled, and frequently came into conflict with polic troops. The movement broke out without any warning, it was soon taken over by the Council of Workmen's D gates,[1] formed, in the end of October, of representatives o the Petersburg factories. The Council was dominated by revolutionaries (chiefly the Social Democrats), and starte formulate the political demands of the workmen and orga them for effectual resistance.

The strike found the authorities helpless and unprepa Several proposals were put forward, varying from a mili dictatorship to the granting of a constitution, and the meas taken by the government swung from one extreme to the o with astonishing rapidity—on October 27 Trépov (Gover General of Petersburg) ordered the troops 'not to spare t cartridges', while the historical manifesto of October 30 c ceded civil rights (inviolability of person, freedom of consci and speech, of meeting and association) and a wide exten of the franchise, and promised that the Dúma should have legislative authority, i. e. that no law should be passed w out its consent. On the same day it was announced elected members would be admitted to the Council of St while on November 1 the Council of Ministers was c pletely reorganized. Witte was appointed president and be to form a ministry, which he invited Shipóv to join. Shi insisted that the Constitutional Democrats (Cadets) should

[1] *Sovét rabóchikh deputátov.*

ed. Witte approached them, but they demanded a con-
ıt assembly, and in the end the ministry was formed
reaucrats. Durnovó, a thorough reactionary, became
ter of the Interior.

pov and Witte represented two currents that had already
themselves in official opinion. Both had one object—to
ain as far as possible the old order—but their methods
different. Trépov stood for sheer repression, while Witte
, by introducing inevitable reforms, to appease and detach
the revolutionary movement the 'reasonable majority',
hus build up a large body of active or passive supporters
e government. In accordance with this policy a partial
cal amnesty was granted (November 3). All measures
d in contravention of the Finnish constitution since 1899
annulled, and a Diet was summoned to draft reforms
ember 4). A Ministry of Trade and Industry was created
ok after the interests of the capitalist classes, while Witte
ed the workmen that 'everything possible' would be done
hem. Land-redemption dues were remitted, and the
ıase of land through the Peasants' Bank was facilitated.
ress was allowed almost complete freedom, until freedom
oped into licence, when it was again taken in hand. A
law published on December 7 abolished the preliminary
rship and simplified the procedure for the starting of
papers. Infringements of the law were to be punished by
ourts and not in 'administrative order', but the heavy
ties of the former repressive code were retained.

the revolutionary wave grew in strength and volume, those
os of the population which for various reasons were opposed
y change in the existing political order began to organize
selves for resistance. Though numerically weak, they en-
support in high quarters. The directing influence in the
ionary movement, the Union of True Russian People, was

formed of officials, landowners, and clergy, while the main b
of its adherents was drawn from the lower classes of the ur
proletariate. The Union set out to mobilize the patriotism
the masses, in defence of the *tsar* and the old order. It fou
revolution with revolutionary weapons, and the organiza
of counter-terrorist acts by the so-called ' Black Hundreds '
' Black Gangs ', was secretly supported by the police. '
people were told that ' strikers, Jews, and students are aga
the *tsar* ', that it was ' the duty of patriots to destroy seditio
In all the anti-revolutionary demonstrations of the period
traits of the *tsar* were in evidence, while the Jewish *pogró*
were frequently preceded by religious services. Immedia
after October 30 attacks on students and workmen began,[2]
the *pogróms* spread all over Russia. Hundreds of Jews w
killed and wounded, and their property was destroyed wh
sale. In almost all cases the procedure was uniform. '
authorities did not interfere, and it was discovered later t
the whole movement was directed from the Department
Police at the Ministry of the Interior, where a secret p
was set up to print literature inciting the people against
Jews.

The manifesto of October 30 was received with wild rejoic
in the country. Shipóv's moderate group was comple
satisfied with the reforms that were foreshadowed in it,
formed a new (' Octobrist ') party, which based its program
on the ' principles of October 30 ' and demanded nothing m
from the government than the fulfilment of its promi
The Cadets continued to demand a constituent assem
On November 1 the Council of Workmen's Delegates stop
the general strike, and urged the working classes to '

[1] *Pogróm* means, literally, ' pillaging, devastation '.

[2] In Petersburg, and later in Moscow, the workmen armed themse
against the ' Black Hundreds ', which were, in this way, kept in check

e final struggle ' for a constituent assembly and a demo-
republic. A second strike began on November 15,
: was only partial and soon broke down. The October
had succeeded chiefly owing to its completeness, which
een assured by the support given to it by the liberal and
cratic educated classes. But the second strike showed
the nation was no longer united. The liberals laid their
on the Dúma, and the struggle was becoming more and
a class struggle. As a political weapon the general strike
no longer be effective. The government continued its
rations for the final conflict and mobilized the counter-
utionary forces. Officials were forbidden to join pro-
nal unions (November 15). The sale of firearms was
cted to strict control (December 7). Special measures
taken to maintain communication in the event of a strike
ilway or postal and telegraph workers (December 12).
punishments were introduced for strikes in undertakings
blic or state importance (December 15). Local governors
ed unlimited powers, and a state of 'reinforced' or 'extra-
ary' protection was declared in many regions. Martial
as introduced in Poland and Finland, at Kiev, Kronstadt,
ther places.[1]

e workmen hoped for a revolt in the army and navy, where

aw published on August 26, 1881, co-ordinated all the special measures
d been adopted from time to time for the preservation of public order,
the struggle against revolution. The government could declare any
a state of 'reinforced protection' (*usílennaya okhrána*), 'extra-
y protection' (*chrezhvychaínaya okhrána*), or martial law (*voénnoe
nie*). Under these 'exceptional states' the ordinary laws were partly
lly suspended, while varying degrees of discretionary power were
to the local governors and the military authorities. During the
revolution this law was very widely applied. By March 1, 1906,
provinces were wholly or partially subjected to one of the three
ional states'.

there were signs of unrest, due chiefly to material cau
Serious riots broke out at Kronstadt (November 5), while
sailors at Sevastópol revolted and raised the red flag on
battleship *Ochákov*, which was joined by other vessels of
Black Sea Fleet. Mutinies and disorders took place among
troops at Warsaw, Petersburg, Kiev, and other places. E
the first battalion of the Preobrazhénski Guard refused to o
orders. All these facts were taken by the workmen as indicat
of the readiness of the army and navy to join them. They be
to prepare for an armed rising. The government took
cautionary measures. It arrested the committee of the Peasa
Union (November 29), the organizers of the Union of Po
and Telegraph Workers (December 5), and the Counci
Workmen's Delegates (December 12–16). An official c
munication condemned the revolutionaries as anarchists
threatened them with extreme measures. The revolutiona
replied with a manifesto calling on the people to 'deprive
government of its ultimate source of existence' by refusing
payment of taxes, withdrawing all savings from the state ba
and demanding payment in gold. On December 20 a th
general strike broke out in Moscow. The railwaymen w
again the first to stop work, and the factory workers joined th
at once. The strikers armed themselves to repel the expec
attacks of the Black Hundreds. There were meetings in
streets, and some conflicts with the police, but no firing t
place. The strike spread on the 21st, and the atmosph
became tense. On the evening of the next day an encou
between a crowd and a squadron of dragoons proved the sig
for the rising. Barricades were erected, and the troops f
along the streets. Artillery was used to clear away the barrica
but they were soon rebuilt. Certain parts of the city pa
entirely into the hands of the insurgents. Continuous figh
took place from the 23rd to the 27th. The authorities co

ıake full use of the Moscow garrison, fearing lest it l join the movement, but on December 27 the Semënov ls and other troops arrived from Petersburg. The revo- .aries were then gradually hemmed in. The most deter- l of them made a desperate stand in the Présnya quarter, : artillery fire was brought to bear on them. By January 1 sing was definitely suppressed.

ned risings broke out simultaneously in several other s,[1] especially in south Russia, but the government forces got the upper hand everywhere. Even in Moscow, where ıs most formidable, the movement never had any real :e of success. The insurgents were few in number and ered over a wide area. They held out so long only because :uthorities could not take decisive measures against them. population of the city had been between two fires, and red heavily.[2] From that time the public lost all sympathy he strikers and their cause. The only positive result of the g was the Electoral Law of December 24, which gave effect ıe promise contained in the manifesto of October 30 with rd to the extension of the franchise. The electors were ded into groups, for the government hoped that under system it would be able to influence the course of the tions. The number of town voters was very considerably eased (from 230,000[3] to 2,700,000), and the professional educated classes were enfranchised. In addition to the e traditional groups—landowners, peasants, and towns-

Novorossísk, Nikoláevsk, Pyatigórsk, Rostóv-on-Don, Sórmovo (on the a), Kharkov, Perm, Vyátka, and in the Donéts coalfield.

Over 1,000 peaceful inhabitants, including 137 women and 86 children, killed. The losses of the police and troops numbered 35. Those of the rgents could not be definitely ascertained, but they were probably small according to one estimate.

The original electoral law, published at the same time as the manifesto ugust 19 (cf. p. 528), imposed very high qualifications for the franchise.

men—a new group for workmen was created. The systen elections was very complicated, and the number of represe tives sent by each group to the provincial meetings that fin elected members of the Dúma was not in proportion to number of voters in the group. Moscow, Petersburg, other large towns formed separate constituencies.

The Reaction in 1906–7

The events of December proved that the working-men the revolutionaries were isolated. The political situa changed completely during the last months of 1905. Phys force had failed. The terrorized gentry joined the reactiona The middle classes were either passive or hostile towards revolutionary movement in its later phases. The liberals cut themselves off from the moderate groups on their right, were despised as representatives of the *bourgeoisie* by Socialists. The peasants and town population were too developed, politically, to be relied upon for moral supp Local risings and economic strikes continued for months. Th were disturbances in the army and navy, and disorders amo the peasants. But from the beginning of 1906 the governm felt itself master of the situation and took a strong line. Puni expeditions were sent along the railways leading from Mosc and the troops received orders to 'act mercilessly'. Sim measures were taken in Moscow itself, and expeditions w dispatched to other regions that had been particularly affec by the revolution. In the Baltic provinces 'order' was resto by large forces under commanders who were given abso powers. Wholesale executions were carried out, villages w burned to the ground or forced to pay heavy contributions, peasants were cruelly beaten. Soon the whole region became volved in a state of war, for the inhabitants, in self-defence, t up arms and fled to the woods. In Georgia and the Cauc

was a three-cornered struggle between Tartars, Armenians, ıe Russian troops sent to calm the country. In the interior ıces the policy of terror was applied with no less energy. exceptional laws allowed the local authorities unlimited . Domiciliary searches were conducted wholesale, and risons became filled to more than twice their normal ity. Thousands of innocent people were executed or without trial. The system of police spies was extended, nany of the terrorist acts of the period were directly or ctly provoked by police agents.

ides these repressive measures the government took other to strengthen its position. In order to consolidate the ce with the landed gentry a large sum of money (8,000,000 es) was assigned to those who had suffered from the agrarian lers. Very heavy penalties were introduced for agricultural rs. The communes were made collectively responsible for mage to property done by their members. The govern- defined the civil liberties granted by the manifesto of ber 30 in a sense favourable to itself. It curtailed very con- bly the rights of meeting and association, and imposed restrictions on the press. Severe punishments were an- ced for the illegal manufacture and possession of explosives, new rules for the employment of troops in cases of civil der were issued.

decree published on March 5 defined the position of the anized Council of State and the new Imperial Dúma. The members of the Council of State were to be nominated e emperor; the other half consisted of elected representa- of the gentry, the zémstvos, the clergy, trade and industry, Academy of Sciences, and the universities. The two bers were to have equal legislative authority, and no law be passed without the consent of both. Their financial rs were severely restricted. They could not deal with

payments on state loans or debts, or reduce the estimates the Ministry of the Court and for the maintenance of imperial family. Expenditure sanctioned by existing l might not be touched, while in time of war the governm received unlimited credit. The government reserved for self the right to promulgate emergency legislation when chambers were prorogued, but such legislation had to be s mitted to the Dúma during the first two months of the foll ing session.[1]

In order to prevent any attempt on the part of the Dúm assume the functions of a constituent assembly, the Fun mental Laws, which laid down the fixed principles of political system, were published on May 6, four days before Dúma met. These laws could only be changed on the ini tive of the emperor. The title of 'autocrat' was retain The emperor remained in supreme command of the army fleet, and received the exclusive right of controlling fore policy, concluding treaties with other states, declaring war peace, and appointing or dismissing ministers.

The elections to the Dúma did not give the results expec by the government. The Cadets were the only party to ca on an organized electoral campaign. They gained 160 s out of 524, and formed a strong centre round which sev smaller groups rallied. There were a hundred Labour memb representing chiefly the interests of the peasants. The Socia parties failed to appreciate the lesson of the last general str and practically boycotted the elections. The right wing c sisted of a small number of Octobrists and Moderates, wit handful of reactionaries.

Before the Dúma met Witte was succeeded by Goremý in whose Ministry Peter Stolýpin became Minister of Interior. On May 10 the emperor received the deputies

[1] This point was incorporated in the Fundamental Laws as Article 8

Vinter Palace and appealed to them to work together for ;ood of the country. Múromtsev, a distinguished jurist one of the leaders of the Cadet party, was unanimously ed president. In his first speech he urged the Dúma to at 'the complete consummation of rights which are the essence of popular representation', though 'the prerogaof the constitutional monarch' were to be respected. The ess to the throne (May 18) referred to 'strictly constitutional ciples', and demanded control over the executive, i. e. nistry responsible to the representatives of the people; a ral political amnesty; the abolition of the exceptional laws; egislative rights and a monopoly of financial control for the na; and the reform of the Council of State on a democratic . The second part of the address contained the legislative ramme of the Dúma, which included measures dealing with ivil liberties; the abolition of all class privileges and of all ictions based on religious or racial differences; the expro- ion of private land and the transfer of state, apanage, and rch lands to the peasants; the recognition of the right of ers to organize in defence of their own interests; universal entary education; the readjustment of the burden of ion; the abolition of the death penalty; and guarantees he free cultural development of minor nationalities.

ne government replied on May 26. It expressed its willing- to work with the Dúma, within the limits laid down by On the land question it declared expropriation to be nissible, but promised to intensify the work of the Peasant l Bank and provide for migration to Siberia. It refused to ss the demand for a responsible ministry, the extension of egislative powers of the Dúma, or the reform of the Council ate, since these questions were covered by the Fundamental , and might be raised only on the initiative of the em- r. This declaration destroyed all hope of co-operation

between the Dúma and the government, for the positi
taken up by the two sides were irreconcilable.

There was no longer any hope of a renewal of the revo
tionary movement. Public opinion, though it had not g
over to the side of reaction, as the elections showed, was pas
and indifferent. The most determined of the revolutiona
carried on the struggle, but terrorist acts were the work
individuals. Progressive forces were hopelessly divided.
Socialists regarded the liberals as enemies, and protested
lently against 'constitutional illusions'.[1] Under the circu
stances the only weapon at the disposal of the Dúma was m
force. Immediately after the government declaration a vot
censure was passed almost unanimously. Count Heyden, lea
of the Moderates, pointed out that the demand for the resig
tion of the Ministry would place the Dúma in a blind alle
'either we must go, or the Ministry'. The Dúma continued
efforts. The right of interpellation was freely used, and
government had to account for the illegal actions of its age
During the discussion of questions on the *pogróms* Prince Urús
who had been Assistant Minister of the Interior under Wít
revealed the existence of a close alliance between the Bl
Hundreds and the police authorities of all grades. Stolýpin
mitted that individual officials had taken part in the organizat
of *pogróms*, but denied that the whole movement was direc
from the Department of Police. Many other grievances w
raised, and every interpellation led to a fresh conflict with
government. The decisive struggle took place over the la
question. Two bills, both based on the principle of expropr
tion, were introduced by the Cadets and the Labour gro
and an agrarian committee was set up. On July 3 the gove
ment published a communication in which it urged the peasa

[1] I. e. the hope of completing the revolution by constitutional metho
through the Dúma.

member the emperor's constant solicitude for them, and
ised measures of relief, such as the transfer of state lands ;
urchase of private land by the State, and its re-sale to the
nts at reasonable prices ; increased subsidies for emigrants ;
he conversion of communal holdings into personal property.
:acked the proposals of the Dúma and warned the peasants
expropriation was a two-edged weapon, since it would rob
of all the land that they had bought to supplement the
ngs granted in 1861. The communication was a direct
enge to the Dúma, which found itself compelled either to
)t the official agrarian programme and renounce its own,
eby completely discrediting itself in the eyes of the people,
take some decisive step. On July 19 it published an appeal
ie people, in which it replied to the government, and de-
d that it would refuse to pass any measures that did not
)rm to its own programme, to which it intended to adhere
:ly. The following day Stolýpin was appointed Premier,
earlv on the 21st the Dúma was dissolved. The govern-
: had been preparing this blow for some time, and, fearing
ing, had moved troops into Petersburg and taken similar
autions in other towns. On the evening of the 21st some
ex-deputies assembled at Víborg, in Finland, and signed an
al urging the people not to pay taxes or furnish recruits
the Dúma should be restored. But the country was too
usted to renew the struggle. There were armed risings
ngst the sailors at Sveaborg (near Helsingfors), Rével,
nstadt, and Libáva, and disturbances amongst the troops in
al places, but these were all easily suppressed. A general
e was proclaimed by the revolutionaries, but the workers
now engaged in a bitter economic struggle with their
oyers and had lost interest in politics. Stolýpin's new
stry declared its programme to be 'repression and reforms';
)uld fight 'the enemies of society' with all the weapons

at its disposal, but intended to proceed with the reforms t had been promised. Stolýpin entered into negotiations w the leaders of the Octobrists and Moderates, but none of th would join him in the Ministry.[1]

The policy of repression was followed out with renev vigour, but the real results achieved by it became smaller smaller. The general mood of the country was undoubte one of opposition, but active manifestations of this mood w as much the work of 'provocation' as of the revolutionar Adventurers and criminals covered their deeds with the cloa politics, and in the absence of legal guarantees respect for laws declined. Domiciliary searches, arrests, and exiles increa in number, and the provincial governors used their exceptic powers to the full. The old arsenal of weapons of repress was added to by the law of September 1, which set up fi courts martial formed of military officers. There was appeal from their decisions, though higher authorities quently quashed sentences that seemed too light. One only was allowed for the preparation of a case, and two the trial, while the sentence entered into force immediat on its declaration. The death penalty was applied for pe offences, and up to May 1, 1907, 683 persons were executed orders of these courts. Many political cases came up for t in this period. The members of the Council of Workme Delegates were exiled, while 180 deputies of the first Dúma w had signed the Víborg appeal were deprived of all their rig and imprisoned. Repressive measures were taken against press. The opposition parties, including the Cadets, were refu recognition, but monarchists and reactionaries formed socie unhindered. The activity of the Black Hundreds continu Two former deputies, Hérzenstein and Yóllos, were murder

[1] These negotiations, however, had a marked influence on the Octob party, which in the third Dúma became the strongest ally of Stolýpin.

fresh *pogróm* was organized at Siedletz (September 9–10)
e head of the secret police in that town.[1]
the sphere of reforms the government concentrated its
ion on the agrarian question, and proceeded to put into
the promises contained in the communication of July 3.
apanage, and cabinet lands were offered for sale or
. to the peasants. The Peasants' Bank readily bought up
e land, and the gentry were allowed to dispose of entailed
s.[2] Measures were taken to encourage migration. Impor-
laws dealing with the rights of the peasants were issued.
were allowed to enter the Civil Service freely, to leave
ommunes, and to elect zémstvo members without the
erence of the governors.[3] The law of November 22,
ulgated under Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws,[4]
ed any head of a household to claim as personal property
nare in the communal land of the village. This measure,
n implied the complete reversal of the traditional policy
e State and inaugurated a great social revolution, was
rtaken with a very definite motive. The government
nxious to convert the peasants into a class of small farmers,
ested in the preservation of order. They were to be
hed out of the hands of the revolutionaries and liberals,
urned into conservative property owners.
e new Dúma was summoned for March 5, 1907. The
ionaries accused Stolýpin of 'radicalism', and demanded a
uffrage law and a Dúma with advisory functions only. The

ıb-Colonel Tikhanóvsky, who was 'sincerely thanked' by his superior, overnor-General of Warsaw. Captain Petukhóv, who exposed the story, was removed from the service.

normous amounts of private land appeared on the market after the an disorders. Much of this land was bought by the Peasants' Bank te institution) at inflated prices, and in this way the government drew ntry class still closer to itself.

. p. 474.

[4] Cf. p. 538.

government believed that it could attain its end by acti
manipulating the elections. By its 'interpretations' of the e
toral law the Senate disqualified whole classes of voters. T
Ministry of the Interior issued a hail of orders 'interpreting'
decisions of the Senate and formulating new ones of its o
Local officials arbitrarily removed voters from the registers. J
were threatened with banishment if they used their right to v
The electoral campaign of the opposition parties was paralys
Their meetings were broken up or forbidden, and their ne
papers confiscated. The police withheld large numbers of vot
papers. All this energy was wasted, however, for the resul
the elections was no more favourable to the government th
it had been in 1906. The Socialists no longer boycotted
elections, and gained 113 seats.[1] The Labour group numbe
about 100, but there were only 92 Cadets, with 80 represen
tives of the alien races. The Octobrists and Moderates w
more numerous than before, and about 20 reactionaries w
elected. The liberal centre was thus weaker than it had b
in the first Dúma, while the right and left wings gained
strength—the latter very considerably.

The second Dúma, which met on March 5, 1907, lived v
little longer than the first. From the beginning the parties
the left, particularly the Social Democrats, declared war on
government. Their attacks were thwarted, however, by
Cadets, who seemed disposed to abandon storming tactics a
concentrate their attention on practical matters in the hope
making the Dúma a real force in the political system. The
actionaries, whose aim was to discredit and, if possible, wr
the Dúma, exploited the conflict between the two wings of
opposition for their own purposes, and created disorderly scen
as a result of which several of them had to be suspended fo

[1] Of these 65 were occupied by Social Democrats (mostly of the mino
or *mensheviks*) and 34 by Social Revolutionaries.

FINNS
Revel
ESTS
Petrograd
Novgorod
L. Ilmen
Pskov
Riga
LETTS
BALTIC SEA
Koenigsberg
LITHUANIANS
Kovno
Western Dvina
Vilna
Smolensk
Tver
R. Volga
Nizhni Novgorod
Moscow
R. Oka
FINNS
Kazan
TARTARS
Stettin
GERMANS
Danzig
Minsk
Mogilev
Berlin
Leipzig
Posen
Warsaw
Dresden
Breslau
Lublin
GERMANS
Prague
Cracow
R. Vistula
Lvov (Lemberg)
Kiev
Khárkov
R. Dnieper
R. Dniester
Saratov
KIRGIZ TARTARS
Vienna
Buda-pest
MAGYARS
SLOVENES
Rostov
Odessa
KALMUK TARTARS
Astrakhan
CASPIAN SEA
SEA OF AZOF
SERBO-CROATIANS
Belgrade
RUMANIANS
Bucarest
ADRIATIC SEA
Sophia
BULGARIANS
BLACK SEA
RUSSIA
ETHNOLOGICAL
Scale of Miles
0 100 200 300
Great Russians
White "
Little "
Poles
Czechs
Lusatian Wends
Slovaks
Broken lines indicate mixture of two Slav Branches
Sparser lines indicate that between Slavs and non Slavs

ɔer of sittings. The Dúma discussed measures for the of the unemployed and of sufferers from the famine that ıarisen in the south-eastern provinces. It interpellated the ;ters with regard to the arbitrary conduct of the local als; passed a law abolishing field courts martial; and ted two days a week to the land question. But under the :mstances real work was impossible, and the Ministry pre- d for the inevitable. On June 14 Stolýpin appeared in the ıa to demand the immediate exclusion of the Social Demo- and a warrant to arrest sixteen of them who were accused eing concerned in a plot to overthrow the existing régime set up a republic. The matter was referred to a committee, before the Dúma could arrive at any decision it was dis- ed (June 16). At the same time, in violent contradiction to Fundamental Laws, a new electoral law was published. The ıber of deputies was reduced from 524 to 442. Poland lost eats out of 37, the Caucasus 19 out of 29, and Siberia 6 out ı. Central Asia was completely disfranchised. Provision made for the representation of the Russian minority in vinces with a mixed Russian and alien population. Of nty-six towns that had sent their own members to the first second Dúmas, only seven retained this right.[1] The electoral mblies were dominated in the towns by the large property ıers and capitalists, and in the country districts by the large lowners. The number of peasant electors was reduced by , and though the peasants still sent one deputy from each vince, their representative was chosen by the whole provincial mbly.

Poland, the Caucasus, Siberia, and Central Asia were strongholds of opposition parties. The same can be said of the towns that enjoyed rate representation, for out of a total of 35 they sent 32 opposition ıbers (including 25 Cadets) to the first Dúma, and 29 to the second.

Epilogue: Political Affairs, 1907–17

THE *coup d'état* of June 16 roused even less protest than t dissolution of the first Dúma. The excitement of the revo tionary period had given place to a mood of depression a indifference. Internal disorder continued for some time af 1907, but Stolýpin persisted in the use of repressive measu until relative calm was restored. Though the revolutiona movement failed to gain all its objects, it achieved one of t most important of them, for the 'senseless dreams'[1] of a wh generation had at last materialized, and Russia possessed representative institution which, however restricted its pow might be, could at least voice the opinions and needs of t country and exert some influence on the laws by which it w governed. The reactionaries would have abolished the Dú altogether, or turned it into a mere consultative assemb while the liberals wanted a real parliament with comple control over the executive. Stolýpin followed a middle cou and stood for the Fundamental Laws of May 6, 1906,[2] whi represented a compromise between autocracy and parli mentary government. The new electoral system gave him Dúma with which he could co-operate. Its political co plexion naturally differed from that of its predecessors, whi had been overwhelmingly liberal and socialist. The oppositi was reduced to 150 (including 53 Cadets and 30 Socialists), t right wing consisted of about the same number of reactionari and extreme conservatives, while the centre was formed of solid block of Octobrists, whose political programme w similar to that of Stolýpin.[3]

[1] Cf. p. 488. [2] Cf. p. 538.

[3] Guchkóv, leader of the Octobrist party, declared that Russia was a co stitutional country, but that this 'did not, and could not, imply parli

ıe third Dúma, which met on November 14, 1907, devoted tention chiefly to practical matters. The most important ese was national defence. In June 1908 Guchkóv opened lebate on the army and navy estimates with an attack on rmy command. Three grand dukes who held high military :s at once resigned. Each year the campaign for reforms renewed, and as the result of the combined efforts of the ıa and the government the military power of Russia lly recovered from the set-back of 1905. Education also pied a prominent place amongst the subjects dealt with by Dúma, for it planned a wide extension of the elementary ol system, voted large sums of money for this purpose in tion to those asked for in the official estimates, and approved he foundation of several higher educational institutions.[1] Dúma passed important laws dealing with state insurance workmen, the reform of the local administration of justice, the provision of state credit for zémstvos and municipal ıorities. It ratified Stolýpin's agrarian law of November 22, 5,[2] under which the peasants might convert their shares of communal land into personal property. Its relations with Ministry were, on the whole, peaceful, though several con- s arose over constitutional questions. The most serious of ē occurred in March 1911. The Council of State rejected vernment measure providing for the creation of zémstvos he western provinces.[3] Stolýpin prorogued the Council the Dúma, and promulgated the zémstvo law under

ary government in the English sense'. The peaceful development of ia was only possible under a constitutional monarch, with a Dúma wed with legislative powers and a strong executive responsible to the ırch.

ncluding a university at Sarátov and commercial institutes at Moscow Kharkov.

Cf. p. 543.

Vitebsk, Volýnia, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilëv, and Pólotsk.

Article 87 of the Fundamental Laws.[1] This arbitrary s raised a storm in both chambers. The Dúma pronoun Stolýpin's action to be illegal and passed a vote of censure the government, while the president, Guchkóv,[2] resigned protest.

The elections for the fourth Dúma, which took place in autumn of 1912, led to no striking change in the balance parties, but they showed that public interest in politics beginning to revive, and the country was throwing off apathy and indifference into which it had sunk after 1907. 1913 there were signs that a new political movement developing. The working classes became restless, and seri strikes broke out at Petersburg, Moscow, Riga, and Bakú. fourth Dúma demanded the introduction of reforms. A c gress of municipal workers met at Kiev in October and pas a resolution condemning the policy of the government. the following month the Octobrist party demanded the wi drawal of the exceptional laws and the unqualified recogni of the civil liberties that had been promised in 1905, and pled itself to use every constitutional means of combating government, which, it declared, was acting in direct con diction to the manifesto of October 30. In February 1 Goremýkin was appointed Premier,[3] with instructions to 'w in harmony with the legislature'. He tried to enter into cl relations with the Dúma leaders, and conferred with them

[1] Cf. p. 538.

[2] The third Dúma had three presidents, all of whom were Octobri N. A. Homyakóv (1907–10), A. I. Guchkóv (March 1910–March 1911), M. V. Rodzyánko (1911–12). Rodzyánko held the same office in the fo Dúma, from 1912 right up to 1917.

[3] Goremýkin succeeded Kokóvtsev, who had been appointed Stolýpin's death in 1911. Stolýpin was shot during a special perform at the Kiev Opera Theatre, in the presence of the *tsar* and the cour September 14, and died four days later.

sh series of measures for the reorganization of the national nces. But the Dúma remained hostile to the general policy e government, and in May passed a vote of censure on the ster of the Interior, Maklakóv, for persistently disre- ing the representative institutions, thereby 'undermining welfare and safety of the State'. Popular discontent con- ed to grow. May Day strikes involved 130,000 workers in rsburg alone. The strikes continued throughout June and , and became more and more threatening. On July 23 ed conflicts broke out in the streets of the capital. Barri- s were erected, Cossacks charged the strikers, and there e many killed and wounded. On July 24 there were still ,000 workmen out in Petersburg.

Thus, on the eve of the war Russia seemed to be drifting into econd revolution. External danger, however, thrust the tical struggle into the background for a time. The Peters- g strikes ceased on July 26. The Dúma met on August 9 gave expression to the feeling of the country in a great riotic demonstration. Political parties called a truce. The was popular—only the extreme section of the Social Demo- s disapproved of it—and the whole nation seemed ready to t the government.

nternal harmony did not last long. The military disasters 915 proved that the crisis through which Russia was passing too serious to be dealt with by bureaucratic methods. The ple began to demand a share in the conduct of affairs, cially in the organization of the supply of munitions and ipment for the army. The government became alarmed, made important concessions. Sukhomlínov, Minister of r, was replaced by General Polivánov. Three other minis- , who had made themselves particularly obnoxious by r reactionary policy, gave way to moderate conservatives. r industrial committees were formed in the chief manufac-

turing centres. The Unions of Zémstvos and Towns, wh were already in charge of the evacuation and treatment of wounded, extended their activity and played an important p in the co-ordination of national effort. The government fou itself constantly compelled to turn for help to these and oth public bodies. The value of their services was fully appreciat by the army and its leaders, and they were uniformly success in every task they undertook.

But public initiative was always suspect, and even in a ti of national crisis the vested interests of absolutism and burea cracy were placed before the safety and well-being of Russ Towards the end of the year the reactionary party began regain the ground that it had lost in the spring and summ The war industrial committees and the Unions found the selves hindered at every turn. The voice of public opinion w silenced, and the censorship laid its hand heavily on the pre The nation looked for guidance to the Dúma, where a stro progressive *bloc* of over 300 members had begun to demand t reconstruction of the Ministry on a more popular basis, with view to the attainment of greater efficiency in the conduct the war.[1] The growth of disorder in the country, the comple break-down of economic life, and the hopeless failure of burea cratic methods in the vital spheres of transport and food supp were giving rise to widespread discontent. After two years war Russia was suffering much more severe privation than a other of the belligerent countries. The government, howev became more and more arbitrary in its actions. Secret i fluences at court ruled the irresolute and yielding *tsar* and knowledge of the real situation was kept from him. Minist who sympathized with the national aspirations were dismiss at the bidding of an irresponsible knot of persons who exploit

[1] A similar *bloc* was formed by the progressive members of the Counci State.

sinister hold attained by Raspútin over the mind of the ress. The last remnants of respect for autocracy vanished, the whole nation united in the demand for a responsible stry, which was raised by the Dúma and the Union of stvos, and insistently repeated by other public bodies ughout the country. Even the United Gentry and the ncil of State, the strongholds of reaction, passed resolutions showed their solidarity with the wishes of the people. nbers of the imperial family constantly urged the *tsar* to l, but he continued to believe his advisers, and even the der of Raspútin did not open his eyes to the dangers of the ation.[1]

he struggle was not confined to internal affairs, for both s realized that the political future of Russia depended ulti- ely on the issue of the war. Progressive opinion was in mplete sympathy with the Allies and demanded reforms that uld enable Russia to take her proper share in the war. The ctionaries feared the triumph of the internal enemy much re than that of Germany, and in the summer of 1916 begged *tsar* to conclude peace immediately, since the war was ngthening the 'revolutionary' elements. Sazónov's resigna- in July and the appointment of Stürmer[2] as Minister of eign Affairs showed that the reactionary view on foreign cy was making headway, and roused unpleasant suspicions. ónov had been the close friend of Great Britain and France,

The most outspoken appeal was that made at the request of the *tsar's* her and sisters by the Grand Duke Nikolái Mikháilovich (the historian), pointed out that 'the constant interference in affairs of State of "dark es"', acting through the empress, was undermining the faith of the ple in the *tsar*, and urged him to shake himself free from these influences rely on his own judgements, 'which are always wonderfully sound'. appeal was received politely by the *tsar*, but the empress resented the rences to herself, and the grand duke was exiled to his estate.

Stürmer succeeded Goremýkin as Premier on February 3, 1916.

while Stürmer was the nominee of a party at court which, not actively pro-German, was at least anxious to throw off t bonds that united autocratic Russia with the free countries the West. When the Dúma met in November a determin assault was made on the Ministry. In a speech that was su pressed by the censorship for several weeks, Milyukóv refer to 'ominous rumours of treachery' that were spreading fr end to end of Russia, rumours about 'dark forces' struggli on behalf of Germany, to prepare the ground for a shame peace, by sowing discord in the country.[1] He accused t government of playing into the hands of the enemy with internal policy, and charged Stürmer himself with corru practices. The attack was so strong, and evidently so clea justified, that Stürmer was dismissed. This was only a ha victory, for although the new Premier, Trépov, tried to rev to a national policy, he was opposed by Protopópov, the actionary Minister of the Interior,[2] and early in 1917 had resign. Protopópov prohibited the congress of the Union Zémstvos, arrested the workmen's delegates on the Petersbu War Industrial Committee on the pretext that they were co spiring to set up a democratic republic, and annulled the Mosc

[1] Milyukóv described the satisfaction with which Stürmer's appointm as Minister of Foreign Affairs was received by the Central Powers, and r the following extracts from German and Austrian papers: 'In fore policy Stürmer is a white sheet of paper. He is undoubtedly one of th who have no particular enthusiasm for the war with Germany.' ' Germans have no reason to regret the change. Stürmer will not hinder desire for peace which is growing in Russia.' 'Stürmer, in any case, wil free in his relations with Downing Street.'

[2] Protopópov was originally a member of the Dúma (Octobrist). A his appointment to the post of Minister of the Interior he went over to reactionaries, and this complete change of front earned for him the bi hostility of his former colleagues. He had been a member of the deputat to the allied countries in the summer, and on his way back to Russia an interview with a German diplomat at Stockholm.

icipal elections, which gave the progressive parties an over-
.ming victory. Under Trépov's successor, Prince Golítsyn,
»ecame practically dictator, and though his policy roused
.tisfaction in the Council of Ministers, he was too strongly
»orted by the Court party to be moved.

Ieantime, the government food campaign failed completely,
the towns were threatened with famine. The Dúma re-
mbled on February 27 and turned immediately to the food
stion, which it discussed in close connexion with the whole
cy of the government. The new Premier, Prince Golítsyn,
le no statement of his programme, but sent Ríttikh (Minister
Agriculture), who talked about the details of food-supply
tried to prove that all was well. The progressive *bloc*
lied with a direct attack on the existing system and re-
ved the demand for a responsible ministry. Milyukóv
used the government of deliberately disorganizing the
plies of war material and food. The bureaucracy was
ing only for its own safety and carrying on war against the
»ple. 'When the fruit of great national sacrifices is exposed
risk at the hands of incapable and evil-disposed authorities,
n the people declare that the fatherland is in danger and
h to take its fate into their own control. We are now ap-
aching this point.' Chkhéidze (Social Democrat) declared
t, in order to force the existing government to give way to
satisfactory to the people, 'a decisive struggle is necessary
national movement. Such a movement may develop into
evolution.'

The situation in the country, and especially in Petrograd,
by now threatening. On March 8 demonstrations took
ce in the streets, and crowds of people were demanding
ad. Red flags appeared on the Névsky Prospékt. Next day
authorities set cordons of police and Cossacks, but the
»ple broke through and held meetings in the centre of the

city. Red flags appeared again, and in some places there we conflicts with the police. The Dúma asked the Premier wh measures he proposed to take in order to ensure a sufficiency bread in the capital. A resolution was passed demanding that t supply and distribution of food products should be handed ov to the municipal authorities. This demand was conceded t same day by the Ministry, at a special conference with repr sentatives of the legislative chambers and the Petersburg Ci Council, convened at the instance of Rodzyánko.[1] But even continued to move in the city. During the night Protopóp strengthened the patrols and had machine-guns posted in cor manding positions on public buildings. The movement in t streets increased on the 10th. The Social Democratic Party a the Labour Unions joined in, and the election of a Council Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates began. As a result of t first serious encounters of troops and police with the crow before the Kazán Cathedral there were many killed and wounde On March 11 Rodzyánko sent an urgent telegram to the *tsar* head-quarters (Mogilëv): 'The position is serious. There anarchy in the capital. The government is paralysed. T transportation of fuel and food is completely disorganize The general dissatisfaction grows. Disorderly firing takes pla in the streets. A person trusted by the country must be charg immediately to form a new Ministry.' Rodzyánko asked t army leaders to support his petition. Brusílov answered, 'I w perform my duty before my country and *tsar*'. On the morni of the 12th Rodzyánko sent a second telegram: 'The positi is getting worse. Measures must be taken at once, becau to-morrow will be too late. The last hour has struck, and t fate of the fatherland and of the dynasty is being decided.'

The troops were already beginning to join the people, a the revolutionary army grew in numbers every hour. Gover

[1] President of the Dúma.

t offices and the fortress of Peter and Paul were seized, and crowd set fire to the head-quarters of the secret police. esentatives of the government were arrested and the ical prisoners released. The people besieged the police in strongholds. The Dúma refused to recognize a decree oguing it until April, and elected a Provisional Committee velve members, which assumed executive power. One by the regiments of the garrison declared themselves in favour he Dúma, and patrols were detached to keep order in the ets. The Dúma sent its representatives to take over the hinery of government. By March 14 the revolution had mphed. The Provisional Committee negotiated with the ncil of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates for the forma- of a Ministry, which was headed by Prince G. Lvov.[1] The usion of Kérensky as Minister of Justice secured the support he Social Revolutionaries for the new government, which mised a political amnesty, full civil rights, the abolition of rictions based on class, religious, or national differences, a discipline in the army, the democratization of local govern- nt, and the summons of a Constituent Assembly elected on basis of universal suffrage. Telegrams from Brusílov and zsky announced that the armies in the field had joined the olution. In Moscow the representatives of the old régime ded at once, and within a few days the wave of revolution rolled to the ends of the country. Public committees took r authority, and the change was everywhere accepted with husiasm.

The course of events in Petrograd and the provinces was wn only to a few of the imperial suite at Mogilëv. Alekséev ief of Staff) reported to the emperor Rodzyánko's telegrams. e empress at Tsárskoe Seló refused to believe that all was lost

[1] The first Provisional Government included six Cadets, two Octobrists, one Social Revolutionary.

until the garrison and palace guards joined the revolution. Th emperor left Mogilëv on March 13 and tried to reach Tsárskc Seló by way of the Moscow-Petersburg line. Near the capit the railway was held by revolutionary troops, and the imperi train was diverted across country to Pskov, where the *tsa* proposed to put himself under the protection of Gener Rúzsky. He arrived at Pskov late in the evening of March 1. and during the night informed Rúzsky that he had decided t make concessions. But Rodzyánko, who was communicate with by telegraph, declared that it was too late to talk of co cessions, and that the only course left for him was to abdicat Rúzsky reported the results of these negotiations to Aleksée the Grand Duke Nikolái Nicoláievich, and other army leader who agreed with Rodzyánko. In the evening of March 15 tw representatives of the Dúma, Guchkóv and Shúlgin, arrived Pskov and were received by the emperor. They informed hi of the position in Petrográd, and insisted on his abdication i favour of his heir, Alexis. Nicholas decided that it would b too painful for him to part with his son, and in the end signe the following historical manifesto, handing over the crown t his brother Michael:

'We, Nicholas II, by the Grace of God Emperor of Russi Tsar of Poland, Grand Duke of Finland, &c., &c., declare t all our faithful subjects:

'In the days of a great struggle against an external enem who for three years has been striving to enslave our countr it has pleased the Lord God to send down on Russia new an severe trials. The internal tumults which have begun threate to have a fatal effect on the further progress of this obstina war. The destiny of Russia, the honour of our heroic arm the welfare of the people, and the whole future of our de fatherland demand that the war shall be conducted at all cos to a victorious end. A cruel foe is exerting his last strengt and the hour is already near when our valiant army, in conce with our glorious Allies, will finally overthrow the enemy.

'In these decisive days in the life of Russia we have considere

'duty to make it easier for our people to unite and organize
eir forces for the swift attainment of victory, and in agree-
with the Imperial Dúma we have decided for the good
e country to abdicate the throne of Russia and lay down
upreme power.

Not wishing to part from our beloved son, we bequeath the
age to our brother, the Grand Duke Michaíl Alexándrovich.
ing him on his accession to the throne, we adjure our
ier to rule in affairs of State in full and unbroken harmony
the representatives of the people in the legislative institu-
, on principles which they shall determine, and to take an
lable oath to this effect, in the name of our dearly beloved
try.

We call upon all faithful sons of the fatherland to fulfil their
d duty to it by obeying the *tsar* in this grave time of
onal trial, and to help him, along with the representatives
e people, to lead the Russian State on to the path of victory,
perity, and glory.

May the Lord God help Russia.

'(*Signed*) NICHOLAS.'

he manifesto published by the Grand Duke Michael on
ch 16 was the last act of the dynasty:

A heavy burden has been laid upon me by the will of my
her, who in a time of unexampled strife and popular
ult has transferred to me the imperial throne of Russia.
ring with the people the thought that the good of the
ntry should stand before everything else, I have firmly
ded that I will accept power only if that is the will of our
t people, who must by universal suffrage elect their repre-
atives to a Constituent Assembly, in order to determine
form of government and draw up new fundamental laws
Russia. Therefore, calling for the blessing of God, I ask all
zens of Russia to obey the Provisional Government, which
arisen and been endowed with full authority on the initia-
of the Imperial Dúma, until such time as the Constituent
embly, called at the earliest possible date and elected on the
s of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall by its
sion as to the form of government give expression to the
of the people.'

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS

62. Traditional beginning of the Russian Nation with a SCANDINAVIAN MIGRATION from the Upsala region of Sweden to Old NÓVGOROD in north-western Russia (Rurik).
First Rus attack on Constantinople, from Kiev.
1. KIEV becomes the chief town of the Russian Princes.
7. Second Rus attack on Constantinople.
Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
Fuller Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
. Third Rus attack on Constantinople.
Fourth Rus attack on Constantinople.
New Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
Russian raiders beyond the Caucasus, fighting with Muhammadans.
Visit of the Princess (Regent-Mother) Olga to Constantinople. Her conversion to Greek Christianity. Progress of the infant Russian Church under her protection.
-72. Reign of Svyatosláv as Grand Prince in Kiev.
-2. Fifth Rus attack on Constantinople and the Eastern Empire.
New Russo-Byzantine Treaty.
[973]–1015. Reign of VLADÍMIR THE GREAT ('St. Vladimir') as Grand Prince in Kiev. Zenith of the Old Russian Power.
Vladimir takes Kherson (in the Crimea) and begins to negotiate with the Eastern Empire (Alliance; Conversion).
-. CONVERSION of the Russians to the Orthodox Eastern (Greek) Church, effected by St. Vladimir.
-54. Reign of YAROSLÁV the Great ('the Lawgiver') as Russian Grand Prince. The Old Russian Federation at the height of its prosperity.
Buildings of Yaroslav at Kiev and elsewhere.
Earliest record of Russians of Old Nóvgorod in touch with *Yúgra*—the NW. corner of Siberia-in-Asia (?).
Cathedral of St. Sophia at Old Nóvgorod completed.
Fresh Nóvgorod expedition to the Northern Dviná regions.
-7. Travels of Abbot Daniel of Kiev to Constantinople, Palestine, &c.
Nóvgorod pioneers in Pechorá and Ob basins, on both sides of the Uráls.

1113–25. Reign of VLADÍMIR MONOMÁKH, as Grand Prince in K
(last of the truly powerful Kiev Princes).
1147–56. Beginnings of MOSCOW.
1169. Siege and capture of Kiev by rebel Russians of the north, led
Andréy Bogolyúbski of Suzdal (fl. 1157–74).
Great Nóvgorod expedition (tribute and commerce) to the north
Dviná.
1174. Foundation of the Nóvgorod colony of Vyatka.
1187–94. Nóvgorod struggles for influence on both sides of the Urals
in disaster.
1203. Kiev again taken and sacked, this time by the Pólovtsi or Kum
of the Steppes.
1200. The German Order of the Sword-Brethren founded (Riga, &c.).
1220. Foundation of Nizhni-Nóvgorod.
1224. First Mongol Tartar attack on the Rus. Russian defeat on
river Kálka.
1237. Union of the Sword-Brethren and the Teutonic Knights. Confl
with Russians of Nóvgorod, &c.
1237–43. Second and decisive TARTAR attack upon *Rus*. CONQUE
of the whole country. Beginnings of the *Tartar Age* of Russ
history.
1240–63. Alexander Névski, Prince of Nóvgorod.
1240. Victory of Alexander Névski over the Swedes on the Nevá.
Fall of Kiev before the Tartars.
1242. Victory of Alexander Névsky over the Teutonic Knights on L
Chúdskoe or Peipus.
1245–7. Carpini crosses Russia on his visit to the Mongol Tartar co
from the Pope.
1269. (Earliest ?) commercial agreement between the merchants
Nóvgorod and the Hanseatic League.
1315–40. Gedimin the Conqueror, Duke of the Lithuanians or *Litva*.
Acquisition of Kiev, with Pinsk, Chernígov, &c., by the *Litva*.
1328–41. IVÁN KALITÁ, Grand Prince of Moscow (vassal to Tartars
Beginnings of importance of Moscow.
1345–77. Olgerd, Duke of the Lithuanians. *Litva* power at its height.
1363–89. DMÍTRI DONSKÓI, Grand Prince of Moscow.
1376–96. Mission work of St. Stephen of Perm in the north-east (Káma,&
1377–1434. Jagiello, Duke of the Lithuanians.
1380. Battle of Kúlikovo on the Don. First Moscovite success agai
the Tartars (Dmítri Donskói).
1386. Union of Poland-Lithuania (Hedwig–Jagiello).

Timur attacks and defeats the Mongol Tartars of Russia, and fatally weakens the Golden Horde, thus giving Christian Russia a new opportunity.

1430. Vitovt, last great Lithuanian leader.

Timur defeats the Lithuanians (Vitovt) at Poltáva.

Death of Timur. Relaxation of Tartar hold over *Rus*.

Battle of Tannenberg or Grünwald. Decisive victory of Poles and Lithuanians over Teutonic Knights.

Foundation of Solovétski monastery on the White Sea.

Last recorded Nóvgorod attempts to exercise dominion on both sides of the Uráls fail.

1505. IVAN THE GREAT, Grand Prince of Moscow, first of the Russian *tsars*. Foundation of the new Russian Empire.

Ivan the Great begins to interfere in *Yúgra* (NW. Siberia).

Conquest of Nóvgorod by Ivan the Great.

Moscovite conquest of Perm.

End of the Mongol Tartar overlordship.

Fresh expedition of Ivan the Great to *Yúgra*.

Moscovite acquisition of Tver.

Final expedition of Ivan the Great to *Yúgra*. Moscovite authority firmly established on both sides of Uráls.

Accession of BASIL III (Vasíli Ivánovich).

Subjection of the city-republic of Pskov to Moscow.

War with Poland.

Subjection of Ryazán to Moscow.

Incorporation of Chernígov and Nóvgorod-Séversk with Moscow.

End of war with Poland, and incorporation of Smolénsk with Moscow.

Accession of IVAN IV ('the Terrible', *Grózny*, Iván Vasílevich).

. Death of Ivan IV's mother.

. Coronation, as *tsar*, of Ivan IV, and his marriage with Anastasia Románovna.

. First General Assembly, *Zémski sobór*.

. Introduction of printing.

Conquest of Kazán.

. Chancellor reaches Archangel and opens direct communication between England and Russia.

. Conquest of Astrakhan.

. War against the Baltic Knights and with Poland.

Colony of the Stróganovs founded on the Káma.

. Defection of Kúrbski.

Retirement of Ivan to Alexándrov.

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1565. Institution of the *Oprichnina*.
1566. Second General Assembly.
1569. Congress of Lublin: Kiev, Volýnia, and Podolia separated f
Lithuania and incorporated with the kingdom of Poland.
1571. Crimean Tartars burn Moscow.
1572. Death of Sigismund II, Augustus, King of Poland, last of the
of Jagiello.
1581. Invasion of Carelia and Esthonia by Sweden.
1582. Ant. Possevinus, legate of Gregory XIII, visits Moscow and h
to restore peace between Moscow and Poland.
Ermák conquers western Siberia.
Ivan IV causes the death of his eldest son and heir Ivan (Ivánovi
1583. Birth of Demetrius (Dmítri Ivánovich).
1584. Third General Assembly.
Horsey in Moscow.
Accession of THEODORE I (Fëdor Ivánovich).
Supremacy of Nikíta Románovich.
Demetrius exiled to Úglich.
1587. Supremacy (Regency) of Borís Godunóv.
1589. Jeremy, Patriarch of Constantinople, while in Moscow, consecra
the Metropolitan Job as Patriarch.
1591. Supposed death of the *tsarévich* Demetrius at Úglich.
1598. Death of *tsar* Theodore, end of the dynasty, and beginning of
TIME OF TROUBLES.
Fourth General Assembly, which elects BORÍS GODUNÓV to
throne.
1600. Banishment of Philaret and Martha, and of their infant son Mich
Románov.
1604. The 'False Demetrius' enters Russia from Poland.
Death of Borís Godunóv and of his son, Theodore II.
1605. Accession of Demetrius, *tsar* Dimítri Ivánovich.
1606. Revolt of the *boyars* against Demetrius, death of the latter,
election by the *boyars* of Prince Vasíli Shúiski to the throne.
Appearance of Pseudo-Demetrius II.
1609. Intervention of Sweden and Poland.
Deposition of *tsar* Vasíli Shúiski (July).
Chuzhevlástie, the period of *Foreign Rule*.
The *boyars* acknowledge Ladislas, son of Sigismund III of Poland
Death of Pseudo-Demetrius II.
1611. First national levy (*opolchénie*).
1612. Second national levy; eviction of the Poles.

Fifth General Assembly and election of MICHAEL ROMÁNOV to the throne.
War with Poland, ending unsuccessfully for Russia.
Truce of Deúlino ($14\frac{1}{2}$ years) between Moscow and Poland.
Vinius establishes arsenal at Túla.
Death of King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden and accession of Queen Christina.
War between Russia and Poland renewed.
. Foundation of the Academy of Kiev by Mogíla.
. Peace of Polyánovka between Moscow and Poland.
. Capture of Azóv by the Don Cossacks.
. Accession of Frederick William, the 'Great Elector'.
. Death of Michael.
Accession of *tsar* ALEXIS (Mikháilovich).
. Popular disturbances in Moscow.
Codification of laws (*Ulozhénie*).
Beginning of the war between Khmelnítski and the Little Russian Cossacks against Poland.
. Slavinétski comes to Moscow from Kiev.
Disturbances in Pskov and Nóvgorod.
. Nikon appointed Patriarch.
The Great Schism in the Russian Church (*raskól*).
. Khmelnítski offers to place himself and the Cossacks of Little Russia under the protection of Moscow.
.. Moscow accepts the offer, and war is declared against Poland.
Abdication of Queen Christina of Sweden and accession of Charles X Gustavus.
. Charles X of Sweden declares war against Poland.
War between Moscow and Sweden.
. Treaty of Vilna between Moscow and Poland.
Issue of copper money.
. Death of Khmelnítski.
. Truce of Valiesar between Moscow and Sweden.
. Peace of Oliva between Poland and Sweden.
. Peace of Stólbovo between Moscow and Sweden.
. Revolt of July in Moscow.
. Truce of Andrúsovo: Moscow secures Smolénsk, Kiev, and Little Russia east of the Dnieper.
–1. Rebellion of Sténko Rázin.
. Birth of Peter (Alexéevich).
. Accession of THEODORE III (Fëdor Alexéevich).

1681. Treaty of Bakhchi-Sarai between Moscow and Turkey.
1682. Abolition of *Méstnichestvo*.
Accession of IVAN V and PETER, under the regency of t
tsarévna Sophia.
1686. Treaty of Moscow between Russia and Poland.
1689. Marriage of Peter with Eudoxia Lopukhiná.
Attempted *coup d'état* by Sophia against Peter, after the failure
which Sophia is relegated to a convent.
1690. Birth of Alexis (Alexéi Petróvich).
Capture of Azóv.
Death of Ivan V.
1697. Election to the Polish throne of Augustus, Elector of Saxo
(Augustus II).
1697-8. Peter visits Germany, Holland, England, and France.
1698. Revolt of the Stréltsy and return of Peter.
1699. Treaty of Carlowitz.
1700. Beginning of the Northern War.
Battle of Narva (Nov. 30).
1703. Foundation of St. Petersburg.
1704. The Russians take Narva.
1705. Revolt of the Stréltsy at Astrakhan.
1706. Treaty of Alt-Ranstädt between Sweden and Poland.
1708. Defeat of the Swedes by the Russians at Lesnáya.
Birth of Anne (Petróvna).
1709. Birth of Elizabeth (Petróvna).
Battle of Poltáva (July 8).
1710. Anne (Ivánovna) married to the Duke of Courland.
War between Russia and Turkey; Peter's defeat on the Prut.
1712. Marriage of Peter with his second wife (Catherine).
1714. Victory over the Swedish fleet at Hangö.
1715. Birth of Peter (Alexéevich).
1716. Catherine (Ivánovna) married to the Duke of Mecklenburg.
1717. Peter visits Versailles.
Alexis escapes abroad.
Treaty of Passarowitz (Požarevac).
1718. Death of Charles XII.
Death of Alexis (Petróvich).
Birth of Anne (Leopóldovna), daughter of Catherine (Ivánov
and the Duke of Mecklenburg.
1721. Peace of Nystadt and end of the Northern War.
1722. *Ukáz* giving the sovereign the right to nominate the heir to the thro

Alliance between Sweden and Russia.
. Accession of CATHERINE I.
Marriage of Anne (Petróvna) with the Duke of Holstein.
. Institution of the Supreme Secret Council.
Alliance between Russia and Austria.
Accession of PETER II (Pëtr Alexéevich).
. Birth of Peter (the future Peter III) and death of his mother Anne (Petróvna).
. Death of Peter II (Alexéevich).
Attempted *coup d'état* and establishment of a constitution by Prince D. M. Golítsyn.
Accession of ANNE (Ivánovna).
. Alliance of the 'three black eagles': the Emperor Charles VI, Frederick William I of Prussia, and the Empress Anne.
. Death of Augustus II, King of Poland.
War on the Polish Succession.
. Election of his son to the throne as Augustus III.
. War between Russia and Turkey.
. Treaty of Belgrade between Russia and Turkey.
Marriage of Anne (Leopóldovna) to Antony Ulrich, Duke of Brunswick-Bevern.
. Death of the Emperor Charles VI; accession of his daughter, Maria Theresa, to the thrones of Hungary and Bohemia.
Death of Frederick William I, King of Prussia, and accession of his son Frederick (the Great).
Death of the Empress Anne, and accession of her great-nephew, the infant IVAN VI (Antónovich), under the regency of Bühren.
Beginning of the War of the Austrian Succession.
. Deposition of Ivan VI and accession of ELIZABETH (Petróvna).
War between Sweden and Russia.
. Charles Peter Ulrich, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, brought to Russia from Kiel by the Empress Elizabeth and proclaimed heir.
. Treaty of Åbo between Sweden and Russia.
. Princess Sophie of Anhalt-Zerbst arrives in St. Petersburg.
. Marriage of Peter and Princess Sophie (Catherine).
. Renewal of alliance between Austria and Russia.
. Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, terminating the War of the Austrian Succession, and giving Silesia to Prussia.
. Birth of Paul (Petróvich).
. Alliance of Austria with France, and of Prussia with Great Britain.

1757. Russia allies herself with Austria and France.
Beginning of the Seven Years' War.
Battle of Gross-Jaegersdorf.
Battles of Rosbach and Lissa.
1758. Battle of Zorndorf.
1759. Battle of Künersdorf.
1760. The Russians raid Berlin.
1761. Imminent collapse of Frederick the Great.
1762. Death of the Empress Elizabeth (Dec. 22, 1761/Jan. 2, 1762). and accession of PETER III.
End of the war between Russia and Prussia (April).
Emancipation of the Nobility from compulsory service.
Deposition of Peter III and accession of CATHERINE II (July).
Peace of Hubertsburg between Austria and Prussia.
1763. Death of King Augustus III of Poland.
1764. Election of King Stanislas Augustus (Poniatowski).
Alliance concluded between Russia and Prussia.
1765. Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa, elected emperor.
1766. Legislative Commission in Moscow.
1768. Secession (*Konfederacja*) of Bar (Feb.).
First war with Turkey begins (Oct.).
1769. Frederick suggests partition of Poland to Catherine (Feb.).
Austria occupies Zips (Feb.).
Meeting of Frederick the Great and Joseph II at Neisse (Aug.).
Victory of Russians over the Turks at Khotin (Chocin, Sept.)
1770. Victory of the Russian over the Turkish fleet at Chésmé (July).
Victory of the Russians over the Turks at Kagul (Aug.).
Frederick the Great, Joseph II, and Kaunitz meet at Neustadt (Sept.
Prince Henry of Prussia visits St. Petersburg (Oct.).
Fall of Choiseul (Dec.).
1770. Austria annexes Zips (Dec.).
1771. Catherine agrees to partition of Poland (Jan.).
The Russians invade and conquer the Crimea.
Treaty of Alliance between Turkey and Austria (July).
1772. Agreement reached on the partition of Poland (Jan.).
Peace conference of Russia and Turkey at Focşani (April).
Signature of the treaties of the first partition (July).
Coup d'état in Sweden (Aug.), and accession of Gustavus III.
Peace conference of Russia and Turkey at Bucarest and armistice.
1773. Ratification by Poland of the treaties of partition (Sept.–Nov.).
Unsuccessful Russian campaign on the Danube.

The rebellion of Pugachëv.
Congress and Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji (July).
Bukovina occupied by Austria (Sept.).
Ratification of the Treaty of Kainardji (Jan.).
Austria annexes Bukovina (May).
Capture and execution of Pugachëv.
Russia forces a pro-Russian constitution on Poland.
War between Austria and Prussia.
Treaty of Teschen between Austria and Prussia.
Death of Maria Theresa (Nov.); accession of Joseph II.
End of the *northern system*, rapprochement of Russia with Austria and France, 'armed neutrality'.
Meeting between Catherine II and Joseph II.
Alliance between Russia and Austria.
Russia annexes the Crimea.
Turkey, by the Treaty of Constantinople, recognizes Russian ownership of the Crimea.
Death of Frederick the Great, and accession of Frederick William II.
Commercial treaty between France and Russia.
Visit of Catherine II to the Crimea.
Beginning of the second war, in alliance with Austria, against Turkey.
Sweden declares war against Russia.
Suvórov captures Ochákov.
Victories of Suvórov in Moldavia.
Death of Joseph II (Feb.); accession of Leopold II.
Defensive alliance between Prussia and Poland (March).
Reconciliation between Austria and Prussia.
Suvórov captures Ismail.
Peace of Verela between Russia and Sweden.
Meeting of Leopold II and Frederick William II at Reichenbach (July).
New Polish constitution promulgated (May).
Peace concluded between Austria and Turkey (Aug.).
Peace of Jassy between Russia and Turkey (Jan.).
Death of Leopold II (March), and accession of Francis II.
France declares war on Austria (April).
Secession (*Konfederacja*) of Targowica (May).
War between Russia and Poland.
King Stanislas Augustus joins the Secessionists (July).
Constitution of 1791 abolished.

1793. Second treaty of partition concluded between Russia and Prus (Jan.).
Constitution of 1775 restored.
Last meeting of the Polish Diet at Grodno (June).
Ratification by Poland of the second treaty of partition (Aug Sept.).

1794. Polish rebellion under Kościuszko (March).
Prussia joins Russia against Poland (May).
Prussians capture Cracow (June).
Siege of Warsaw (July–Sept.).
Rebellion against Prussia in Great Poland.
Suvórov storms Praga (Nov.); capitulation of Warsaw.

1795. Third treaty of partition concluded between Russia and Prus (Jan.) and between Russia and Austria (Oct.).
Abdication of King Stanislas Augustus (Nov.).

1796. Death of Catherine II (Nov.).
Accession of PAUL.

1797. Russia joins the Second Coalition. Suvórov's campaign.

1800. Paul breaks with his allies, and prepares for war with England.

1801. Murder of Paul (March 23). Accession of ALEXANDER I.
Peace with England (June 17). Annexation of Georgia.

1804. War with Persia (1804–13).

1805. Russia joins the Third Coalition, Austerlitz (Dec. 2).

1806. War with Turkey (1806–12).
Prussia breaks with France, Jena-Auerstadt (Oct. 14).

1807. Eylau (Feb. 8) and Friedland (June 14). Treaty of Tilsit (July Russia acquires Belóstov. Duchy of Warsaw created.

1808. Sweden cedes Finland (Sept. 17). Speránsky's 'Constitution'.

1812. Treaty of Bucarest. Bessarabia acquired. Napoleon's invasion Russia. Borodinó (Sept. 7). French occupation of Mosc (Sept. 14—Oct. 15).

1813. Campaign in Germany. Battle of Leipzig (Oct. 16–19).
Treaty of Gulistan. Central and eastern Caucasus acquired.

1814. Invasion of France. The allies occupy Paris (March 31). Fi Treaty of Paris (May 30).

1815. Treaty of Vienna (June 7). Russia acquires Poland.
Waterloo (June 18). Holy Alliance (Sept. 26). Second Treaty Paris and Quadruple Alliance (Nov. 20).

1821. Outbreak of the Greek revolt.

1825. Death of Alexander I (Dec. 1). Interregnum. Accession NICHOLAS I. 'Decembrist' rising.

Treaty of Akkerman (Oct. 7). War with Persia (1826–8).
Persia cedes Eriván and Nakhicheván. Russo-Turkish War (April 26).
Treaty of Adrianople (Sept. 14). Acquisitions in the Caucasus.
-1. Polish rebellion.
-3. Crisis in the Near East. Mehemet Ali.
Publication of the Code of Laws.
Russia assists Turkey. Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (July 8).
'Three Emperors' League'.
Russian port established at the mouth of the Syr-Dariá.
Russia helps Austria to suppress the Hungarian rebellion.
Dispute over the custody of the Holy Places.
Russian advance along the Syr-Dariá.
Outbreak of war between Russia and Turkey (Oct.).
Great Britain and France declare war (March 27). Crimean campaign.
Accession of ALEXANDER II (March 2).
Fall of Sevastópol (Sept. 9). Russians capture Kars (Nov. 26).
Peace of Paris (March 30). Russia loses Bessarabia.
Treaty of Aigun. China cedes the Amúr region.
Surrender of Shamil. North-eastern Caucasus finally conquered.
China cedes the maritime region east of the river Ussuri.
Emancipation of the peasants (March 3).
Beginning of the revolutionary movement.
-4. Polish revolt.
Creation of Zémstvos (Jan. 13). Educational and legal reforms.
Capture of Tashként.
Karakózov's attempt on the life of Alexander II (April 16).
Capture of Khodzhént.
The Emir of Bukhara becomes a vassal of Russia.
Municipal government reform (June 30).
'Three Emperors' League' revived.
Conquest of Khiva.
Universal military service introduced.
Annexation of Kokánd.
Russo-Turkish war. Fall of Plevna (Dec. 10).
Treaty of Berlin (June 13). Russia acquires Kars, Batúm, and Ardahan, and regains Bessarabia.
Alliance between Germany and Austria.
Explosion in Winter Palace. Dictatorship of Lóris-Mélikov.
Assassination of Alexander II (March 13). Accession of ALEXANDER III.

1881. The Trans-Caspian Turkomans subjected.
1882. Triple Alliance—Germany, Austria, and Italy (May).
1884. Annexation of Merv.
'Three Emperors' League' renewed. 'Reinsurance' treaty.
1885. Penjdeh incident.
1887. Great Britain and Russia define the frontier of Afghanistan.
Alliance between Russia and Austria terminated.
1890. New Zémstvo law (June 24).
Secret treaty between Russia and Germany lapses.
1891. Trans-Siberian railway begun.
1894. Dual Alliance concluded—Russia and France.
Accession of NICHOLAS II (Nov. 1).
1898. Liaotung peninsula and Port Arthur leased from China.
1904. Russo-Japanese War. Battles of the Yalu (May 1), Liao-yang (Aug.) and the Sha-ho (Oct.).
Zémstvo congress (Nov. 19–22). The 'eleven points'.
1905. Fall of Port Arthur (Jan. 1). Battle of Mukden (Feb.). Baltic Fleet destroyed (May 27). Treaty of Portsmouth (Aug. 29).
Manifesto granting a Dúma (Aug. 19). First general strike (Oct.). Manifesto of Oct. 30. Armed rising at Moscow (Dec.). Electoral law published (Dec. 24).
1906. First Dúma (May 10–July 21). Stolýpin's agrarian law (Nov. 22).
1907. Anglo-Russian agreement.
Second Dúma (March 5–June 16). New electoral law (June 16).
Third Dúma meets (Nov. 14).
1911. Assassination of Stolýpin (Sept.).
1912. Fourth Dúma elected.
1913. Strike movements.
1914. Disturbances in Petersburg (July).
Germany declares war on Russia (Aug. 1).
1915. New national movement. Reforms demanded.
1916. The Dúma attacks the Government. Dismissal of Stürmer (Nov.).
1917. The Revolution (March 8–14). Abdication of Nicholas II (March 15).

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